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Introduction—Constructing the Conservation Landscape 
For over two centuries Americans have been apprehensive about the suitability of the 
Great Plains for intensive agriculture, and while they devised and implemented many 
schemes to "fix" the landscape, their worry remained. Americans worried about the Great 
Plains because the land was arid and prone to recurring droughts that brought dust storms, 
crop failures, economic ruin, and abandonment. This made agriculture tenuous at best and 
disastrous at worst. To fix these troubles Americans experimented with tree planting, 
plowing, and a variety of cultivation practices. Congress passed repeated acts in support, 
from the Timber Culture Act of 1873 to the Conservation Reserve Program of 1985. 
University and federal experts taught farmers how to farm—to plant trees in blocks, to plant 
trees in wide rows, to plant trees in narrow rows, to plant on the contour, to leave crop 
stubble, to plow deep, and not to plow. Farmers offered their fields to these measures and 
helped install them. They learned to file paperwork for government assistance, and they 
developed their own methods and theories. When private initiative seemed insufficient, 
Americans created conservation agencies to undertake tree planting, grassland restoration, 
emergency plowing, and other direct measures. Despite these actions, Americans failed 
repeatedly and dramatically to impose the stability and order they desired. They tamed, at 
least temporarily and with great effort, some aspects of nature, but agriculture on the Great 
Plains today still lives in fear of the next drought. 
Of all the schemes to transform the environment, the longest lasting and most 
persistent was tree planting. Social forestry was the belief that trees had agronomic, climatic, 
and social benefits. Early boosters used social forestry to inform the world that tree planting 
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increased rainfall and that the Great Plains was becoming America's Garden. In this newly 
planted Garden, settlers would find an improved version of the Eastern United States. The 
droughts of the early 1890s crushed facile assertions of climatic change, but, instead of 
abandoning trees, a new group of individuals emerged to promote planting. Professional 
foresters called for systematic and sustained planting. They planned to combine scientific 
expertise with federal power to build a series of forest reserves. Once covered with trees, 
these reserves would stabilize the environment and secure their professional authority. The 
great difficulty foresters encountered in growing trees, however, crushed their hopes of 
expanding the reserve system, and Plains forestry withered into a small, unglamorous field of 
science. 
These trends seemed to reverse when drought returned in the early 1930s, and 
Americans once again searched for solutions to dust and economic ruin. In cooperation with 
President Franklin Roosevelt, foresters proposed literally to divide the nation in half with a 
Great American Wall of trees. The Shelterbelt Project, as it was called, at first planted more 
controversy than trees, and Americans and professional foresters began debating the future of 
tree planting on the Great Plains. The emergence of such a systematic, massive plan offered 
foresters an opportunity to reengineer the mistakes of nature, culture, and history, but in 
moving from plan to practice foresters found that planning and science had not escaped 
culture or history. Both were instead intimately bound together. Grandiose plans began to 
fade, but even as foresters downshifted to creating technical guidelines for smaller 
landscapes, they could not extract social, political, and natural conclusions from their 
science. When foresters looked out from their miniature forests, they saw another group of 
experts, agronomists, providing farmers with conservation assistance on the Great Plains. 
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Agronomy, with its greater mixture of populism and patina of comity, emerged victorious as 
the dominant approach to managing Plains landscapes. Agronomy was sorely tested by 
repeated drought cycles, but with the help of irrigation, it would remain the favored method 
of stabilizing the Great Plains landscape into the new millennium.1 
Part of the difficulty Americans faced on the Great Plains was the environment. In its 
most expansive definition, the region stretches from Canada, through Montana, North 
Dakota, and the edge of Minnesota, Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, eastern 
Colorado and New Mexico, Kansas, western Oklahoma and Texas (Figure 1.1). The region is 
characterized by flat, eastward rolling plains and tablelands that stretch in a broad belt across 
the central United States. While notable for its flatness, valleys, canyons, isolated mountains, 
badlands, and sandhills divide the region. The shortgrass prairie east of the Rocky Mountains 
consists of short, sparse bunch grasses, but varies from semi-desert to woodland. Vegetation 
on the eastern edge is a mixture of shortgrass and tallgrass species with cottonwood and red 
cedar forests common along floodplains. During the last 200 years, Americans replaced 
much of this native vegetation with domesticated annuals. Wheat growing dominates North 
Dakota and is frequent throughout the shortgrass region, as is grazing. On the eastern borders 
or where irrigation is available, however, corn, soybeans, and cotton dominate.2 
Natural climatic variations created the diverse flora of the Great Plains, and the 
region's conversion to market agricultural only underscored that variability. Winters and 
summers can be extreme, even if the average annual temperatures are about 40° F in the 
north and 60° F in the south. The frost-free season ranges from 120 days in the far north to 
235 days in the south. Average annual precipitation falls mainly during the growing season 














Figure 1.1—The Great Plains.3 
from east to west approaching the foothills of the Rocky Mountains, but it also varies with 
distance from the Gulf of Mexico and elevation. Drought is a periodic reality. Large droughts 
follow roughly thirty-year cycles, but shorter and smaller-scale dry periods are common 
within the larger cycles. Sustained droughts struck during the 1860s, 1890s, 1930s, 1950s, 
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and late 1980s, but of these the drought of the 1930s was by far the most severe and long 
lasting. Under extreme conditions even native grasslands suffered declines in cover and 
productivity, and the less drought-tolerant, human-introduced grasses often failed 
completely.4 
It was these environmental features that inspired American efforts to transform the 
region. Historian William Cronon has warned against environmental histories that simply 
recite "innumerable minutiae about climate, soil, and vegetation without the slightest 
indication of why they matter to history." But natural geography has always been central to 
Great Plains history. When Americans first explored the region, they viewed nature as flawed 
and questioned its ability to support traditional agriculture. Historian Walter Prescott Webb 
has described how Americans eventually adapted some of their agricultural techniques to the 
region, but they also hoped to adapt the region to their agriculture. In the 1870s tree boosters 
argued that Nebraska would soon have a climate similar to Cuba, and in the 1930s serious 
scientists insisted that a wall of trees would turn Kansas into Indiana. While these 
pronouncements had no effect on nature, they did encourage settlement, and when drought 
struck, settlers found that they had sorely misjudged nature's malleability. Decades later 
when professional foresters worked on the Prairie States Forestry Project, they learned again 
that the Plains was not as uniform as it appeared and that its intricacies—from soil types to 
wind patterns—exerted irresistible influences. Perhaps most disturbing, even after careful 
study foresters could rarely provide assurances about nature.5 
Science legitimized Plains forestry and soil conservation, but it was never very good 
at solving the Great Plains central problems. Foresters idealized science as separate from 
politics, culture, history, and nature. They hoped that science would reach universal and 
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efficient solutions. When it did not, they blamed the problem on a lack of scientific expertise, 
but better science could never solve problems that were at their root social, political, and 
natural. Foresters repeatedly moved the zone of planting to accommodate politics, rain and 
soil patterns, and public opinion. They justified these moves as technical decisions, but in the 
end they recognized that their technical estimates were often political approximations that 
also reflected various institutional biases. Plans for forest reserves and wide, forest-like belts 
were as much about profession building as science. Soil conservation on the Great Plains 
today still suffers from the same tendency to hope that science will solve difficult social, 
political, and natural troubles. 
This failing of foresters and science also tells us much about how Americans viewed 
science and approached difficult decisions. Americans hastily settled the Plains and resisted 
foresters' efforts to reserve portions for the public good. Foresters' justification for creating 
the reserves were flawed, but had they been given time to learn this, they might have offered 
some useful advice for the many Americans who wanted to settle nearby lands. During the 
1930s, however, Americans were in a desperate hurry to see improvement. Thus, foresters 
relied heavily on cottonwoods because the trees were fast growing, cheap, and attracted 
public attention. Unfortunately, cottonwoods were a poor choice on many sites, and the trees 
reduced the long-term effectiveness of the project. Perhaps most damning, Americans 
resisted all calls for public ownership of afforested lands. Landowners benefited from federal 
assistance on conservation measures, but when these same farmers plowed under trees after 
the rains returned, they also robbed the many Americans who paid for these measures. 
The complicated story that emerges from the interplay of public opinion, science, and 
nature undermines traditional accounts of Plains forestry and conservation. Most narratives 
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have reinforced the ideal of scientific progress by framing climate-change theories as quirks 
of the nineteenth-century. When links between climatic change and trees were discussed in 
the twentieth-century, historians portrayed these debates as archaic holdovers. Real science 
had progressed beyond such questionable claims, yet climatic theories in fact persisted into 
the 1930s and beyond. In part the persistence reflected institution and reputation building. 
The Forest Service and scientist Raphael Zon repeatedly emphasized the potential links of 
trees and climate, but these claims also exposed the fundamental uncertainties of science. 
Even today the exact relation between land cover and climate remains a contested issue. Few 
"respectable" scientists would claim that massive tree planting on the Great Plains would 
increase rainfall, but they have had great difficulty agreeing on what other effects such a 
transformation might have.6 
Historian Joseph Taylor counseled that the "persistence of simple stories about the 
past has been an obstacle" in environmental policy debates. This problem extends to 
discussions of soil conservation on the Great Plains. During the late nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century, foresters recommended planting more trees, and blamed previous failures 
on a lack of scientific expertise. It was not that they were insincere in their concern for 
settlers, but their proposed solution reflected their institutional goals rather than a careful 
analysis of settlement and nature. When the Dust Bowl and the scientific controversy 
surrounding the Shelterbelt crushed their claim, a new group of experts blamed the "plow 
that broke the Plains" and called for new programs aimed at educating and assisting farmers. 
These experts also asked the wrong questions of history. They constructed the problem of 
Plains settlement as resulting from farmers' unwillingness to adopt newer, more scientific 
technologies, but evaded environmental complexities and institutional influences. Today 
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most farmers have adopted conservation tillage and unsustainable irrigation, and the threat of 
drought remains.7 
The history of tree planting on the Great Plains, suggests that soil conservation has 
long been an interaction of socially constructed conservation policies and natural processes. 
Institutional goals, public policies, local demands, professional and scientific agendas, and 
party interest all dictated the application of soil conservation policies, yet all were 
inextricably entangled with a natural world that alternately empowered and constrained their 
application. On the Great Plains, humans have still only partly to come to terms with an 
environment that is harsh and unpredictable. Conversely, it is au courant to advocate 
searching for ecological equilibriums or grassland stabilizations without confronting just how 
intertwined such ideas are with human history. Historian Donald Worster was almost 
certainly correct when he noted that "viewed as a contribution to the plains' ecological 
recovery, [the Shelterbelt Project] was of little utility; the money might have been better used 
to buy more abused lands, revegetate them, and set them aside as scientific and wilderness 
reserves," yet any alternative would have been equally embedded in institutional and 
professional rivalries as the Shelterbelt. And it too would likely have been shuffled, 
modified, and rearranged by political and social forces. Ecological recovery is a fine idea, but 
it, like the phrase nature, also carries "an extraordinary amount of human history."8 
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Notes—Introduction 
1 Shelterbelt describes any long row or "belt" of trees intended to shelter people, livestock, and crops. 
Windbreak is often used interchangeably with shelterbelt. In recent years conservation planners have favored 
using windbreak, or field windbreak, and abandoned the term shelterbelt. This paper adopts the older logic of 
referring to windbreaks as barriers planted around homes and livestock and shelterbelts as barriers planted to 
protect fields. This will help avoid confusion with the sources. 
2 Brian Blouet and Frederick Luebke, The Great Plains: Environment and Culture (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska, 1977); B. L. Turner II, et al., The Earth as Transformed by Human Action: Global and Regional 
Changes in the Biosphere Over the Past 300 Years (New York: Cambridge Press, 1990); S. R. Johnson and 
Aziz Bouzaher, eds., Conservation of Great Plains Ecosystems: Current Science, Future Options (Boston: 
Kluwar Academic, 1995). 
3 This is a modified version of the United States Geological Survey, Earth Resources Observation 
System, Data Center, "Digital Elevation Shaded Relief Map of the Great Plains." 
4 Blouet and Luebke. See also, James C. Malin, History & Ecology: Studies of the Grassland (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1984), and James C. Malin, The Grassland of North America, Prolegomena to its 
History (Lawrence, Kansas, 1947). 
5 William Cronon, "Kennecott Journey: The Paths out of Town," in Under an Open Sky, William 
Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin, ed„ (New York: Norton, 1992): 33; Walter Prescott Webb, The Great 
Plains (Boston: Ginn, 1931). 
6 Thomas Wessel, "Prologue to the Shelterbelt, 1870 to 1934," Journal of the West 6 (January 1967): 
119-134; Thomas Wessel, "Roosevelt and the Great Plains Shelterbelt," Great Plains Journal 8(2) (1969): 57-
74; Wilmon Droze, "Changing the Plains Environment: The Afforestation of the Trans-Mississippi West," 
Agricultural History 51(4) (January 1977): 6-22; Wilmon Droze, Trees, Prairies, and People: A History of Tree 
Planting in the Plains States (Denton, Texas: Texas Women's University, 1977). The subject of trees and 
rainfall is complex, but for a start look at Helen Pearson, "Felling Trees Has Sky-High Price: Deforestation is 
Drying out Cloud Forests," Nature 19 (October 2001): 78-91 ; R. W. A. Hutjes et al., "Biospheric Aspects of the 
Hydrological Cycle," Journal of Hydrology 212-213 (1998): 1-21; W. R. Cotton and R. A. Pielke, Human 
Impacts on Weather and Climate (Cambridge: University Press, 1995); Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edwards 
eds., Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
press, 2001). 
7 Joseph Taylor III, Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999); Peter Rollins and Harris Elder, "Environmental History in two 
New Deal Documentaries," Film and History 3(3) (1973): 1-7; P. J. Nelson, "To Hold the Land: Soil Erosion, 
Agricultural Scientists, and the Development of Conservation Tillage," Agricultural History 71(1) (Winter 
1997): 71-90. 
8 Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), 223; Raymond Williams, "Ideas of Nature," in Problems in Materialism and Culture, Raymond 
Williams, ed., (London: Verso, 1980), 67. 
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Chapter One—Idealized Landscape: building a case for Plains forestry 
Untroubled by past failures, the first generation of thinkers to approach the issue of 
climate on the Great Plains—and the role of forests in that climate—were able to imagine the 
region transformed into a Republican Garden with minimal need for government assistance 
or scientific expertise. They would replace short grass, cattle and bison with small stable 
farms, towns, and scattered woodlots for fuel, timber, and aesthetics. At first they saw little 
need for special methods of cultivation—for crops or trees—and it was only gradually after 
the disappointments of the depression and droughts of the mid-1870s and 1890s that attitudes 
changed. From the perspective of the 1860s and early 1870s, individual initiative, hard work 
and perhaps a dose of federal encouragement would be enough to transform the "Great 
American Desert" into a garden. 
Replacing desert images with a Republican Garden on the Great Plains was not 
without risks. Henry Nash Smith attributed the image of the Plains-as-garden to eastern 
boosters, such as William Gilpin, who sought to promote settlement. Leo Marx, Roderick 
Nash, and David Emmons built on this interpretation by showing the important function that 
the idea of a garden-like frontier played in nineteenth-century America. When settlers 
reached the Great Plains they found a new environment. Desert and wilderness could not 
support the yeoman farmer that had made America great. America had either to rethink its 
commitment to agrarian values and an ever-expanding frontier, or remake the West. On the 
Great Plains, Americans decided to recast the image of the Plains, and proposed large-scale 
alterations of nature.1 
One of the most enduring methods of altering nature was tree planting, and as 
Americans settled the Midwestern prairies and then the Great Plains beyond the Missouri 
River, interest in tree planting increased. At a personal level, the most obvious explanation 
for widespread curiosity about afforestation was that settlers "missed" the presence of trees 
they had become accustomed to in the Eastern United States and Europe. This explanation 
fits what Edward Wilson has called the "biophilia hypothesis," that humans have possessed 
an affinity for certain types of landscapes. In their writings and discussions, however, 
settlers' impulse to "Easternize" the Plains was only a partial explanation. Although the 
landscape Americans imagined did in some ways resemble Eastern ones, ultimately they 
were searching to improve on the East, not simply to replicate it.2 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the most powerful explanation for 
afforestation was that trees and civilization where fundamentally intertwined—particularly 
through the influence trees exerted on climate and soil, but also through their supposed moral 
influences. In the 1860s, George Perkins Marsh linked deforestation with economic and 
social decline. Other writers, scientists, foresters, and settlers built an optimistic corollary of 
Marsh's observation that afforestation would lead to economic and social progress. This 
group of influential writers spun a new American myth. They argued, as did Marsh and 
others, that deforestation was equated with "despoliation." Cutting down the forests of the 
Eastern United States was leading to economic, moral, and social decline, but then they 
moved beyond to declare that planting trees on the Great Plains would help insure the moral, 
economic, and climatic future of the region. Modern readers may find claims about trees and 
climate quaint, but they should recall that a great deal of scientific research still analyzes the 
relation of tropical deforestation to climate.3 
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When pressed about the specifics of how trees could modify climate, tree advocates 
such as Joseph Wilson and Richard Elliott turned to Marsh for inspiration. Marsh argued that 
the link between deforestation and the decline of ancient civilizations arose from the effects 
of forests on climate, erosion, and rainfall. He followed the lead of Alexander Von 
Humboldt, who in the 1840s theorized that forests increased humidity and thus evaporation. 
Living in Italy at the time of his writing, Marsh was especially struck by the complete 
desertification of formerly fertile sites in North Africa and the Levant. This "realm of 
desolation.. .no longer capable of affording sustenance to civilized man" was a stark warning 
about what could happen when society abused the natural world. On the Great Plains of the 
United States "forestry boosters" extended Marsh's argument: if forests increased humidity, 
then increased evaporation would lead to increased precipitation; if deforestation led to 
desertification, then reforestation might transform deserts into fertile land.4 
Making the intellectual case for Plains forestry went hand in hand with developing 
practical methods of growing trees. During the nineteenth century, this meant encouraging 
individuals and corporations to do the planting. In 1870, Richard Elliott and the Kansas 
Pacific Railroad built three "experiment stations" in Kansas for testing tree and crop 
cultivation. Robert Furnas and J. Sterling Morton advocated tree planting as a civic duty and 
eventually inspired public recognition as Arbor Day. The new tree-planting holiday was 
popular enough that, by the end of the decade, it had spread to other Plains states and 
eventually to the entire United States. Finally, the United States Congress underwrote tree 
planting through the Timber Culture Act of 1873, offering settlers up to 160 acres of public 
land in return for planting 40 acres to trees. Together these early efforts assembled the social 
and narrative groundwork for future afforestation programs. Plains residents and educated 
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observers of Plains settlement imagined an interaction of theory, labor, and nature that would 
reform the Great Plains landscape. The Garden landscape they imagined in 1870 seemed 
within reach for two decades but then violently came apart. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, most observers of the Plains were skeptical 
about the potential future of the land. Zebulon Pike's (1806-1807) army expedition described 
the region as "barren soil, parched and dried up for eight months of the year [without] a 
speck of vegetation." Pike suspected the land would always remain the home of nomads and 
savages. Thirteen years later, Major Stephen Long's expedition confirmed Pike's views. 
Long described the region as "wholly unfit for cultivation, and... uninhabitable by a people 
depending upon agriculture." The view that Pike and Long presented achieved wide enough 
acceptance that many maps of North American began describing the present Central and 
Southern Great Plains as the "Great American Desert" (Figure 1.1).5 
Several authors have explained the classification of the Great Plains as a desert. 
Martyn N. Bowden, a geographer, has argued that most Americans never completely 
accepted the idea of a desert and that it was later authors who circulated the idea that most 
Americans had believed the desert myth between 1820-1870. Bowden's research revealed 
that opinions varied according to sectional background, political affiliation, and cultural 
values. The desert image lasted the longest, and had the most influence in New England, 
where the rapid expansion of the American West threatened the old Federalist-Whig 
establishment. However, many Missourians never totally accepted the idea that the region 
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Figure 1.1—The "Great American Desert" 1849. 
was a desert, or at least not a "real" desert. Bradley Baltensperger, also a geographer, has 
added to Bowden's explanation by showing how many Plains settlers and boomers during the 
1870-80s promoted the desert myth as a means of self-promotion; contrasting current 
conditions with a mythical desert past allowed promotional literature to claim human actions 
could modify the environment. Merlin Lawson and Charles Stockton took a different route 
and used tree-ring data to show that Pike and Long probably experienced exceptionally dry 
conditions during their expeditions. Their description of the region as desert was thus a 
reflection of drought conditions.7 
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Clearly cultural values and nature played a huge role in labeling the Plains a desert— 
just as they would in later labeling it a garden—but if we remove the word desert from the 
early accounts and focus instead on descriptions of aridity and unsuitability for crop 
agriculture, we find a description of the Great Plains that is surprisingly consistent. In the 
early nineteenth century, Pike and Long felt the region was too dry and windswept to support 
the type of civilization to which Americans and Europeans were accustomed. In the second 
half of the century, many boosters, town builders, and foresters understood the Plains were 
arid or desert-like; they simply believed this could change. Less sanguine observers, such as 
John Wesley Powell, told anyone who would listen that western aridity would require a 
different approach, that the land could not support Eastern-farming practices. In the 1930s, 
filmmaker Pare Lorentz and ecologist Paul Sears once again questioned the ecological 
suitability of farming such dry lands. Most recently, Deborah Popper and Frank Popper 
predicted that the region was too arid to support intensive agriculture.8 
If the actual nature had a certain consistency, then part of the explanation for why 
labels attached to the Plains changed rested with transformations in the meaning of the word 
"desert." In the early nineteenth century most Americans had never experienced a desert. 
Educated Americans would have read about, and a few might even have visited the deserts in 
Africa and Asia, but deserts were a biblical curse for the vast majority of Americans. 
Compared to the well-forested and watered lands of the Eastern United States, the Plains 
(even vicariously) must indeed have felt like a desert. As Americans began to experience or 
read about the even more arid climates in New Mexico, Arizona, California, Colorado, and 
Utah, however they gained a more nuanced appreciation of what constituted a desert. In the 
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second half of the nineteenth century, calling the Plains a "desert" seemed for many an 
exaggeration, yet a few observers continued to regard the analogy as uncomfortably close. 
A further consideration needs to be made about the time and area of the Plains 
traveled through. When Lewis and Clark traveled the Missouri through the states that would 
become Nebraska, the Dakotas, and Montana, they offered a far more positive assessment of 
the region than Pike and Long in later years. Well supplied with water and game along the 
Missouri, Lewis and Clark noted the fertility of the soil and the beautiful landscape. Zebulon 
Pike's second expedition left St. Louis on 6 July 1806. It traveled through the future states of 
Kansas and Nebraska before crossing into Colorado. Pike's party spent the hottest part of the 
year—July and August—crossing the Plains without significant rainfall. In 1819-20, Stephen 
Long again traveled out of St. Louis and headed through the future state of Nebraska, 
Colorado, Texas, and Oklahoma. Not only did this southerly route expose them to greater 
heat and drier conditions than Lewis and Clark; Pike and Long also had to make extended 
jornadas—waterless passages—as they crossed between river valleys. Long had special 
reason to view the whole area negatively since he had not successfully completed his 
mission. He was unable to find the headwaters of the Arkansas River, and mistook the 
Canadian for the Red River. Losing his expedition notes and then recreating them while 
surrounded by Eastern civilization probably did little to improve his overall opinion of the 
region.9 
Comparing Pike or Long's expedition with the journeys of John C. Fremont, in the 
1840s helps to expose a further source of bias. Geographer Merlin Lawson in his study of 
Pike's writings contended that Pike's view changed because of his connection to the 
Wilkinson-Burr scheme to separate the southwestern portion of the Louisiana Territory from 
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the United States. On his outward journey, while still on favorable terms with Wilkinson, 
Pike's journals contained only one reference to the word desert describing an area by the 
Great Bend of the Arkansas River. Four years later in the published version of his journals, 
he changed his tone and wrote "these vast plains of the western hemisphere, may become in 
time equally celebrated as the sandy deserts of Africa. ..on which not a speck of vegetable 
matter existed." Lawson suggested that the change occurred out of Pike's disillusionment 
with the Wilkinson-Burr scheme and as an attempt to appeal to Jeffersonian Republicans 
who sought to limit American's "rambling" character.10 
Long had similar motives when he made his journey for the American Philosophical 
Society in Philadelphia, and under the sponsorship of Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. 
From a military and developmental perspective, it was appealing to exaggerate the value of 
the Plains as buffer that might help contain the westward spread of American settlement, 
allowing the federal government time to extend its control over an already sprawling frontier. 
Despite the diplomatic success of John Quincy Adams dealing with Spain and Great Britain, 
the frontier of the 1820s was still a risky place; Aaron Burr's infamous 1806 plan to create an 
independent confederacy south of the Ohio was recent history, and Native American tribes 
still held considerable power. 
By the 1840s, Americans had filled up the most desirable portions of the Midwest, 
and the desert buffer of previous decades became a liability. The expansionist sentiments that 
pushed the United States into war with Mexico also redefined the western plains of the 
Louisiana Purchase. Like most Missourians Senator Thomas Hart Benton realized that the 
land to the west was not really a desert and that settlers would soon begin to invade the 
region. Like most expansionist leaders, Benton believed it was his duty to assist the spread of 
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American settlement. After Fremont married Benton's daughter, Benton sponsored 
Fremont's expeditions and his daughter rewrote her husband's expedition notes into glowing 
accounts of the West that Benton had printed as government reports. While officially just 
survey expeditions, Fremont was far from an objective observer. He presented a more 
positive view of the Plains and the West in general, despite traveling across some of the very 
same territory and experiencing summertime heat.11 
What emerges from these early accounts was an intertwining of culture and nature in 
defining Plains landscapes. Personal inexperience with desert conditions, political and 
cultural desires, and dry weather encouraged early explorers to label the Great Plains a desert 
unsuitable to permanent settlement. The hot dry summer weather had done little to dissuade 
such an opinion. Later travelers had more experience with desert conditions and every 
political and personal desire to paint a positive picture. The nature they saw spawned endless 
herds of bison, rich grasses, shaded river valleys, and thick fertile soils. It was not that each 
group was simply imposing their own cultural definition on the landscape. In each case they 
described a very real natural world, but their personal perspective, encouraged them to notice 
different aspects of the natural world. The treeless Central Plains that Pike and Long 
observed were too hot and dry and the soil too poor to support crop agriculture, when 
Fremont saw the same area a few decades later he saw land ready to become a fertile garden. 
Gradually, under the influence of need and science, the Plains lost status as a true desert and 
geographers reserved the term for the even drier lands beyond the Rocky Mountains. 
However, the Plains were not simply an extension of the East. They were a fundamentally 
different place: they were drier, wide areas between river valleys were completely treeless, 
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and they were windy and flat. Americans spent most of the nineteenth century trying to 
decide the exact nature of the Plains, and never reached a satisfactory answer. 
Richard White has settled on a useful metaphor to describe this interchange between 
human ideas, perceptions, expectations about nature, and actual nature. White thought the act 
of discovery and naming was part "of a protean conversation involving Europeans, and later 
Euro-Americans, Native Americans (though far more rarely), and nature." The term 
"conversation" to describe the interaction of culture and nature in defining a landscape is 
especially appropriate because it accounts for the ability of actors to build on or modify 
previous definitions, and how their definitions entered a dialectic with the natural word. Pike 
and Long began the conversation by describing a Great American Desert, but later observers 
moved away from that label by highlighting other natural features. Even new labels, 
however, remained hostage to natural conditions.12 
Plains nature was highly variable and it was difficult to discuss in terms of 
"averages," or even "trends." Averages would never be very useful in describing the highly 
irregular rainfall of the Great Plains, but they were even more problematic given the very 
limited number and precision of early measurements. Trying to create statewide, or even 
regional measurements was also difficult since rainfall, temperature, and wind speed varied 
considerably, occasionally over even short distances. Gradually, meteorologists would begin 
to think in terms of trends, or cycles, of wet and dry weather, but this was also problematic 
since droughts could occur at critical seasons or in the middle of wet trends, and vice versa. 
The best climatologically records for the area were in places, such as Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, where the War Department kept some records and where later the Smithsonian 
Institute and then the Weather Bureau took over record keeping. Unfortunately, early 
explorers did not even have this limited record to inform their impressions, and could thus 
come away with opinions based on one or two years experience.13 
Merlin Lawson and Charles Stockton have recreated the best early estimate of plains 
climate using tree-ring data. While there are technical issues involved with the method, such 
as gathering sufficient samples of known origin from the right locations, the indices that 
Lawson and Stockton created revealed a definite natural component to explorer's 
observations. Pike experienced dry conditions on his outward journey, but wet conditions 
during his return to the United States in the summer of 1807. Long underwent much drier 
conditions, and "in relative terms, the region identified by Long as the Great American 
Desert was experiencing drought stress exceeding that of the 1930s." Although Lawson and 
Stockton did not analyze Fremont's expeditions, their evidence suggests that in 1843 
Fremont had only slightly drier than average conditions, but that his 1846 expedition 
coincided with extremely dry conditions. Taken as a whole natural factors do not explain 
every individual's impressions of the region, but they did support certain impressions. Long's 
description of the region as a desert was not far from the truth, at least in 1820.14 
While the exact nature of the Plains remained debatable, most observers understood 
that the region was a very different place than the East that presented serious challenges to 
settlement. As early as the 1850s, Americans began to speculate on potential solutions to the 
problem of aridity. Some reasoned that crisscrossing the region with railroad tracks and 
telegraphs lines would attract rainfall. Another popular theory held that irrigation works 
would increase evaporation and result in precipitation, thus increasing the overall rainfall. 
Closely related were ideas about cultivation releasing moisture that then became part of the 
meteorological cycle. This theory, known as "Rain Following the Plow," eclipsed tree 
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planting in popularity for a time. Finally, one group looked to afforestation as the most likely 
route to increase rainfall. Not incidentally, afforestation promised to solve not only climatic 
failings, but also to provide timber for fuel and perhaps construction.15 
Of these many theories the final one—trees—was both the first and the last to have 
widespread currency. Western Civilization had a long history of associating trees with 
precipitation and humidity, and when American's began thinking about how to settle the 
Plains, they tied into this long tradition. Theorists began by arguing trees would improve 
climate, but often supported other methods as well. By the early 1870s, the more enthusiastic 
boosters had become so convinced of the success of the various methods that afforestation 
almost became unnecessary. Settlers did not need to plant acres and acres of trees if plowing 
the land and putting it to crops was sufficient to alter the climate. By the late 1880s, however, 
attitudes had changed, because the climate did not change. In the chaos and drought of the 
late 1880s and early 1890s, only the original theory—trees—held any currency and then only 
among certain, albeit among of the most influential, foresters. Before Americans could 
realize the inadequacy of early theories about climatic change, though they had to come to an 
understanding of the Plains. 
Although the rush to settle the higher and drier reaches of the Plains was several 
decades away, the 1850s and 1860s were critical decades in focusing attention on the region 
as central to the future of the United States. The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 opened the 
Central Plains to settlement, and both North and South invested enormous political 
importance in settling the region. The Republican Congress that came to power during the 
Civil War began making good on their "free soil" rhetoric by enacting the 1862 Homestead 
Act, which subsidized westward expansion by making "free" land available to settlers. The 
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same year Congress finally passed a bill creating a transcontinental railroad, in the process 
granting huge swaths of Western lands to the Union Pacific and Central Pacific lines. Their 
lines provided market connections that made farming away from navigable streams more 
appealing. Perhaps most importantly, government officials, private citizens, and railroad 
employees had imagined the Plains as something more than an obstacle to westward 
movement. Technology and policy melded to invigorate the region as the Nation's new 
farming frontier.16 
Increased political and public interest in the western half of the Louisiana Purchase 
encouraged Joseph Henry to advocate afforestation as a means of modifying climate. Henry 
was a widely respected scientist and the director of the Smithsonian Institution from its 
founding in 1846. Henry's advocacy was heavily influenced by the climatic theories of 
Alexander von Humboldt's Cosmos: A Sketch of a Physical Description of the Universe. 
Humboldt speculated that extensive woodlands significantly increased evaporation by 
drawing water from the ground and gradually emitting it into the atmosphere. He went on to 
describe the potentially disastrous effects of deforestation leading to diminished 
precipitation. Henry interpreted Humboldt's observations to mean that if deforestation 
decreased rainfall, then afforestation would increase rainfall. He reasoned that humans could 
cultivate plants and trees in such as way as "to produce artificial atmospheres, and to so 
temper the impulses from the sun that the effects of variations in latitude and the rigor of the 
climate may be obviated." Writing in the 1850s before settlement had extended beyond the 
wooded river valleys of the Plains, Henry spent more time worrying over the possible 
negative effects of deforestation, and even suggested the "judicious reservation of trees along 
the boundaries of certain portions of land" to help maintain the climate. But Henry's 
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assertion that humans could alter the physical environment to produce climatic change 
offered an appealing solution to the problem of Plains aridity.17 
It would be a mistake to attribute too much influence to Henry's early speculation. 
Forestry issues consumed only a small portion of Henry's writings, and even these passages 
were hesitant and intended more as an affirmation of society's ability to modify nature than 
as a blueprint for doing so. Henry also never tried to popularize his ideas. He was content to 
publish them in Smithsonian reports that reached a limited, if very influential, audience. A 
careful reading of Henry's published sources also suggests that he probably never intended 
his early musings to be applied to the Plains, and that his ideas reemerged in the 1870s when 
theories about using trees to improve climate were widespread.18 
Living and writing in Italy, George Perkins Marsh was also not particularly 
concerned with the possible affects of afforestation on the Great Plains when he published his 
landmark 1864 study, Man and Nature, or Physical Geography as Modified by Human 
Action. Yet many of Marsh's conclusions became fundamental to Plains forestry, in the 
hands of less careful authors. At over four hundred pages, Man and Nature made a detailed 
and scientifically compelling case for forestry as a central institution of civilized society. 
Marsh explained the many ways that humans had changed the face of the earth from ancient 
Rome to the modern United States. He also made a gripping case that tyrannical civilizations 
would abuse their environment and then suffer decline. In his final chapter he set out 
guidelines for modifying societies' approach to nature through conservation. 
While a firm believer that humans had altered natural environments, Marsh was 
skeptical about the relation of forestry to rainfall. Man and Nature included a section on the 
"Influence of the Forest on Temperature and Precipitation" which began by noting that "it 
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does not seem probable that the forests sensibly affect the total quantity of precipitation, or 
the general mean of atmospheric temperature of the globe, or even that they had this 
influence when their extent was vastly greater" and concluded fifteen pages later that "we 
cannot positively affirm that the total annual quantity of rain is diminished or increased by 
the destruction of the woods." Marsh quoted a number of forestry experts on both sides of 
the issue, but the majority supported Marsh's opinion that forest cover, while influencing a 
variety of factors, probably did not increase rainfall.19 
Marsh's description of humankind's wider role in modifying the environment was 
ultimately more influential than his discussion of forests and rainfall. Marsh portrayed a 
world that was surprisingly malleable in the hands of humankind. Forests, fields, and streams 
shrunk and swelled according to human interventions. Humans drained swamps and opened 
new lands to cultivation while allowing other lands to erode away to bare rock or sterile soil. 
Marsh considered many of these changes negative, but he continually stressed "the 
possibility and the importance of the restoration of disturbed harmonies and the material 
improvement of waste and exhausted regions." He did not have to apply this logic to the 
Great Plains specifically, for the knowledge and endeavor he advocated was universal. 
Against such an activist stance, Marsh's cautious discussion of forest and rainfall seemed 
almost an afterthought, and it is not surprising that many later writers brushed over the details 
and instead focused on the larger vision.20 
Underlying Marsh's positive endorsement was a warning about the failure to act. 
Living and writing from Italy, Marsh was particularly fascinated and troubled by the apparent 
destruction of the Mediterranean Basin and Levant. Both regions seemed to offer 
unequivocal evidence of human-inspired environmental destruction and its role in the 
collapse of civilization. Across "more than one half of their [Roman Empire and parts of the 
Old World] whole extent—including the provinces most celebrated for the profusion and 
variety of their spontaneous and their cultivated products, and for the wealth and social 
advancement of their inhabitants—is either deserted by civilized man and surrendered to 
hopeless desolation," or greatly reduced in population and production. Lest the reader be 
uncertain about the cause of this destruction, Marsh went on to describe how forests had 
disappeared from mountains, how the soil once held by those forests had eroded, how 
surrounding fields and pastures had washed away, and how irrigation works lay dry and 
broken. In Marsh's eyes, the chain of destruction that flowed from the Old World's denuded 
mountains left no natural feature untouched: "rivers famous in history and song have shrunk 
to humble brooklets," "the entrances to navigable streams are obstructed by sandbars, and 
harbors of the rivers at whose mouths they lie," and formerly fertile deltas had become 
"unproductive and miasmatic morasses."21 
The environmental destruction that Marsh described was troubling enough, but he 
also hinted at the great social and moral decline that the people of the worst effected regions 
underwent. Areas that had formerly been centers of learning and civilization were at best 
"thinly inhabited by tribes too few in numbers, too poor in superfluous products, and too 
little advanced in culture and social arts, to contribute anything to the general moral or 
material interests of the greater commonwealth of man." Describing Europe, he linked 
Catholicism with environmental destruction and argued that the decline of the Roman Empire 
left behind a "superstitious," "nominal Christianity" that "perpetuated every abuse of the 
Roman tyranny" and left the great mass of people locked in servitude as serfs. In both cases, 
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according to Marsh, environmental destruction and the decline of civilization went hand in 
hand.22 
Environmental destruction had not yet proceeded far enough in the New World to 
threaten civilization, but Marsh argued that it soon would if left unchecked. European 
colonization degraded New World landscapes after only two centuries, and the land was 
beginning "to show signs of that melancholy dilapidation which is now driving so many of 
the peasantry of Europe from their native hearths." In New England "the ground was 
growing drier and drier." Certain trees, such as the plum had almost disappeared from land 
where they had been numerous, and "the peach, which, a generation or two ago, succeeded 
admirably in the southern portion of the same States, has almost ceased to be cultivated." At 
the end of his chapter on forestry, Marsh included a short section on "Instability of American 
Life" that criticized American's restless and nomadic nature. Americans seemed to love 
change and to have a reckless affection for felling trees even when sufficient cleared land 
already existed. In Marsh's opinion, maintaining some form of fixed ratio between ploughed 
and wooded land would stabilize the American character and create "a well-ordered and 
stable commonwealth, and not less conspicuously, a people of progress."23 
Few Americans would have argued with Marsh's affection for "a well-ordered and 
stable commonwealth," but most had very different ideas about how to get there. In the 
1860s, railroads, most politicians, and the majority of the American people were firmly 
committed to rapid westward expansion. They saw little need for restrictive land use laws in 
the East. The railroads had every incentive to encourage rapid settlement to benefit from the 
sale of land and the hauling of goods. Unlike in the eastern United States, on the Great Plains 
the railroads proceeded settlement and undertook the development of the regions through 
which they passed as part of their business plan. With their financial futures firmly bound to 
rapid development, the railroads saw "a well-ordered and stable commonwealth" as one that 
moved as quickly as possible to take up any and all vacant lands. If there were not enough 
prospective settlers in the East, then more settlers would have to be found in Europe. 
With the South defeated and the Republican Party triumphant, political sentiment 
favored rapid western expansion. Partially this was a continuation of older ideas about 
Manifest Destiny, but it also reaffirmed of the Republican's free soil rhetoric. Unlike conflict 
over Reconstruction, or trade, western settlement was a relatively easy issue for Republican 
politicians. They were able to make good on their "free soil" rhetoric through homesteading 
laws, railroad acts, and Indian wars. They created a "safety-valve" for discontented or 
"excess" Eastern workers which, in theory, pleased both the workers who could escape 
Eastern cities to start up a farming life in the West, and the Eastern industrialists who would 
be rid of urban discontents. The fact that the safety valve operated mostly on Eastern rhetoric 
and emotion rather than as an escape for urban workers did not diminish its significance to 
nineteenth-century Americans.24 
During the 1860s, the Civil War, Indian wars, and drought slowed settlement of the 
Plains, but this at least gave government time to begin surveying the region and making plans 
for its future. Perhaps the most important official during the decade to address the settlement 
of the region, and certainly the one that made forestry an official goal, was Joseph Wilson, 
the Commissioner of the General Land Office. Charged with overseeing the dispersal of 
public lands, Wilson saw the great empty spaces of the Plains as a potential stumbling block 
to national prosperity. Fortunately, Wilson believed he had found the solution to Western 
aridity in the writings of George Perkins Marsh. Rather than slow settlement or change land 
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use patterns, Wilson argued that humans could alter the nature of the Plains through forest 
plantings, artesian wells, and other methods. Wilson found Marsh's assertion that humans 
could influence nature enormously empowering.25 
Later boosters claimed that the Great Plains had been misunderstood, that it had never 
been a desert. Wilson too was tempted by this explanation, but writing in the 1860s, he 
remained uncomfortably close to the region's problematic reputation as a desert. Although 
settlement had not proceeded far, and the looming political storm obscured it, the drought of 
1860 was severe on the Central Plains. In Wyandotte County, Kansas during "the fall and 
winter of that year, there were many steamboat loads of provisions landed on the levee, for 
the hungry people in the interior" who had "been thirteen months without a drop of rain, and 
raised nothing. Often their families were left with only enough commeal to last while the trip 
was made to the river." Horace Greeley, writing for the New York Independent of 7 February 
1861, wrote: "Drought is not unknown to us; but a drought so persistent and so severe as that 
which devastated Kansas in 1860 is a stranger to the states this side of the Mississippi. No 
rain, or none of any consequence, over an area of 40,000 square miles from seed time to 
harvest. Such has been the woeful experience of seven-eighths of Kansas during I860."26 
Conditions improved during the decade but in his reports Wilson sometimes referred 
to the region west of the Mississippi and east of the Rocky Mountains as the "Barrens" or 
"inarable lands." Wilson's plans of climatic modification were an implicit admission that 
something was wanting in the climate. He also understood that settlers had mostly avoided 
the region, as "the abundance of unoccupied fertile acres to be found in the productive 
Mississippi Valley" had been sufficient to prevent "encroaching upon these wide-spreading 
and uninviting regions." Even in 1868, it was clear that with "the rapidly-increasing 
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population, attention will be directed to the feasibility of transforming the inarable portion of 
the plains into resources of wealth and prosperity." The rapidly expanding mining districts in 
Colorado, and the construction of railroads across the Plains further required the settlement 
of the region.27 
By 1866, Wilson was offering a solution to the dilemma of how to settle the Great 
Plains. He combined American frontier optimism with Marsh-like environmental 
manipulation. First, Wilson invented his own version of climatic history by claiming that "in 
every locality where the improvement of settlers, even for so short a period as ten years, has 
resulted in adding considerably to the number of trees; attesting not only the extraordinary 
importance of the forest in rural economy, but the readiness of nature to second the 
operations of man in respect to climate, and other agencies affecting the productiveness of 
the soil." Wilson had little evidence for this assertion, but it fit the general feeling of frontier 
optimism and could remain largely unchallenged as long as drought did not strike28 
Second relying on his interpretation of Marsh, Wilson argued for a program of vastly 
increased forest planting on the Plains: 
Mr. Marsh has collected nearly all the historical facts bearing upon the 
question, in his excellent work published in 1864, entitled "Man and Nature," 
and from the great variety of the illustrations presented, there appears to be 
but little room to doubt the general accuracy of the position assumed, that the 
climate of a country is influenced in a most important respect by the extent 
and distribution of its forests. 
Wilson's writings also shared Marsh's concern over the apparent reckless deforestation that 
had taken place in the Old World and subsequent natural and social problems that both men 
feared might be repeated in the New World.29 
Where there was no forest to influence climate and culture—like the Great Plains— 
Wilson proposed covering "one-third the surface" with forests. Wilson's number was 
arbitrary but also a future red flag, since locking up such a huge amount of land would 
inevitably create tensions. The cattle barons were expanding northward rapidly in the late 
1860s, and such plans would clearly conflict with other interests in a region of grass. The 
Plains states themselves could also become potential opponents since locking large areas in 
forests could hinder development and the growth of tax rolls. Although the plans were 
offered to assist farmer, later events proved that even they could be halfhearted supporters if 
they viewed reserves as locking up good farmland. Wilson's number also conflicted with his 
own earlier claim that the haphazard planting of settlers in the Plains border states, such as 
Iowa, had already seen their efforts lead to significant alterations of climatic conditions.30 
Although Wilson did not indicate it at the time, the obvious explanation for the "one-
third" figure was that Wilson had a much better understanding of Plains climate and of 
Marsh than was apparent in his other proposals. The monumental undertaking of foresting 
one-third of the Plains was a clear acknowledgement of the colossal problem that Wilson felt 
American farmers faced on the Plains. It was also clearly more in tune with the doubtful and 
speculative claims of Marsh about forests and rainfall. Marsh had always indicated that any 
potential increase in moisture from tree growth would be slight and that the mechanical 
benefit of reduced wind velocity required forests at very frequent intervals. As a booster for 
settlement and therefore forestry, Wilson could not build a case on "uncertainty" and 
therefore stuck to positivistic and dramatic claims. 
The state of knowledge about the effects of forests on climate was illustrated by 
Wilson's use of examples from Marsh to justify domestic programs. Just before revealing his 
dramatic plan to cover one third of the Great Plains with forests, Wilson explained that "the 
redemption of sterile and desert lands is one of the growing ideas of the times." He then 
offered several fragmentary examples to prove his point. There was little to unite these 
examples, other than Wilson's conclusion that forests were successfully redeeming sterile 
lands. The French were restoring the Algerian desert to "fruitfulness" while Egypt was 
planting of "over twenty millions of trees in the valley of the Nile, thereby greatly extending 
its cultivable area." In Eastern Europe the Czar was undertaking the reclamation of the 
steppes and in many parts of Western France and Central Europe reclamation projects were 
turning "worthless sterility and sandy wastes" into fertile land. By Wilson's account, 
fundamental alterations of entire regions to make them more amenable to human habitation 
were almost commonplace. While Wilson tried to make such plans seem well established, the 
cases he cited were poor examples. Stabilizing sand dunes in Prussia might be labeled a 
success story, but it offered little information about how to afforest hotter, drier plains. 
Likewise, Wilson's open admiration for the planned forestry of various German provinces 
offered little evidence on how to afforest a region. French efforts at planting trees in Algeria 
might seem more applicable, but Wilson made no effort to document the French program and 
a careful reading of Marsh reveled extreme skepticism that Egyptian tree planting had 
appreciably altered rainfall.31 
Wilson was not the only American official offering questionable advice on tree 
planting during the late 1860s. In his 1867 report to Congress, Wilson included a section 
from Ferdinand Hayden, director of the Geological and Geographical Survey of the 
Territories. Like Wilson, Hayden had concluded that trees could transform the West after 
reading George Perkins Marsh. Hayden brought practical as well as intellectual experience to 
the Land Offices' Reports. He led several Western expeditions in the 1870s and was widely 
respected as a field geologist and explorer. It was Hayden who began the long and popular 
tradition of explaining the great differences between past epochs, and current conditions. 
During the Tertiary period, Nebraska had an almost tropical climate with abundant rainfall 
and was cloaked in "a luxuriant growth of forest." The ancient forest cover had worked in a 
sort of virtuous circle by helping to increase rainfall which in turn helped create the 
conditions for its own existence. Hayden argued that human settlement and tree planting 
would one day return the Plains to Tertiary like conditions, and that "settlement of the 
country and the increase of the timber has already changed for the better the climate of that 
portion of Nebraska lying along the Missouri."32 
Hayden was so optimistic about tree planting on the Plains that he not only offered 
ideas about how to grow timber but also made claims about the future benefits of tree 
planting. He explained that the "planting of ten or fifteen acres of forest-trees on each 
quarter-section will have a most important effect on the climate, equalizing and increasing 
the moisture and adding greatly to the fertility of the soil." Tree planting would improve soil 
fertility and within a mere thirty to fifty years they would provide timber for commercial 
uses, thereby ending the region's dependence on outside sources for lumber.33 
In the late 1860s, Joseph Henry, still directing the Smithsonian, added further 
scientific evidence that trees could alter climate. In 1869,1870, and 1871, he had some of the 
work of French scientist M. Becquerel translated and published in the Smithsonian's annual 
report. Although modest in its claims and intended for European conditions, Becquerel's 
"Forests and Their Climatic Influence" agued that forest could have two significant effects 
on climate. First, large masses of trees would force air to rise and "if it encounters a colder 
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stratum of air, yields its vapor to precipitation, and a fall of rain ensues." Second, tree roots 
penetrated the soil and "fulfill an important part in the distribution of the waters of a country" 
by allowing water to move back and forth between subsoil and surface. In 1870, Henry also 
published a report by W. W. Johnson who made similar claims about forests in Idaho, 
Montana, and Washington, and suggested that most of the treeless parts of the United States 
could be transformed merely by seeding the ground.34 
Henry and Hayden also used their positions to promote the work of railroad 
agricultural agent Richard Smith Elliott. Elliott—who once compared himself to Napoleon 
Bonaparte—was involved in a number of projects ranging, from mining to harbor design. 
During the 1860s, he turned his considerable enthusiasm to forestry and railroad promotion 
in Kansas. As the industrial agent for the Kansas Pacific, Elliott found himself in the enviable 
position of offering objective scientific advice while promoting settlement. Nowhere did it 
seem to occur to Elliott—or to Henry and Hayden—that such an arrangement might present a 
conflict of interest, probably because all three agreed that settlement was more important 
than concerns about climate.35 
Although it is easy to question Elliott's objectivity through the graces of hindsight, in 
1870 he appeared as a scientific and powerful proponent of settlement and forestry. The 
sciences, and particularly forestry, had not yet become carefully policed professions. Self-
educated individuals with wide-ranging interests could make believable claims to expertise 
on a subject with less worry about peer review or criticism. Elliott operated in the tradition of 
a Benjamin Franklin rather than according to the standards of later forestry officials such as 
Raphael Zon. Elliott also did what he could to make sure his advice sounded as objective as 
possible. He conducted his experiments "along the line of the" railroad, and while careful 
readers would have guessed that Elliott was in the employ of the Kansas Pacific, he never 
made his connection explicit. Elliott also presented his work as part of "experiments in 
cultivation" done at "stations" along the line, again making his work appear an integral part 
of both the United States Geological Survey and Report of the Smithsonian. Elliott also 
brought the one important element that previous scientific treatise on Plains forestry and 
climate lacked: real world experience. 
Unlike other writers, Elliott enjoyed the rhetorical and practical advantage of having 
actually cultivated crops and trees on the Plains. Henry, Hayden, and Marsh were theorists 
when it came to Plains agriculture. Elliott invented himself as an "expert" by convincing the 
Kansas Pacific to set up three "little patches of a few acres each" at Wilson, Ellis, and Pond 
Creek, Kansas. Elliott then carefully exploited his position as a national "expert" and, by 
1871, began referring to his experiments as "our Agricultural College" and pointing out to 
readers of the Lawrence Journal that "we are not acting out the suggestions of the learned 
world, taken as a whole; for many very learned people have decided, from theory, that 
nothing could be done, where, in practice, we now have grains and grasses and trees 
growing." Elliot offered very real—if suspect—evidence that crops and trees could be grown, 
and that settlement was already transforming the climate of the region. By constructing his 
three little "stations" and publishing his findings at the critical moment, Elliott had 
transformed himself into an expert on climate and cultivation on the Plains.36 
While often condescending towards scientific expertise, Elliott was far less critical of 
theories he liked and never met a theory about positive climatic change that he did not like. 
He believed that cultivation, trees, railroad and telegraph lines, and seemingly just about 
everything else was already improving the climate. Fortunately, many of the potential climate 
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improving changes occurred alongside settlement as the railroads stretched lines into new 
areas and as settlers began cultivating the land. In his report to Hayden for 1870, Elliott listed 
the many factors that might verify "the popular notion of a climatic change [on the great 
plains]." He then explained that, while none of these could be verified, "it partakes more of 
sober reason than wild fancy to suppose that a permanent and beneficial change of climate 
may be experienced." In closing his discussion of the possible causes of climatic change, 
Elliott referred to Marsh for support.37 
Like other proponents of Plains forestry, Elliott's favorite theory was that if 
deforestation reduced rainfall, then it would be increased by reforestation. Elliott put this 
syllogism in slightly different terms however, by speculating that "the appalling desolation of 
large portions of the earth's surface through the acts of man in destroying the forests [see 
Marsh's book, "Man and Nature"] justifies the trust that the cultivation of taller herbage and 
trees in a region heretofore covered mainly by short grasses, may have a converse effect." 
However twisted its logic, Elliott's version contained two useful modifications of previous 
thought on the issue. First, he replaced the necessity of reforestation with "cultivation of 
taller herbage and trees," a more appealing and nebulous change that, if true, meant 
settlement was the real key to climatic change and that tree planting was only incidental. 
Second, Elliott argued that cultivation would improve the climatic condition of a landscape 
"heretofore covered mainly by short grasses." Previously, authors had speculated that 
formerly fertile landscapes degraded by human activity could be gradually reclaimed through 
forest plantings. Elliott's theory applied to lands that were relatively untouched by humans 
and contained what later observers would call stable and climax vegetation. These two 
changes made Elliott's version of climatic modification much more appealing to boosters, 
town builders, and the railroads, since it required very little sacrifice and applied directly to 
the conditions of the Plains.38 
Ever the self-promoter, Elliott made sure his theories gained an audience by widely 
publicizing his work along the Kansas Pacific Railroad. In the summer of 1871, the Missouri 
State Board of Agriculture stopped by his stations and returned with the news "that grasses, 
grains and trees may surround the settler's house at a small outlay of labor, promises grand 
results in the future." Later that same summer an "excursion of agricultural editors and 
writers" from Midwestern and Eastern states visited the stations and brought back similar 
news. The agricultural writer for the Chicago Tribune declared "that trees may be grown on 
these plains without the aid of irrigation," while a correspondent for the Albany Country 
Gentleman called Elliott the "Tree Planter of the Prairies" who "possesses a vast amount of 
information on all subjects, and has proved to all the wisdom of his project, and no one who 
has seen his plantation can doubt the possibility of clothing these fertile prairies with forests 
of deciduous and evergreen trees." Other writers carried similar testimonies in the 
Germantown Telegraph, Hearth and Home, and Kansas Farmer?9 
Elliott was not alone in recognizing the value of trees in advertising settlement, or in 
believing the climate was improving. Nebraskans Robert W. Furnas and J. Sterling Morton 
also promoted tree planting. Furnas was editor of the Nebraska Advertiser newspaper, as well 
as nursery owner, politician, and first president of the Nebraska State Board of Agriculture. 
By the late 1860s he had developed a deep interest in promoting settlement. Morton, the 
"father of Arbor Day," also owned a newspaper, the Nebraska City News, and had his own 
political ambitions. Despite disagreeing on most subjects—Fumas was a Republican, Morton 
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a Democrat—both promoted tree culture as a means of increasing settlement, and especially 
in Furnas' case, improving climate. 
Of the two, Furnas more closely fit the mold of Elliott and other tree boosters. He was 
a vocal and enthusiastic proponent of tree-modified climate, and he used his position as 
editor and then governor to promote tree planting. In 1871 he published "The Effects of 
Trees on Climate" in the Nebraska Advertiser, arguing that the Plains had some of the richest 
and most productive soil in the world. Nebraska only needed a bit more moisture to become 
the center of America, and the key to that extra moisture lay in trees. As proof, Furnas cited 
the example of Egypt, where tree planting had supposedly increased rainfall from six to 
twenty-four inches, and similar changes were underway in Algeria. His examples suggested 
as liberal a reading of Land Commissioner Wilson's 1868 report as Wilson had made of 
Marsh's Man and Nature.40 
Morton offered a slightly different perspective on tree planting. Like Furnas, Morton 
had dabbled in farming and fruit growing as well as politics and journalism. He also 
advocated tree planting as a way to increase settlement. Historian Ian Tyrrel illustrated how 
Califomians and Australians after 1860 promoted garden landscapes to stabilize population 
and move from frontier to civilized society. Morton applied similar logic by arguing fruit and 
forest trees would civilize Nebraska and improve the social and moral health of its citizens. 
Of his peers, Morton most fully articulated a Marsh-like approach to forests that linked social 
progress to landscape, and that specific landscapes produced different societies. At a meeting 
of the Nebraska State Horticultural Society in 1871, Morton outlined the potential of 
Nebraska as a fruit growing state and then ended his discussion by explaining the many 
indirect benefits orchards would have: 
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Orchards are missionaries of culture and refinement. They make the people 
among whom they grow a better and more thoughtful people. If every farmer 
in Nebraska will plant out and cultivate an orchard and flower garden, 
together with a few forest trees, this will become mentally and morally the 
best agricultural state, the grandest community of producers in the American 
union. Children reared among trees and flowers growing up with them will be 
better in mind and in heart, than children reared among hogs and cattle.41 
At the 1872 meeting of the Nebraska State Board of Agriculture, Morton urged the 
board to create a special day for recognizing and encouraging tree planting in Nebraska. The 
board offered $100 to the county agricultural society that planted the largest number of trees 
and $25 worth of books to the individual that planted the most trees. The Board unanimously 
endorsed the proposal, and on 10 April 1872 thousands of Nebraskans entered the contest. 
Newspapers across the state took up the cause and bombarded the public with incitements to 
join the festivities. The individual winner—J. D. Smith—won the contest by planting 35,550 
trees! Morton's own seedlings arrived late so he could not plant them until after the holiday, 
but he commemorated the event with a letter to the Omaha Daily Tribune in which he 
exclaimed: "the cultivation of flowers and trees is the cultivation of the good, the beautiful, 
and the ennobling in man, and for one, I wish to see this culture become universal in the 
State." While governor in 1874, Furnas issued a formal proclamation celebrating Arbor Day 
and calling upon Nebraskans to take up tree planting as a yearly duty. The holiday proved 
popular not only in Nebraska, where it became official in 1885, but in many other states after 
1890, and eventually in many other countries around the world.42 
The actual impact of Arbor Day on the landscape of the Plains went well beyond 
numbers of trees planted. The labor of planting often consumed only one day a year, but the 
trees left by that labor became community landmarks that united labor and landscape. 
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Participants in Arbor Day had the opportunity to see their labor modify the landscape. In 
doing so, they not only gained an appreciation of how labor could modify the landscape, but 
an understanding of the Plains recreated in their vision. Eventually, some planters also, had 
the opportunity to see how nature rejected their labor because of aridity, hard winters and 
disease. 
Many Nebraskans already had a deep appreciation of labor in nature through their 
farm work, but the labor and results of Arbor Day elevated their labors to social cause. Arbor 
Day encouraged entire communities to engage in tree planting. Newspaper editors, 
schoolteachers, farmers, and merchants alike participated. Growing trees became visually 
dramatic symbols that the Plains had sustained an agrarian landscape over the course of years 
and then decades, not just a season or two. As residents and tree boosters were fond of 
saying, 'trees lend an air of permanence.' Perhaps most importantly, trees and forests sat on 
the other side of the divide between human nature and natural nature. Even though these 
woods had anthropogenic origins, residents insisted that the dividing line between human and 
natural landscapes was between field and forest. Planting trees to the end of fields or even on 
town lots, helped to define the landscape as natural in a way that cultivated fields alone 
simply could not. 
Historian D. S. Olson has suggested that Arbor Day was an early expression of 
environmentalism, but the holiday defies easy classification. Olson explained that "Arbor 
Day was established out of concern for the environment and as a means of improving it." 
Morton was indeed concerned, but he was less interested in saving the grasslands than 
Western civilization and American democracy. His idea for improving the environment was 
to completely change it. Tree planting would increase rainfall and enhance social goals. 
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Morton's holiday did encourage a fundamental engagement with nature, one that was neither 
work nor play but instead a mixture of the two combined in a ceremony that was as much 
about societal interests as the environment.43 
Richard White has suggested that one of the fundamental ways humans come to know 
nature is through labor. Environmentalists have tended to subordinate modern labor-based 
relationships in favor of knowledge gained through play or archaic labor. Clearly there were 
elements of play and recreation in the ritual of Arbor Day and its picnic-like atmosphere, but 
these rituals also stressed the actual labor of digging, planting, backfilling, and watering. 
Many participants in the first Arbor Day got up early and spent the entire day planting trees. 
Although largely unrecorded, the results of their labor, and how they came to judge its 
success was the first large-scale social "conversation" about trees and nature on the Plains. If 
the holiday encouraged some to see the Plains reconstructed as a forest, it probably 
convinced others that tree planting was hard work for slim results.44 
Although the symbolic value of tree planting remained significant, boosters gradually 
undermined the climatic-modifying effects with enthusiasm for a variety of less intensive 
methods. Richard Elliott had originally claimed that tree planting would improve the climate, 
but by 1873, when he left the Plains to build jetties at the mouth of the Mississippi, tree 
planting had become only a small part of his prescription for climate change. Nebraska 
professor of botany Samuel Aughey followed a similar course. In 1873 he explained to the 
state legislature "as civilization extends westward the fall of rain increases from year to year" 
because of planting and preservation of trees. If such planting continued, Nebraska would 
soon re-enter Ferdinand Hayden's "Tertiary epoch" of semi-tropical climate, "magnificent 
forests," and lakes swept by "balmy breezes" similar to those of Mexico or Cuba. By the end 
of the decade, however, Aughey had reversed himself when he realized that the improved 
climate could not have been solely due to tree planting. The recent increases in rainfall had 
actually begun before settlers had planted enough trees to replace those they had cut. Instead, 
Aughey theorized that cultivation was the true cause of increased rainfall. The resulting 
program of climate change, labeled "rain follows the plow" by Charles Wilber, soon replaced 
visions of timber culture among Plains boosters, railroads, and many residents. Doubts 
emerged about taking the trouble to plant huge numbers of trees if all one had to do was 
plow. If a settler needed trees for other reasons, they might be better off to wait until plowing 
had sufficiently improved the climate to make tree growing a simple task.45 
Today we read such claims as transparent boosterism, but at the time they carried 
more than just the weight of American optimism. Nature itself seemed to confirm hopeful 
theories. Elliott, Aughey, and the many others were noticing a subtle rise in precipitation 
during the 1870s. Without the benefit of long-term climatic records from the region, they 
worked with the extant evidence and concluded that the increase was part of some larger, 
hoped-for pattern. Between arguments over measurement, equipment, and the recent nature 
of settlement, the climatic history of the Plains was almost exactly skin-deep in the 1870s. 
The longest nearby records were from Minneapolis since 1837, from Leavenworth starting in 
1836, and from Manhattan, Kansas beginning in 1858. The early portions of all three record 
sets were somewhat unreliable because of equipment and methodology, but also because of 
the rough conditions of the Army camps. Nevertheless, all three locations indicated a gradual 
upswing in precipitation beginning between 1865-70. The two Kansas records peaked in 
1880 before declining to lows around 1895.46 
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Climatic uncertainty did not prevent Congress from initiating its own tree-planting 
program, the Timber Culture Act of 1873. Congress had floated different plans for a 
modified homestead law to encourage tree planting since 1866. Although none of these early 
proposals became law, the object of the acts—tree planting to improve climate—went 
unchallenged. Instead, what prevented the passage of early bills were objections over specific 
measures that required all homestead claims to plant a portion in trees or to make 
reforestation a much broader goal that would promote forest growth on all public lands. 
Debates over deforestation and future timber famines were not unusual in Congress in the 
late-1860s and 1870s. These discussions would eventually lead to the first Forest Reserve 
Bill of 1876. In 1871, however, Congress was not ready to pass radical forest legislation. The 
overall mood was instead only supportive enough of forestry for a narrowly aimed bill. In 
December 1871, Iowa Senator George Wright submitted just such a resolution to the 
Committee on Public Lands that urged homesteaders to plant trees on their claims. The bill 
spent a year in Committee and was finally introduced on 20 February 1872 by Nebraska 
Senator Phineas Hitchcock as a bill: "To encourage the growth of timber on western 
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The bill sailed through Congress. Debate in the Senate was the most significant and 
even here it revolved around the bill's details rather than its purpose. The original bill 
required 120 acres of 160 be planted to trees. The Committee had reported the bill out with 
that amended to forty acres, and some Senators found this too liberal. They also wanted to 
require the claimant to show ten years worth of timber cultivation, instead of the original 
five, before granting final title. Iowa Senator James Harlan worried that "those of us who 
were born on the frontier and understand how things are done and may be done, know very 
well that five years' growth of timber on a western prairie, cultivated as it probably will be 
within the meaning that clause, will not amount to much." The only other attempt to amend 
the bill involved preventing preemption claims under the Homestead Act from also filing 
under the Timber Culture Act. Senator Hitchcock successfully defended the measure by 
explaining that planting forty acres to trees would require significant capital investment. 
Individuals without capital, and who had no previous land claim, would surely file under the 
Homesteading Act rather than go through the expense and labor of filing a Timber Culture 
claim. The House accepted the Senate's version, and President Grant signed the Act into law 
on 3 March 1873.48 
The law underwent a series of changes for both environmental and political reasons 
before its repeal in 1891. Congress passed the original law with so little attention that the 
next year it had to revisit the act and clarify some details. As originally passed the act would 
have allowed anyone to file a timber claim. In 1874, Congress demanded that claimants meet 
the same age and citizenship requirements as pre-emption and homestead acts. Grasshopper 
plagues and dry conditions in Kansas and Nebraska led to further amendments in 1874, 1875, 
and 1876 that allowed settlers to maintain all land rights even if the trees were destroyed. In 
return, they added time to proving up equal to the number of years lost due to the destruction. 
In 1878, petitions, memorials, and general dissatisfaction with the operation of the law 
persuaded Congress to reduce the area of required tree planting from forty to ten acres and 
decreased the spacing between individual trees by half. In 1882, the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office alerted Congress to serious abuses of the law by fictitious entries later 
sold to speculators or real settlers. Such complaints plagued the law throughout the 1880s 
and led to several failed attempts at repeal by the House of Representatives. Finally in 1891, 
the Senate agreed to repeal the law. A law that had begun as an attempt to alter the climate of 
the West ended as a widely ridiculed land giveaway.49 
Initial indifference on the part of Congress, land offices, and forestry boosters to 
abuses and failures of the Timber Culture Act should not be interpreted as evidence that it 
arose from a cynical desire to give away land. Theories of forests and climate that permeated 
debates reveal a different impulse. By 1873 and the passage of the Act, many individuals 
subscribed to the same ideas and ideals as Elliott or Aughey. They believed that the climate 
of the Plains was already changing because of a variety of less intensive methods. With 
settlement being the key to unlocking the Garden, it made sense to ignore the law's limited 
success and get on with the business of transferring the public domain to the public. It was 
also no accident that Congress resisted repeal until 1891, when drought forced members to 
admit Joseph Wilson optimistic prophesy of three decades earlier that nature was willing to 
"second the operations of man in respect to climate" simply had not proven true. 
Although the Timber Culture Act never cloaked the Plains with timber, its failure was 
almost as useful as success. Later investigations, programs, and theories all used the Act as a 
starting point to make claims about nature and the role of trees. More than one future 
Congressmen would work a tree claim or have first-hand knowledge of someone who did. 
They took these experiences with them to office and made it central to their understanding of 
whether trees would grow on the Plains. Many opponents of tree planting—either for the 
National Forests or Shelterbelt Project—used the Timber Culture Act as evidence that the 
Plains would not grow trees, yet tree supporters were just as eager to invoke the Act's 
examples of successful claims. 
During the nineteenth century, the single greatest lesson of the Timber Culture Act 
was that it lacked the very qualities that progressive foresters would soon bring to federal 
forestry. The law lacked careful monitoring and bureaucratic support. The western states 
were more concerned with transferring public land into private hands than enforcing either 
the letter or the spirit of the law, and, above all, the individuals who carried out the actual 
work of planting lacked proper information. There were no specific planting instructions as 
to time of year, depth, method of planting, preferred species, spacing, or care after planting. 
Tree suppliers sold settlers unsuitable species from far-flung nurseries transported 
haphazardly. Even when settlers used hardy native species, they did not have adequate 
expertise to grade stock for disease, pests, or "sickliness." In the absence of sound scientific 
expertise, many foresters would later argue, it was a wonder that any tree claims succeeded. 
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Chapter Two—Formalizing Science: forest reserves on the Great Plains 
Plains forestry underwent fundamental shifts in methods and structure at the turn of 
the twentieth century. Formally trained scientists—increasingly specializing in forestry— 
replaced the ad hoc and self-appointed tree apostles, and began to develop a professionalized 
science and discourse of Plains forestry. Most of these experts worked for federal or state 
government, and sought to replace private management with public control. They succeeded 
at building a scientific base for Plains forestry and drawing the federal government into tree 
culture, but their success was as much the result of natural fluctuations as the strength of their 
convictions. Likewise, the variations in Plains nature that helped initiate the profession 
limited the growth of Plains forestry and insured it remained on the margins of the national 
forestry movement during the Progressive Era. 
The brightest goal of professional foresters was direct federal involvement in 
constructing a series of national forests on the Great Plains. These foresters believed that 
forests would gradually modify the climate and serve as demonstrations of tree growth under 
difficult conditions. While foresters might be accused of over optimism, they understood the 
need to develop both a theoretical explanation for afforestation and a scientific program for 
planting. The unarticulated, but obvious dilemma they faced was that to develop scientific 
evidence about climatic change, they first needed to grow large numbers of trees. As a result, 
foresters could only speak in theoretical terms about the "potential" effects of forestry on 
climate. More successful was their rapid development of a practical and concrete science of 
tree culture. While foresters remained unable to test climatic theories, they were able to study 
and promote a host of other benefits that planting trees might bring. In part this was simply a 
way of rationalizing their own actions so they could successfully compete for public funds. 
But through laboring in nature on the Plains reserves, foresters also developed new ideas 
about how forestry and federal land control could assist residents. 
Foresters advocated federal land control to help eliminate many of the weaknesses of 
earlier afforestation programs, but when they controlled substantial sections of land, they 
became involved in actions only loosely related to forestry. The Forest Service wanted 
control to apply the latest scientific ideas and to protect the plantations. However, to obtain 
local support they also needed to allow access to traditional users. The landscape of the 
reserves became a hybrid that combined public and private goals. Better off ranchers used the 
fenced and managed range to improve their livestock. Foresters used the reserves as giant 
working laboratories to develop nursery and planting techniques. 
It was in the actual work of growing trees on the Sandhills of Nebraska that many 
foresters came to terms with the Great Plains landscape, the potential role of trees, and the 
future of the Forest Service on the Plains. Initially, many foresters believed that they would 
convert millions of acres of grassland to forest, but as they interacted with Plains nature they 
realized the impracticably of massive plans. Although early disappointments discouraged the 
most exuberant, occasional modest successes led foresters to appreciate forestry's potential. 
They found that constructing a forest was exceedingly difficult work. They needed to build 
nursery facilities and get seedlings growing under the trying climatic and soil conditions. 
Once they had seedlings to plant they had difficulty getting them to grow in the Sandhills. 
Partially solving some challenges of propagation still left them under constant threats from 
stray livestock, drought, disease, and fire. The tenuous plantations also required constant 
human labor to insure reproduction. Despite these trials, foresters remained surprisingly 
enthusiastic especially when they realized that even a small forest served as a refuge for 
animals and humans. Foresters also learned that the nurseries and nursery techniques they 
developed were a valuable commodity on the Plains. 
Before foresters could test their theories against the reality of Plains nature, they had 
to construct a series of forest reserves where there were no forests. The first hesitant step in 
appreciating the difficulties of afforesting the Great Plains began in 1891 as a part public, 
part private, experimental plantation in central Nebraska named the Bruner Plantation after 
its owners. The justification of an expanded program ultimately hinged on this experiment. 
Beginning in 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt undertook that expansion by establishing 
four forest reserves on the Plains: the Dismal (1902), Niobrara (1902), and North Platte 
(1906) Reserves in Nebraska, and the Garden City (1905) Reserve in Kansas. President 
William Howard Taft added the Dakota National Forest (1908) in North Dakota to the list. 
Like the Bruner Plantation, these Forest Service efforts met mixed success. Congress opened 
the North Platte reserve to homesteading in 1913 after planting trees on only a few dozen 
acres. The Garden City reserve struggled with drought, fire, and the Forest Service's lack of 
experience in Plains forestry before President Woodrow Wilson terminated it in 1915. The 
demise of the first Dakota National Forest followed two years later, and the Forest Service 
combined the Dismal and Niobrara River reserves as the Nebraska National Forest in 1908. 
Only this last forest still exists today. Though begun with grand intentions, the eventual 
importance of Plains forestry lay in helping to create a science and profession, not in 
modifying climate.1 
The call to put Plains forestry on a sounder scientific basis began almost as soon as 
the idea gained official recognition. The successful passage of the Timber Culture Act in 
1874 led the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to urge creation 
of an Office of Commissioner of Forestry. Franklin Hough, a prominent member of the 
Association, and eventually the first Commissioner of Forestry, was the most active voice in 
arguing for tree planting on the Plains. Hough's explanations sounded similar to his 
contemporaries: he argued that deforestation led to desertification and loss of soil. Hough 
offered examples from Europe where tree planting seemed to increase rainfall, and he even 
included data from Utah that indicated settlement increased rainfall.2 
The AAAS and its call to professionalize forestry research were part of larger 
changes within America that led to the Progressive movement. Historian Samuel Hays saw 
the building demand for a "program of scientific management" originating in worries over 
waste by the timber industry. Hough and others sought scientific methods for managing 
efficiently a variety of economic activities, but they were equally concerned with 
modernizing government to keep pace with industry. The application of steam power to 
logging, the rapid spread of railroads, the consolidation of forest-to-market activities, and the 
increasing scale of operations had by the 1870s far outstripped the ability of private 
individuals or even elected officials, to influence forest policy. Professional scientists like 
Hough desired some federal oversight over industry. They assumed that science, 
professionally applied, would rationalize the timber industry and create nonpartisan public 
policy.3 
Although substantial federal intervention in timber management remained decades 
away, Hough succeeded in creating a forestry office entrusted with studying the potential 
effects of trees on climate and other aspects of the nation's timber resources. The Committee 
on Public Lands did not act on the Association's recommendations in 1874, but the following 
year it provided funds for "studying" American timber resources and in 1876 created a forest 
commission within the Department of Agriculture. The Division remained essentially a one-
man job during its first decade, and both Hough and his successor, Nathaniel Egleston, began 
compiling and publishing on a variety of forestry activities. 
During his tenure as Division head from 1876 to 1883, Hough built a scientific case 
for Plains forestry. One of his tasks was to bring together much of the available information 
on forestry within the United States. He published this as The Elements of Forestry. Although 
wide-ranging in subject matter, Elements dwelt on the potential humidifying effects of forests 
on rainfall. Instead of quoting George Perkins Marsh and other earlier authors, Hough 
developed his own theoretical foundation for how forests might increase humidity and 
rainfall. Without concrete, long-term data on rainfall and tree growth, he had to rely on 
explaining evaporation rates and the influence of temperature. He reasoned that trees created 
a cooling effect that reduced evaporation and added moisture to the air, and that these factors 
encouraged the formation of clouds and precipitation. Hough then used his theory as lens into 
the North American past and adapted traditional Old-World narratives linking deforestation 
and social collapse to New-World conditions. He speculated that the collapse of some 
American Indian cliff dwelling societies might be attributed to deforestation.4 
Hough also developed a long list of potential benefits for Plains forestry and specific 
advice on planting. In his discussion of shelterbelts, he submitted the traditional explanations 
of humidity and temperature but also emphasized their wind-reducing benefits. The latter 
would help orchards, improve pasture and crop yield, and make yards and gardens more 
pleasant. He also suggested that tree planting increased the habitat for insectivorous birds and 
thereby helped control grasshoppers—a theory obviously designed to appeal to the many 
farmers that faced grasshopper plagues during the mid-1870s. Finally, he offered hope that 
many plantings might eventually be harvested for lumber. Although Hough did not elaborate 
on these arguments, foresters would increasingly emphasize alternative influences and 
decrease climatic claims.5 
Hough's successor at the Forestry Division, Nathaniel Egleston, continued in much 
the same vein. He argued that forests drew clouds and created a cooling effect that increased 
precipitation, and he also revised downward Land Commissioner Joseph Wilson's suggestion 
that "one-third the surface" of the Plains should be covered with forests to "one-quarter." 
Egleston also remarked that forests might reduce the incidence of droughts, floods, 
tornadoes, and destructive rainfall. Tellingly, he admitted that there was not enough evidence 
to know whether trees had any effect on climate, but theory, reason, and available data from 
Europe seemed to indicate they should. He was certain that trees could be grown on the 
Plains and that this fact alone made the region much more attractive for settlement.6 
Underlying both Hough's and Egleston's discussions of Plains forestry was the 
amazing flood of settlers during the late 1870s and 1880s. Despite the panic of 1873 and 
grasshopper plagues and localized droughts throughout the mid-1870s, the population of 
Kansas and Nebraska increased by 173 and 268 percent respectively during the 1870s. The 
rush slowed during the 1880s, but population still increased by 43 and 134 percent 
respectively. In the 1870s, much of the increase had moved into the eastern counties, but by 
the 1880s the legislatures in Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas were creating new counties, 
towns and villages in the central and western parts of the states. Even eastern Colorado 
joined the boom as optimistic settlers flooded in by the tens of thousands.7 
Adequate rainfall in most years helped support these waves of settlers. Kansas 
experienced good crop years in 1878 and from 1884 to 1887. The success of the 1878 crop 
started a rush for the central and western counties of the state, and although the subsequent 
years were often marginal for crop production, they were not bad enough to break the 
optimism. When rainfall improved in 1884, settlement accelerated in the western quarter, of 
the state. Nebraska also benefited from improved rainfall in 1878, and unlike Kansas, mostly 
good conditions continued until 1890. The Dakotas followed a similar path. Good rainfall 
during and after 1878 triggered heavy settlement until droughts in 1886 and steep declines in 
the price for wheat brought the Dakota boom to a close. Meanwhile, good rainfall in eastern 
Colorado in 1886 seemed to demonstrate for some Coloradoans the existence of a human 
induced rain belt. The Elbert County Democrat told its readers their county was "an 
extension of the beautiful lands of Western Kansas, and is productive beyond computation ... 
the quantity of moisture is no longer a speculation, but it is an assured fact... all that is 
needed is to plow, plant and attend to the crops properly; the rains are abundant." The rapid 
return to dry conditions in 1889 brought the Colorado boom to a halt.8 
During the early 1880s, Hough and Egleston's theories about trees, rainfall, and the 
need to reserve one-quarter the surface of the Plains for trees seemed out of step. Americans 
continued to trumpet the benefits of tree planting, but there was little sustained enthusiasm 
for any plan that cost money or stood in the way of settlement. Even enforcing the full 
provisions of the Timber Culture Act seemed unnecessary when the goal of the act— 
settlement and climatic improvement—was happening anyway. Settlers and boosters were 
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more in tune with the pronouncements of Samuel Aughey and other proponents of rain 
follows-the-plow. Most had little interest in making the sacrifices that massive tree planting 
required.9 
In the late 1880s and early 1890s, however, the boom in Plains settlement ground to a 
painful halt. Half the population of western Kansas exited between 1888 and 1892, driven by 
failing rainfall, inflated land values, and high temperatures. By 1891 tens of thousands of 
settlers a year were heading back across the Missouri River. Between 1887 and 1897, crops 
failed in the central and western regions of Kansas and Nebraska in at least five of ten years, 
and production remained low in all but two years. A professor in Lawrence, Kansas, reported 
to the Weather Bureau that at the peak of the drought in September 1894, "the fierce dry heat 
burned the foliage of the trees so that they crumbled to powder at the touch of the hand."10 
The low rainfall and hot winds that crushed settlers' dreams coincided with the 
appointment of a new and vigorous head to the Department of Forestry. On 15 March 1886, 
President Graver Cleveland appointed Bemhard Femow to replace Nathaniel Egleston as 
Division chief. That summer Femow went into the field to study tree planting in the West. 
He traveled through Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, and in September attended the 
American Forestry Congress in Denver. Returning from the trip, Femow compiled his first 
Report of the Division of Forestry. Femow made a strong case for the role of forestry on the 
Plains, arguing that government could play a crucial role. He believed the work of "a forest 
department might be properly extended to the creation of new forests, so as to produce 
beneficial results upon the agricultural conditions of the arid and semi-arid regions of the 
Western States." Planting in small tracts would not suffice because the "unfavorable climatic 
conditions" would not soon change "unless large tracts be covered with forest growth."11 
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Fernow's assertion that the government would have to plant large areas to achieve 
any lasting benefit was a direct challenge to the agrarian and frontier ethos of many Plains 
residents. The implication was that individual initiative as embodied by Arbor Day and the 
Timber Culture Act, was inadequate to the task. Femow did not take the logic of this failure 
as far as later critics of Plains settlement who equated pioneering with reckless destruction. 
Instead, Fernow felt individual effort was simply insufficient to the task at hand. He saw 
Arbor Day and the Timber Culture Act as steps in the right direction, but as needing more 
scientific and financial support from government. A key aspect of this science was Femow's 
theory—which became central to Plains forestry advocates—that forests created their own 
conditions for existence. If enough trees could be started in a dense stand, and protected from 
early threats, then gradually the forest would create ideal soil and moisture conditions for its 
continued propagation. As a forester, Femow understood how and wanted to build forests. 
He had an authentic desire to assist settlers, but his primary training and interests lay in 
creating managed forests. Ideally, along the lines of the single species, regimented forests of 
his German homeland. It was not immediately obvious to him that the two goals, assisting 
settlers and building forests, could be in conflict. 
Theories about settlement and forestry were never based on a close examination of 
nature. Femow and many later authors viewed the failure of the Timber Culture Act and the 
economic distress and farm abandonment of the 1890s as economic and political problems 
that could be addressed with scientific or political solutions. In both cases, nature—in the 
form of drought—probably played a far larger role. Likewise, many agricultural experts and 
later historians argued that the improvement in conditions after the mid-1890s was the result 
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of improved methods and crops when a large share of the success was simply the result of 
increased rainfall.12 
The vast government plantations that Femow imagined would have spatial 
consequences as well. The ideal of carving the land into private parcels would be replaced by 
consolidating huge tracts under bureaucratic responsibility. Farmers and ranchers would, at 
least in part, become government tenants leasing rights to use government lands. Even on 
farms surrounding the reserves, where older patterns of ownership prevailed, a putatively 
egalitarian social structure would collide with distant, powerful bureaucratic controls on a 
scale to make even the railroads seem local. Femow had not made the step to advocating 
public maintenance of private lands. He still imagined a Plains separated into public and 
private spheres with the public being managed to improve the private and it would not be 
until the ecological and economic disasters of the 1930s that foresters and other 
conservationists would willingly cross that threshold. In the 1890s, Femow and his peers still 
harbored deep reservations about spending public funds to improve private lands. They 
understood that consequences could flow between spatial divisions because the premise of 
the reserves was that massive tree planting would improve the climatic conditions of 
neighboring farms.13 
Femow had difficulty articulating the reverse formula in which bad behavior on the 
part of some landowners created negative consequences for other users, but another attendee 
at the American Forestry Congress in Denver, Charles Bessey offered a partial solution. 
Bessey, an influential author and botany teacher at the University of Nebraska was in Denver 
to describe the results of his botanical survey of Nebraska. His studies suggested that the 
Nebraska Sandhills had been partially forested. The remains of fossilized yellow pine 
suggested that scattered groves had once grown throughout the northern, central, and western 
portions of Nebraska. Another clue was the frequent presence of Bearberry or "kinniknick," a 
prostrate, vine-like plant that normally favored open wooded hillsides. Bessey hypothesized 
that unfavorable climate alone did not explain the treeless character of the Plains. Instead, he 
suggested, that lightning fires had gradually destroyed the forests, and bison trampling and 
repeated Indian burning had prevented natural reforestation. If Bessey was right, then 
excluding fire and grazing from portions of the landscape would be an essential first step in 
afforestation. The best way to accomplish both goals would be through some form of public 
ownership.14 
Neither Fernow nor Bessey had yet begun to advocate federal controls, but Femow 
remained interested in the subject and promoted forestry to state agencies and farmers. 
Although Femow's thinking had clear implications about the limits of individual enterprise, 
he continued to advocate private involvement and to use agrarian rhetoric. He argued that 
farmers would be the best forest owners since they were the "most stable class of our 
population, and can devote the most care and attention to the management of their wood 
lots." This agrarian perspective infused Division of Forestry reports until he left in 1897. 
Fernow's concern for agriculture was not limited to eastern farmers. He consistently 
advocated forestry for the Great Plains, and as Congress expanded the Division's budget, 
Femow made planting experiments on the Plains one of the Division's three research goals.15 
By 1891, Femow was ready to explain why the region lacked forests and how to 
remedy the deficit. On 20 January 1891, Femow delivered an early version of his 1891 
Report on Forestry to the annual meeting of the Nebraska State Board of Agriculture. 
Combing Bessey's work with his own theories, Femow argued that "the entire earth is a 
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potential forest," and "it is a noticeable fact that the forest to some extent creates its own 
conditions of existence." He admitted that "unfavorable rainfall conditions in parts of the 
region" made forest extension difficult, but even here he insisted that foresters could have 
prospered if "the fire of man with the tramp and browsing of buffaloes had not prevented it" 
Fernow proposed that "forest planting is one of the necessary requisites to permanently 
reclaiming this vast domain ... [and] success can be forced only by co-operation ... 
systematically carried out by commanding knowledge, means, and power, such as alone a 
government—be it state or general government—can command."16 
In the face of the environmental and economic disruption of the early 1890s, Fernow 
was taking the final steps from reliance on private initiative to advocating a statist approach 
to Plains landscape management. With Bessey's data in mind, Fernow was able to make an 
effective argument that the Plains could be returned to its formerly forested condition. Doing 
so would require an effort on a scale completely beyond the individual farmer, and only 
science and government could create such landscape. A stable controlled environment would 
serve as the backbone of the "independent" farmer, even if that independence would be 
increasingly dependent on outside intervention. 
Although Fernow remained silent about the growing political challenge of Populism, 
the timing and essence of his proposals seemed heavily influenced by them. Fernow's 
understanding of Populism was similar to historian John Hicks who argued the movement 
was "the inevitable attempts of a bewildered people to find relief from a state of economic 
distress made certain by the unprecedented size and suddenness of their assault upon the 
West." Later historians have questioned whether economics was a sufficient motivation for 
Populism, but in the early 1890s it was the second part of Hicks' thesis that was particularly 
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compelling: "their assault upon the West." Fernow theorized that trees would help create a 
more stable farm population, and foresters all the way back to George Perkins Marsh had 
argued that mixed landscapes created the best class of farmer. Not only was tree planting 
linked to long-term social and environmental stability, but the trees would be valuable 
commodities that could help farmers through trying times. Most of this theorizing about 
landscapes and people was based more on foresters' visceral distaste for farming practices 
that resulted in deforestation, soil erosion, and then abandonment, rather than a clearly 
articulated argument about how trees created prosperity. For Fernow, however, the exact 
mechanism was less important than the immediate goal of stabilizing land and society by 
getting more trees on the Plains.17 
While Fernow and Bessey may have dreamed of an expansive, government funded 
effort to afforest the Great Plains, the political will and bureaucratic organization for such an 
effort was severely lacking. This did not stop them from taking small steps. As early as 1891, 
Fernow organized a trial planting. He asked Bessey to find a man who owned property in the 
Sandhill region and was "responsible and fit to do the work of planting, who would place his 
ground and superintendence at our disposal under some arrangement by which he retains 
possession of his land and ultimately of the forest growth." Fernow urged Bessey to find 
someone as soon as possible so that they could begin planting next spring. Bessey tapped 
Lawrence Bruner, an enthusiastic fellow professor at the University of Nebraska, who owned 
land near Swan Lake in Holt County, Nebraska (Figure 2.1).18 
The scale of their experiment was small compared to the vastness of their plans, but 
even a little experiment could help identify future problems. One was that the desire for 
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Figure 2.1—Holt County, Nebraska from an 1889 map showing Swan Lake.19 
Bruner became locked in a legal dispute over the exact status of trees and land. The Division 
of Forestry asked for a contract that secured control of the experiment for five years. Fernow 
hoped this would prevent premature cutting of trees, undesired replanting, or, worse, plowing 
under of failed plantings. The Division's difficulties were compounded by problems in 
locating the right numbers of seedlings and delivering them to the Bruner brothers. At the 
end of March, Fernow took personal control of the project to expedite matters. He agreed that 
there would be no formal contract and that "a simple distribution of plant material under 
special conditions" would suffice. Dispensing with a formal contract reduced legal and 
departmental red tape, and perhaps relieved the Bruner's worry that they would be locked 
into a relationship that might prove difficult to fulfill. Fernow hoped that the 1891 plantings 
would be "a beginning which may lead to more, [and] if experience warrants then we may 
enter more formal arrangements."20 
The Bruner's choice of plantation site made success difficult. Their land lay on the 
eastern edge of the Sandhills of north-central Nebraska. The Sandhills are, as the name 
implies, wind created sand dunes most of which are stabilized by a mixture of perennial short 
and tall grass prairie. The region lies between the 24 and 16-inch isohyets but rainfall is often 
distributed in a patchy fashion making local droughts frequent. The porous, sandy soil 
absorbs most runoff, and valleys between dune formations are often covered with seasonal 
marshes or lakes. The lush grass and open water encouraged early settlers, but the sandy soil, 
high winds, and frequent droughts made crop production difficult. Adding to the inherent 
difficulties of Sandhills cultivation, Nebraska suffered from serious drought in 1890, and 
while conditions temporarily improved in 1891, droughty conditions returned the following 
year and cumulated with the severe drought of 1894.21 
Despite the difficult conditions the Bruners began planting in late spring 1891. Delays 
over the status of the land and late arrival of planting material forced the brothers to begin 
work in May when the weather had already grown hot and dry. They followed Fernow's 
guidelines and planted their seedlings in four separate half-acre plats. They located the 
rectangular plats end to end in a rough line on the high Sandhills, about five miles southwest 
of Swan Lake. They surrounded each one hundred yards long by twenty-four yards wide plat 
with a plowed firebreak, and intended to install a temporary windbreak of willow cuttings on 
the northwest and southwest sides. The willow cuttings arrived in insufficient numbers and 
poor condition, however, so the plats remained largely unprotected from the drying winds. 
The brothers tried a number of conifer species, including Austrian pine, jack pine, Douglas 
spruce, ponderosa pine, red pine, and Scotch pine. In some plats they also intermixed rows of 
deciduous trees such as box elder, cherry, oak, and locust. The sources for the seedlings were 
almost as varied, with material coming from private nurseries in Franklin and Fairbury, 
Nebraska, Snowflake, Michigan, Dundee, Illinois, and Grantsburgh, Wisconsin. In all, the 
brothers planted 16,434 seedlings in the spring of 1891.22 
The first year's plantings were successful enough to warrant more the next spring. In 
October 1891, Bruner wrote Fernow a detailed report on the conditions of the plantation from 
the previous spring. He indicated that 43.6 percent of the seedlings survived. Of those, the 
black locust, "although reported to be received in poor condition, and the Banksian pine, dug 
from the forest in Wisconsin," were the most successful. In April 1892 the brothers once 
again planted seedlings and counted survivors, and throughout that summer Fernow kept 
close track of the plantations. In February 1893, however, he informed Bruner that because 
of a lack of funds "we might for the present consider our tree planting experiment at an 
end."23 
In most accounts of the Nebraska National Forest, the Division of Forestry forgot the 
Bruner plantation until 1901, but this was an oversimplification. Fernow maintained personal 
correspondence with Hudson Bruner concerning the condition of the plantation at least until 
November 1894, and that year Charles A. Keffer, Assistant Chief of the Division of Forestry, 
also visited the plantation and published his observations in the Division of Forestry Bulletin 
18. Keffer explained that the Division had abandoned the plantation because its location, 
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twenty-five miles from the nearest railroad, made inspections difficult. Keffer indicated that 
of the four plats planted in 1891 and 1892, only plat number one survived, and only the jack 
pine seemed adapted to the locality. Keffer returned in 1896, and reported that 87 percent of 
the jack pine, and 45 percent of the yellow pine survived. The Division of Forestry had by 
this time a number of experiments underway at the State Agricultural colleges of South 
Dakota (Brookings), Nebraska (Lincoln), Kansas (Manhattan), and Colorado (Fort Collins). 
By the middle of the 1890s in other words, the Division of Forestry was, if anything, 
suffering from an overload of information on Plains forestry.24 
During the 1890s, the Division of Forestry faced greatly expanded responsibilities 
with limited staff and budget. In 1891, the Forest Reserve Act authorized the president to 
create forest reserves from the public domain. Between them, Presidents Benjamin Harrison 
and Grover Cleveland created 18 million acres of forest reserves. These reserves remained 
under the control of the Department of Interior, but the Division of Forestry, within the 
Department of Agriculture, provided technical assistance. Congress did not expand the 
Division's budget as rapidly because its duties and activities remained largely advisory, not 
managerial. Thus, just as Fernow began his first experiment in Plains forestry, he was 
suddenly overwhelmed by potential activity on the nation's forest reserves. Fernow had 
linked the agency to direct planting experiments on the Plains and, through the Bruner 
plantation, even had evidence that trees could grow. Given the Division's limited staff and 
funding, however, the Bruner plantation was not so much forgotten as ignored because it did 
not mesh with Division goals.25 
Fernow's goals for the Division reflected the many ideas and reforms that became 
Progressivism. At a practical level this meant an expanded responsibility assisting the 
Interior Department in managing forest reserves, and an expanded research program lodged 
in the nation's land grant colleges. But the ideas of the 1890s and early 1900s were also at 
work on the agency. Historian Daniel Rodgers used the term "idea clusters" to refer to sets of 
rhetorical concepts that groups began using. Rodgers argued that the central Progressive 
viewpoint that such groups shared was discontent with arbitrary, unregulated individual 
power. Foresters such as Fernow, and later Gifford Pinchot, represented one idea cluster in 
the Progressive Era. Yet within that cluster Progressive foresters could vary considerably in 
how they wanted to respond to the abuses of the Gilded Age. Historian Samuel Hays 
suggested that Fernow "believed that the Division of Forestry should merely dispense 
information and technical advice," but Pinchot desired to improve forest management 
through federal intervention. Although the two men may have had different views about the 
potential for scientific management of American forests, they shared similar ideas about the 
need to apply science to Plains afforestation. They also worried about the failure of previous 
private efforts. The politics of afforestation for both men echoed themes that Progressives 
sounded in many spheres. They sought a more centralized, efficient, and scientific model for 
resource management. The movement to rationalize resource management gained momentum 
during the 1890s, and by the end of the decade the final pieces were in place.26 
With the 1898 appointment of Gifford Pinchot to replace Fernow as head of the 
Division of Forestry, a new era began in American forestry. What Pinchot lacked in technical 
skills, he more than compensated for with political acumen. This allowed him to continue 
Fernow's expansion of the Division of Forestry, and he rapidly made the Division a powerful 
and far-reaching bureaucracy. Pinchot worked to increase the role of the Division in 
managing the Department of Interior's forest reserves. In 1901 he had the Division of 
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Forestry upgraded to the Bureau of Forestry, and in 1905 responsibility for the reserves 
transferred to the Bureau of Forestry, which was renamed the Forest Service. Pinchot also 
greatly increased the budget of his office through timber sales and Congressional funding.27 
Although Pinchot did not share Fernow's deep interest in Plains forestry, in the 
summer of 1899 he began to consider the opportunities it presented. The Division's budget 
for the year—double that of only two years before—included language authorizing 
afforestation experiments. Pinchot had read some of Bessey's papers on the Sandhills, and 
hired Bessey as a "Collaborator" for $300 a year to "take up the subject of the causes which 
produce treeless prairies of large or small extent in regions from which forest trees are not 
wholly absent." The request to explain the treeless nature of the Sandhills was for Bessey, at 
least, a familiar request, and he quickly agreed to help with the understanding that the 
Division was finally going to take up the cause of Plains forestry in earnest.28 
Pinchot's other motive for involving the Service, while less clear, appears to have 
been political. First, Pinchot wanted to transfer responsibilities for all of the nation's forest 
reserves to his department. He disagreed with the Interior Department's management of the 
reserves as preserves that were off limits to many uses, and he distrusted the Department as 
corrupt. Gaining control of several reserves on the Great Plains would be a first step in 
showcasing the Forest Service's management abilities. Pinchot viewed forests as something 
akin to agricultural crops that could be planted, grown, and harvested. He also wanted to 
open forests to grazing. With this management scheme in mind, it made both political and 
institutional sense for the Forest Service to embrace projects closely connected with 
agriculture. The reserves on the Plains were the perfect example of a forest that would be 
managed like a crop and whose very existence benefited agriculture. On reserves consisting 
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mainly of grasslands, it would also be logically difficult to exclude grazing interests except 
where trees grew.29 
The move onto the Plains would also increase political support from a region that was 
well-disposed to government tree planting but skeptical of federal regulation. Pinchot needed 
Western support to have the nation's forest reserves transferred to his department and to 
increase its budget to manage the new lands. Creating Plains reserves and opening them to 
managed grazing signaled the Forest Service's contribution to Western development. 
Although the idea was of fading importance, the reserves' theorized effect on climate also 
appealed to western agricultural interests and, perhaps, served as a model for even drier 
areas. 
Finally, Theodore Roosevelt's sudden assumption of the Presidency in September 
1901, upon the assassination of President William McKinley, signaled to his close friend 
Pinchot that the Division would have staunch support from the executive branch for any 
expansion efforts. Both Pinchot and the President believed that scientific management of the 
nation's resources was a legitimate goal of government. The duo would greatly expand 
federal control and activities on public lands. Within this broader agenda, the reserves were 
scientific testbeds for afforestation and could act as a model for managed grazing on public 
and private lands. They were also politically less sensitive first steps to increased Forest 
Service involvement in conservation. 
Pinchot had a talent for attracting dedicated personnel to his new agency, and these 
young, college educated, and mostly male, foresters spread out across the nation at the turn of 
the twentieth century. Foresters such as Henry Graves and Eugene Bruce that Pinchot 
brought along became the core of the growing profession. Pinchot also established the 
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Society of American Foresters in 1901 and began to transform the American Forestry 
Association into an advocate of scientific forestry. Between Pinchot's ability to inspire his 
subordinates, and the larger social stirrings of Progressivism and conservationism, the 
personnel that he hired brought with them an unusual level of dedication and commitment.30 
On the Great Plains, the cutting edge of Pinchot's expansion was a small party of 
seven young foresters, and several mules that set out from the Mid-way Hotel in Kearney, 
Nebraska on a hot July day in 1901. All were recent university graduates, and only two, the 
party's chief, Royal Kellogg and the second in command, Louis Miller, had been with the 
Division of Forestry for more than a few months. William Hall, the Assistant Superintendent 
of Tree Planting of the Bureau of Forestry, had organized the group to travel through western 
Nebraska with a view to establishing government forest reserves in the Sandhills. Their 
mission was to conduct a survey of the Nebraska Sandhills to determine if trees grew, or 
could be made to grow, in the wind-swept and dry vastness beyond the ninety-eighth 
meridian. To that end, they brought along a large, sharp cross-cut saw and several axes for 
felling any trees they might find. From a cut tree they would carefully saw a six-inch section 
of stem. The trophies could then be used to calculate growth rates. Hall hoped to use this 
information to locate and justify several large reserves. As if in penance for this initial 
destruction, Charles Scott, the party's cook and mule driver, would spend subsequent years in 
the Sandhills trying to grow trees rather than cut them down.31 
Fortunately for Plains forestry, 1901 was a wet year in Nebraska. Spring and summer 
rains were especially forgiving, and the Sandhills were damp and green when the party began 
its survey. They moved up the Platte River and then the North Platte towards the Wyoming 
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Figure 2.2—Path of the 1901 survey.32 
and then along the White River to Crawford. In these far western reaches of Nebraska they 
entered the Pine Ridge region. Here they found large numbers of red cedar and ponderosa 
pines, some quite large. On several occasions they counted annual growth rings of large 
ponderosas that indicated trees had been there for three hundred years. From Crawford the 
party moved east towards Rushville. The broken edges of the Pine Ridge landscape gave way 
to undulating hills, the grama and buffalo grass common transitioned to distinctive Sandhill 
bunch grass. Occasionally the party came across "blow-outs," or holes of loose sand. In areas 
of especially loose sand, or on south slopes, they found long-leafed reed grass reaching their 
horses' bellies. Interspersed throughout the Sandhills, the dry but rich bottom lands supported 
thick growths of switch grass that local farmers cut for hay. The party rode right through the 
center of the Sandhills roughly paralleling the Burlington Railway to Broken Bow.33 
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Unlike areas farther west, the party encountered little evidence of tree growth in the 
Sandhills. Along the river courses they found some green ash, hackberry, cottonwood, and 
aspen. In a few locations they found clumps of young trees growing in the Sandhills proper, 
but they could not find any trees of significant age. It appeared that Bessey was correct, that 
fire or poor soil prevented tree growth, but the foresters reasoned that if trees grew to the 
west in soils containing similar materials, then the same trees might grow in the Sandhills if 
protected from fire.34 
Word that the Bureau of Forestry was interested in creating a forest reserve on the 
Sandhills spread. Femow, by then the dean of the New York College of Forestry at Cornell 
University, heard of the plan and asked Bessey about the condition of the old Bruner 
plantation in Holt County. Femow encouraged Bessey to use the plantation to promote an 
enlarged program of tree planting. This would eventually lead to a survey of the plantation by 
Charles Scott, but not until after President Roosevelt created the reserves. In the meantime, 
Bessey, at the urging of William Hall, lobbied President Roosevelt to back the plan. Bessey 
also convinced the Nebraska Academy of Sciences to pass a resolution in favor of such a 
plan.35 
Efforts to create the forest reserves ran into strong opposition from railroads. George 
W. Holdrege, the general manger of the Burlington and Missouri (B&M) Railroad organized 
the resistance. Holdrege saw Sandhills forestry as a threat to the railroad's prospects. He 
feared that locking up large parts of the region would prevent continued settlement, and he 
pressured Nebraskan Senator Joseph Millard to oppose it and traveled to Washington in 
March of 1902 to organize opposition. Holdrege had been instrumental in getting the railroad 
to run a spur line from Grand Island through the Sandhills to Sheridan. He had also pushed 
the B&M to help settle the region by funding experimental farms, irrigation, and even a dry 
land farming expert.36 
The Bureau of Forestry tried to appease Holdrege in February 1902, by indicating that 
the plan would not harm the economic welfare of the region. James Wilson explained that the 
farms of the region greatly needed "growing timber to check the wind, retain soil moisture, 
and provide fuel, posts, and other supplies." The plan would not sacrifice the whole region to 
timber, and it would not unduly interfere with livestock interests. Grazing only needed to be 
excluded "on such limited portions as are actually planted to timber, an area which for many 
years would be less than 10 percent of the reserves." The Bureau and the Department of 
Agriculture assured Holdrege that "to the region as a whole the outcome of such a action 
could be only advantageous."37 
But Holdrege stood fast. He learned that many Sandhills locals, especially smaller 
ranchers, also opposed the plan. Some ranchers were already infuriated at the government for 
forcing them to dismantle fences on the public domain. One of the more prominent citizens 
of Hyannis, Nebraska, let out "a prodigious roar about the disaster it would be to Grant 
County." Other cattlemen encouraged their congressmen to oppose the plan. Benjamin Irwin, 
clerk of the Broken Bow Land Office and an important local supporter of the proposed 
reserves observed that "the cattlemen ... and of course the banks and railroads would rather 
mortgage and haul cattle than raise trees."38 
Afforestation goals were coming into conflict with tacit uses of the Sandhills. 
Foresters wanted to reserve a portion of the public domain, ostensibly for improving 
surrounding lands but also as living laboratories. Livestock owners, railroads, and farmers, 
were less convinced that the goals of the Forest Bureau and their own coincided. Most local 
interests remained deeply suspicious of outside control of the landscape, even when that 
control promised to improve their own conditions. Foresters were discovering that 
constructing a forest required more than just planting trees. Despite their seeming emptiness, 
the Sandhills where already a thoroughly occupied place. Foresters would have to 
incorporate existing usages with their own penchant for the scientific management of nature. 
The Bureau of Forestry eventually reached a compromise. It had originally hoped to 
establish three reserves in Nebraska, but in return for dropping the third, most western 
reserve from the plan, Holdrege agreed to end his opposition. The Bureau also drastically 
scaled back the size of earlier reserve proposals and worked hard to assuage local fears by 
persuading ranchers that the reserves would improve grazing and favor local landholders in 
grazing permits. Unlike its timber policy that demanded competitive bids, the Bureau sold 
range permits based upon a "reasonable fee." In practice this meant granting grazing permits 
that were considerably cheaper than private lands. Pinchot had instituted this policy as a way 
to favor small nearby stockowners that might otherwise have been outbid by large 
corporations, although the policy also often reflected the varying quality of public and private 
lands and sometimes simply corruption. The compromise allowed President Roosevelt to 
establish two forest reserves without antagonizing the Nebraska congressmen. The Dismal 
River Reserve located in central Nebraska, and lying between the Middle Loup River and 
Dismal River in Thomas County, stretched over 96,000 acres of Sandhills. The Niobrara 
River Reserve, which lay between the Niobrara and Snake Rivers in Cherry County of north-
central Nebraska, encompassed 110,000 acres. In the end, the actual size of the reserves was 






Figure 2.3—The Niobrara and Dismal River Forest Reserves.40 
Establishing the reserves was only the beginning. The Bureau of Forestry still had to 
mark reserve boundaries, locate a nursery site, persuade trees to grow in sand, and hope the 
weather cooperated. Louis Miller and Charles Scott returned to the Plains in spring 1902. 
When the two, along with a new cook and teamster, reached Broken Bow, they recovered the 
equipment, mules, and horses from the previous survey, and ventured back into the Sandhills. 
With the help of local homesteaders, they traveled to the Dismal River Reserve and began to 
locate section corners. More personnel began to arrive while the party was working at the 
Dismal River Reserve, and on 12 July the group divided. One gang led by Miller continued 
to survey the boundaries of the reserves, while another led by Scott established a nursery 
west of Halsey. On 18 August President Roosevelt added the 80 acres of the nursery to the 
Dismal River reserve.41 
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Planting operations began the next spring at the Halsey nursery. A party of seed 
collectors visited the Pine Ridge region and returned with a large supply of red cedar and 
ponderosa pinecones. After a visit to the reserve in late September 1902, William Hall put 
Scott in charge of the program and returned Miller to Washington. Scott then left for the 
Black Hills of South Dakota to acquire more seeds and seedlings. The nursery also received 
ponderosa seed from New Mexico, jack pine seed from Minnesota and Michigan, and 
assorted pine seeds from California. They experimented with planting stock from different 
locations under the assumption that the growing conditions of seeds collected at high 
elevation might approximate the adverse Sandhill climate. Despite all the work of getting the 
nursery into shape, Scott was able to begin planting in the late fall of 1902.42 
While Bureau of Forestry personnel may have been up to the task of locating reserves 
and preparing the nursery, they had less success with getting trees to grow. Foresters tried 
broadcast seeding red cedar and ponderosa pine collected from Pine Ridge, but none even 
sprouted. The following spring Scott and his crew tried planted seedlings pulled from the 
Black Hills, but these showed almost immediate signs of failure. Scott estimated that fewer 
than 100 out of 30,000 specimens survived. They had somewhat better success with Jack 
Pine seedlings dug from the forests of Minnesota, as these had an average survival rate of 15 
to 20 percent after three years. The nursery's one apparent success in spring 1903 was the 
rapid sprouting of seeds planted in the newly created nursery-beds, but these too failed when 
hit by a "damping-off." In 1903, a particularly wet year, the many difficulties could have 
been a warning about what would happen during dry years. However, Plains climatology was 
still a new subject and foresters had difficulty knowing wet from dry years.43 
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The initial disappointments of the nursery were partially offset by Scott's success in 
convincing ranchers to support the program. Although he did not explain it that way, Forest 
Service policies proved especially favorable to middle and large sized ranchers, and once 
Scott convinced these users, the rest were "gradually falling in line." The more powerful 
ranchers were angry over Department of Justice prosecutions for maintaining illegal fences 
on the public domain. Many saw the reserves as another effort to drive them from the range. 
Convincing them otherwise required many small meetings to explain the advantages that the 
reserve would bring. One important incentive was that each permit holder would have their 
own range and could supply salt and water to their stock. The reserve permit would also 
eliminate the need for annual community roundups that caused stock to lose valuable weight. 
Most importantly, controlling the range allowed a rancher's stock to breed true. This allowed 
ranchers that could afford the cost to invest in expensive bulls to improve the quality of their 
herd. Rancher Bob Fadis, who had been instrumental in introducing Scott to other locals, told 
Scott three years later that "he had branded a crop of 95% white-faced calves, due to the fact 
his fences on the Reserve had kept his neighbor's bulls out of his heard." Another well-off 
rancher, Ed Myers, told Scott that his cattle averaged 100 pounds per animal heavier as a 
result of having their own range, water, and salt. As historian Claire Strom pointed out in her 
study of tick eradication in the South, government cattle improvement plans often contained 
a class bias. Forest Service controls on the Nebraska Reserves mostly benefited those who 
could afford to take advantage of them.44 
In addition to the social and political control of the range, the Forest Service 
introduced animal pest eradication as a small, but visible element of natural control. 
Historian Thomas Dunlap attributed the drive for federal involvement in "pest" control on 
the Great Plains to "Western Congressmen [who] saw federal predator control as a cheap 
way to serve their constituents." At the time, this was easy political capital since it was one 
proposal to which no one objected. By the time the Forest Service took control of its reserves 
in Nebraska there were few large animals left as market hunters and local settlers had 
eliminated the antelope and deer populations, but foresters did poison smaller competitors. In 
later years, one of the primary values of the forests would be to encourage wildlife. Despite 
the many advantages, Scott could not convince everyone that the reserves were desirable. 
Sometimes squabbles broke out over divisions between ranges—especially when the new 
North Platte reserve was created—but gradually local ranchers went from opposing the plan 
to support.45 
Although neither the stockmen nor Scott realized it at the time, they were 
spearheading the future of the reserves. Foresters had come to the Plains to grow trees, but as 
most of their reserves remained covered with grass, they quickly had to learn grassland 
management. The records of the forests were especially revealing in this respect. The 
majority of the material related to range management, many of the forester's working hours 
revolved around grazing issues, and the only "profit" the reserve could generate came from 
grazing fees. Stockmen also gradually came to appreciate the reserves once they realized that 
most of the land would remain covered by grass for the foreseeable future and that federal 
control was not inimical to local profits.46 
The other important future activity on the forests, nursery operations, gradually 
improved as foresters developed more effective methods. They learned to defeat the 
"damping-off ' problem by chemically treating seedbed soil using a program devised by Carl 
Hartley of the Bureau of Plant Industry. Hartley and the Bureau of Plant Industry were 
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another part of the rapid expansion of government during the Progressive Era. Hartley's use 
of a sulphuric acid to treat seedbeds was only one of their many innovations. They worked on 
plant genetics, pest control, agricultural inspection, aspects of mechanization, and became a 
valuable source of plant expertise for other federal agencies. With seedlings increasingly safe 
while at the nursery, foresters next had to improve field survival. A time-consuming but 
effective method was to move seedlings from the seedbeds to a transplant-bed in the third 
year. Seedlings did not grow materially taller in the transplant-beds, but they did increase 
their root system, thus improving the ability to withstand final transplanting in the fourth 
47 year. 
In the field, planting crews gradually understood the Plains' microenvironments and 
developed viable practices. They categorized the Sandhill environment into types based on 
slope and vegetation. They then adapted their selection of species to location. Planters placed 
yellow pine on windy "ridge type" soils, where exposed trees would receive less water. Jack 
pine found favor on warmer and wetter south slopes. On the heavier soil of the bottom lands, 
most species would grow if they could out-compete native grasses, but planters chose yellow 
pine because it could make best use of the fertile soil. On the cooler north-slopes, planters 
eventually settled on Scotch pine, which was better suited to the wetter, cooler micro-climate. 
Planters were literally constructing a forest out of sand and grass by conceptualizing Plains 
nature as a series of environments. In doing so, however, they favored a forest system that 
resembled conditions in wetter natural forests, and did not at first try to replicate the mixed 
forest growth of cottonwood and red cedar that was indigenous to Plains river valleys. Only 
in later years, once nursery personal under the direction of Carlos Bates learned to 
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successfully germinate and transplant red cedar, did the red cedar become an important part 
of afforestation efforts.48 
The actual method of putting seedlings into the ground also varied as planters 
developed methods that maximized survival rates by mimicking natural conditions. Initially, 
planting crews tried the "slit" method. A planter inserted a shovel into the ground, moved it 
back and forth to create a narrow hole, and then inserted the seedling. They then closed the 
hole by inserting the shovel off to one side and pushing the earth towards the seedling. This 
method was fast and required little labor, but the narrow plane of the planting limited the 
seedling roots' access to moisture. If the seedling's roots were unnaturally cramped by the 
slit method, then perhaps they could be spread along three dimensions. This led to the 
"square-hole" method. One planter moved ahead and dug a square hole in the soil. Another 
planter put a seedling in the hole and backfilled with one hand while trying to keep the 
seedling centered. The square-hole method was slow, however, and the roots were often as 
cramped as with the slit method. These observations led planters to try the "cone" method, in 
which one planter dug a square hole, with a cone shaped mound pointing upwards in the 
center. The next planter then spread the seedlings' roots around the cone and carefully 
backfilled. In assessing these methods, economic considerations were as important as 
agronomic findings. The cone method was very successful at first, but after the first year the 
survival rate for all methods equalized. Thus, the slit method was judged most desirable 
because the higher initial death rate for seedlings was more than compensated by its lower 
labor costs.49 
The slit method also allowed the eventual application of mechanical power. Planters 
initially used a breaking plow to turn a shallow furrow. They then ran a trencher plow down 
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the furrow to make a deep, but narrow, "Y-shaped" trench. Into this narrow trench planters 
placed seedlings at regular intervals and pressed the hole closed with a shovel. While this 
method required the greatest human artifice, it proved the most economical since it was rapid 
and inexpensive.50 
Bessey and Femow had argued that trees could be grown because they had once been 
a natural part of the environment, but when foresters tried to recreate those forests, they 
found themselves instead creating a new hybrid nature. At the nursery site they had to 
chemically treat seedlings, cover them with shade cloth, and move them between beds. When 
they plotted planting sites, their paper forests had more in common with a home architect's 
vision than a natural mimesis. Their planting methods mixed economics, human labor, and 
machine labor in an effort to emulate natural conditions. But their interventions would never 
end. Once they succeeded in getting trees to grow, they had to exclude cattle and fires from 
plantations. As forests matured, they became infested with a variety of plant diseases and 
parasites that kept foresters busy spraying, fumigating, and praying. All along the single most 
important factor, rainfall, remained the one element they could neither control nor predict, 
and however much they modified other aspects of the landscape, their efforts remained 
dependent on nature. The eventual forests were not Frankenstein monsters—they never 
turned on their creators, or ran amuck—but then neither could they be considered natural. 
Instead a novel, hybridized landscape had emerged that was in perfect symmetry with the 
hybrid society around it. 
The rhetoric of restoring natural conditions would become a common theme in Great 
Plains conservation, but from the start it was in dissonance with the actual hybrid landscape. 
Farmers substituted native grasses with domesticates: com and wheat replaced native 
perennials. Ranchers replaced bison with "purebred" cattle. The human landscape also 
hybridized as the federal government confined American Indians to reservations and "native" 
Americans and immigrants from northern and eastern Europe resettled the land. Claims about 
nature were tied to social and political goals and were disconnected from the actual hybrid 
nature. Efforts to return areas to antediluvian forest would only add another hybrid layer to 
the landscape. 
While foresters began constructing a new landscape, the political context of 
conservation underwent a series of changes. When President Roosevelt established the 
Nebraska reserves in 1902, conservation was beginning to gain popular appeal. Between 
1904 and 1908 both Democrats and Republicans competed to display their conservation 
credentials. This had concrete consequences for Nebraska. On 10 March 1906, President 
Roosevelt created the North Platte Reserve, comprising 347,170 acres, north of the North 
Platte River in Grant and Arthur Counties, Nebraska. The following year Pinchot relabeled 
the nation's "forest reserves" as "national forests" to better indicate their purpose as 
utilitarian forests rather than preserves. Suddenly and with little opposition, the Forest 
Service had three forests in Nebraska.51 
By 1910, however, political and public support for the Forest Service had ebbed. 
Pinchot's aggressive promotion of his agency and conservation in general produced a 
backlash. Much of this opposition came from westerners who feared that eastern 
conservationists were interfering with their plans for development. The 1907 act establishing 
national forests also ended Presidential authority to create new national forests in six western 
states. President Roosevelt's successor, William Tafit, also curbed the conservation 
movement further by appointing Richard Ballinger to head the Department of Interior. When 
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Pinchot, a bureau chief, and Secretary Ballinger, clashed over Alaskan coal claims in 1910, 
Taft replaced Pinchot with acting chief Albert Potter. Later that year, Henry Graves became 
the official chief of the Forest Service, and during his tenure from 1910 to 1920 the 
watchwords were retrenchment and economy, not expansion. On the Plains, the Forest 
Service continued its reserve program, but it lost interest in other experimental programs run 
through the state experiment stations. The Office of Dry Land Agriculture within the Bureau 
of Plant Industry largely assumed these activities (See Chapter 3).52 
Congressional hostility to the Nebraska National Forests also erupted in 1910. The 
initial attack was directed at the Forest Service in general. Many members of Congress 
believed that the Service spent far too much money, and the Nebraska forests were easy 
targets. James Latta of Nebraska explained, "in my state ... you appropriate $18,000 for the 
maintenance of a national reserve. You can buy all the timber on that reserve for less than 
$5000." Latta did not see how the forests could both be used for grazing and growing trees 
since the cows and sheep would destroy them. Forest Service supporters argued that "the 
purpose of the reservation ... [was] to determine whether or not it might be possible to 
reforest land in that region." Latta responded rhetorically, "is it not cheaper and better if you 
want to grow timber to put it on land that will produce timber in a reasonable time? That land 
is so poor it will not grow a merchantable saw log in five hundred years. [Laughter.]"53 
The Kansas National Forest also generated criticism. This was particularly acute at 
hearings before a congressional subcommittee in June 1911. Part of this criticism was the 
familiar refrain that operation costs far outweighed potential benefits, but the committee also 
received evidence suggesting that the Forest Service wasted seeds and planted at the wrong 
time of the year. Although Congressmen had occasionally offered unsolicited advice about 
tree planting, this was the first time they challenged the expertise of the Forest Service over 
Plains forestry. Unprepared for the criticism, acting Assistant Forester, Earle Clapp denied 
the allegations but promised to look into the matter further. The result of his inquiry 
undermined the evidence put before the committee, but was not particularly satisfying. The 
Kansas Forest had cost much less to plant per acre than what had been alleged at the 
committee hearings, but it still ran over $10 an acre with just labor and seedlings counted as a 
cost. To claims that the foresters planted at the wrong time of year, the State Forester from 
Kansas informed Clapp that they had "every reason to believe that spring or summer sowing 
will prove the most satisfactory." Neither the cost nor the scientific uncertainty should have 
been a surprise in such a new and difficult endeavor, but these were weak and uncomfortable 
responses before a skeptical Congress.54 
The Forest Service did retain supporters in Congress. Nebraska representative George 
Norris defended the forests as experimental but treaded on treacherous ice by suggesting that 
"in my judgment... good timber could be raised if water could be supplied." Such a hope 
was not only unrealistic, since water supplies were limited in the Sandhills and the sandy soil 
made irrigation problematic, but it was also illogical since the effort would hardly be justified 
for the limited profit. Norris was using an end to justify the means. He wanted to see the 
forest and state prosper, and he willfully disregarded the fact that the land would be far more 
valuable in crops than in timber, even if water were available.55 
Perhaps sensing the vulnerability of this argument, Norris also argued that trees 
would improve the conditions for agriculture. He gave Congress a personal example from his 
own district, where he was "shown a mountain of white sand as high as the ceiling of this 
room, and there was a man living close by who was cultivating land worth $75 an acre 
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growing as good alfalfa as ever grew upon ground. They had planted these scrub trees, which 
held the sand, and made good soil where there was nothing but barren area." This, Norris 
believed, was what the Forest Service was trying to do with its forests. "If scrub trees would 
grow, it would gradually redeem a country now almost worthless." Edmond Madison of 
Kansas, whose district included a part of the sandhill forests of that state, added his support 
for the Nebraska forests by explaining that "people out on those treeless Plains want to be 
told and have demonstrated to them what trees will grow there, and the influence in this 
forest is becoming to be [sic] felt all over the south-western portion of Kansas." Madison 
died in office the next year, but the 7th District he represented would be at the heart of the 
Dust Bowl.56 
Some senior representatives were even more direct in their belief that trees had 
modified the environment of the Plains. William Reeder of Kansas explained that farmers in 
western Kansas had quit irrigating "because our cultivation and tree planting have produced 
such an atmospheric condition that the rains come more frequently." He argued that if pines 
and cedars were planted in the sandhills, and the land then cultivated, it would render the 
country as fertile as eastern sections of the state. Reeder had made his fortune in Kansas by 
buying cheap land during the troubles of the early 1890s and then creating one of the largest 
irrigated tracts in Kansas. It undoubtedly bolstered his perception that rainfall had been 
particularly heavy in 1909.57 
Perhaps what was most surprising about these assertions was not that politicians 
believed trees might influence climate, but that they believed afforestation on the Plains had 
already improved conditions. Just as optimistic boomers in the 1870s and 1880s had believed 
that tree planting and plowing improved climate, members of the most powerful law making 
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body in the nation argued in 1910 that tree planting was improving climate even though few 
trees had actually been planted. Every member of the body had lived through the excessive 
optimism of the 1880s and the droughts of the 1890s, but the return of relatively good rainfall 
quickly revived dreams that humans could change the climate for good. 
A few observers remained more discriminating. The representative of the district that 
encompassed all three of the forests in Nebraska, Moses Kinkaid, was only partial in his 
praise. Kinkaid visited the Dismal River Forest in 1907 and, according to Charles Scott, 
came away impressed. Kinkaid believed that trees would grow on the Sandhills, and he 
brought up the example of the old Bruner plantation as proof. He pointed out that the 
plantation trees had quickly reached a mature size despite the poor soil of the Sandhills, yet 
he was not as happy with the creation of the North Platte Forest. The Bureau of Forestry had 
submitted the request for the forest before he could object, and now land that seemed suitable 
for settlement had been locked up. Kinkaid argued that the Forest Service had overreached 
itself with the creation of the North Platte Forest, and he was receiving "many requests" to 
open the forest to homesteading.58 
Congressman Kinkaid had staked his name on homesteading in western Nebraska, 
and support for the North Platte Forest quickly withered under his influence. The Kinkaid 
Act of 1904 allowed settlers in western Nebraska to take up 640 acre enlarged homesteads. 
Although in later years a 640-acre homestead would seem too small to support a family, in 
the 1900s this appeared generous and new settlers rapidly took up much of western 
Nebraska. By the 1910s the North Platte Forest had become an undeveloped island in a sea of 
hungry settlers, and the Forest Service seemed to have plenty of land in the Dismal and 
Niobrara Forests to practice forestry for the foreseeable future. In the face of this pressure, 
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Congress opened the North Platte Forest to homesteading on 1 March 1913. At a stroke, the 
total area of the reservations in Nebraska fell by well over half. In some ways though, the 
loss of the North Platte Forest was an advantage because the Forest Service could no longer 
afford to administer so much territory since the budget for the forests had also declined 
precipitously, from $18,000 in 1910 to $2,919.59 
Concern over the path and success of the forests also grew within the Forest Service. 
The difficulty of planting meant that trees would never be as widespread or significant as 
hoped. The most optimistic congressmen might believe that the forests were already 
modifying the climate, but that enthusiasm was difficult to maintain among foresters who 
measured plantings in hundreds of acres. In 1909 the most successful forest, the Dismal 
River, had about 300,000 living trees spread over 865 acres, but in 1910 a prairie fire burned 
several hundred acres of the forest. At Niobrara and North Platte results were even slimmer 
with acres counted in the dozens. The Kansas Forest had several hundred acres planted, but 
by 1911 these were in extremely poor condition, and a drought that year killed almost all the 
broad leaf species, which had been the forest's primary species. It seemed that trees were the 
clear losers in the battle to transform the Great Plains. Their dead trunks marked the field of 
battle like headstones. Though it does not appear in the records, it must have crossed the 
mind of some foresters that money spent in Nebraska or Kansas, building forests against 
difficult odds, might have put far more trees into the ground if spent on a region where trees 
grew naturally.60 
The least known of the Plains forests, the Dakota National Forests, also failed to meet 
Forest Service expectations. At 13,930 acres, the forest was the smallest and least publicized 
of the Plains reserves. In part this was because 3,762 acres of it were already covered with 
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pine trees. This made it a more "logical" forest than the others, and its isolated location in the 
badlands of Slope County, North Dakota also helped by limiting pressure from outside 
forces. Although on a much smaller scale, operations preceded there much as in Nebraska. 
Foresters set up a small nursery at Deep Creek to supply seedlings and received additional 
seedlings from other locations. Most supplies came by mule until 1913, when the station 
obtained a Model T Ford. Forester Francis Cobb relates that "trees were planted in plowed 
furrows in the sod, on contours where hilly" using a planting crew similar to Nebraska. 
Despite the presence of natural growth, the Forest Service had little success in growing 
seedlings and discontinued operations and relinquished the land to the state in 1917.61 
The Forest Service was concerned enough about the future of the national forests on 
the Plains, and the internal criticism they generated, that in 1909 it sent Raphael Zon to 
survey the Nebraska forests. The Service could simply have requested a progress update from 
personnel on the ground, but there was enough concern over the forest's future that they 
needed someone with a strong theoretical and research background. Zon had risen rapidly 
within the Bureau of Forestry since his appointment as a "student assistant" in 1901. Not 
only had he become a close friend and confidant of Pinchot, he had also turned his small 
office into "the first cradle and treasure house of forest research in America." His interest and 
abilities led to his appointment as chief of the Office of Silvics in 1907, from which he 
continued to advocate an increased role for research within the Forest Service. In the spring 
1909, Zon took up the challenge of the Plains forests, and found himself in a line of research 
that would periodically consume him for the rest of his career.62 
Zon was never short on criticism or advice, and his report stood out for its honesty 
about forest conditions. He realized that one of the primary problems facing Plains forestry 
was imagery. National forests needed to look successful. Previous reports had always 
justified the plantings as an attempt to show that tree culture was possible, but forests that 
looked barren and patchy could easily discourage tree culture. Zon remarked: "what 
impressed me most sadly is the unconscious attempt of emphasizing our failure to enormous 
proportions by planting every year new areas (this year about 125 acres) regardless of the 
fact that plantations of the previous years were almost in every case a complete failure." Zon 
was shocked to see miles of plowed Sandhills with very few trees growing in the furrows. 
His solution was to use all available stock and labor for replanting. Zon expressed many 
other concerns about the quality of the planting stock and methods of planting. He argued 
that the Halsey nursery was a mistake that should be abandoned, but his chief explanation 
was nature: the "lack of success in plantings on the sand hills is deficient moisture and strong 
desiccating winds."63 
Although Zon did not realize it, he had charted the essential future of the national 
forests on the Plains. Until the crisis of the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, there would be no more 
grand plans to cover wide areas with trees. Foresters would concentrate instead on improving 
methods, reforming failures, ending controversial forests, and gradually expanding remaining 
forests. The forests and nurseries would serve as important training and research centers, but 
they would never regain significant institutional support from within the Forest Service or 
Congress. The North Platte Forest had been the first to go in 1913. The Kansas National 
Forest suffered a similar fate from President Woodrow Wilson in 1915, and the Dakota 
National Forest followed two years later. The Forest Service debated adding the Niobrara 
Forest to the list of failed reserves, but decided not to push the issue either way. The 
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establishment of a nursery there in 1914, its proximity to the Dismal River Forest, and the 
lack of any public outcry helped insure its survival.64 
Despite the setbacks, foresters did not stand still on the two remaining reserves in 
Nebraska. Their efforts to develop satisfactory nursery and planting techniques began to pay 
dividends, and at the silver anniversary held in Halsey in 1927, the forest's supervisor could 
proudly point to "nearly 12,000 acres of this area successfully planted, and the work is being 
continued at the rate of 1000 acres per year." Foresters could also point to new nursery 
techniques they had helped pioneer that had produced enough seedlings to continue both 
planting on the Sandhills and distribute to local farmers under the Kinkaid Act of 1911 (See 
Chapter 3). Clearly, much of the success foresters had in increasing their survival rates came 
from improved techniques and seedlings, but to that list should also have been added 
improved natural conditions. After the drought year of 1910 and with the exception of 1916, 
Nebraska enjoyed relatively wet weather until 1931. Rainfall was particularly heavy in 1915 
and even the 1916 crop year benefited from reasonably good summer conditions. The role of 
nature would not become obvious, however, until foresters applied their improved methods 
without the support of natural conditions.65 
Acres planted were not the only way to measure a forest's success. The paper that 
John Hatton presented at the silver anniversary illustrated the point. For Hatton, it was the 
ritual and camaraderie of the anniversary—outdoors under the very trees it came to 
celebrate—that mattered. He argued that the question of profits was "not the only 
consideration in our country's reforestation or afforestation needs." Instead, he offered a 
more personal sense of valuation: "I can see groves and shelters when all that come to me are 
the joyous caroling of birds, the chirp of squirrels, the scurrying of rabbits, the contentment 
of farm animals, and the sweet voices of children enjoying their friendliness and shade." In 
tones reminiscent of George Perkins Marsh or J. Sterling Morton, Hatton told the audience 
"we must not overlook the contentment, the contributions to spiritual good, to character and 
citizenship building, for these are wealth, the richest of all possessions." Hatton had found 
his own reasons to advocate forestry on the Plains, but these were a significant departure 
from strictly economic arguments.66 
The grand design of converting one-third or one-quarter of the Plains into forests 
faded rapidly when confronted with the reality of social and natural constraints. The return of 
settlers to the Plains after economic and natural conditions improved in the later half of the 
1890s made the reservation of large areas for forestry, let alone forestry experiments, 
politically unpopular. The four reserves created by President Theodore Roosevelt were the 
high point of the Plains forest reserve movement, not its beginning. The failure cannot be 
entirely blamed on a lack of public support. The reserves themselves were difficult and 
expensive, so much so that even the Forest Service began to question their future. Barring 
another natural disaster, institutional, public, and governmental will for big forestry simply 
withered during the 1910s and 1920s. 
The reserves may not have succeeded in some of their wildest goals, but they created 
an institutional and financial framework for federal Plains forestry. Forest Service experts 
working at the reserves developed their own techniques and perspectives on Plains forestry. 
Some, like Raphael Zon, never abandoned their belief in climatic change or the role that 
forestry could play in transforming the Great Plains. Zon would continue to build his case 
about forests and climate while increasing the role of the Forest Service in research on Plains 
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forestry, but most others eventually abandoned claims about climate, and developed a more 
constrained, agronomic perspective. 
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Chapter Three—Science Professionalized : the early science and politics of 
Plains forestry 
In the decades following 1890, scientific forestry on the Plains emerged as the 
concern of a wider audience than just the Forest Service. State experiment stations, 
agricultural colleges, and a growing bureaucracy of agricultural scientists sought to stabilize 
and standardize farm methods. By the mid-1890s they had added farm forestry to their list of 
solutions to the "farm problem." For these researchers, trees were simply one of many tools 
to improve farm life, whether that was by slowing winds around farm houses or providing 
firewood and fence posts. At the same time they remained skeptical of sweeping claims 
about the value of afforestation. In part, they wanted to distance their discipline from the wild 
claims about trees and climate of the 1870s and 1880s, but their skepticism also reflected 
fundamentally different goals. Agricultural scientists wanted to improve the economic and 
social conditions of farming, and to modernize what they perceived as archaic practices and 
habits. Growing trees would always only be a small part of that agenda.1 
Institutional conflicts were also part of a growing trend towards professionalization of 
the sciences. Political scientist Stephen Skowronek explained that the burgeoning influence 
of professionals corresponded with the increasing popularity of governmental reform, and 
was a partnership between professionals and politicians. Professionals ran and staffed the 
growing bureaucracies, which made it possible to control the increasingly complex state and 
economy. However, as professionals divided into various bureaucratic institutions, each with 
its separate agenda, they lost their ability to speak with a unified voice. Foresters' 
disagreements over theoretical and practical issues were complicated by struggles for 
political recognition for the profession and, eventually, battles with soil scientists for control 
of trees, money, and objectives.2 
While deeply entangled in its myriad duties on the nation's forests, the Forest Service 
continued to support some Plains forestry research and planting. Most Forest Service 
researchers, like their agricultural scientist peers, began to doubt earlier theories of climatic 
change, yet they did not abandon trees as a tool for modifying Plains landscape. Like 
agricultural scientists, they looked to the wind-slowing effect of trees as a potential tool, but 
their plans showed a bias toward forests creation rather than wind reduction. The Forest 
Service was institutionally a forestry agency, and it had difficulty adapting as an agricultural 
service agency. Foresters also believed they had good reasons for their preferences: trees 
created the conditions for their own existence, farmers often lacked the interest and skills to 
make forestry work, only forests could provide merchantable timber to help relieve the 
nation's "timber famine," and tree distribution programs seemed designed more to please 
politicians and their constituents than to transform the Great Plains. Thus, foresters' 
institutional perspective and scientific leanings divided them from researchers with a more 
agronomic perspective and from the farmer clientele they both sought to serve.3 
A few Forest Service researchers harbored even more radical differences with 
agricultural scientists as well as other foresters. Although they were every bit as dedicated to 
scientific precision as their peers, a small group of foresters remained theoretically wedded to 
the late-nineteenth-century social forestry theories about trees and climate that had spawned 
the Timber Culture Act and Plains forest reserves. These foresters favored massive projects 
that would transform the very nature of the Plains. Planting sporadic windbreaks and 
encouraging municipalities to plant trees, while good for public relations, could never 
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fundamentally alter the landscape. The cooperative plantings embodied in the Kinkaid and 
Clarke-McNary Acts were a poor solution because they lacked bureaucratic control and 
depended on private initiatives. Only an ambitious forestry program, run centrally by a 
government agency could alter the landscape sufficiently to test climatic theories. Although 
on the Great Plains big projects and direct federal control fit with climatic views, such plans 
also reflected the conservation agenda put forward by Gifford Pinchot and others who 
promoted aggressive regulatory policies during the 1920s. 
President Taft had ousted Pinchot as head of the Forest Service in 1910, but Pinchot 
continued to be an influential political force and advocate of federal regulation. Historian 
Harold Steen agued that Pinchot saw his dismissal as an opportunity to promote conservation 
to the public "unencumbered by government regulations." By the 1920s he was once again in 
government, first on the Pennsylvania Forest Commission and then as a two-term governor 
of Pennsylvania. Pinchot also maintained contact with his allies within the Forest Service. 
Historian Char Miller explained, "Pinchot's veiled authority had been immediately reflected 
in what the press believed to be Taft's fortuitous selection of Henry S. Graves, then dean of 
the School of Forestry at Yale, to be the second chief of the Forest Service. Actually, there 
was nothing fortuitous about his choice of one of Pinchot's oldest friends and closest 
colleagues—the disgraced chief had helped arrange it." Pinchot and Graves grew apart 
during the 1920s because of Pinchot's meddling in Forest Service politics, and what Pinchot 
perceived as Graves' lack of support for federal regulation. Graves' replacement, William 
Greeley, had even less interest in promoting regulation. He instead developed a cooperative 
model of forest management that mirrored Republican Party platforms of the era. However, 
even on the outside, Pinchot continued to maintain close ties with other Forest Service 
personnel, including Raphael Zon, with whom he felt a shared sense of purpose.4 
Of Pinchot's supporters within the Service, Zon was the most outspoken and visible 
advocate of climatic influences and federal control. In the 1920s he led Forest Service 
opposition to Greeley's cooperative forestry agenda. Politically sidelined by Greeley because 
of his opposition, Zon reemerged instead as one of the Forest Service's top scientists and, as 
late as the 1930s, continued to argue that trees could influence climate. While clearly in the 
minority of opinion, Zon remained an influential voice within the Service from both a 
bureaucratic and scientific standpoint. Drawing inspiration from him, other researchers 
working on Plains forestry also argued variations of the trees-and-climate theme, as well as 
alternative schemes, that would result in planting enough trees to ameliorate the Plains 
climate. 
Of all the scientific agendas that Plains foresters promoted, the most problematic was 
the connection of trees to climate. Initially the drought and economic crisis of the early 1890s 
seemed a fatal discredit to climatic theories. The idea that links between trees and climate 
ended with the crisis of the early 1890s has dominated the historiography of Plains 
afforestation. Geographer Michael Williams recently perpetuated this historiographical 
misconception by claiming that "the exceptionally dry years of 1889-90 showed that planting 
in this part of the country did nothing to ameliorate the climate," but views on trees and 
climate remained considerably more complex than this.5 
Although the early 1890s did crush the most facile theories of climate change, trees-
and-climate had much greater staying power than ideas such as rain-follows-the-plow. The 
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public and some foresters believed that Plains forestry had never been given a fair chance, 
and they argued, accurately enough, that the crisis of the 1890s could not be blamed on the 
failure of trees to modify the climate because far too few trees had been planted to test the 
theory. Bemhard Fernow and then Raphael Zon continued to support versions of this link 
well into the twentieth century, despite their recognition that the idea had lost most 
professional support. Perhaps even more significant was that the general public never 
completely lost its belief in the link either, and as late as the 1930s many Americans, still 
thought that trees could influence climate. 
Adding to the confusion, the exact meaning of "climate change" underwent its own 
modifications. Originally many Americans had hoped that forests would increase rainfall. By 
the 1890s most supporters, and all who valued their credentials as scientific experts, grew far 
more cautious in their pronouncements. In his 1891 report on forestry, Fernow largely 
avoided the question of whether forestry could directly affect climate. He instead vaguely 
noted that "there is a very peculiar and intimate connection between vegetation (especially 
forest vegetation) and climatic conditions ... [Tjthere is also a reaction of vegetation upon 
climatic conditions, and this truth is strikingly expressed by the poet, who speaks of 'Africa's 
arid sands, where nothing grows because it does not rain, and where it does not rain because 
there nothing grows.'"6 
Two years later Fernow articulated more clearly the current state of science on trees 
and climate. His remarks bore the hallmarks of the continuing ambivalence about trees-and-
climate. On the one hand he admitted that the possibility of large-scale climatic changes, or 
"cosmic" effects, were unlikely and speculative, and he attributed most such claims to 
"popular writers on forestry, friends of forestry reform, and the public mind." On the other 
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hand, Fernow advocated a more balanced and scientific study of the potential effects of 
forests on climate because "there are as trustworthy and careful observers who maintain the 
existence of such influences." Having left the issue unsettled, Fernow went on to describe the 
known effects of forests on "the local modification of climate conditions."7 
The more Fernow tried to clarify the subject, the murkier it became. The phrase "local 
modifications" was less than transparent, and in the hands of some pundits it was becoming 
code for wider ranging effects. The continuing premise was that a sufficient percentage of 
afforested land could produce cumulative "local modifications" that would have a result 
similar to "cosmic" changes. For Fernow the question was "whether we can alter these 
[temperature and moisture] conditions on a larger scale by such means as alternating forest 
areas and fields or by large bodies of forest." This was not a simple appeal to trees increasing 
rainfall, but the basis for a controlled scientific experiment in landscape change: 
We are not so much concerned as to whether the total rainfall over the 
continent is increased, but whether the distribution of precipitation in time and 
quantity over and near a forest area is influenced by its existence; whether we 
or our crops feel its absence or presence in our immediate neighborhood; 
whether the protection it seems to afford and the changes it seems to produce 
in the meteorological phenomena are or are not real and of sufficient 
magnitude to influence our forest policy. 
Fernow cautioned that these deductions were far from proven, yet he insisted that there were 
enticing "results obtained in the forest station at Lintzel, which seem to show that forest-
planting did, under the conditions there prevailing, produce a considerable change in 
meteorological conditions."8 
Although Fernow was guardedly optimistic, most scientists remained unpersuaded. 
M. W. Harrington, chief of the Weather Bureau, and meteorologists Cleveland Abbe and 
George Curtis also contributed to the 1893 forest influences report. Their arguments varied in 
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subtle ways, but they all agreed that it was unlikely trees influenced climate or that, if they 
did, it was only by a very small amount. And this was Fernow's friendly audience. 
Researchers at the US Geological Survey and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
had already come out with much stronger rebukes. The Geological Survey studied data from 
twenty-four weather stations and concluded there was no evidence of any increase in rainfall 
from tree planting. An MIT study reexamined George Perkins Marsh's Man and Nature and 
concluded there were no scientifically verifiable cases of forests increasing rainfall.9 
Despite the many critics, however, some foresters continued to suspect trees might 
influence climate, whether through a slight "cosmic" effect or, more probably, local effects 
writ large. An 1898 Division of Forestry publication on Plains forestry revealed that the issue 
was far from dead. Bulletin 18 was a sober analysis of the difficulties faced by Plains tree 
culture, but Fernow displayed a continued interest in trees and climate. He opened by arguing 
that "forests subserve [sic] two purposes: supply of most necessary raw material, and 
amelioration of the conditions of climate and water flow." On the Plains "protection, then, 
amelioration of climate, is the principal object of forest planting in these regions." Fernow's 
introduction formed a brief part of the bulletin, and he was probably already more concerned 
with his upcoming move to lead the new Forestry Department at Cornell University, but his 
salvo cast a lasting, if ambiguous, illumination on the subject.10 
Fernow's usage of "amelioration" caused considerable misunderstanding. Those who 
doubted claims that trees influenced climate took such words as a code for outdated theories 
that trees increased rainfall. Fernow almost surely meant something different, and was 
instead expanding on his "localized modification" theory of 1893. By the later half of the 
decade, Fernow and Division of Forestry scientists were piecing together how localized 
effects might have wide-ranging results without resorting to easily discredited claims about 
increasing rainfall. First there would be localized changes such as the wind slowing effect of 
a grove or windbreak. Farmers who had successfully planted windbreaks around farmsteads 
could testify that indeed windbreaks had "ameliorated" the climate around their home. Thus 
Fernow had carefully chosen the word to suggest, at least potentially, the role forests might 
play in other aspects of the hydrological cycle, but lacking a simple sentence clarifying that 
"ameliorate" meant only the localized wind slowing effect, confusing misinterpretations 
persisted.11 
A clue to what Fernow might have had in mind by wider ameliorative effects was in 
another section of Bulletin 18, written by assistant chief forester Charles Keffer. Discussing 
the value of afforestation to Western agriculture, Keffer explained that "tree tops will protect 
the surface of the soil, which ... will become much more absorptive than when protected 
only by the slight covering of grasses which nature has placed there." The additional 
absorptive capacity of the soil tree groves would act like a giant sponge, and the moisture 
would be "available to the surrounding fields." Keffer's sponge theory was typical of 
forester's conception of how Plains forestry could benefit farmers. He was barkening back to 
Land Commissioner Wilson's plea to cover one third of the Plains with trees, but instead of 
arguing that tree planting would increase rainfall, Keffer envisioned forests as reservoirs. 
This was perfectly in keeping with more credible theories about the value of forests to 
watersheds in other parts of the nation, where reserving areas to protect water supplies was 
common and popular.12 
Division of Forestry personnel avoided public discussion of the trees-and-climate 
issue following Femow's departure, but Raphael Zon, who had been a student of Femow's at 
Cornell in the early 1900s, reasserted the forests-and-climate theory as he established himself 
in the new Forest Service. At the 1911 meeting of the Society of American Foresters, Zon 
presented a paper titled: "The Relation of Forests in the Atlantic Plain to the Humidity of the 
Central States and Prairie Region." Zon began by arguing that deforestation of the Atlantic 
seaboard could have a significant influence on the circulation of water vapor. His contention 
was that much of the atmospheric moisture derived from continental sources, and he believed 
that while the eastern United States received most of its moisture from evaporation from the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, as the air moved inland and lost moisture to 
precipitation, continental evaporation became more important to areas further inland. Forests 
absorbed and expired precipitation, and like exhaust steam that moisture reentered 
continental circulation. If water were allowed to run-off and enter streams or soak into the 
aquifer, then areas further inland would receive proportionately less rain. At the time, there 
was little precise knowledge about global circulation patterns, and while many scientists 
were beginning to suspect that oceans played the primary role in adding water vapor to 
global circulation, the exact relation between continental and oceanic sources remained 
unknown. There was also imperfect knowledge about the total amount of water in 
circulation, so Zon's argument that oceanic evaporation "ran out" as it moved inland 
remained plausible. Additionally, there was little unequivocal evidence that forests reduced 
run-off more than tilled or pasture lands. Proving forests could influence run-off became a 
major Forest Service goal, but it was highly contested territory in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
exact effect of vegetation on rainfall remains contested. Roger A. Pielke Sr., an atmospheric 
scientist, has recently suggested that forested landscapes influence the formation of 
thunderstorms and therefore rainfall. Zon's greatest error was of proportion. He 
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underestimated the amount of water vapor in circulation and therefore the ability of small 
changes in continental evaporation to have a perceptible effect on the entire hydrological 
cycle.13 
While cooperating with the National Waterway Commission the following year, Zon 
began to work on Forests and Water in the Light of Scientific Investigation, in which he 
reviewed much of the available literature and found that most reports "demonstrate beyond 
doubt that the amount of precipitation over forests is greater." Zon noted that "this excess of 
precipitation over forested areas varies from a fraction of 1 percent to 25 percent." Although 
much of Zon's discussion was aimed at preventing deforestation, he found that the best proof 
"of the effects of forest in increasing local precipitation is afforded by observations following 
forest planting in the steppes of southern Russia." In this he not only made an explicit claim 
that forests influenced climate, but his choice of "most direct proof' focused on how 
afforestation of a dry plains had increased precipitation. Unfortunately for Zon, the increased 
precipitation over forested areas found in many of the studies he examined was indeed a 
common occurrence, but it also reflected an error in measurement. Small forest clearings 
created air currents that did draw slightly more precipitation into waiting rain gauges. Not 
until the 1930s was this phenomena widely recognized and weather researchers compensated 
with more accurate experimental methods. Thus in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
Zon's theories remained supportable.14 
Zon understood that his conclusions were controversial, but that did not restrain him 
from presenting his views to a wide audience. Forests and Water entered the Congressional 
Record in 1912, and Doubleday books published the popular science reader Science 
Remaking the World, which included a chapter by Zon setting out his theories on the 
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importance of forests to rainfall in the central United States in 1922. Then in 1927, while Zon 
was the director of the Lake States Forest Experiment Station, the Forest Service published a 
revised edition of Forests and Water. In every case Zon was careful to qualify his findings 
with the caveat that science had not reached conclusive findings on the issue, and his 
persistence revealed that the issue of trees-and-climate was far from settled after 1890, even 
within scientific circles.15 
In formal settings Zon carefully qualified his claims as theories, but privately he 
expressed little doubt that forests increased rainfall. In 1913 he undertook for the Forest 
Service a survey of forest conditions and the conservation movement in Kansas and 
Nebraska, but the resulting report seemed mostly aimed at his close friend, Gifford Pinchot, 
whose signature it bears. Zon argued that the "forests of the Appalachians and Coastal Plain 
exert a most marked influence upon the humidity of Kansas and Nebraska. Being in the 
pathway of the prevailing moist winds from the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean they 
help to carry the moisture farther into the land, and in this way increase the precipitation over 
the prairie region." This was a simplified and more positively stated version of his "The 
Relations of Forests" paper. Addressing the question of the afforestation of the Plains more 
directly, he claimed that "forests are needed, especially in the sandhills, to check the wind 
locally for preventing the further encroachment of the sand on the fertile land to the east, and 
ameliorating the dryness of the atmosphere so that the agricultural land to the east may 
receive a greater amount of precipitation." As Zon shifted from a scientific to a political 
discourse, he also moved from cautious speculation to forceful advocacy. In his mind the 
issue seemed settled: forests increased rainfall in other areas, and they could do the same for 
the Great Plains.16 
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For these reasons Zon's thinking appealed to and paralleled popular opinion. In 1914, 
A. K. Westervelt addressed a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture calling on the federal 
government to plant trees along the Missouri River as a giant windbreak and moisture 
reservoir. As the resident expert on forest influences, Zon eventually received the letter. Zon 
replied by sending to Westervelt a copy of Forests and Water and an encouraging note that 
he had "little doubt that if the prevailing winds during the summer passed over large bodies 
of timber south of Nebraska and the Dakotas and absorbed the moisture given off by the trees 
through evaporation, large quantities of moisture would be carried farther north and 
deposited in the form of rain." Little separated such a claim from tree booster Richard Elliott 
except forty years and Zon's substantial credentials as one of America's premier forest 
researchers.17 
Although Zon was the best known and most forceful advocate of forest influences on 
climate in the twentieth century, other foresters made similar claims. One of the Forest 
Service's leading researchers on Plains forestry, Carlos Bates argued: 
When the prairie regions of the Middle West were first developed the lack of 
trees was felt severely. The clear sweep of the winds across the flat plains was 
a great hindrance to agriculture, for the soil was dried out quickly by 
evaporation, and grain was lodged and orchards injured by the mechanical 
forces of the wind. Windbreaks were the only remedy, and thousands of miles 
of them were planted along roads and farm division lines. The effect of this 
planting, though only gradually felt, was very distinct; farming and living 
conditions became more favorable throughout the whole region. 
Perhaps he was only referring to aesthetic conditions, or perhaps simply local effects, but 
without greater elaboration the statement led some readers to conclude that Bates hoped for 
regional climatic changes from windbreak planting. Ten years later Bates would revisit the 
issue when the Shelterbelt Project came under criticism, and his opinion was still unclear.18 
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Bates' ambiguity was not unusual, and other sources displayed similar uncertainty. In 
1910, Scientific America published an editorial that categorically refuted any claims that trees 
influenced climate. The editorial relied on the work of Willis L. Moore, chief of the US 
Weather Bureau, who had found no evidence in the climatic record of the United States that 
deforestation had in any way reduced precipitation, let alone the ability of afforestation to 
increase it. Moore also doubted that forest cover was superior to cultivated land in its water 
retention capabilities, and stream flow measurements seemed to bear out this conclusion. 
Four years later, however, Scientific America carried an article by L. A. Foshey claiming that 
deforestation had a profound influence upon climate. Foshey was more ambiguous about the 
potential benefits of afforestation, but his findings kept the debate open.19 
The persistence of the trees-and-climate theme was a mixture of scientific and 
bureaucratic pressures. One the one hand, Fernow and Zon were making honest 
interpretations of the available scientific evidence. Extant measurements from Europe did 
indicate that trees might influence climate. The incomplete knowledge of such things as 
atmospheric circulation and albedo limited discussions of their influence to speculations. 
One the other hand, by arguing for some link—whether it be "cosmic" or local—Fernow and 
Zon were also arguing for an increased Forest Service role in managing the national 
landscape. When Fernow argued that only government could mobilize the resources 
necessary for a vast program of Plains forestry, he clearly understood that the Division of 
Forestry would likely oversee any project. Likewise, if Zon's analysis of the role of trees in 
the moisture cycle was correct, then forest preservation would have to become a national 
project; a project perfectly suited for the Forest Service. 
I l l  
Forest Service employees were not the only ones working on forestry, and researchers 
working in different institutional settings tended to come up with different explanations for 
the value of afforestation. They concentrated on versions of what Fernow called "local 
effects," with less emphasis on the potential for local effects to be anything but local. 
Working out of state agricultural colleges, state experiment stations, and the Office of Dry 
Land Agriculture, foresters C. B. Waldron and Francis Cobb developed an array of opinions 
on the needs and potential of forestry. Their solutions often sought to solve concrete 
problems of farm life. This meant a greater interest in proving that windbreaks were a paying 
investment, or on farmstead plantings protecting buildings and gardens. They de-emphasized 
timber production and experimented with narrow windbreaks that occupied little land. They 
were also more supportive of cooperative programs that offered seedlings and advice but 
depended on farmers to do the work. The increased acceptance of cooperative programs by 
agricultural scientists was partly a reflection of the conservative political goal of keeping 
government small, but it also reflected their desire to remain independent of Washington DC, 
and their dependence on state funds. Forest Service researchers, however, remained skeptical 
of agricultural scientist's forestry projects and viewed their cooperative programs and 
emphasis on local goals with suspicion. 
Many potential criticisms of both agricultural and Forest Service scientists could be 
traced back to their institutional and political perspectives. It was the job of the Forest 
Service to promote forest growth and to insure the nation's timber supply. Many in the 
Service regarded giving away seedlings as part of a long tradition of questionable 
congressional practices more akin to franking privileges than serious forestry. Experiment 
station and Office of Dry Land Agriculture programs also had their faults. Researchers at 
state experiment stations could rarely devote themselves to forestry full time because of the 
wide range of agricultural experiments underway at most stations, and the limited number of 
personal and funds to carry them out. Not only did this result in haphazard experiments, but 
they could rarely publicize forest issues. The shifting and unstable nature of their funding 
undermined studies that were, by their very nature, long-term. The cooperative farmstead 
windbreak plantings, undertaken by the Office of Dry Land Agriculture, also tended to invest 
most public money to increase the comfort of a select few farmers. Farmstead planting had 
few broad public benefits, either for future timber needs or for erosion control. 
While agricultural scientists had difficulty explaining the public benefits of 
windbreak planting, they were clear about the benefits of windbreaks to individual farmers. 
Under the leadership of Fernow, the Division of Forestry helped plan and fund a series of 
forest experiment stations after 1896. Working from land grant colleges under the auspices of 
the Hatch Act, researchers developed subtly different goals and procedures than Division 
personnel. One of these differences was a greater emphasis on the crop production benefits of 
windbreaks. In 1897, Fred Card at the University of Nebraska explained that "the great 
problem upon the Plains is that of conserving, to the utmost extent, the available moisture 
supply during the growing season." Windbreaks helped by slowing the winds, and he insisted 
that "this is their chief though never their only, use upon the Plains." Card also surveyed 
members of several state horticultural societies on their opinions about windbreaks in a self-
conscious effort to make windbreaks immediately relevant to the personal needs of farmers. 
A long decade later C. B. Waldron of the North Dakota Agricultural College also argued that 
windbreaks had multiple uses, but "the primary object of tree-planting in North Dakota has 
been and should be for protection." Windbreaks were a way to protect homes and crops at the 
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individual level, while erosion control, climatic change, and timber production were 
secondary or incidental benefits.20 
Forest Service plans were by their very nature less amenable to this type of thinking. 
If the only benefit of trees on the Plains was to slow the wind for a short distance, then large 
forest reserves were clearly a poor solution. Likewise, trees in windbreaks made timber 
production problematic. Trees would have to be harvested and replaced from within the 
windbreak if it was to retain its aerodynamic properties. Most researchers advocated 
windbreaks with a variety of species, including shrubs, but this made harvesting and 
replanting an entire windbreak even less efficient. Finally, the Forest Service personnel 
responsible for Plains forestry would have to become customer-oriented and learn to work 
with farmers on solutions to farm problems, not simply advocate wholesale afforestation. 
This would include educating farmers about planting and care but also convincing them to 
convert valuable land to trees. These challenges were essentially cultural and institutional, 
but the Forest Service personnel could never quite imagine themselves as agricultural 
scientists. Even within the realm of forestry, Plains forestry ran a poor second to working on 
the nation's "real" forests 21 
The institutional perspective of the Forest Service was particularly apparent in its 
preference for timber production. This continued long after evidence mounted that growing 
profitable timber on the Plains would be a difficult task. Carlos Bates, a graduate of the 
forestry program at the University of Nebraska, had become one of the Forest Services' lead 
afforestation researchers in the 1910s through his work at the Nebraska and Kansas National 
Forests. Both reserves experienced serious difficulties in 1912, when Bates published 
Bulletin 86. Despite the growing evidence that building forests on the Plains was expensive 
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and difficult, he devoted nearly one-third of the publication to theories on generating profits 
through timber sales. Card, Waldron, and other agricultural scientists always included at least 
a paragraph suggesting that windbreaks might provide a source of fence posts and firewood, 
but Bates went much further. He calculated hypothetical sales numbers as part of a 
windbreak's value. He also recommended planting high value species such as white and 
ponderosa pine. Bates conceptualized windbreaks as miniature planned forests that would 
slowly migrate across a field as farmers harvested the mature side as they replanted the other 
side. Neither goal was realistic. Most researchers, including Bates, found conifers difficult to 
establish and required interplanting with deciduous trees. Ironically, a properly located and 
successfully established conifer windbreak was in fact far too valuable to cut.22 
Foresters and agricultural scientists had institutionally different approaches to 
controlling erosion as well. Congress created many of the nation's national forests to protect 
water supplies and to prevent flooding. As with timber production, the Forest Service 
regarded windbreaks as another means of erosion control that might also act as water 
reservoirs—Keffer's "sponge" theory. Agricultural scientists had from time to time noted 
that windbreaks prevented erosion, but they did not boost this specifically except in extreme 
cases, such as the blow sand areas of Wisconsin. In some cases they even denied its 
significance. In a 1910 bulletin on the control of blowing soil, soil scientists E. E. Free and J. 
M. Westgate commented that "the moving of soil by wind and water, and even its final 
removal into the sea, is not in general harmful. Much good results from this process." When 
instability became a problem, there were numerous methods for controlling soil, including 
planting a cover crop or stubble mulching which left of crop residue on top of the soil to act 
as protection. Windbreaks were only a distant choice because "their cost is relatively high 
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and the percentage of idle land is considerable." Such costs would only be justified for 
protecting valuable crops "regardless of the existence or nonexistence of danger of wind 
damage to the soil." For Free, Westgate, and other agronomists, trees were often only a last 
resort.23 
While not all foresters agreed on the goals of windbreak planting, they did tend to 
favor certain solutions. One was a search for a superior tree species that would grow 
vigorously, resist disease, and survive drought. During the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, many researchers designed their windbreaks as single species stands. Sometimes 
they suggested adding shrubs or quick growing deciduous trees to protect slower growing 
conifers, but generally their idealized windbreak would be a nearly pure stand of superior 
specimens. In support of this during the 1890s, the Department of Agriculture searched the 
world for exotic species and imported the most promising for trial planting. During the 1920s 
and especially in the 1930s, foresters shifted to favoring communities of trees. They began to 
design windbreaks with numerous species that complemented each other's growth patterns 
and created a total that was greater than the sum of its parts. By the 1930s many researchers 
grew skeptical of exotic species and favored the use of natives.24 
Single species plantings only gradually gave way to mixed plantings. In 1897, Card 
encouraged farmers to identify a species that was rapid growing and vigorous enough to 
survive the Plains. By 1910, Waldron noticed that "it is impossible to get all of these qualities 
in perfect degree in any one species, it is usually advisable to use a combination of two or 
three different kinds to get best results." Experimentation continued over the next decade, 
and by 1921 some researchers recommended planting as many as nine distinct species within 
one windbreak. Under the theory that "mutual protection is afforded where large numbers are 
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put out." Fred Johnson and Francis Cobb commented that "most older plantation in the Great 
Plains have been made with but a single species," but in their opinion "the ideal shelter belt 
will contain a mixture of species." This was not yet a consensus view. Some such as Carlos 
G. Bates continued to recommend single species windbreaks—mostly it seems for timber 
production—but even he eventually became an advocate of mixed plantings.25 
Inspiring the search for how trees might act as a community was a hope that 
observations of the natural world would guide human activities. The natural tree growth on 
the Plains was a mixture of cottonwood and red cedar strewn together by time and chance. 
Somehow such combinations created the conditions for their own survival and reproduction. 
An article for Successful Farming in 1920 suggested that nature had planted trees to make 
havens of calm for other species and that "we must think about these things and adjust our 
screens as Nature suggests." Writing for the South Dakota Agricultural College, N. E. 
Hansen believed that "nature has provided trees for almost all conditions ... in our plantings 
we should work with, rather than against, nature." Popularized appeals to follow nature ran 
back at least to ancient Greece, but turning to nature for Plains foresters was not so much a 
search for ultimate truths as an incorporation of ecological theories.26 
Nebraska was an early center of ecological education. Frederic Clements developed 
his ideas of "plant associations," or the grouping of plants according to climate, while a 
student at the University of Nebraska in the 1890s. Clements and Roscoe Pound had explored 
the Sandhills and were apparently encouraged by Charles Bessey to examine the Bruner 
plantation in 1892 and 1893. While a professor at Lincoln in 1904, Clements published The 
Developmental Structure of Vegetation, in which he argued that vegetation must be 
understood in its entirety as a complex organism. The next year he published his influential 
117 
Research Methods in Ecology that outlined a program of study for ecology as a discipline. 
Eventually Clements described collections of species as starting, growing, maturing, 
reproducing, and dying together as a "superorganism." The mature phase of the process was 
popularized as the "climax" stage, and he theorized that plant communities within specific 
climates tended to reach a stable "climax" growth.27 
Critics would accuse Plains forestry of disregarding ecological knowledge, but Plains 
foresters in fact had an early exposure to ecology. Ecology was not a widely recognized 
scientific discipline in the 1900s, and foresters at Yale and Cornell had no compulsory 
exposure to the new discipline. Clements had only recently introduced it to the regular 
botanical curriculum at Lincoln. While a student at Lincoln, Bates studied with Clements, 
and later when Clements worked at the University of Minnesota he also introduced Cobb. 
Bates, of course, went on to work for the Forest Service and Cobb in Dry-Land Arboriculture 
for the Bureau of Plant Industry. Through these well-placed foresters Clements' theories 
began subtly to influence Plains forestry, but the full expression of that influence—the 
enormous wide and mixed species shelterbelts—would not flourish until the 1930s. This was 
the very moment when critics would accuse Plains foresters of not understanding Plains 
ecology. Yet many Plains foresters had already been thinking about ecology, forestry, and the 
Great Plains for several decades. They had come to a different conclusion than their critics, 
not because they lacked an ecological understanding, but because they viewed ecology as 
another forestry tool.28 
The difference in perspective between foresters and agricultural scientists was not 
universal. As with the growing emphasis on ecology, their work was often indistinguishable. 
At other times differences that appeared institutional actually reflected idiosyncratic 
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approaches. The Forest Service also became less involved with Plains forestry as the Bureau 
of Plant Industry and its Office of Dry Land Agriculture became more involved. Although 
Bates continued to publish on windbreaks after 1909, he spent much more of his time on the 
controversial Wagon Wheel Gap forest cover and stream flow experiment. This study would 
offer clues about the ability of forested land to reduce run-off—and theoretically support 
Zon's climatic theories—but it also reduced Bates' interaction with agricultural scientists and 
their work on afforestation. The growing differences between institutional approaches would 
not be revealed until the Forest Service returned to the Plains during the 1930s, however, and 
by then agricultural scientists had assumed the lead in afforestation. The Forest Service thus 
had to rebuild or borrow expertise from state laboratories and the Office of Dry Land 
Agriculture. 
Although the Forest Service grew less interested in Plains forestry, it still possessed 
two national forests in Nebraska and one of the earliest experiments with cooperative 
planting: the Kinkaid Act. In 1904, congressman Moses Kinkaid secured passage of an act 
allowing settlers in Western Nebraska to claim 640-acre extended homesteads. The act was a 
success, and within ten years settlers had taken up all but a quarter of a million acres out of 
seven million subject to entry. The land boom in Western Nebraska helped spell the end of 
the North Platte forest reserve, yet at the same time created thousands of potential 
"customers" for trees. In this way the Forest Service nursery at Halsey became an attractive 
and valuable institution in western Nebraska, where trees were a rarity. Kinkaid himself 
recognized that potential, and in 1910 secured an amendment to the Kinkaid Act authorizing 
the Forest Service to distribute "extra" seedlings not needed for its forestry program to 
surrounding farmers.29 
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When they started to distribute seedlings under the act's provisions, foresters quickly 
realized that there was no such thing as an extra tree. Nursery workers had carefully 
coordinated their plantings with planned work on the Sandhills. Some stock was deemed 
"cull" every year because of unsuitable growth habits, disease, or other factors, but unloading 
culls on unsuspecting farmers was an invitation to disaster. Fred Johnson, the forest 
supervisor at Halsey, considered it a "waste of money to wrap up trees of this kind, and a 
discouragement to tree planters who may be interested." Johnson warned that during the first 
year of distribution "if the present plans are to be carried out there is no stock available for 
distribution." Rather than disappoint local farmers, the Halsey nursery decided to distribute a 
small amount of stock. This was great for publicity, but without funding it was also a burden 
and, worse, toying with negative publicity.30 
Whatever problems the act created for the Forest Service, it was an opportunity for 
Congressman Kinkaid. He began to pass personal requests on to the Forest Service. Not only 
did this link him to trees in his constituents' minds, but it made it very difficult for the Forest 
Service to turn down requests. Kinkaid also made requests on the behalf of towns, schools, 
and other local property owners. The demand for seedlings was so strong that Kinkaid began 
questioning why the Forest Service had so few seedlings available and why they could not 
rapidly increase production so there would be sufficient seedlings the next year. Chief 
Forester Henry Graves had to explain that "it has been found by past experience that 
successful plantations of suitable species can not be started in the sandhills with trees less 
than three years of age. In other words, they must be grown in the nursery for three years 
from the time of sowing the seed before they are large enough to plant, under the arid 
conditions." Thus, even under ideal conditions, it would take several years to increase 
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production. Kinkaid responded by trying to secure a larger appropriation for the program, but 
Congress was less enthusiastic about funding a tree giveaway for western Nebraska. The 
Forest Service would have to carry the burden until Clarke-McNary Act funds became 
available in the mid-1920s.31 
The open-ended nature of the Kincaid Act, which according to its wording allowed 
distribution to any "resident," also irritated the Forest Service. When a 14-year-old boy 
applied for trees in 1915 to plant on town lots in Thedford, Nebraska, the Service tried to 
reject the request. The understanding of nursery personnel was that, while the act technically 
allowed distribution to anyone, trees should only be furnished to "heads of families or single 
persons who either own land or hold it under homestead entry." The District Forester in 
Denver was no more certain than the nursery personnel how to handle the request, but he 
thought it seemed "logical to suppose that the object of the Act... was to furnish trees to 
homesteaders ... or occupy[ed] lands within the District... for the purpose of developing the 
farms and creating an interest among the agricultural residents in the growing of trees." The 
Denver office doubted that Congress intended to apply the act to towns or ornamental 
planting. If trees were distributed too loosely, they might end up subsidizing a burgeoning 
resale industry. Washington's eventual conclusion was that the lack of clear wording of the 
act meant that the Service had to interpret it liberally and distribute seedlings to any resident. 
If trees were to be planted in a town, however, "town officials or responsible associations" 
would have to make the request. There is no record whether the boy from Thedford ever 
received his trees.32 
Although historians have concluded that the act was a successful addition to Forest 
Service activities in Nebraska, at the time it caused considerable disarray. In 1913, Johnson 
121 
complained to the Assistant Forester "the Kinkaid distribution has reached the point where it 
constitutes a distinct drain upon our appropriation and may readily prevent doing as much 
reforestation work on the Halsey National Forest as otherwise would be desirable." It was not 
just the drain of valuable seedlings that concerned Johnson. The large volume of 
correspondence created havoc with office routines. Johnson asked for an extra appropriation 
from Washington to cover the costs of the seedlings, a partial covering of facilities, and a full 
time clerk to handle shipping and receiving. The act in effect siphoned already razor thin 
resources to a haphazard planting program for local farmers. Washington remained 
unsympathetic, and it instructed Johnson to segregate his funds and stock to support planting 
and distribution under the Kinkaid Act.33 
Foresters were also disappointed by the motivations of farmers. In 1915, Johnson cut 
back the number of trees sent to individual applicants from 350 to 150 on the grounds that 
"many applicants were attracted simply by the possibility of acquiring something for 
nothing." He was upset that only about half the recipients sent in the required follow-up 
reports. Johnson hoped that by limiting the number of trees, farmers would be forced to 
reevaluate and rededicate themselves. These frustrations were likely exacerbated when 
Johnson had to report that "the amount of stock on hand was not sufficient to plant the area 
required by the reforestation plan." Farmers seemed to waste valuable Forest Service trees 
that should have been contributing to their afforestation plans.34 
Bowing to the inevitable in 1915, Johnson developed a policy to meet both forest 
planting needs and distribution needs. He made permanent the policy of sending reduced 
numbers of seedlings. In his eyes, the Kinkaid program "should be conducted to stimulate 
interest of settlers in tree growing and not to supply sufficient to raise large woodlots." 
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Sensing what would become a conflict between federal and private nurseries, Johnson hoped 
that farmers would instead purchase additional trees from commercial nurseries. If the Forest 
Service distribution program served simply to interest farmers in tree planting and then 
encouraged them to buy substantial stock from private sources, not only would the burden on 
the Halsey nursery be reduced but local commercial nurseries would be less likely to criticize 
the Forest Service for unfair competition. Johnson also expanded the Halsey nursery to 
provide 200,000 "extra" trees a year by 1917, and he wanted to establish a permanent 
inspection process. He wanted one of his foresters to visit participating farms and determine 
the success of plantations. This would help to eliminate the need for planting reports from 
farmers, who tended not to complete reports, and to provide valuable information on tree 
culture.35 
The wrench in the works, however, was the constant need for greater funding. The 
Kinkaid Act was the Forest Service's first foray into cooperative planting on the Plains, and 
many of its early troubles seemed predictable. Foresters came to Nebraska to build a forest, 
not to run themselves ragged helping farmers. The design of the act and its lack of funding 
ensured, at least at first, that the two goals would conflict. Although the program eventually 
became popular with everyone concerned, and was widely regarded as a success, its early 
trials were particularly troubling in light of the distribution program begun by the Office of 
Dry Land Agriculture in North Dakota. 
The Bureau of Plant Industry established the Office of Dry Land Agriculture in 1905 
to tackle agricultural problems on the Great Plains. The Office of Dry Land Agriculture 
divided the Plains into three regions and established major experiment stations within each, 
along with substations in adjoining areas. The Northern Great Plains division, based at 
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Mandan, North Dakota, began cooperative tree planting programs with area farmers in 1915. 
The Southern Great Plains station at Woodward, Oklahoma, followed one year later. Both 
stations provided trees under a cooperative agreement that required farmers to prepare the 
land, do the planting, and care for the trees according to instructions provided by the stations. 
Both stations used the program to gather experimental data about planting sites, soil types, 
species selection, row requirements, and windbreak effects. Although the program was small 
and labor intensive, by 1937 the Office of Dry Land Agriculture could boast of more than 
4,000 cooperative plantings, representing over 6,000,000 trees on the Great Plains.36 
The experiment stations also conducted their own nursery work and experimental 
plantings, but these tasks complemented rather than complicated their cooperative programs. 
From the start the stations designed their nursery operations to distribute stock to local 
farmers. Station experiments were modest and only required a small portion of the output of 
the nursery. Likewise, managing and reporting on cooperative plantings was seen as part of 
the daily tasks of researchers, along with nursery labors and experimental activities. 
Designed as a farm service program with the funds and bureaucratic infrastructure to handle 
that task, the Office of Dry Land Agriculture project became an example of how to 
implement cooperative tree planting. 
The North Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station epitomized this pragmatic farmer-
oriented policy. The station encouraged a vigorous role for its scientists in solving North 
Dakota's farm troubles. Historian David Danbom argued that this was because North Dakota 
had few scientists and, by necessity, researchers were drawn to a wide variety of fields. This 
suited the early staff at the station, which had trained broadly and felt compelled to assist in 
North Dakota's immediate problems. Waldron was a good example of this thinking. He had 
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trained as a horticulturalist-entomologist but published on forestry and other farm issues, and 
he became a local leader in the Country Life Movement, which emphasized the need to 
beautify the farm home to make healthier and happier farm families. Predictably, Waldron 
began investigating how trees could be used to further his goals and then advocating an 
active role for the station in beautifying North Dakota.37 
The successes of the Mandan program caught the attention of Forest Service 
researchers. By 1915, Johnson had modified Forest Service procedures at Halsey to imitate 
Office of Dry Land Agriculture procedures at Mandan. He would have modified them further 
to include hiring an inspector, as did Mandan, but the Forest Service lacked the necessary 
funds. Foresters continued to watch with anxiety as the Mandan program expanded, and in 
1921, John Hatton wrote the Chief Forester that: 
It occurs to me that the Service has no idea of the extent to which the 
shelterbelt planting at the Mandan Station is growing. To some extent it is a 
duplication of work which has been done by the Forest Service and it 
threatens to crowd out a true function of the Forest Service on the plains 
region. It has been the experience of several men in this office who have come 
in contact with the officials at the Mandan Station, that they are somewhat 
jealous of the Service work. 
Hatton had been a member of the original survey party that established the Nebraska 
National Forest, but by 1921 he had moved into range management at the Denver office of 
the Forest Service. Although such concerns were immediate and real for Hatton, observers in 
Washington cared little whether the Mandan Station crowded out their work on the Plains. 
The Plains had ceased to be a critical area in Forest Service planning.38 
In retrospect, Hatton need not have worried that Mandan would take over tree 
planting. Beginning in 1913, the station underwent its own gradual realignment toward basic 
science rather than farm politics. The Office of Dry Land Agriculture grew more concerned 
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with conducting plantings as experiments rather than as farm assistance, although its 
emphasis on useful science persisted. Cobb typified the trend by promoting windbreak 
plantings as "cooperative demonstrations" which were at once field laboratories, farmer 
assistance, and demonstrations to encourage farmers to plant their own windbreaks. After 
1915 the Mandan station's funding also stagnated. These developments undermined the 
possibility of further station expansion and afforestation seemed to settle in as a minor 
activity for both agricultural science and forestry.39 
The first change in that attitude began with Congressional maneuvering over the 
passage of a new forest protection law that would eventually be called the Clarke-McNary 
Act. The Forest Service began work on a new forest management plan in 1919 to improve 
timber company practices, reforest cutover lands, and reduce forest fires. The framing of the 
new law soon pitted Pinchot and his conservationist friends against the timber industry, with 
foresters such as Henry Graves and William Greeley caught in the crossfire. Pinchot and his 
advocates—including Raphael Zon—argued for federal regulation of all timberlands. They 
believed that timber companies had proved that they could not harvest timber in a sustainable 
manner. Industry representatives predictably argued otherwise, and Graves and Greeley had 
the unenviable task of creating a compromise that would satisfy timber interests, the states, 
and federal agencies. Cooperative fire protection soon emerged as something that most could 
agree upon, but fire protection by itself did not add up to a national forest policy. 
A bill that would form a national forest policy finally emerged in the summer of 
1924. As expected the bill offered a cooperative program of fire prevention between federal 
and state government. The act also called for cooperative procurement and distribution of 
forest seedlings and seeds for reforesting cutover or under productive forestlands. In the same 
vein, the Act called for a cooperative program of "assisting and advising" farmers in 
establishing woodlots, windbreaks, shelterbelts, and a program to establish and fund state 
nurseries that would meet the needs of the program. The bill earmarked $100,000 to provide 
technical advice to farmers and another $100,000 to fund nursery operations. It also included 
provisions for acquisition of cutover lands and other measures. The bill was truly national in 
that the section on farm forestry and nursery establishment allowed states with little or no 
forestlands to participate. This was important to Forest Service goals of increasing the 
national timber supply, but it also made the bill more politically palatable to key Senators 
such as Nebraska's George Norris, chair of the Agricultural Committee, which controlled the 
bill40 
Such support was critical because Clarke-McNary began to displease a number of 
foresters. Pinchot had already declared his opposition to any bill that did not give the Forest 
Service regulatory control of timberlands. When he realized that Greeley would support the 
existing cooperative measure, he encouraged allies within the Service and Department of 
Agriculture to oppose the plan. Zon led the challenge from within the Service. He was 
concerned that Greeley was too eager to compliment industry practices, and he insisted that 
the interests of the Service required that it be critical of all bad management techniques, even 
if this alienated industry support. Zon was not opposed to cooperative measures in principle, 
but he doubted the sincerity of industrial users, and therefore their suitability as partners in 
any cooperative venture. The criticisms that Pinchot and Zon raised were not central to Plains 
forestry, since under Clarke-McNary timber companies would have no role, but their distrust 
of private motives remained a potent force in future programs. By 1925, Zon's advocacy for 
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federal regulation and his confrontations with Greeley led to a "voluntary" transfer to head 
the Lake States Forest Experiment Station in St. Paul, Minnesota.41 
The broad nature of the Clarke-McNary act, which seemed to assure something for 
every state, succeeded in drawing wide support, but the proposal to advise and assist farmers 
in tree planting highlighted a problem for the growing effort to lend federal science and 
support to farmers. Representative Martin Madden of Illinois lamented: "what are we getting 
at? Have we reached that stage in the Nation's progress where everything that anybody ought 
to do for himself is to be turned to the Government?" There was a general unease that 
America's most cherished icon—the independent yeoman farmer—was becoming a ward of 
the state. The conflict had roots well outside forestry, but foresters would have to learn how 
to overcome such fears if they ever hoped for legislation more aggressive than Clarke-
McNary. In the short term, though, the Clarke-McNary Act's cooperative features negated 
most such criticism.42 
The cooperative principles of the act created their own problems. Some congressional 
representatives believed that farmers needed advice but not their work done for them; others 
felt that farmers already had too much advice and not enough help. The debate came to a 
head over a proposed committee amendment removing the word "advised" from Section 4 of 
the bill, which authorized the Department of Agriculture to "advise and assist" farmers on 
planting windbreaks, shelterbelts, and woodlots. The amendment would have made the 
section more active, requiring the Department of Agriculture to offer assistance as well as 
advice. In dismay, representative James McLaughlin remarked: "Congress is going out and 
doing common, ordinary physical work for the people of the country." He was strongly in 
support of "the scientific, experimental, investigational, and educational work," but he 
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wanted to "emphasize my disapproval of laws and appropriations for the purpose of having 
officials and employees of the department perform ordinary physical labor."43 
McLaughlin's objections ran completely counter to Representative Gilbert Haugen, 
chair of the Agricultural Committee and author of the amendment, who tried to convince his 
colleagues that the act should promote assistance but not advice. Haugen worried that 
farmers would be swamped by an "army of people traveling over the country giving advice, 
and no assistance would be rendered except advice." Coming from Iowa, a state hard struck 
by the post-World War I agricultural depression, he complained that farmers "have too much 
advice as it is." It was not simply that Haugen sought more assistance for farmers; he was 
also worried that without the amendment the act would "provide for a few soft berths in the 
public crib for people to hold down swivel chairs." Scientific agriculture had made great 
strides in the United States since its acceptance as official policy under the Hatch Act of 
1887, but many Americans remained skeptical of its value. This was especially apparent on 
issues such as forestry, which could show little quantitative or concrete assistance for 
problems of oversupply and low prices.44 
Clarke-McNary passed with its advise and assist language intact. Congressional 
opponents realized that the real power over Department of Agriculture activities lay in 
budgetary appropriations. Having voiced their opinions on the role of science and 
government in agriculture, they supported the bill. The larger question of how scientific 
forestry could assist agriculture remained unanswered. The bill's language authorized almost 
any tree planting action by the Agricultural Department so long as it could display some 
evidence of farmer cooperation. Likewise, the exact role of research remained unsettled. 
Foresters such as Zon and Bates remained frustrated that the public and Congress did not 
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adequately understand the difficulty of tree growth on the Plains or the need for scientific 
study. This created an obvious incentive to show how research could be relevant. Zon and 
Bates might have disagreed with the principle of only undertaking practical science, but they 
understood the need to make their projects politically meaningful. 
The cooperative principle of the act also harbored conflicts that would return to 
plague future farm forestry projects. By their very nature cooperative plans divided complex 
actions into distinct duties assigned to different actors. In theory this spread the burden and 
ensured that all participants had an interest in a successful outcome. The difficulty was that 
every interest depended on all the others to complete any task. The failure of the process at 
any one stage could render other actions moot. In the Clarke-McNary Act this meant that 
government agencies and farmers had to wait until individual state legislatures funded their 
portion of the bill. The Forest Service, Office of Dry Land Agriculture, and agricultural 
colleges that handled seedlings and offered advice depended on the goodwill of individual 
farmers to get trees into the ground. If farmers chose to destroy those trees after a year or 
two, or to resell them, then governments had little recourse. Even legal restrictions about the 
future care and use of distributed stock were problematic since the whole plan depended on 
farmer volunteerism. 
In light of the many pitfalls, then, it was notable that the results of Clarke-McNary 
were mostly successful across the Plains. Individual states could only receive a maximum of 
$2,000 a year in federal funds under the law, and although that appropriation was helpful, 
state support was critical to establish nurseries and to assemble the required technical 
personnel. Some states such as North Dakota rapidly qualified for federal funds and were 
able to funnel these through their existing infrastructure at Mandan and Bottineau. Other 
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states such as South Dakota were much slower to take advantage of Clarke-McNary funds 
because they lacked state nurseries. Nebraska was one of the most enthusiastic beneficiaries 
of the act. The governor and state legislature quickly cooperated, the Forest Service already 
had the Bessey Nursery at Halsey, and farmers were already demanding more trees than the 
state could provide. The first Clarke-McNary plantings in Nebraska began in 1926 with 
33,900 trees and 96 cooperators in 44 counties. In 1927 the program distributed 186,000 trees 
and 700,000 the following year. The extension service hired Clayton Watkins to oversee the 
distribution and educational functions, leaving the Forest Service to concentrate on its 
nursery and afforestation duties. While the federal nursery servicing the Kansas National 
Forest had long closed, Kansas had an aggressive state program that included a nursery at 
Hays and a division of forestry at the state agricultural college in Manhattan. As with North 
Dakota and Nebraska, this infrastructure allowed Kansas to take advantage of Clarke-
McNary funds. Oklahoma had the Office of Dry Land Agriculture experiment station at 
Woodward that was engaged in work parallel to Mandan, again providing infrastructure to 
take advantage of federal funds.45 
Cooperative planning was not without dissenters, in particular Pinchot, Zon, and their 
allies. At the national level, the resignation of Greeley and his replacement by Robert Stuart 
caused big forestry proponents to renew their calls for federal control and big projects. Their 
efforts quickly focused on watershed protection, flood abatement, and regulation of timber 
companies. It was not immediately apparent, even to foresters like Zon, that the Great Plains 
would support an expansion of federal forest control. That would wait until economic 
depression and natural catastrophes rearranged the conservation calculus. In the meantime, 
131 
Zon initiated one final program that embodied big forestry principles, if not their scope, by 
proposing the creation of another national forest on the Plains. 
In 1929, Zon and North Dakota Senator Gerald Nye, suggested establishing a satellite 
of the Lake States Forest Experiment Station on the sandhills near Denbigh, North Dakota. 
Senator Nye persuaded Congress to appropriate $15,000 for the substation and experiments 
on windbreaks and erosion control. The citizens of Towner provided the land for the station 
and its experimental plantings by turning over an unused section of the North Dakota School 
of Forestry. Congress and the Forest Service then set up two purchase units, the Sounis in 
McHenry County, and the Sheyenne in Ransom and Richland Counties. The proposal was 
consciously modeled after the Nebraska National Forest. Zon and his supporters hoped that 
several years of substation experiments would create the foundation for the afforestation of 
the sandhills. According to historian Wilmon Droze, they intended to cover "the entire sand 
hills area," but their plans unraveled. First was a growing realization that this land was worth 
more for grazing than trees, then the start of World War II ended Civilian Conservation Corp 
labor and finally the Forest Service was unwilling to purchase the land.46 
Despite a hopeful beginning, Zon's latest scheme fizzled for reasons far beyond his 
ability to control. The failure of the Denbigh project was even more instructive because of its 
broad support. The creation of the Forest Service substation was not seen as an attempt to 
compete with the Office of Dry Land Agriculture at Mandan. In fact, Cobb drummed up 
local support for the plan, helped Zon during a visit to the state, and was enthusiastic about 
having more foresters nearby. In concept the two stations would have complemented each 
other. The North Dakota Experiment Station, and later the Office of Dry Land Agriculture, 
had always promoted windbreak planting "to stimulate interest in the improvement of farm 
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homes" and to increase crop yields. The Forest Service substation only enhanced these 
efforts by afforesting the marginal sandhill land with block plantings. Cobb saw little to 
worry about and many advantages in having two agencies working on forestry in North 
Dakota. The growing number of agencies engaged in afforestation would not necessarily 
overlap as long as their activities remained distinct. Thus the eventual battles for funding and 
scientific legitimacy were even more telling in how they led both agencies to compete for 
leadership and the prosecution of their distinct goals for Plains forestry.47 
Much of the disagreement between the professions and the bureaucracies arose from 
defining spheres of influence. The Forest Service's influence increased through its ability to 
wrest control of the nation's forest reserves from the Department of the Interior. One of the 
first steps had been convincing Congress to allow the Service to manage the Plains forest 
reserves. In the following decades, the Forest Service was deeply entangled with national 
forest activities and only belatedly realized the potential of bureaucratic expansion through 
agricultural assistance. The Office of Dry Land Agriculture was positioned to provide 
agricultural assistance, but defined itself as a scientific institution, albeit one whose work 
benefited farmers. By working on farm forestry through cooperative measures they defined a 
separate role for themselves on the Plains. The state experiment stations were also heavily 
involved in providing agricultural assistance, but lacking an effective national bureaucratic 
structure, they saw their role more narrowly as only providing assistance not management. 
Bureaucratization was also about the control of landscapes and sciences. Raphael Zon 
saw his trees-and-climate theories as a method of improving human welfare, but also as a 
way of promoting his own research and the Forest Service. It was not a stretch to argue that if 
deforestation along the Atlantic states decreased rainfall in the Midwest, then the federal 
government should promote reforestation. Likewise, Office of Dry Land Agriculture 
researchers erected a farmer-centered approach that reduced forestry to one of many 
agronomic tools for increasing crop yields. In doing so, they reduced the claim of forestry to 
solve the nation's agricultural problems, and increased the profile of scientific agriculture. By 
promoting themselves as providers of agricultural science and increased production to be 
carried out by farmers, however, they limited their bureaucratic reach. Farmers should be 
taught to properly apply new scientific methods, and then there would be little need for a 
federal bureaucracy to manage private farmlands along the lines of what the Forest Service 
was doing for the national forests. An emphasis on increased production was also 
problematic. It had obvious appeal to farmers, but it was a difficult sell to a Congress that, 
during the 1920s, was primarily concerned with the problems of low prices and oversupply. 
With so many voices speaking for Plains forestry, perhaps it was not surprising that 
legislative backing remained parsimonious. Plains foresters had difficulty articulating what 
problem they were solving other than pleasing institutions, farmers, or politicians. Farmers in 
western Nebraska enjoyed the "extra" trees that the Kinkaid Act provided, but this was not 
the goal that foresters had in mind when they established their plantations and nurseries. 
Clarke-McNary expanded the level of generosity by offering trees to all the Plains states. As 
a farmer assistance program it was a useful if small addition; as a forestry and conservation 
policy, however, it was severely lacking. Even when Plains foresters thought they had 
developed a legitimate forestry use, they often found that other institutions offered 
contradictory advice. The Forest Service promoted windbreak planting as timber production, 
while the Office of Dry Land Agriculture wanted to protect farm homes and increase crop 
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yields. All of these concerns would come to a head in the early 1930s when agricultural 
depression and wind based soil erosion suddenly combined to make the "farm problem" and 
Plains forestry front-page news. 
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Chapter Four—The Rhetoric of Nature: science, politics and the 
Shelterbelt Project 
Plains forestry became front-page news in the summer of 1934 when the Department 
of Agriculture and Forest Service announced to the nation the enormous Shelterbelt Project. 
The New York Times and Herald-Tribune explained to a puzzled public that President 
Franklin Roosevelt had issued an executive order allocating $15 million in drought relief 
funds for a tree-planting project on the Great Plains. And that was only the beginning. Over 
the next ten years, Roosevelt would request $75 million for the project, which was a huge 
sum of money in 1930s America. The project was equally large. The plan called for 
constructing a one hundred mile wide zone of shelterbelts, spread one mile apart, and running 
continuously from the Canadian border to the Texas Panhandle. The 1200-mile long parallel 
forests would be America's Great Wall, holding back the dust, drought, and despair of the 
Dust Bowl.1 
Although public reaction was a mixture of ridicule, adulation, and sheer disbelief, the 
plan was everything that some foresters had long dreamed of for the Plains. They believed 
that the Timber Culture Act had failed, not because trees had failed, but because farmers had 
lacked the necessary knowledge and skills. Likewise, the reserve movement had been a good, 
but under-funded, idea in need of more systematic planning. Plans for cooperative tree 
distribution were by their very nature, too limited and too prone to some of the same failures 
as the Timber Culture Act. Foresters hoped that the Shelterbelt Project would correct 
previous errors by bringing the full scientific, budgetary, and bureaucratic might of the 
federal government to bear on the problem. 
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Despite these positive developments, the plan posed both opportunities and risks. 
Foresters such as Raphael Zon thought it would finally fulfill their quest for big forestry on 
the Plains. The program would make the Forest Service relevant to two of the nation's great 
problems: unemployment and natural disaster. The former would be ameliorated by the 
massive need for labor, and the later by altering or stabilizing nature. The great risk, 
however, was not simply that it could fail, but also that its dramatic claims would reignite 
arguments over the direction of the profession, the relationship between trees and climate, 
and the future of the Great Plains. 
The plan instantly divided the already politicized forestry community over leadership 
of the profession. The drought and depression of the 1890s had no more killed the debate 
about the effects of trees on climate than it had killed the popular desire to settle the Plains. 
In the 1930s the pro-climate faction, led by Raphael Zon, struggled again to articulate an 
acceptable version of their theories or, failing that, to convince the profession to close ranks 
in order to secure support from Congress. Opponents charged that the plan was bringing 
unwanted publicity to old, discredited ideas, and that it threatened to undermine their 
scientific credentials. What the profession thought mattered because without unanimity, or at 
least its facade, the plan would lack the sheen of scientific objectivity. 
Outside the profession, the Shelterbelt helped focus a debate on the future of the 
Plains. Chief Forester Ferdinand Silcox, Zon, and their allies portrayed shelterbelts as a way 
to assist farmers. To their surprise, many Americans questioned whether they should be 
helping farmers, and whether planting trees was really the right type of help. In many ways 
the debate repeated older arguments about the true nature of the Plains as Desert or Garden. 
Despite low agricultural prices during the previous decade, many Americans still viewed the 
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region as a moral, economic, and cultural center, yet others assembled a different 
combination of moral, economic, and ecological arguments in favor of federal programs that 
would restore it to natural grassland. Both claims had merit. For many residents the land had 
been a garden and would be so again, but critics rightly wondered at what cost. The downside 
was that the Desert and Garden narratives reduced the debate to scripted positions and 
oversimplified the role of nature.2 
The role of nature mattered, even if most opinions about it were based on little 
observation. Bureaucracy building, professional recognition, and social welfare were each 
bound to specific definitions of Plains nature. The Forest Service supported a view of the 
Plains as Garden as much because it would increase their profile and professional standing as 
because they thought their plan would benefit people. Foresters and the Forest Service were 
not the only ones with a stake in the outcome, however. The state agricultural colleges, the 
Office of Dry Land Agriculture, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Erosion 
Control Service (Soil Conservation Service), political parties, and more, had their own views, 
all of which were based more on myth and self-interest than on careful ecological study. 
Thus when researchers did begin to examine the Plains, they quickly realized it was an 
enormously large and complicated landscape, and that their initial plans and hopes were often 
unrealistic. Gradually institutions and researchers circumscribed their claims to ever-smaller 
spaces. Grand plans to belt the middle of the nation with trees morphed into concentrated 
plantings in ever-smaller zones, and finally transformed into individual farm blueprints. 
Beginning in 1931 the Great Plains underwent almost a decade of low rainfall and 
high temperatures. The summer of 1934 was the hottest on record, and rainfall in the Dakotas 
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and Nebraska averaged about half of what was called "normal" in this typically volatile area. 
During the peak of the drought in 1936, an area from Oklahoma to North Dakota received 
only one-third of normal rainfall. Hot, dry conditions combined with poor cultivation 
practices and high winds to spawn dust storms that, at their peaks in the spring of 1934 and 
1935, blanketed areas as far east as shipping lanes in the Atlantic Ocean with a fine layer of 
soil.3 
Compounding the adverse natural conditions was a massive economic depression. 
Indebted from heavy investment and rapid expansion during World War I, some Plains 
farmers had only managed to forestall insolvency during the 1920s through high production. 
Much of this increased production came from newly opened lands on the western reaches of 
the Great Plains. The plentiful rains of the first two decades of the century did not last, 
however, and a precarious balancing act collapsed in 1931 when bumper crops led to record 
deflation. Prices stayed low for the rest of the decade. 
The Forest Service was aware of the brewing farm crisis and looking for ways to 
make their expertise relevant. At first it was not obvious that this would be through anything 
as grand as the Shelterbelt. Raphael Zon hoped the North Dakota National Forest would 
assist the national problem by providing useful employment and, eventually, assisting 
agriculture. Gifford Pinchot and Zon also discussed the potential for forest work to take up 
large numbers of the nation's unemployed, but Zon doubted that forestry could absorb vast 
sums of money or untrained individuals. Another ambitious plan floated at a Service meeting 
in late January 1929 was "to give agricultural relief through putting larger acreage of 
marginal and sub marginal lands in forests." Composed of the Forester and most Washington 
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department heads, the committee agreed that while it wanted to be relevant to the crisis, the 
true goal should be forestry, not solving farm problems.4 
There were also plans to increase forestry work for flood and erosion control. In 
April 1930, Zon and George Pratt the President of the American Forestry Association began 
directing "a steady pressure of public opinion to secure increased federal appropriations for 
carrying out the provisions of the several fundamental forestry and conservations laws." 
They hoped to insure a share in any job creation or economic recovery programs for forestry. 
A year later Earle Clapp, chief of research for the Forest Service, directed Zon to lobby for 
the McSweeny-McNary Act which would provide funds for erosion and stream flow studies. 
Zon and Carlos Bates gave presentations to the Mississippi Valley Association, the Izaak 
Walton League, drainage and flood control conventions, and other forums advocating an 
increased role for forestry in national plans. Taking his lead from Gifford Pinchot, Zon 
expressed dissatisfaction with farm relief and unemployment programs in which "erosion 
was merely incidental to the bigger problem." He remained pessimistic that Congress would 
enact aggressive legislation because "the progressive legislature place farm and 
unemployment relief above everything else and the conservatives think of nothing but 
economy in government expenditure." Zon believed that the real problem was recognizing a 
need for greater government intervention in a variety of spheres. He argued that only the 
federal government had the resources and knowledge to revive the economy, enforce 
conservation goals, and counter the negative influences of private capital. Although Zon 
sensed the beginnings of a change in political sentiments, he worried that new proposals 
would become entangled in political infighting and compromise. He wrote to Clapp: "we will 
gain much more by waiting for the opportune psychological moment."5 
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The first hint of that moment began in the summer of 1933, when newly elected 
President Roosevelt canvassed his department heads for solutions to the troubles afflicting 
the Great Plains. Roosevelt had pushed reforestation efforts while governor of New York 
State, and he took a personal interest in tree planting on his estate at Hyde Park. He also 
admired the conservation credentials of his distant cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. In August, 
Roosevelt asked Chief Forester Robert Stuart: "What can be done to reforest the Great 
American Desert?" His question caused confusion at the Forest Service, because nobody was 
sure what Roosevelt meant by "the Great American Desert." Edward Munns drew the task of 
decoding Roosevelt's query and made a visit to the Library of Congress to search old 
geography texts. Once they had an answer, Stuart and Munns encouraged Roosevelt to 
sponsor shelterbelt planting along highway and section lines throughout the Plains and 
Prairie regions of the Midwest.6 
Roosevelt was unhappy with the Forest Service's plan. He had in mind something far 
more ambitious, far more systematic. Roosevelt wanted to form a wall between the 
expanding 'deserts' on the western Plains and the more productive regions to the east. He 
imagined a single belt of trees, three or more miles wide, running slightly west of the 100th 
meridian. The earliest plans called for a wall of trees to stretch from the northern border of 
Nebraska to the end of the Texas panhandle near Childress. This soon extended into a single 
wall running from Canada to southern Texas. Roosevelt's ideas fit the tradition of nineteenth 
century forestry, with its emphasis on climatic and "cosmic" effects. The idea might seem 
anachronistic for 1930s America, but the eventual public debate over the plan revealed a 
different conclusion. Coming from an eastern perspective, Roosevelt had little familiarity 
with the use of windbreaks and shelterbelts on the Plains, and he seemed inclined to think 
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that existing plantings were insubstantial and haphazard. Bates later wrote that it was "quite 
apparent that President Roosevelt's proposal in 1933 for a belt of tree plantings several miles 
wide from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico did not have in mind local protection of soils or 
crops, but a widespread effect from the presence of trees." Roosevelt's plan reflected the 
tradition of Joseph Wilson, Charles Bessey, Bemhard Fernow, Zon, and others who had 
argued for over half a century that tree planting on the Plains would increase rainfall and 
have far reaching effects.7 
A central problem for Roosevelt's enthusiasms was that most foresters no longer 
subscribed to theories about trees and rainfall. The Forest Service resisted Roosevelt's plan 
of a single wall of trees. Munn's plan for planting along highway and section lines, while less 
dramatic, was thought to do far more to assist the region. Evaporation studies conducted by 
the Forest Service and Bureau of Dry Land Agriculture suggested that windbreaks only 
protected an area of approximately ten times their height. Thus shelterbelts should be narrow, 
tall, and planted around fields. In the face of Roosevelt's insistence, however, the Forest 
Service tried to develop a compromise calling for one central forest belt several miles wide 
and one-hundred-foot wide belts spaced one mile apart running parallel to the western side of 
the central belt along its full length. This plan still did not please Roosevelt's department 
heads or Roosevelt, but he finally agreed to let the Forest Service handle the planning and 
placement of the belts. However, he always maintained his vision of the project as a dramatic 
wall across the Plains.8 
The final report was closer to Roosevelt's original plan than to Munn's. Although the 
exact internal process by which the Forest Service developed the proposal is unclear, the 
content of the report strongly suggests that Raphael Zon wrote it. Presented to Roosevelt in 
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late August of 1933, "Forest Planting Possibilities in the Prairie Region" began by explaining 
that wind-slowing effects of a shelterbelt would reduce evaporation over an area five to ten 
times the height of the barrier. It described shelterbelts as "a form of insurance against the 
evil effects of drouth," and it discussed Russian studies that demonstrated an increase in 
annual precipitation on plains protected by systematic forest plantings. The report closed "it 
is possible that their [shelterbelts] beneficial effects as to climate would spread far beyond 
their immediate vicinity." These arguments paralleled the theories and evidence Zon had 
presented in Forests and Water and that the Forest Service had republished only six years 
before. Although the justifications were fully formed, in other ways the plan was still clearly 
preliminary. It specified little about the exact type and location for plantings, and it continued 
to present arguments both for and against planting in a three-mile wide wall versus planting 
along highways and section lines, as though these decisions had not been finalized. Munns 
and other foresters in Washington had already made clear their preference for diffuse 
plantings; only Zon was still advocating block plantings as useful to agriculture (as for 
example in his plans for the North Dakota National Forest). Therefore it seems likely that any 
author other than Zon would have omitted the information about potential climatic effects 
and argued strenuously against block plantings.9 
Federal interest in the project waned during the winter of 1933-34, but as dry weather 
and high winds descended again in the spring and summer of 1934, soil conservation 
regained urgency. With dust from the Plains falling on Washington, D. C., and with refugees 
fleeing the area, Roosevelt needed some stabilization plan to keep the political troubles from 
spreading. This was the psychological moment that Zon had been looking for: the nation, its 
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president, and the Forest Service were yearning for a dramatic solution, and the plans from 
the previous summer provided one. 
Bibds-cye View Of Fopest Strip* 
Figure 4.1—1934 Forest Service artist's rendering of Shelterbelts.10 
Given the controversial nature of Zon and Roosevelt's ideas, it should not have 
surprised either of them that the plan that hit the front page of newspapers in July 1934 drew 
as much ridicule as support. The New York Times quoted the somewhat ambiguous statement 
made in Executive Order 6793 authorizing the project, that is was "a means of ameliorating 
drought conditions," and described it as nothing less than "an experiment in climate control 
to combat the ravages of drought." Ferdinand Silcox, the new chief of the Forest Service 
after Stuart's death, was less ambivalent. Silcox explained that "man cannot change all the 
forces of weather, but he can modify his own surroundings." He did not limit this to climatic 
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modifications in the immediate vicinity of tree planting because he went on to state that man 
"can ameliorate the effects of weather on a large scale, just as he can around his own home." 
Like Fernow three decades earlier, Silcox was supporting the theory that mass localized 
effects might have cosmic effects.11 
At least part of the explanation for Silcox's claims was the need to define the public 
benefit of the project. The Forest Service had seen in earlier debates over forestry proposals 
that many Americans were skeptical about federal actions on private lands, especially when 
the beneficiary was only the landowner. Bearing this in mind, Silcox presented the 
Shelterbelt in its widest possible impact as addressing the "general public interest in 
ameliorating the climatic conditions over broad areas." Silcox elaborated on this at the end of 
July by outlining Forest Service assumptions about the nature of the crisis on the Plains and 
impact of the Shelterbelt. He argued that severe climatic conditions and heavy agricultural 
use had turned the Plains into "an incipient desert" that threatened both the Plains and "a 
much larger area to the east." Westerly summer winds blew dry, overgrazed, and over-
plowed soils eastward. President Roosevelt's preferred solution was not "scattered plantings 
here and there, but... continuous, practically unbroken forest strips." The proposal combined 
George Perkins Marsh's theories about forestry and civilization with Fernow and Zon's ideas 
about climate to argue the nation had an interest in afforesting the Plains.12 
Not all public discussions focused solely on large-scale effects, and most evinced a 
confused mixture of large-scale hopes and practical suggestions. A speech written for 
President Roosevelt in early August 1934 had as its second paragraph the suggestive 
sentence that "we must learn how to overcome the effects of recurring drouths, locust 
plagues, dust storms, and the economic hazards that go with single crop farming, if we are to 
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build for the future." Someone had crossed out the section about single crop farming, but it 
nevertheless suggests the President's desire to modify climate. Echoing Silcox, Roosevelt 
admitted that "man, of course, cannot change the climate over a wide region, but he can and 
does improve his immediate surroundings." He then described how plantings in the Nebraska 
Sandhills had improved the "physical conditions of living" in the immediate vicinity. When 
discussing the form the plantings would take, Roosevelt called for a "systematic manner" on 
large scale because "planting forest strips against the prevailing wind within a wide belt 
should have a more general beneficial effect over a larger territory than could be attained by 
scattered windbreaks on small areas." Roosevelt cautioned that shelterbelt planting would not 
solve all the region's problems and that its immediate benefit would be employment for local 
farmers. The outlined program and effects were for the most part supported by the experience 
of both foresters and farmers, but in the already politicized context created by the first public 
announcements, critics could interpret such statements as resurrecting discredited theories 
about forests and climate.13 
In the fall and winter of 1934, Roosevelt's "tree belt" materialized into a project that 
began to plant trees in spring 1935. Before the Forest Service could begin, however, it had to 
reclaim its funding. Executive Order 6793 had allocated $15 million in July 1934 to execute 
the project, but Comptroller General John McCarl had ruled that the plan was not an 
immediate relief measure, and therefore could not use relief funds to purchase land. More 
ominously, McCarl believed that the project should receive Congressional approval since it 
was in essence a new federal agency. During August 1934, Secretary of Agriculture Henry 
Wallace negotiated a deal with McCarl to spend $1 million in relief funds for the first year. 
McCarl agreed to the initial allocation with the understanding it served, literally, as seed 
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money so the Service could establish nurseries and devise a program of action, but this was a 
temporary measure until Congress passed judgment.14 
While the Service worked to release the funds Roosevelt had committed, it assembled 
an infrastructure for directing operations. In August 1934 personnel began arriving in 
Lincoln, Nebraska, to set up administrative headquarters. Initially Fred Morrell led the effort, 
with Paul Roberts as Associate Director. In late September Roberts took over as acting 
Director, and Morrell returned to Washington to work with the Civilian Conservation Corps. 
The administrative branch directed shelterbelt planting, nursery operations, seed collection, 
acquisition of land, and other activities. They did not do the actual planting or nursery work, 
but instead managed seasonal labor crews hired from local relief roles. Although this was an 
awkward process that involved considerable paperwork and training, the plan had always 
been considered both a work relief and tree-planting program.15 
One task of setting up a new program was the creation of technical guidelines to 
guide fieldwork and provide a scientific foundation to defend the project from its critics. 
Silcox gave the technical branch control over developing guidelines and standards, and Zon 
directed it from the Lake States Forest Experiment Station. This included determining the 
"zone," or area of operations. While the location of the zone changed several times, it was 
generally an area one hundred miles wide from the Canadian border to the Texas Panhandle. 
The research branch also determined the orientation that belts should follow, and this too 
varied. Finally, Silcox and Zon commenced a study of tree planting on the Plains and 
developed plans for belt design. During this phase their primary goal was to determine the 
ideal shape, species selection, and soil types for shelterbelt planting. In late 1935 the Forest 
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Service published its study and technical standards as Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting in 
the Plains Region. It would form the scientific and public face of the Shelterbelt.16 
The program's rapid creation locked the Forest Service into promoting a controversial 
plan. It had committed its name, scientific reputation, and many personnel with the belief that 
Roosevelt's support, and a general public outcry for action in attacking the Depression, had 
created the right psychological moment for big forestry. Unfortunately, the scientific 
community of professional foresters mostly operated outside either concern. Even foresters 
who normally supported any Service plan worried about dissipating its efforts on projects 
only loosely related to forestry. They also still worried that unsupportable claims might 
undermine their scientific authority, and, by extension, their ability to promote other goals. 
The project's relation to the Depression and Dust Bowl was also problematic since many 
Americans questioned whether the Great Plains were naturally suited to agriculture and trees. 
It was hard to convince many Americans that trees could even be grown in an area wrenched 
by drought and dust, let alone solve these vexing problems. 
The unexpected announcement of a massive new forestry program on the Great Plains 
shocked many within the community of professional foresters and led to accusations that the 
old climate-and-forests issue would discredit forestry's status as a science. The opposition 
leader was Herman Chapman, president of the American Forestry Association. In an article 
for the November 1934 issue of Journal of Forestry, Chapman explained that "foresters have 
been and still are regarded by many engineers and scientists as falling short of professional 
status. This attitude has been due largely to many unscientific statements regarding the 
effects of forests on climate and rainfall." Chapman worried that, just as the profession was 
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overcoming doubts about its scientific objectivity, along "comes this sudden front page 
publicity, reviving all the old misguided notions of forests and climate."17 
Although Chapman offered sound criticisms, Zon believed that Chapman had acted 
out of political motivations. Chapman and Zon had been feuding over leadership of the 
Society of American Forests since 1932. Zon saw himself in the Pinchot tradition, 
representing scientific management and federal regulatory power at a time when industry and 
private capital lacked strong conservation credentials. The Dust Bowl, the giant Mississippi 
floods, and denuded tax-delinquent timberlands had cast considerable doubt on the 
Hooverian ideal of cooperative-based conservation, and the time had come for more active 
federal involvement. In Zon's mind, Chapman's wrongheaded support for industry 
miscalculated the changed climate of the country. He was a throwback to failed policies. Zon 
viewed the Forest Service as the logical lead agency for the science of forestry and that the 
rest of the profession ought to respect its expertise; Chapman wanted to make the Society 
into an alternative voice for the profession, and he was willing to undermine Forest Service 
projects to do so.18 
This pre-existing antagonism between Zon and Chapman was recast by the 
announcement of the Shelterbelt Project. In January 1935, Zon circulated a letter among the 
Journal of Forestry members attacking Chapman for using the Journal to criticize the 
Shelterbelt. In Zon's opinion, Chapman was misusing his position and publishing the 
opinions of foresters with "little knowledge" of Plains forestry or who disliked the Forest 
Service and were of "doubtful" scientific standing. Zon had not confronted Chapman in 
November 1934 because he was still a useful ally in the fight to keep the Forest Service 
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within the United States Department of Agriculture. Thus Zon's desire to maintain a unified 
voice for the profession impaired his ability to strike back against Chapman.19 
Ironically, the article to which Zon objected, "Digest of Opinions," presented a less 
critical view than Zon had suggested. In preparation for the article, Chapman had mailed a 
form letter to forty-four foresters. Of the thirty-one who replied, over half were from the 
Plains or immediately to the east and several were experts on Plains forestry. Chapman 
divided the responses into twenty categories. Although no responses offered "unqualified 
approval of the project as originally announced by the U. S. Forest Service," most favored 
the plan with modifications. Chapman also admitted that some foresters were unhappy with 
the publication of the article, and printed the names and positions of the protesters, along 
with their telegrams of protest. Perhaps more importantly, of the eighteen individual letters 
actually printed, eight supported the plan given some technical modification. Among these 
where long letters offering conditional support from F. E. Cobb, Fred Johnson, and Clayton 
Watkins.20 
A letter to Zon from Arthur Pack, a private forester, illustrated the misgivings many 
had about the plan. Zon had written Pack asking him publicly to support the proposal. Pack 
instead expressed concern that the project, while presenting opportunities, also entailed 
significant risks. "To my mind," he wrote, "our own organization has not been sufficiently 
careful in editing our statements. We don't know. We may guess wishfully. Who has the 
courage to come forward honestly and admit the uncertainty of our collection of facts? Who 
has the courage to admit there will be a tremendous wastage of money in such a large-scale 
experiment?" Zon's effort to present a unified voice of scientific support for the Shelterbelt 
conflicted with the disparate reality of forestry science's "collection of facts" and voices. Zon 
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wanted the profession to speak with authority, but well-trained scientists could and did come 
to widely different opinions.21 
In response to Zon's request that he help put together a scientific plan, Pack explained 
that while he was willing to help, he doubted that Zon and others at the Forest Service would 
be happy to hear what he had to say. "The trouble is," explained Pack, "that what I might 
finally conclude would be at variance with some of the flag-wavers. Will it really help 
forestry to have the gift horse's teeth examined? Does anybody want them looked at right 
now?" Pack feared that helping the Forest Service might force him to abandon his scientific 
opinions and become a Pollyanna.22 
As Pack's letter suggested, the calculus surrounding the Shelterbelt was never solely 
scientific. Letters in the "Digest of Opinion" were not the hatchet job that Zon had claimed. 
Many of the concerns and suggestions turned out to be valid, but the ideal of peer review 
suffered in the face of both the political need to present a united opinion and the politically-
borne caution of some critics. "For myself," wrote Pack, "I have already half turned 
conservative. I'm frightened for the ability of forestry to fulfill the promises made in its 
behalf." Consensus could only be achieved outside the normal avenues of scientific praxis. 
Zon and his allies within the Forest Service and in Washington were a powerful group. They 
would have preferred keeping disagreements private, but, when that was no longer possible, 
they had to settle for using the Journal of Forestry as a debating forum.23 
The November 1934 issue of the Journal of Forestry carried an article by Carlos 
Bates defending the Shelterbelt and its relation to climatic change. He had been heavily 
involved in Plains forestry early in his career, but during the 1910s and 1920s he had devoted 
much of his time to erosion, growth rate, and flood control studies. Then in 1927 he 
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transferred to the Lake States Experiment Station under Zon. Bates still carried a 
considerable reputation for his work on Plains forestry, but his efforts to clarify the issue 
resulted in a weak nod to both positions. He began by explaining that the early 
announcements were misunderstood, and that the Forest Service based their claim of 
ameliorating climate strictly on the local, or "micro-climatic" effects of windbreaks, but then 
he described the possibilities for increasing rainfall by preventing run-off and making more 
water available for evaporation and re-precipitation. Like others before him, Bates' attempt 
to settle the climate issue left it open to interpretation. Opponents were unsatisfied because 
he seemed to cling to outdated ideas about the importance of re-precipitation, while 
supporters argued that enough trees, over enough area, could add enough vapor to the air to 
indeed increase rainfall.24 
Bates' article had little impact on the project's critics, so in spring 1935 Zon also 
addressed the issue. In an article for Science magazine he attributed all claims of climatic 
modification to "popular imagination" and "newspaper publicity" which dramatized the 
project as "a grandiose plan of changing the climate of the entire plains region, and droughts 
and dust storms through the planting of trees." While Zon denied ever having promised the 
plan would increase rainfall, he did not completely abandon the idea of regional climatic 
modifications. His temporizing insured that climatic effects would again become an issue 
after the publication of Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting and during Congressional 
debate.25 
For all the politicking, the ongoing debate revealed the still unsettled scientific 
opinion on trees and climate. Both Zon's and Bates' claims represented honest, educated 
guesses. Bates' arguments that shelterbelts would reduce run-off and evaporation were well 
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documented. His major error was in assuming that most precipitation came from continental 
evaporation and re-precipitation rather than ocean-borne currents. Zon, being the more 
enthusiastic proponent of the idea that afforestation might influence climate, had repeatedly 
published his ideas on the theory and during the early 1930s became embroiled in a 
controversy with Russian forester G. N. Vissotsky over who had originated the idea of 
"forest influences" and the "transmissive role of forests"—two phrases used to signify the 
effects of tree planting on climate, although forest influences also referred to flood control 
and other tasks. In a private letter to the editor of the Journal of Forestry, Zon admitted 
borrowing some of Vissotsky's ideas and added that "there is no denying that the idea that 
forests have an effect upon climate over wide continents, is largely a Russian idea." A 
trademark of Zon's work on forests and climates was using evidence from European studies, 
and usually he was "inclined to think that the school of thought which believes in the 
influences of forests on climate has an edge on the opposing forces."26 
Although Zon's writings did little to silence his loudest critics, his Science article did 
outline a plan that many professional foresters could support. G. A. Pearson, the Director of 
the Forest Service's Southwestern Forest and Range Experiment Station, wrote to Zon after 
reading the Science article to complement the changed plans and offer his support. Pearson 
was cautious and wanted verification from Zon that the article represented "the official 
announcement of a change in the shelterbelt program." He was sure that "the shelterbelt 
would have received the support of most of the foresters who have opposed it, and of the 
larger number within the Forest Service who have disapproved in silence" if it had been 
presented in the form Zon now advocated. Pearson was not entirely clear about all the 
changes, but he hoped that "under the new program, as I understand it, you will plant only on 
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suitable sites and I read between the lines that the plantations will not necessarily be in the 
form of long narrow strips." Pearson then suggested "it would be impracticable to plant 
enough shelterbelts to have any appreciable effect on the climate in the plains country." The 
debate within the profession over the scientific merits of the project had a healthy political 
effect on the project. Supporters were learning to edit climatic claims from their public 
announcements, if not their private thoughts, while opponents were learning to overlook 
early dramatic proposals and look at the latest plans for the project.27 
In part the debate over climatic change and project standards was the extension of 
political debate within the forestry profession, but it was also rooted in different visions of 
what the Plains should or should not be. Many Americans still believed that the Plains were 
unsuited to tree growth and that the Shelterbelt was not only likely to fail, but a poor solution 
to agricultural distress. Thus instead of finding clear sailing once the scientific debates 
eroded, the Forest Service was drawn into a much wider and more troubling debate about the 
future of the region. 
Many critics believed that the Great Plains were naturally suited only for grass and 
stockraising. Echoing the sentiments of John Wesley Powell and other critics, they often 
argued that the region required a fundamentally different approach to settlement and that 
traditional agricultural methods were completely unsuited to the semi-arid climate. Some had 
also incorporated into their criticisms ecological theories about climax vegetation developed 
by Frederick Clements. They argued that ecology proved the region was naturally suited to 
grass. Trees were not a survival type of vegetation and thus doomed to die. Other opponents 
argued that God had already determined what was natural for the Plains, and it was not trees. 
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Critics had not misunderstood the region's troubles; they simply believed the best response 
was to return the landscape to a more natural state. 
Much popular sentiment regarding what was a natural, and thus logical, use for the 
Plains rested on a view more mythical than scientific. The Great Plains were still the land of 
Indians and buffalo, a grand Wild West only marginally suited for civilization. This was the 
Plains as Desert—forever outside the pale of civilized humans. Those who believed the 
region a wild Desert favored a stock raising economy based on grass and cattle. Although the 
landscape they described was a hybrid of ancient and modern, they believed that "returning" 
the land to grass and cattle was still more natural. The converse view was an extension of the 
American East, of the landscape as Garden only waiting for the plow and human will. 
Booster's theories of rain following the plow had failed, but many Americans still hoped that 
some scientific approach—such as systematic trees planting—would effect the necessary 
changes to precipitation and aridity. Despite their plans, the Garden and the Great American 
Desert still informed public opinions. Those who saw a Garden understood that the Plains 
was, at best, an uncertain producer, but they hoped new tools, hard work, and daring would 
reduce uncertainties and guarantee agriculture a permanent place in the Heartland. 
The Shelterbelt Project became entangled in the Garden verses Desert debate as the 
first trees were going into the ground in spring 1935. Opponents condemned the plan for 
challenging the desert. One writer commented that Roosevelt had flouted "the traditionally 
impossible of nature and economics! ... the sort of planting the cattle country needs to 
preserve its usefulness and keep its soil from blowing away is that of grass ... What this 
region pre-eminently demands is restoration of its natural cover—grass—and of its 
appropriate use—grazing instead of tillage." The land was "good cattle country, for nutritious 
160 
grasses grow there admirably," but poor farming country. An article published in Nature 
Magazine reached a similar conclusion. According to its author, "Nature herself' would 
decide where trees will or will not grow. "Regardless of all this, how often we find ourselves 
arguing with Nature over the matter, even going so far as to work contrary to her wishes and 
purposes." By working "contrary to the established rules of Nature" the Shelterbelt Project 
was destined to suffer defeat. Clementsian ecology had combined with resurgent Desert 
myths to condemn tree-planting as unnatural. Opponents in effect rejected the entire ethos of 
wholesale manipulation of the landscape. The obvious solution was to return the Plains to a 
more natural order—a desert-like landscape whose climax state was grass—yet project 
opponents seemed unaware that their own preferred uses—grassland and cattle—were no 
more or less natural than trees and farms.28 
The same mythic reasoning sometimes shaped supporters of the project. Some 
claimed that the Desert myth was born from a lack of first-hand knowledge of Plains 
conditions and forestry, yet this claim also faltered as criticism arrived from foresters with 
direct Plains forestry experience. In a 1934 letter to the editor of the New York Times, C. E. 
Brinkman explained his long familiarity with Plains conditions while living there in the 
"middle Eighties." He argued that "the full absurdity of the plan to plant arbitrarily where 
Nature failed can be understood only by a man who has actually broken the tough sod which 
was the natural protection of the soil and water under that soil." William Hall, Chief of the 
Section of Tree Planting for the Forest Service during the 1910s, explained that "the area is 
upland where nature with great fixity of purpose has determined upon grasses as permanent 
cover. To shift to trees as permanent crop means a fight with nature every step of the way." 
Royal Kellogg, another forester with practical experience on the Plains, but who by the 1930s 
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was living in New York State, argued that "the end form of vegetation for the plains area in 
the present geological epoch is grass sod." Kellogg maintained that it was foolhardy to go 
against nature's plan. "Nature clothed the plains with buffalo grass and other hardy species, 
just as she covered the northeastern states with pine and spruce and hardwoods. We might 
conceivably cover the High Plains with trees and we might carpet the state of Maine with 
buffalo grass—but if we are sensible we shall try to do neither."29 
For all the emphasis on natural order, however, critics also had to answer a much 
more tangled political question. In defining the Great Plains as primarily grassland unsuited 
to trees and conventional agriculture, critics had to explain what to do with the people 
already living there. Ellsworth Huntington, a Yale University geographer, historicized the 
agricultural and ecological breakdown as just the latest in a long series of crises all caused 
because Americans had not recognized the true nature of the land and its unsuitability for 
permanent crop-production. Instead of altering the fundamental base of their economy, Plains 
residents repeatedly called on Washington for help. "With the normal perversity of human 
beings the farmers blamed the government at Washington for troubles due to nature." To 
Huntington, the Shelterbelt Project was an attempt to save "sub-marginal" land, ground not 
even marginally suited for cultivation. The New York Times built on this theme in an editorial 
that characterized Plains farmers as stubbornly dim. They had "emphatically declined to fall 
in with Washington's belated discovery that those regions never should have been brought 
under the plow, being primarily adapted for grazing." Plains farmers were "peasants on the 
slopes of a volcano" who lacked the sense to flee. Framed this way, people who actually 
lived and worked on the Great Plains were the least informed actors in the debate.30 
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Arguments that the Shelterbelt Project contravened nature, that the area would be 
better off returned to grassland, created a problematic narrative. Critics that embraced the 
Desert myth had constrained both their position and that of supporters. To embrace the 
Desert myth was to declare it no longer myth but history, and to accept its narrative as an 
explanation of events, conditions, and outcomes. The Desert myth cast residents as at best 
ignorant. The only solution was to return to a cowboy-and-cattle past. The myth also 
positioned Easterners as "outsiders" locked in inevitable conflict with residents. Outsiders 
were objective observers who dispassionately perceived the Plains' true nature. They were 
simply presenting unpalatable truths to childlike, recalcitrant residents. Residents would by 
definition regard outsiders as critics and unnecessary meddlers. Likewise, the Desert 
narrative simplified nature and transformed it into a staged backdrop. Nature was not the 
cause of the current crisis because it had always really been a desert. The real problem was 
rather that humans had ignored reality. Market agriculture's simplification of human and 
natural influences reduced the ability of either to solve the crisis. The more critics leaned on 
the Desert myth, however, the more inevitable seemed the return of its opposite, the Garden 
myth. 
To counter critics and place the Shelterbelt Project on firm scientific footing, the 
Forest Service published Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting in 1935. The technical branch 
of the project, led by Zon, assembled the book not so much as a guide for fieldwork as a 
reference for the science of Plains forestry. It was also quite clearly a refutation of the Desert 
narrative. Both were important because Roosevelt's plans to bypass Congress with relief 
funds had failed to materialize. By late-summer 1934 it was clear the project would have to 
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go through Congress. Thus Zon and his fellow authors issued Possibilities to answer critics 
and provide a tool for future struggles over funding and recognition. 
In the book, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture M. L. Wilson offered the most direct 
refutation of the Desert myth. Wilson offered an economic and social history of agriculture 
on the Plains that seemed to discredit completely the idea of a "Great American Desert." 
Settlers and pioneers had overcome "eastern suspicion of the prairie country" to create the 
nation's "greatest wheat-producing section." The Garden narrative could never contain the 
Desert except as fallacy. To do otherwise would have undermined its own claims. Inverting 
the logic of the Desert narrative, residents were pioneers and settlers who knew their land 
best. They were hardly the "peasants on the slopes of a volcano" that critics suggested. 
Residents had built unique rural communities before the drought and depression, and they 
had been "well satisfied with the farm as home and as a mode of living." Ecological reality 
prevented Wilson from adhering to script, however. The region's climatic variability was too 
much in evidence, too much at odds with facile stories of a Garden. Recognizing the need to 
explain the current crisis, Wilson argued that the lack of rain was only a temporary burden. 
He claimed that the "farmer, over a period of years, can expect a few bumper crops, several 
fair-to-good crops, a number of crops that pay little more than the cost of harvest, and some 
seasons in which crops do not grow at all." It was the last instance that caused wind erosion 
and erased the profits of good years. An unstable nature was the primary culprit, and the 
government's role was to stabilize nature. In the new Garden narrative, the state would 
deploy science to ensure nature as provider.31 
Most of the rest of Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting was written to answer the 
project's scientific critics, but doing so also helped refute the Desert myth. Zon took the lead 
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in summarizing the project's technical aspects. He explained that the western limit of the 
planting zone was "generally within the precipitation boundary marked by 16 inches of 
precipitation annually in the north and 22 inches, to allow for greater evaporation, in the 
south." Within this zone, belts would run not in continuous north to south strips but along an 
east-west axis on favorable soils. All these changes were suggested by early criticism within 
the profession, but rather than admit that critics had made inroads, Zon claimed that early 
newspaper accounts had exaggerated the plan and that the Forest Service never intended to 
create rigid belts. This was pure politics. Zon, Silcox, and Munns had created the early plans 
and sent them to the press, and in later testimony Zon would lament the project's loss of its 
original rigid pattern.32 
Zon once again tried to clarify the meaning of climate modification, and once again 
he offered mixed messages. He carefully qualified earlier statements about the effects of trees 
on climate by explaining that shelterbelts were only intended to have local climatic effect, 
but then he noted that "European data, based not on occasional windbreaks but on a 
succession of them at regular intervals, indicate that cumulative protection can be obtained if 
the belts are established at every one-third mile." The results of such a cumulative change 
would be an overall climatic modification that would protect areas to the east. The same 
study referred to Danish afforestation experiments in the Heath Districts of Jutland that 
showed an increase in rainfall due to forest plantings. Local effects had once again become a 
vessel for potentially larger regional changes. Zon's disclaimers about the relation of forests 
to climate were more likely a recognition that the majority of foresters did not share his 
opinion than evidence of a personal change of mind. As late as August 1936, Forest Service 
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documents called farm forestry "one of the principal permanent remedial measures to 
ameliorate the effects of recurring droughts."33 
Another section of the report addressed afforestation data from countries such as 
Canada, Denmark, Hungary, and Russia. Of the four, the Russian information was most 
abundant and the writers believed conditions there were closest to the United States. Russian 
silviculturalists had successfully planted shelterbelts on the steppes since the early nineteenth 
century, and the government had promoted shelterbelt planting since the 1890s. The survival 
of many early plantings stood "as a monument to the practical ideal of bringing forests 
benefits to a treeless region." The report suggested that extensive plantings might have 
increased the rainfall of the Kamennaya Steppe by nearly 15 percent. As further, if 
problematic, evidence of success, in 1932 the Soviet Union launched a new shelterbelt 
program calling for planting 865,000 acres (compared to the 1,282,000 proposed for the 
Shelterbelt Project). The report did not claim the studies were conclusive proof that 
afforestation could modify climate, but given Zon's history of relying on such work, the 
section was yet another red flag for critics.34 
The issue of climatic changes was important to Zon, but because opposition had 
always been broadly based, Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting presented an extensive 
historical case for tree growth. The argument consisted of a survey of past plantings, a review 
of earlier tree planting programs, an overview of studies done in other countries, and a 
refutation of the Great American Desert. Predictably, the Service found that trees did indeed 
grow on the Plains, and that while past plantings showed the strain of severe drought and 
indifferent care, they nevertheless survived. A quick survey conducted in fall 1934 estimated 
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that "some 230,000 acres appear to have been more or less successfully planted in the 
shelterbelt zone in the past 50 years."35 
A section on previous tree-planting efforts by John Hatton showed that the region had 
never been a forest, but that at one time it had contained many more trees than at present. 
Native Americans had used fire to reduce underbrush and to encourage fresh grass, but in the 
process they also destroyed native timber and prevented its spread. European Americans 
greatly increased the use of native timber, and by the late 1860s they had completely 
destroyed certain areas. More optimistically, the reports noted that "where destructive factors 
were eliminated, native timber reclaimed sections where it had been destroyed and, according 
to some opinion, even extended into other districts where it had not grown for centuries." 
This section of the report focused on anthropomorphic causes of timber destruction, creating 
the impression that humans largely controlled the landscape. This supported the Forest 
Service's case, and the authors hoped that it would convince skeptics who believed trees 
would not grow on the Plains. It did little, however, for those who questioned whether 
humans should meddle with nature.36 
Hatton also reviewed various federal and state programs that had promoted tree 
cultivation, and once again he stressed human failure over natural difficulties. For example, 
although the Timber Culture Act was not "generally successful, it did have the effect of 
further directing popular thought to tree culture." Hatton noted the establishment of the 
Nebraska and Kansas National Forests as other examples that trees could be grown. As for 
the failure of the Kansas Forest, he cryptically explained that it was discontinued "for a 
number of reasons." He also assured readers that the Office of Dry Land Agriculture 
plantings would "make the largest single contribution to the shelterbelt project because of the 
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authentic records that have been kept on the behavior and success of different species." This 
proved misleading since some foresters would later feel the project had not sufficiently 
consulted the Office of Dry Land Agriculture. Hatton concluded the section on federal 
planting efforts with what had become a clichéd explanation that farmers wanted to grow 
trees but lacked proper cultivation knowledge and the right species.37 
Despite the contribution of Possibilities to the field of Plains forestry, opinions 
remained divided over the true nature of the Great Plains. Beliefs about nature were not 
purely subjective judgments; science itself was fragmented and contradictory. In the face of 
such incomplete evidence people could passionately disagree. The Forest Service made a 
scientific case that trees were natural to at least part of the Great Plains, even as critics made 
an equally scientific claim that trees were unnatural. Ironically, while both sides viewed 
nature as separated from human intervention, and accorded direction and purpose to nature, 
they also supported particular human interactions with nature. Project critics believed the 
proper, undisturbed nature was grassland, yet in reality they wanted to replace one hybrid 
landscape with another, exchanging farmers for cattle ranchers. The Forest Service argued 
that without human intervention the Plains would have had more trees, and that their 
proposals would complement natural re-growth. All along, however, they knew they were 
advocating planting in many areas that had not seen trees for millennia. The convoluted logic 
of both sides reflected a desire to use nature as a normative tool to support deductive 
arguments. By removing humans from nature, each side could claim a direction to the natural 
system based on their preferred scientific observations. Science, in this case, was as much a 
matter of rhetoric and power as hypotheses and findings. 
168 
While Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting may not have succeeded in establishing the 
true nature of the Great Plains, it was well received by foresters and conservation 
professionals. The publication met "with a wide demand from agricultural workers, foresters, 
and other land-use technicians, and the small edition was soon exhausted." For the personnel 
who worked on the project, "the bulletin has remained in effect the 'Bible,'" although actual 
operating procedures varied. Most foresters seemed to find the book altogether "a very fine 
piece of work." Even critics found it a "competent technical document" that corrected many 
errors in the earlier plan. Paul Sears, another graduate of Bessey and Clement's botany 
program at Lincoln, who was highly critical of the Shelterbelt, declared the publication "a 
remarkable example of applied ecology."38 
The contradictory opinions—by foresters that they had solved the essential problems 
and by critics that the Forest Service was not addressing the larger issue—left fertile ground 
for future misunderstandings and conflict. Zon was correct when he wrote a friend and fellow 
Shelterbelt supporter that the center of gravity in the debate had changed and "most of our 
opponents (and that includes not only scientists but many lumbermen) grant now that trees 
can be grown within the belt selected." The new objection was "whether it was a worthwhile 
use of public funds." This was a question that the early plans had not clearly addressed, 
especially if claims of climatic change were omitted. Although Zon argued that the residents 
would ultimately have to make that decision, he did offer an opinion: 
Are you willing to give up an investment of close to two billion dollars in 
farm lands and improvements, aside from several hundred million in cattle, 
and move, some million and a quarter strong, into regions soon to be opened 
by irrigation? ... This region was and probably will continue to be the granary 
of the United States. We glibly talk about the Federal government providing 
long term credit to the lumber men, running into tens of millions of dollars to 
pay the tax on their timber land. We do not hesitate to provide CCC labor to 
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improve private forest land and yet there are some who protest the 
expenditures of a few million dollars for the farmers in the plains region. 
Proving that trees could grow on the Plains was only a first step. Zon and the Forest Service 
still had to show why trees should be grown, and why the federal government should foot the 
bill.39 
Drawing funds from Congress for the Shelterbelt Project proved problematic. Most 
members objected to the expenditure of public funds to improve private lands. Many argued 
that if farmers were the ultimate beneficiaries, then they should plant the trees. To modern 
readers, the deficit spending of the 1930s seems mild, but at the time it concerned many in 
Congress and they made every effort to curtail spending. Some conservative leaders objected 
simply because they saw it as Roosevelt's pet project. Others noted that the program seemed 
to have done fine with relief funds and saw little reason to give it permanent status. Many 
members also adhered to the mythical visions of the Plains as desert or garden, which in turn 
shaped their responses to the project's practicality. 
The Shelterbelt Project began operations in 1934 with $ 1 million in relief funds. In 
1935 it again operated on relief funds since its field operations had only just begun, and 
Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting was not ready by the July 1 deadline for regular 
appropriations. The 1935 allocation of $1,990,958 appeared generous compared to the 1934 
allocation, but for a project that once envisioned spending $75 million in ten years this was 
small indeed. 
Using relief funding was also less than ideal because of restrictions placed on 
expenditure. While the exact guidelines became stricter over time, the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA), which administered relief funds, was first and foremost an 
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employment measure. Its interest in creating new employment opportunities meant that 90 
percent of WPA funds went for relief worker's wages. This left 10 percent for the salaries of 
permanent employees, the purchase of material, and any other miscellaneous expenses. A 
further restriction placed on relief funds—that they be divided between states to meet varied 
planting needs, and the strict guidelines governing the ratio of supervisory to labor personnel 
made it difficult to achieve the level of control the Forest Service would have liked given the 
untested nature of planting. If the Shelterbelt was to proceed on the scale, and with the 
control that Roosevelt and the Forest Service desired, becoming part of the regular 
Agricultural Department budget was a necessity.40 
In January 1936, the Forest Service presented its case to the House Subcommittee on 
Agriculture of the Committee on Appropriations. Under the heading "Forest Influences" the 
Forest Service justified the project as providing immediate relief to drought stricken farmers 
and the unemployed. It would also "improve the physical conditions of living, aid in 
stabilizing rural population, conserve soil moisture, develop needed recreation areas, 
establish a protective cover for upland game and other wildlife, and make an area of over 
70,000,000 acres, a better place to live."41 
By 1936 the scientific community largely rejected any claim that tree planting could 
modify climate, but the political pressure to show a general public benefit from shelterbelt 
planting kept climatic issues in debate. Chief Forester Silcox found himself caught by this 
dilemma when he testified before the Committee. On the one hand, Silcox explained that the 
project did not intend to alter the climate of the region. He blamed "newspaper reporters and 
others" who jumped on the idea the project intended to change the weather. On the other 
hand, Silcox had to respond to congressional critics such as Georgia's Malcolm Tarver who 
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demanded to know "whether there is any general improvement by reason of the planting of 
this shelterbelt, or whether the benefits will be confined chiefly to the area in which they are 
being planted?" Silcox responded vaguely that "there has been consistent legislation 
recognizing the public benefits of planting some of that area," and that one such legislation, 
the Kinkaid Act, had resulted in "a change of temperature, wind velocities, and moisture."42 
Well aware of the controversial nature of climatic claims, the Forest Service tried to 
deflect criticism during congressional testimony by subtly modifying the form of such 
claims. For example, foresters denied that the project would increase rainfall, yet they also 
argued shelterbelt effects would extend well beyond the immediate vicinity. Zon explained to 
congress that "the shelterbelt project, as an ameliorative measure, if it is to be of national 
benefit, should, in my opinion, follow the original plan and objective." This meant planting 
in continuous parallel strips, "systematically carried out through the entire length of the 
plains States." Zon told the congressmen that "if you plant only one shelterbelt, it will not, 
modify the conditions very much except a short distance from the shelterbelt, but if you plant 
them at certain intervals, then there is a great accumulative effect, and that effect will be of a 
regional character." The effect would not be limited simply to the area between belts, but 
"the aggregate effect of these 100 strips will extend beyond the 100-mile width of the belt." 
The program would be of "a national significance, climatically and biologically." In Zon's 
opinion, such widespread effects satisfied the congressional demand for public benefit.43 
Besides the issue of public versus private good, the Committee also had reservations 
about the plan's financial and economic advisability. Several members questioned the logic 
of spending more per acre planting trees than the ground was worth. Even if the trees made 
the neighboring land more valuable by increasing its production, they felt that "we are adding 
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to the problems of the American farmer in disposing of his already top-heavy surplus of farm 
products." The Forest Service had no effective way of answering either criticism except to 
note that one day the land might be worth more and the crop surplus disappear.44 
In the face of open congressional hostility, the best hope was a rapid revision of the 
plan to make it more palatable. A week after its initial hearing the Forest Service returned 
with a new cooperative plan that would operate under the structure of the Clarke-McNary 
Act. The Service hoped that the cooperative nature of the Clarke-McNary Act, combined 
with the fact that it was already popular in many states, would reduce criticism of the 
Shelterbelt and allow the Service to receive legislative recognition. The Forest Service 
dutifully presented the revised plan, but the Committee was no more impressed with the new 
version than the original. Assistant Chief Forester C. M. Granger promised that under the 
cooperative plan the Forest Service would "require, just as fast as we could, at least 50 
percent cooperation by the states and all landowners." This unspecific ideal of moving 
towards a fifty-fifty participation between the federal government and the states and farmers 
was not what the Committee had in mind. They wanted specific and substantial contributions 
by farmers in carrying out and paying for site preparation, fencing, and cultivation. One 
Committee member complained that "there is no greater degree of cooperation under this 
plan ... than has been required before." There was still the chance that an amendment could 
be added to the Agricultural Bill on the floor of the House, or the plan could get re-approved 
in the Senate, but loosing the support of the Agricultural Committee would be a major 
blow.45 
The Forest Service believed that acquiescing completely to the Committee's view of 
making the Shelterbelt simply another public tree distribution program would be worse than 
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failure. Withdrawing key elements of federal control from the Shelterbelt would endanger the 
whole undertaking and potentially discredit the idea of federal Plains forestry. In a long and 
impassioned memo, D. S. Olson lamented the budget restrictions the project labored under 
and warned against relaxing federal control. He pointed out that: 
when the common question arose as to why the Government should undertake 
this project rather than the individual, and why success could be expected in 
this undertaking as a federal project, when individual efforts had failed, we 
replied that... the Government would protect the planted areas from livestock 
by fencing ... would prepare the ground sufficiently in advance to conserve 
adequate moisture ... would carefully select seed of a suitable sources ... [and] 
would control such enemies as rodents. All of these important points seem to be 
wiped out by the restriction set up in our present authorization, and with them 
goes any assurance of success. 
The Forest Service was not just maintaining federal control to increase its importance. 
Foresters believed that Service control was essential to success.46 
It was no surprise then that the Forest Service was not pleased with the Agricultural 
Bill the committee reported. It contained no funds for the project, and contained only a paltry 
$99,152 for "forest investigations." The committee also inserted an amendment to the 
Agricultural Department Appropriations Bill specifically prohibiting the use of any part of it 
to continue or establish a shelterbelt program. Not only had the committee failed to support 
the project, they were squarely opposed to any continuation. With the program rejected by 
the committee, the Forest Service's next hope for funding was by amendment to the 
Agricultural Department Bill when it came up for debate on the floor of the House.47 
Relying on amendments from the floor of the House to revitalize the Shelterbelt was a 
risky proposition. In committee hearings the Forest Service had been able to provide expert 
advice that eliminated most challenges of the project's scientific credentials, and confined 
debate to issues of economics and bureaucratic politics, but on the floor the plan was open to 
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attack from every direction, and its only defenders would be the Service's congressional 
allies. On the floor, members could without restraint claim that trees would not grow on the 
Plains, or do any real good if they did, without any fear of being contradicted by Forest 
Service experts. Similarly, members could freely lament that the "tree giveaway" did not 
include their own districts. Without Forest Service experts there to explain the reasons for 
confining the plan to a zone, the project was open to traditional pork barrel politics. 
Representatives were particularly swayed by the view of the Plains as a desert and 
that planting trees would go against "nature." Just as the Forest Service had feared, the early 
negative publicity surrounding the project had colored public opinion, and led members to 
embrace the Desert Myth. Louis Ludlow of Indiana ridiculed the Forest Service for thinking 
"they could construct a luxuriant forest belt across a part of the country where the Almighty 
will hardly permit a cactus to grow." He went on to explain that even were they allowed to 
spend huge sums of money and managed to do "what the Almighty has not done ... it would 
not have affected climate or temperature, and the only benefit would have been to local 
people in the belt zone who would have profited by the Government's largess." Earl C. 
Michner of Michigan ridiculed the science of the project as "blueprints, formulas and 
theories" by those without any practical experience. The Forest Service simply did not 
understand "that trees will not grow in a desert country."48 
Jed Johnson and William Lambertson combined desert mythology with pork barrel 
politics to condemn the project for not running through their districts. Johnson, whose district 
sat just to the east of the planned Shelterbelt zone, argued against spending money "that 
might be wasted in the future in an unsuccessful effort to grow trees in an arid region and in 
many instances many miles from water." Lambertson, who like Johnson found his district in 
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Eastern Kansas excluded by early plans, was "convinced from the first... that the project 
would fail, because I have seen too much of these trees trying to grow under existing 
circumstances." The claims for the project were so "fantastic" that they "brought ridicule on 
the idea of planting trees."49 
Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting, the document that the Forest Service hoped 
would overcome such objections met with almost as much ridicule on the House floor as did 
the project. Ludlow condemned it as an extravagant waste of paper. He charged that "even a 
pamphlet that was issued to advertise it was prepared in such an expensive way and with 
such artistic embellishment that it cost the taxpayers of this country $4,011.64." Rather than 
see the book as presenting a scientific viewpoint, Ludlow considered it simply another 
example of extravagance typical of the whole scheme. According to forester Edward Munns, 
Republicans raised a "hullaboo" over the publication, calling it a "political document and the 
project a Demo affair" because it had a picture of President Roosevelt along with other 
important personalities in Plains forestry. Its partisan attributions were overstated, however, 
because Democrats had been just as ready as Republicans to oppose it. Rather, Possibilities 
stripped of its physical supporters in the form of Forest Service experts, transmuted from 
scientific plan to political document.50 
The defeat in the House illustrated the need on the part of the Forest Service to create 
a public voice in favor of the project before the Senate took up the bill. Zon blamed the 
Administrative Branch for not having organized greater public support before the House 
hearings. Now he promised to take more aggressive action himself to insure approval by the 
Senate. This consisted of getting "regional interest in this item to manifest itself in full 
measure to the respective Senators." These "regional interests" were the forest experiment 
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stations, state planning boards, and anyone else with an intellectual or fiscal interest in the 
project. For his part, Silcox had "secured the definite interest of the President" and promised 
to go "to the mat in the Senate with a competent presentation of the Shelterbelt, bringing in 
the scientific basis and the social values of the project."51 
To maintain an aura of scientific objectivity, however, Zon and his staff sought to 
mask their hand in generating political support. They instructed backers to keep "yourself 
and staff out of the picture." Zon proved a master of double-speak. When writing to Senator 
Gerald Nye of North Dakota to sound out his opinion, Zon indicated that "when it comes to 
dealing with Congress, I, as a scientific worker, must necessarily remain 'deaf, dumb, and 
blind.' If the people in the region are vitally interested in this Government activity, they will 
have to look to their Senators and not to us for any help." This tactic seemed to work. Nye 
was impressed enough by the program, and what it might bring to North Dakota, that he 
promised to lend his support.52 
Zon's and Silcox's efforts resulted in an impressive showing before the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture Hearing. Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace made a personal 
appeal, and the Forest Service brought large pictures showing windbreaks already growing in 
the proposed area. Various "regional interests" also did their part. Letters of support came in 
from James Anthony, State Forester of North Dakota, Raymond McLees, President of the 
School of Forestry, W. R. Ronald, Chairman of the South Dakota State Planning Board, and 
a host of other figures.53 
Having learned from his experience with the House, Silcox began by showing 
senators that trees would grow on the Plains. He hoped that his efforts would prevent the 
attitude of the House that "God did not make trees grow in that plains country, and they 
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could not grow." Presenting the senators with photographs of twenty-year-old shelterbelts on 
a Nebraska farm made it clear that trees did grow. While the senators were dutifully 
impressed, Silcox had not explained the more crucial question of why trees should be grown. 
Fortunately, the senators provided their own reasons.54 
It turned out that Silcox was preaching to the converted. Senator Charles McNary of 
Oregon called himself "a dreamer when it comes to planting trees, and I love the forests." 
Charles Copeland of New York, the Committee chair, was a long-time Forest Service 
supporter, and Senators Nye of North Dakota and Peter Norbeck of South Dakota were 
strong supporters of a project that promised to pump federal dollars into their states. The 
Senate was in general more supportive of spending measures. Often because they knew the 
House would do the unpopular job of curtailing spending while they could make constituents 
happy by supporting pet programs. True to form the Senate Committee restored the 
$1,000,000 for the Shelterbelt Project and recommended the deletion of the House 
amendment that prohibited the use of Agricultural Appropriation Bill funds.55 
The restored project moved through the Senate without significant opposition, which 
brought the issue to a joint conference committee. The House had no intention of allowing 
the project to go ahead, and succeeded in again killing funding. As a measure of compromise, 
however, House conferees did agree to add an amendment originally proposed by 
Representative Philip Ferguson of Oklahoma providing $170,000 to distribute the trees 
already growing in project nurseries. The conferees also agreed to remove the restriction on 
using Agricultural Department Appropriations funds. With no source of funding it appeared 
termination was imminent. 
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Fear of termination threw the administrative branch into disarray. Zon explained to 
Assistant Chief Forester Earle Clapp that two of the "strongest men" in Paul Roberts' 
organization, Alva Simpson and David Olsen, had already left or would shortly. Both 
Simpson and Olsen were senior foresters working in Lincoln. Zon believed their loss would 
mean "the death of the Shelterbelt Project, not in a physical but a spiritual sense." Zon 
blamed Roberts for giving up too early when Roosevelt had made clear in a recent press 
conference that he was going to find a way to continue the project despite the disapproval of 
Congress. Zon informed Clapp, "the fact is that the Shelterbelt organization is 'all washed 
up' with Roberts."56 
Zon was correct in his assessment the project would continue. Roosevelt released 
$1,605,521 in WPA funds under the justification that it was part of the "long-range drought 
relief program." While WPA funds came with some restrictions, the Forest Service found 
these "quite liberal" during early years and had "little difficulty living up to them." The 
Service also renamed the project the Prairie States Forestry Project to "increase emphasis on 
the Project's relationship to the WPA, and suggest a change in program." The change also 
helped distance the project from the controversial linkage of shelterbelts to climatic change.57 
In order to shore up failing morale and make clear the reasons for the name change, 
Acting Chief Forester L. F. Kneipp circulated a memorandum spelling out Forest Service 
plans for the Shelterbelt in August 1936. He reassured the branch stations that "our purpose 
is to try to salvage and hence to continue the Shelterbelt plan." The name change was simply 
to increase the likelihood of obtaining Congressional support. He also made it clear that the 
Service intended to use the $170, 000 in regular funds of Ferguson's termination amendment 
to continue the day-to-day operations and not as intended to end the project. Although he was 
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optimistic Congress would at some later date fund the plan, he assured the stations that WPA 
funds would be forthcoming to continue the work. There was also the possibility in the near 
future of having the Agricultural Adjustment Agency provide funds to the Service as part of 
its land management plans.58 
While the project continued to rely on WPA funds, its most important supporter, 
President Roosevelt was unsatisfied with the state of affairs. In particular he was troubled 
that his "wall" of shelterbelts was little in evidence across the Plains. Roosevelt had visited 
shelterbelt plantings during his 1936 reelection campaign and left dismayed that most 
appeared more ornamental than soil conserving. Also he argued that the total acreage planted 
so far was "negligible from the point of view of soil conservation and water retention." He 
urged Secretary of Agriculture Wallace to submit a new study "from a large acreage point of 
view."59 
With the continued support of President Roosevelt, the Forest Service turned again to 
Congress. This time they promoted the Norris-Doxey Cooperative Forestry Act. Senator 
George Norris of Nebraska and representative Walt Doxey of Mississippi proposed a national 
program of farm forestry. Under it the Forest Service would cooperate with farmers in every 
state and territory to "bring about a more scientific and effective control" of farm woodlands. 
This included reforestation, management of existing farm woodlands, and conducting 
research. The wording of the act avoided mention of the Shelterbelt Project, but the Service 
drew the act broadly enough to cover any afforestation work on the Great Plains. As passed, 
it called for spending $2,500,000 a year spread between all the states but with the lion's share 
earmarked for the Plains. However, success eluded the project when the House Deficiencies 
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Committee refused to fund Norris-Doxey under the suspicion they were being tricked into 
supporting the old Shelterbelt.60 
The Forest Service renewed its struggle with Congress in 1938, but success proved as 
elusive as before and for similar reasons. In 1938 they placed their request in the regular 
Department of Agriculture Appropriation Bill, and requested $1,000,000 for the Prairie 
States Forestry Project. The House Appropriations Committee reacted with irritation to what 
they believed was a complete subversion of the spirit of the Cooperative Farm Forestry Act. 
The original act had a national farm forestry program as its nominal goal, but the request 
before the committee made a mockery of this intent by allocating the vast majority of funds 
to the six Plains states of the Shelterbelt. Even the project's stalwart supporter, Senator 
Norris, felt that the proposal directed far too much of the appropriation towards the Plains. It 
also upset several committee members that the Forest Service was forcing through a proposal 
Congress had already, repeatedly, declined to fund.61 
Only on the surface did the Forest Service's intransigence seem surprising. Olsen had 
earlier warned that spreading Forest Service efforts too thin, and placing too much 
dependence on farmers, would imperil the whole project. The Service also had to consider 
President Roosevelt's original intentions and continued interest. The President had made it 
clear on several occasions that he expected the Shelterbelt to be an intensive program that 
would make a bold statement and significantly impact the entire Plains region. The proposals 
put before Congress had never been intended to replace WPA funding but merely to 
supplement it and add greater flexibility. Failure to secure congressional funding was a 
hindrance, but after 1935 the President had made certain the project would not lapse for lack 
of funding. The Service's logic seemed to be borne out as the WPA continued to fund the 
program until 1942, when it for the first time received a regular appropriation from Congress 
for $218,000.62 
Relying of WPA funding had drawbacks, however. The guidelines governing use 
became stricter over the years, and the amount of funds eligible for supervisory personnel 
declined. This encouraged the employment of as much relief labor as possible, regardless of 
its relevance to the project, so that critical supervisory personnel could continue in 
employment. After 1940 the WPA no longer recognized Civil Service status and stripped 
project field personnel of their titles and salary schedules. Originally, money had shuffled 
between the six states where planting took place, allowing some leeway in meeting personnel 
and material needs. This too changed in 1942 when WPA guidelines locked up funds within 
each state. Despite these restrictions the project continued and actually increased the number 
of plantings each year until World War II mobilization began to drain labor. The Forest 
Service's plan was mostly a success, even if the project continued in a greatly scaled back 
imitation of its 1936 form.63 
The Shelterbelt Project, planned as a dramatic solution to dust and depression, 
became embroiled in controversy that it seemed unable to shake. Encouraged by President 
Roosevelt, Zon and Silcox had formed a plan to grid the Plains with a Great Wall of Trees, 
and perhaps modify the climate. The wildest features of the earliest plans quickly faded when 
exposed to the light of scientific debate, but the project never recovered from its initial 
misstep. Trumpeted as a plan to stop a desert, the public took it at face value and argued its 
practicality. Congress had many reasons for opposing the plan, but none more compelling 
than its lack of widespread public support and scientific uncertainty. 
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For their part, foresters tried to blame the initial missteps on newspaper publicity and 
public ignorance, but their own actions had assured both. Some wanted the Shelterbelt to be a 
dramatic solution, and they seized the opportunity to make forestry central to national 
recovery. When other foresters and the public questioned elements of their plan, they tried to 
play politics and enforce scientific comity instead of swiftly modifying their proposals. When 
the project went before Congress, the Forest Service decided it would rather be assured of 
WPA funding and presidential support rather than risk spreading itself too thin and risking 
failure. When foresters began planning for the project they hoped that they had left behind 
politics for the calmer atmosphere of scientific planning, however, they quickly found that 
their technical decisions were also contested, and that even the seemingly most mundane 
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Chapter Five—The Politics of Planning: technical decision-making, 
politics, and nature in constructing a plan 
When foresters began preparations for the Shelterbelt Project they hoped to leave 
behind political and professional battles in favor of pure technical planning. Surely science 
and planning could provide solutions that would be above criticism by outsiders, and 
scientific forestry could assume a central role in securing Plains landscapes. This, at least, 
was their theory, but foresters' grand plans gradually eroded before them as environmental, 
economic, and governmental pressures proved far more complex and resistant than expected. 
The landscape foresters constructed became a hybrid monster of technical, burecratic, and 
social decisions, all of which were shaped by forces beyond their control. 
Part of the difficulty foresters faced was that the plan they pursued epitomized what 
political scientist James Scott calls "high-modernist ideology." As Scott explains, this 
reflected a belief "about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the 
growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and 
above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understandings 
of natural laws." Foresters Carlos Bates, Edward Munns, and particularly the European-
trained Raphael Zon, attempted a radical simplification of natural and social spaces to 
accommodate their vision of proper planning. At its peak they contemplated literally dividing 
the United States in half with evenly spaced shelterbelts, running like unbroken corn rows 
from the Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico. This grand reorganization would tame 
nature and stabilize the economy and society. When it became clear that political, social, and 
natural conditions militated against the scheme, planners attempted to enforce their notions 
of order and nature on ever-smaller landscapes.1 
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Three interrelated aspects of planning caused foresters the most trouble. The first was 
the zone of planting, or the region in which foresters expected to plant. At the outset this 
region seemed to reflect natural barriers as defined by the latest science, but in practice the 
borders, and even the entire region itself, shifted repeatedly in response to scientific, 
political, and natural forces. The second issue was the direction and continuity of shelterbelt 
plantings. Foresters wanted shelterbelts to enforce a rectilinear order across the center of the 
nation, thereby blocking the eastward spread of the Dust Bowl. When this proved unrealistic, 
foresters clung to the hope that they could create such structures within smaller areas. 
Finally, the vast reorganization of space collided with property. Foresters wanted some form 
of state protection for their shelterbelts, but financial insecurity and existing ownership 
patterns made this unworkable. As restrictions on shelterbelt plantings waned, farmer support 
seemed to increase, but there was no guarantee that farmers would maintain acreage in trees. 
When foresters modified plans for the zone, direction, and ownership to accommodate 
farmers, politicians, and nature, they increased the support and practicality of the project, yet 
ultimately changed it into something that had lost most of its vision and uniqueness. 
Foresters' earliest plans did not lack for vision. They were ambitious on a scale 
seldom seen in United States history. The idea that perhaps most clearly illustrated foresters' 
penchant for overarching, systematic planning was the selection of a zone or region for 
planting. Confining the shelterbelt to a zone was supposed to be a technical adaptation to 
natural conditions, a geographic area within which planners would conduct successful 
planting operations. Thus the Forest Service called for a zone based on a natural boundary 
"as far west as trees will grow." The resulting belt of trees would be "100 miles wide 
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extending for 1300 miles from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico." The "western border of this 
belt [would] follow approximately the line of 18 inches average rainfall." The earliest 
newspaper announcements echoed this logic by placing the "western boundary of the forest 
protective zone ... as far west as trees can be made to grow with assurance of success," while 
Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting, the Forest Service's "bible" for the plan, located the 
zone along the ninety-ninth meridian with some wavering from the Turtle Mountains of 
North Dakota to Lubbock, Texas.2 
Planners were essentially constructing a new environmental space on the Plains, one 
that thoroughly blurred the social with the natural. The zone was defined as a natural region 
where tree planting was difficult but possible. Concrete natural limits such as "average" 
rainfall, soil type, and climate were supposedly the primary determinants of where tree 
planting was possible, and plans could never account for the full complexity or 
capriciousness of nature, let alone humans. Planners found themselves once again locked in 
what historian Richard White described as a "conversation" with nature that built on and 
modified previous understandings of the natural world. During the dry years of the 1930s, the 
conversation returned to the old debate about whether the Great Plains was a desert. The 
shelterbelt zone became the potential demarcation between wasteland and permanent 
agriculture. The exact location of this divide was hotly contested territory, however, and 
planners had to adjust it several times to account for natural and political concerns. Although 
foresters prided themselves on their unprecedented knowledge of Plains nature, they were no 
less engaged in a process of discovery than Zebulon Pike.3 
The zone concept at first seemed to harbor several advantages. Centralizing control 
and limiting the planting program to a finite region fit well with the main tenets of 
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progressive government and resource conservation, which stressed efficiency and scientific 
management. By spatially limiting plantings, the project paralleled efforts such as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority and the abortive Columbia Valley Authority, which stressed 
"comprehensive, expert designs for vast sections of the country." The economic crisis of the 
1930s had discredited the market-oriented policies of the 1920s. Greater government 
intervention had gained much political support. Centralized planning unified these 
interventions, and the PSFP was portrayed as another way to apply "rational and scientific 
method" to managing natural resources over a large area of the country. With greater 
freedom to intervene in economic and natural problems of the 1930s, experts developed plans 
to reorganize space in ways that they believed were ecologically and socially rational. In the 
case of the Shelterbelt zone, this meant identifying an area where trees would grow and 
where agriculture needed trees. The borders of the region, at least in an idealized sense, could 
ignore political boundaries.4 
From the start, however, plans for the zone also had to incorporate bureaucratic 
concerns. For administrative and field personnel creating a zone offered significant 
advantages. The zone facilitated standardization of planting and training, since procedures 
could be worked out on paper and then adapted to specific geographic locations. 
Concentrating plantings had the happy coincidence of offering political centralization as 
well, or in PSFP director Paul Roberts' words, it "enabled location of field unit headquarters 
inside or nearby the major work areas." This not only increased Roberts' control of field 
work, but it also brought PSFP employees into contact with other Federal relief agencies 
such as the Works Progress Administration, Resettlement Authority, and Agriculture 
Adjustment Administration. Although true coordination eluded relief agencies, the close 
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proximity of administrative and field personnel at least assisted in joint planning. In addition, 
Roberts wanted to ensure his access to local relief organizations, regional planning groups, 
and other groups and individuals that might be encouraged to promote planting. In these 
ways the zone concept, initially construed as a sort of bioregional construct, also helped 
planners to control the institutional workings of the project and enhance bureaucratic 
connections to the other agencies and people which shared the space.5 
Not everyone took such a positive view of Roberts' dedication to planting within a 
zone. Carlos Bates argued that Roberts wanted the zone primarily so "that their 
[administrative's] job is purely mechanical and that Research can give such information that 
no brain work on their part is essential." Although Bates was not opposed to the idea of a 
zone, he worried that the administrative branch was using the concept to rush forward with 
plans that were still tentative and prone to spectacular failure. If the administrative branch did 
not adopt the attitude that all jobs were technical, then the project might be "one awful flop." 
According to Bates, Roberts had become so enamored with the zone concept, and his ability 
to specify uniform planting procedures, that he was "perhaps the worst enemy that this 
consideration has to face, because he is so absolutely bland and immune to any worry about 
technique." Bates was too harsh, for like Roberts, he too believed that confining planting to a 
zone based on natural boundaries was the best method to minimize field errors, especially on 
a grand scale.6 
Political tensions also intruded in planning the putatively natural boundaries. 
President Roosevelt had originally wanted to create a "wall" of trees across the Plains, and 
Chief Forester R. Y. Stuart had responded in October 1933 with a proposal approximating 
the President's wishes. The belt would be 25-miles wide and extend from Valentine in 
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northern Nebraska to Childress in the Texas panhandle (Figure 6.1). More than later plans, 
Stuart's proposal was directed at walling off a region that soon became notorious as the Dust 
Bowl. This received very little circulation outside of the Department of Agriculture, 
however, and it is unclear how FDR himself felt about it. What we do know is that the plan 
sat poorly with professional foresters.7 
People who made their living planting trees wanted a broader, more nuanced 
approach. As work began on the conservative 25-mile plan, Raphael Zon and his staff grew 
even more ambitious, devising a plan that called for a 100-mile wide zone extending from the 
Canadian border to Brownsville, Texas (Figure 6.2). The western border of the zone would 
roughly parallel the 20-inch rainfall line along the middle and southern Plains but move 
significantly to the west in the northern tier states to account for lower temperatures. This 
massive belt would test Zon's theory that forest planting, systematically carried out on a 
broad scale, could transform the region climatically and economically. Paradoxically, 
Roosevelt's narrower wall of trees was too confined to accomplish the large-scale changes 
Zon desired, yet too ambitious for a temporary relief measure. Thus the long and narrow 
form of the 100-mile plan was a deliberate effort to maintain some part of President 
Roosevelt's original idea and thereby maintain his interest.8 
By the time the public saw the first plans in the summer of 1934, the zone had moved 
again. A July 1934 map in the New York Times shifted the zone slightly east throughout most 
of its length, yet it omitted most of the Texas section (Figure 6.3). This map was attributed to 
the Forest Service, and it seems to have been part of a concerted publicity drive that summer 
to drum up support and to reassure the public that the administration was actively pursuing 
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Figure 6.1—Earliest Plan for a 25-mile wide belt.9 
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Figure 6.2—Early plan for a belt running from Canada to Brownsville, Texas10 
intended as much more than a representation of the final boundary. For the many Americans 
eager for information, it remained the best available source.11 
During late 1934 and January 1935, yet another map began to circulate (Figure 6.4). 








Figure 6.3—Zone from the vVew ForA: Tïmes in summer of 1934 
rigid borders of earlier maps. Although the map's exact authorship is unclear, it was 
apparently created as a work-map for the various state directors who were organizing field 
operations. It was never intended for public distribution, yet it began to circulate and 
"received considerable public distribution." The map had a large divot out of its center 
portion to exclude the Nebraska Sandhills, presumably under the assumption that these were 
primarily non-agricultural lands. The deep westward bow in the zone's center allowed 
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Figure 6.4—Zone from fall of 1934.13 
198 
foresters to include a portion of the Platte River Valley that extended all the way into 
Colorado, both areas of which were demanding inclusion. Increasingly, the Shelterbelt's zone 
was morphing for political as well as ecological reasons. The long protrusion above the 
sandhills extended planting activities along the Niobrara River Valley into the Pine Ridge 
region of Northwestern Nebraska. Over the years these areas had proven their potential for 
tree growth despite being west of the previously announced boundary. The same applied to 
the Platte River Valley in Southern Nebraska, where tree growth had long preceded Euro-
American settlement. Yet the inclusion of the eastern counties of Colorado was almost 
certainly purely political, as this was far west of any previously successful tree planting 
effort. The new map's uneven borders and westward push only exacerbated calls for further 
changes, and on Chief Forester Ferdinand Silcox's order in late January 1935, Roberts 
discontinued its use, instructing his personnel to do likewise.14 
Towards the end of 1934 zone planning developed another wrinkle when foresters 
contemplated creating a second "grass belt" to the west of the Shelterbelt. According to a 
press release, this "new belt 100 miles wide will be added on the west of the original 
shelterbelt zone extending in some places like Colorado almost to the foothills of the Rocky 
Mountains." The release described the various methods of restoring the zone, including 
afforestation and water conservation, to restore "its natural grass cover." The idea for a 
second grass belt was the result of "insistent demands from several of the Plains States that 
the protective zone be pushed farther west." Silcox explained that the combination of grass, 
trees, and water conservation would have "the effect of increasing the productiveness of the 
lands in the eastern half of the belt where farming has a definite and permanent place." The 
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grass belt never evolved beyond the speculation stage, and the Forest Service quickly found 
that creating one belt was difficult enough.15 
While moving the zone west might please some potential constituents, foresters 
were extremely cautious in this regard, and their impulse was often to move the zone farther 
east into higher rainfall regions. Word that the administration was interested in a vast tree 
planting project on the Plains had leaked out as early as 1933, and although little public 
attention focused on the plan before the New York Times and other newspapers began to 
carry stories, foresters were aware that the plan faced significant opposition. In particular, 
many foresters questioned whether trees would even grow on the drought stricken Plains. 
Although the project's defenders claimed that these were foresters with little knowledge of 
the region, in fact even foresters with long experience were cautious. The impulse to shift 
planting to an area of higher rainfall might thus reassure some doubters. As it turned out, 
though, many critics still regarded the zone as too far west even after the politically-
motivated eastward shift, and a storm of criticism met the plan's release in the summer of 
1934 (see Chapter 4). The relocation actually exacerbated political tensions because it placed 
the zone squarely atop relatively more populated sections of the Plains states. These sections 
had higher land values and produced a greater agricultural surplus, thus making it easier to 
justify extensive federal spending, but it also made farmers more reluctant to donate land for 
tree planting. 
At internal meetings in December 1934, foresters aired many of these concerns and 
tried to push the zone of planting farther eastward. The Oklahoma representative wanted to 
shift the border "15 to 20 miles east of the present approved eastern boundary." Kansas 
foresters, led by the former Nebraska National Forest director Charles Scott, wanted the 
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"eastern boundary considerably farther east." With the exception of areas along the Platte 
River, the Nebraska foresters also wanted the boundary moved farther east. But the Dakota 
representatives wanted a slight westward shift at the extreme north of the zone. Everyone 
agreed that there was sufficient land in the eastern region of the already established zone for 
existing planting programs, and that an immediate revision was not necessary. Roberts 
endorsed these findings and informed the research arm of the Shelterbelt, directed by 
Raphael Zon out of the Lake States Experiment Station, that "the zone should be located far 
enough east so that it will have public support, so that it will involve primarily agricultural 
land, and so that the plantings themselves will be successful."16 
At such moments it became impossible to hide political dimensions of the Shelterbelt 
Project, yet the move eastward was too little for most critics and the resulting protests pushed 
the zone even farther eastward. The final version of the zone began to circulate as early as 
February 1935, although not widely outside the Forest Service until the publication 
Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting (Figure 6.5 and 6.6). More than the first shift east, the 
move between summer 1934 plans and February 1935 was clearly designed to ameliorate 
political criticisms and to increase public support. The project had operated on relief funds in 
1934 and 1935, and foresters were intensely aware of the need to increase public and political 
support to ensure long-term survival. However, the shift was not solely the work of politics. 
Foresters had been studying Plains climate and soils for a number of years. As their 
knowledge had increased, so had their caution about planting too far west.17 
Foresters had intended the zone to define the region within which planting would take 
place, but in practice both the eastern and western boundary were porous. A survey of 
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Figure 6.5—Zone in February 1935.18 
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plantings done by Ralph Reed in 1954 found considerable planting had been done east of the 
zone shown in Possibilities, and in some areas plantings had also extended farther west 
(Figure 6.7). Thus by 1936 the Forest Service was regarding the zone's borders as essentially 
elastic, but in 1934 and 1935 it was not at all clear that the zone would be a flexible creation. 
To many Plains residents, it appeared that "blueprints, formulas, and theories" might triumph 
over "practical experience."20 
The logic of limiting planting to a zone was never as convincing to Plains residents as 
it had been to foresters. The high-modernist affection of some foresters, or at least the zone 
that such thinking facilitated, left many residents outside the planning process. The borders 
became highly contested territory, with each county and state lobbying for their own section 
to be included. Sometimes they argued that the zone should be shifted east or west to 
incorporate their favored space; other times they asked for exceptions. Some clever residents 
in South Dakota argued that the borders of the zone should be used to indicate what counties 
would be included, thus farms falling outside the zone, but inside a county adjacent to or 
partially within the zone, would also qualify. More even than inclusion, though, residents 
wanted the Forest Service to acknowledge their opinions and experiences. 
The potential for relief work and federal dollars that the Shelterbelt program 
represented was a significant draw for regional politicians, and many lobbied the Forest 
Service on behalf of their preferred location. When Oklahoma congressman Jed Johnson 
discovered in the newspaper that the zone would run to the west of his district, he 
immediately opposed the project because "every farmer in every area or section of the United 
States is as much entitled to these free Government trees as are people who live in the so-
called shelterbelt." Senator W. J. Bulow of South Dakota took a less aggressive tack, asking 
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for "careful consideration" to expand the program into Potter County, which stood just west 
of the proposed zone. Representative Francis Case, also of South Dakota, lobbied the 
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PSFP to make at least some plantings in the West River counties. The Colorado State 
legislature petitioned the U. S. Congress to create a second shelterbelt zone "supplementing 
the proposed national shelter belt, to relieve dire need and distress in eastern Colorado." In 
each instance the primary attraction seemed to be less the presence of trees than the infusion 
of federal work relief funds.22 
The location of the zone also spurred demand by Plains residents that resembled a 
community tug-of-war. By March 1935, at least 2050 residents living to the east of the 
proposed zone in South Dakota had signed a petition asking the Forest Service either to 
expand the boundaries or to shift the zone eastward. Meanwhile, 1601 residents to the west 
signed another petition asking the Forest Service to leave the line as originally announced, 
thus including Campbell and Walworth Counties. The Colorado Forestry Association 
adopted a resolution calling for extension of the project west into Colorado, while the 
Business Farmer asked that the belt extend deep into the Platte Valley. An ad hoc 
organization in eastern Colorado, western Kansas, and western Nebraska, which called itself 
"the Western Great Plains Shelterbelt Association," petitioned for the establishment of 
another shelterbelt zone on the western Plains. The demands for a second shelterbelt zone in 
turn encouraged additional states, including Wyoming and Montana, to ask for inclusion as 
well.23 
The placement of the zone for areas to its west was particularly critical. For western 
residents the implication of remaining west of the planting zone meant not only that they 
were excluded from the project but that their very status as agricultural pioneers was 
threatened. In both a material and cultural sense, they were beyond the agrarian pale. Many 
had moved to the high Plains during better times and struggled for years to carve out a 
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meager existence against great odds. In so doing they thought they had earned their right to 
remain. Given their lack of other services, the government had an obligation to help them 
through the current difficulties. In her study of western South Dakota, historian Paula M. 
Nelson observed that "the symbolic implications of the plan ... were well understood in 
western South Dakota, located as it was on the windy and sunny side of the shelterbelt. Those 
on the east side would be protected from hot winds, blowing dust, and blizzards, and perhaps 
as well from the sight of failure to the west. West river residents, outside of the shelterbelt by 
a decision of their own government, would stand unprotected." Bradford Knapp, president of 
the Texas Technical College in Lubbock, warned the Forest Service that "to run the belt in 
Texas as suggested is a very serious matter, because it is the equivalent of condemning all of 
the land west of the belt as unfit for development."24 
It was the limiting of the shelterbelt planting to a zone, not the project itself, which 
threatened residents farther west. The zone was a visible demarcation of which land, and by 
implication people, the government decreed worth saving. Having previously encouraged 
settlement and dry farming on the western Plains, the government was now implicitly telling 
settlers that their lands were unsuited for crop production. The zone was a marker in the ever-
shifting construction of nature on the Plains. As this marker shifted to the east in the 1930s, 
some settlers were redefined as "not builders, as they saw themselves, but destroyers; not the 
final chapter in manifest destiny, but manifest failure; not heroic pioneers, but foolish 
hanger-ons."25 
Almost instinctively, residents living to the west challenged the decision to exclude 
their areas. Many, such as I. E. Shirk of Colorado, assured the Forest Service that their 
county had "very fertile ground and produces fine crops." On the surface these requests 
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sought to have the Forest Service reexamine the boundaries of the zone, but their requests 
also revealed a quest for legitimacy. They were defending their decision to farm the ground 
as much as requesting assistance. George Frye of North Dakota explained that "I know this 
country is subject to droughts but there were times when we had an abundance of 
everything." Flora Kicken of Nebraska (Jules Sandoz's daughter) reminded foresters that "we 
have no good roads, no good schools, no good churches here but this is one thing that we 
could have and need." When the Forest Service responded that the "the shelterbelt as it is set 
up now applies only to agricultural lands," she fired off a second letter reminding the 
foresters that "this may be a grazing region, primarily, but the government considers it an 
agricultural region also ... many of the families around here make their living entirely by 
farming as do most of my own people." O. B. Helmer of North Dakota noted that she had 
"lived in North Dakota sixteen years and have planted quite a good many trees. They have 
nearly all lived, and are doing fine."26 
Although the zone was less threatening to residents living to the East, they too sought 
to influence the location of planting. H. C. Halvorson of South Dakota warned the Forest 
Service that people in the eastern portion of the state had advocated shelterbelt planting for 
years with little hope of systematic success, and now, when the government had finally 
initiated a program, it seemed like it would completely miss them. In response to an 
Associated Press article that indicated the Forest Service was considering moving the zone 
west in North Dakota, E. J. Gurski adopted the Forest Services' own technical arguments to 
warn foresters that "the original location was ideal, particularly from the standpoint of 
rainfall, and we feel that serious consideration should be given to this feature." Echoing the 
worries of the foresters who were even then trying to finalize the zone's location, Gurski 
208 
warned that "it would be an awful blunder if the shelter belt were moved westward, and then 
it were found later that there was not enough rainfall for the trees to survive."27 
Project personnel had admitted the eastern boundary was "somewhat arbitrary," but 
they defended their verdict on the grounds that tree growth east did not necessitate 
government expenditure. They were also concerned that high land values might discourage 
farmers from participating, and that they did not want to "lose" land to trees. While the first 
reason contained some logical consistency, the widespread demand of residents to the east 
that the zone include their lands had already demolished the second. Instead, the eastern 
boundary represented two interrelated desires on the part of planners. First, they wanted to 
maintain a wall like zone with fixed borders and a 100-mile width. Second, they wanted to 
create what they called a concentrated effect. This could only be accomplished by planting in 
a relatively confined region.28 
The Forest Service adopted a different argument for the western boundary, defending 
it as the "natural limit for any tree plantings," but this too was somewhat arbitrary. The 
supposed natural limits of the zone had in fact blurred because of foresters previous efforts. 
The western border of the Shelterbelt zone ignored the earlier testing by field experiment 
stations on the Plains, some of which seemed to indicate that with proper planning and 
management trees could be grown in areas far to the west of the zone. The western border 
also seemed increasingly arbitrary as the project progressed. Foresters began to encounter 
complicated problems with soil types, water tables, and species selections, all of which 
proved every bit as important as an arbitrary "natural limit" line. They also realized that their 
assumptions about average rainfall were problematic, since not only did rainfall on the Plains 
vary considerably between years, but the exact timing, the soil type, and the age of the trees 
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were also critical factors. Increasingly, any hard line on a map seemed difficult to determine, 
and one survey even suggested delineating "four nearly parallel but somewhat variable 
western boundaries."29 
In the end any ecological rationale for constructing the western boundary was 
intrinsically founded on the political economy of market agriculture. As a Forest Service 
memo noted, shelterbelt planting "aims to make land more valuable for agriculture, less 
subject to the effects of the elements—in short, to develop its more intensive use under the 
artificial conditions set up by human activities." It was thus a priori senseless to enhance a 
grazing or predominantly grass landscape. Not only must the land support tree growth, but it 
must also be worth growing trees. Therefore, "should an economic survey of the same 
territory show that agriculture as far west as this is too much of a risk, then it would be only 
fair" to move the boundary until it contained lands of "fairly uniform prospects along the 
entire western boundary." The more planners tried to pin down the zone's location, the more 
they realized that the "final determination of the shelterbelt limit will give us protection from 
political considerations to place the boundary here or there, [but] this entire process might be 
considered merely as a rather expensive means of "rationalizing" what, in the end will be just 
a good, well-balanced estimate of the best location for the western boundary." As if that were 
not enough, the plan also needed to fit "the President's original conception of the shelterbelt 
project," which "was to create a barrier against the desiccating winds of the western plains— 
the western boundary of which was to be approximately in the longitude of the Missouri 
River and Bismarck."30 
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More than any other factor, the creation and maintenance of a zone of planting—long 
after it had become a political liability—reflected foresters' wish to "concentrate" plantings. 
This was part of the long running effort to alter the nature of the Plains through tree planting. 
During the nineteenth-century this goal had reflected a pastoral vision of groves and forests 
interspersed with farms. The twentieth-century version was a combination of scientific 
forestry and high-modernist planning. As James Scott's has noted, this high-modernist plan 
was more systematic, more uniform, and imagined a program of shelterbelt planting carried 
out over a wide area. One forester explained there was a need for "some cumulative mass 
effect which would necessitate a systematic arrangement of large numbers of individual 
shelterbelts, together with other miscellaneous plantings." Concentrating shelterbelts would 
also offer overlapping protection. In a completely developed community, each farm would 
only need belts on one or two sides. The other sides would be protected by neighboring farms 
likewise throughout the entire zone. Conversely, if every farm were an island then the job of 
foresters and the amount of land each farm would dedicate to trees would be much larger. 
Planners, operating on a Plains constructed of paper, numbers, and theory, had imagined a 
way of rearranging the landscape to accommodate a new conservation feature, trees.31 
During the early New Deal political discourse took a radical departure towards 
comprehensive, statist plans, and progressive politicians contemplated drastic rearrangements 
of formerly state and private spaces. Briefly high-modernist approaches seemed possible in a 
variety of places: from the Tennessee Valley to the Great Plains. However, the window of 
opportunity closed rapidly and regional interests and Congress began to reassert their 
traditional authority. The most obvious example of this was the Supreme Court's declaration 
that the National Recovery Act (NRA) was unconstitutional in May 1935. But there were 
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also increased rumblings from a restless public that saw the NRA and other early programs 
as a failure of the dream that disinterested experts could effectively manage the economy or 
nature. The Shelterbelt Project, with its suggestions of climate change, was an easy target 
since criticism made few enemies outside the Forest Service. Silcox and Zon understood that 
the political momentum had shifted against them, and they avoided making the types of 
dramatic claims that had seemed possible in 1934. After that year high-modernist planning 
became more difficult to discuss in public, but foresters continued promoting a systematic 
concentration policy even if they did not always clearly articulate the reasons.32 
Instead of dramatic claims, Zon relied on scientific and bureaucratic rationale to 
determining the outline of the Shelterbelt zone. In response to a letter from Roberts 
requesting advice on expanding plantings west of the line in South Dakota, Zon noted in 
1935 that farmers outside the zone should be reassured of their eventual inclusion. Otherwise 
no immediate action should be taken until the Forester decided that helping areas outside the 
zone was "more important to the country than the systematic development of the zone itself." 
This was in some senses pure politics, Zon was the Forester's principle advisor on such 
issues, so he in practice had immense influence in regard to answering such questions. 
Shifting the decision to Washington was in this instance an effort to deflect requests. In other 
cases, though, he defended adamantly the concentration of work. In his testimony before the 
House Subcommittee on Agriculture in 1936, he argued that without a definite zone forestry 
work would be so spread out as to be just another program to assist individual farmers, with 
no "larger" public benefit. Although Zon was the strongest proponent of this idea, it was not 
uncommon to see other foresters, such as South Dakota State Director A. L. Ford, warn that 
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"our present scattered plantings serve very well to sell local people on the proposition but I 
question its selling value from a national standpoint."33 
Nevertheless, after 1936 the zone gradually broke down. Zon became less involved 
with planning for the PSFP and the administrative staff had greater control over locations and 
methods. As the Director of the Lake States Forest Experiment Station, the Shelterbelt and 
then PSFP were only a small part of his duties. He also seemed to lose personal interest as 
the project lost its more transformative aspects and became "simply" a plan to assist farmers 
in tree planting. At first the field personnel tried to sustain Zon's policy, but this was 
primarily for labor reasons. Concentrating planting work helped reduce transportation and 
equipment expenses. It also allowed the relatively few skilled field personnel to supervise a 
large number of plantings and thereby avoid the WPA employment ratio cap.34 
In the face of continued pressure to expand operations, the zone became a largely 
theoretical construction that had only a general influence on plantings. Despite the labor 
advantages of concentration, Olson began to argue in favor of dispersion on the grounds that 
"it would be to our advantage from the public relations standpoint to have in each state a 
vastly greater number of community developments ... wherever we have gone the program 
has gained the wholehearted support of the community." From this he concluded that not 
only should planting extend beyond the zone, but work should "extend into Colorado, 
Wyoming, and Montana." John Emerson made the same argument for inclusion of western 
Minnesota and Iowa. For the 1939 and 1940 planting seasons, Robert asked Washington for 
permission to expand plantings to some of these states, but the final ruling was that "in view 
of the present emergency status of the Project, and the relatively limited amount of work you 
are now able to carry on each year with funds available, it appears unadvisable to attempt 
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extension of activities." While this quashed plans, the PSFP continued to expand its 
operations within the Plains states.35 
A strange thing happened as Roberts pushed for expansion within the Plains states: 
the natural barrier to tree growth moved west. In response to "rather urgent requests to push 
further west in several of the states" in 1941, Roberts began planting west of the old 
shelterbelt zone in the northern states. In part the expansion was based on obvious political 
advantages, but Roberts also hoped that "we are going into a rainfall cycle when we can 
expect to get some successful results." This was still a bit optimist in 1941 when, with the 
exception of South Dakota, rainfall remained below average, but the following year did mark 
the end of drought and the beginning of higher rainfall. After almost a decade of bad news, 
the Weather Bureau finally reported in 1942 that production was increasing on the Plains and 
that "the phenomenal increase over drought years is due primarily to the difference in the 
weather." Nature had changed the line of "as far west as trees will grow."36 
It was not only the zone of planting but the orientation of belts that displayed the 
limits of high-modernists planning. The earliest plans called for trees to run continuously 
north to south in belts one mile apart. Such an orientation fit eastern desires for a green wall 
against western aridity. When President Roosevelt had first suggested a tree wall to hold 
back dust storms, forester Edward Munns had proposed planting belts along section lines and 
highways. Munns did this to control costs, since more of the land under such a plan would be 
publicly owned. He also wanted to form a grid pattern that would protect fields from the 
prevailing winds. By the summer of 1934, however, the plan called for "about 100 parallel 
windbreaks one mile apart" running north-south. Chief Forester Silcox reinforced this rigid 
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pattern in his early announcements by calling for "windbreaks to run north and south; each to 
be seven rods wide, making about 100 parallel windbreaks, one mile apart and 1,000 miles 
long." The Forest Service had multiplied FDR's tree wall idea several fold into a series of 
tree-walls that, at least on paper, buffered the East from dust storms like those of 1934 
(Figure 6.8). Running continuous, rigid shelterbelts along a north-south axis would materially 
and symbolically protect the East.37 
Politics made the north-south orientation of trees seem like second nature, but the 
Plains subverted such common sense dreams. To begin with, not all soils were suitable for 
tree growth. Thus regardless of whether plans called for north-south belts, they would not 
and could not be continuous. In addition, the hot winds of summer generally blew from the 
south or southwest, while winter winds descended from the north and northwest. In neither 
season was a north-south orientation particularly protective. Politics and nature collided 
before planner's eyes, and given the choice of either north-south plantings or west-east 
plantings—the only choices possible given the township survey system—the west-east 
orientation emerged as the stronger choice. For Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting, the 
authors assembled the best available evidence about soil types and wind direction on the 
Plains (Figure 6.9,6.10, 6.11, 6.12, and 6.13), to clearly demonstrate the impracticality of 
continuous, north-south belts. To diagram their findings foresters used "wind roses," a small 
circle with wedge-like petals, the width of which indicated the frequency of winds from that 
direction. Most winds struck the southern two-thirds of the shelterbelt zone from the south 
during summer months. However, switching to an east-west orientation was also less than 
ideal because enough variation existed—especially in the critical months of spring— 
occasionally to render east-west belts useless as well. Even displaying the average sweep of 
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the wind was deceptive in terms of crop health. Some years it only took a few days of hot dry 
winds—usually from the southwest—to ruin a crop. Such short blows might barely register 
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Figure 6.13—Wind pattern on the Great Plains for non-summer months.43 
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to enclose each section or farm on two, or better yet, three sides, yet such tactics instantly 
doubled or trebled the amount of plantings.44 
Although not as immediately obvious as orientation, the complexity of soil types also 
influenced location and orientation. Both the Bureau of Chemistry and Soils and the Soil 
Erosion Service had conducted soil-reconnaissance surveys over a large part of the proposed 
zone. The agencies had developed an extensive, even intimate knowledge of Plains soils, but 
knowing the soil in a specific area did not mean knowing whether it would support trees. 
After all, much of the point of the project was to plant trees where they had not grown. 
Therefore foresters had to find examples of tree growth in each soil type and then make 
assumptions about the suitability of the soil. The life histories of some trees might be well 
recorded, but in many cases foresters had to make educated guesses about the relationship 
between soil and tree condition. The surveyors could not always know that the poor 
condition of a grove was the exclusive work of unsuitable soil types. It was possible that 
certain varieties of trees were unsuited to the vicinity, that previous treatment such as 
cultivation or thinning had been less than ideal, or that any number of other factors had 
influenced events. Despite these hurdles, foresters reduced the huge variety of Plains soils to 
three categories: favorable, difficult, and unfavorable. Even keeping in mind the above 
difficulties of categorizing tree growth and soil types, the approximations were further 
complicated by geographic features, water table levels, and precipitation.45 
But it was not only natural conditions complicating the simplifying pressures of 
planning. Human patterns of use, ownership, and perception also contributed to the conflict. 
Unless the government was going to buy land for the belts, there was little incentive for 
farmers to cooperate if belts ran north-south. Having lived on the Plains, many farmers were 
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skeptical that north-south belts would offer protection from anything but cold winter winds. 
A former wheat-grower from central Kansas warned the Forest Service that "your proposed 
plan of building 'Wind-breaks' of trees running from the North to the South is like trying to 
dam a river by building a dam parallel to the running water in the stream" and only a 
"'greener', just out of college, would plow ground or plant crops in rows North and South." 
Belts that did not protect crops, homes, or fields, but took up valuable farmland, were not 
going to be popular. Making matters worse, continuous belts would require the government 
to exercise its eminent domain powers to seize the land of non-cooperators. The Forest 
Service never considered doing this, but it was increasingly obvious that maintaining the 
original orientation of nearly continuous strips would require drastic interventions by the 
state. Given these difficulties, Bates informed Zon in January 1935 that "within the territory 
covered by the Zone, there will be so many omissions for various reasons that the solid 'belt' 
idea, implying uniform distribution, cannot be carried out."46 
Most foresters viewed these changes as an entirely positive development. The idea of 
systematic, continuous belts had always seemed more a science fiction hoax—an agrarian 
analog of Fritz Lang's Metropolis. Many foresters who submitted opinions to the Journal of 
Forestry in 1934 cited the continuous north-south belts as a primary objection. More telling, 
even supportive foresters questioned this aspect. It was not until April 1935, when Zon 
published "Shelterbelts—Futile Dream or Workable Plan," that Zon publicly abandoned the 
goal, but even then the issue remained clouded. G. A. Pearson, Director of the Southwest 
Forest and Range Experiment Station, wrote to Zon to congratulate him on the "new 
program" because, as he understood it, "you will plant only suitable sites and I read between 
the lines that the plantations will not necessarily be in the form of long narrow strips." 
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Although Pearson was ultimately correct that the project would abandon the idea of long 
continuous strips, the change was not yet a forgone conclusion.47 
Zon and Olson attempted to maintain some aspects of the plan's early emphasis on 
continuous north-south strips. Zon tried to sustain elements because it was only through such 
systematic planting that a large-scale climatic effect could be attained. Zon made this point 
explicitly in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Agriculture in 1936. He tried 
to convince the committee that the project should retain its commitment to continuous north-
south plantings. Only in this way could the project justify itself as for the general public 
welfare rather than just for individual farmers. According to Zon, Chief Forester Silcox also 
supported retaining aspects of the original plan, although it is not clear whether Silcox was 
doing this to support Zon or because he truly believed in the plan.48 
As the Chief of Timber Management, Olson had a central role in determining the 
actual location of belts, and initially he tried to maintain some continuity and a north-south 
orientation. Like Zon, Olson seemed to believe that systematic plantings might have wider 
effects, but Olson remained concerned about the effects shelterbelt work would have on the 
Forest Service and Plains forestry. He argued that the "work should have some semblance of 
forestry," or at least the "general public concepts of forestry," rather than simply a scattered 
project of planting hedgerows on individual farms. Olson firmly believed farmers could do 
the latter for themselves. Maintaining the original plan of wide, relatively continuous belts 
running on a north-south axis would unequivocally place foresters and the Service at the 
center of the undertaking.49 
Olson was no neophyte when it came to Plains forestry. He understood the natural 
and social barriers to such an arrangement, and the plantings he directed were always 
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something of a compromise. There was little chance to create continuous, north-south belts 
from the Canadian border to Texas, but he hoped for something similar on a smaller scale. 
Within concentrated areas he wanted belts to run "practically continuous" except for roads. If 
the PSFP could maintain continuous belts at half-mile intervals on this reduced scale, then 
the plantings would create an interlocking system of protection. On an isolated farm, 
foresters would have to plant on at least two sides, ideally in an "L" shaped pattern. 
However, with long continuous strips running across multiple farms each would give up only 
one side to a shelterbelt. Farms would be bracketed on two sides by a belt, one their own and 
the other their neighbor. In addition the continuation of the belt on their other neighbor's land 
to the north and south would help protect against glancing winds from the north or south.50 
By 1937 Olson had realized that even this compromise was not having the desired 
effect. In some cases shelterbelts were not stopping sand and soil from blowing. The 
southwest corners of farms in the three southern Plains states were particularly vulnerable, 
and north-south belts seemed unable to stop such erosion. Under pressure from the state 
directors of Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, Olson agreed that "it should not only be 
permissible but is highly desirable that your organization plan the location of the shelterbelts 
where they will do the farm the most immediate good, whether such locations be on the 
north, south, or west edge." Olson admitted that when "we look back at our 1935 and 1936 
strips, we realize that some of them cannot justify their present locations." In the future most 
field shelterbelts would run "east and west and preferably on the south edge or mid-field." 
The southern Plains states had been the strongest in their criticism, but plantings all along the 
zone tended to follow an east-west axis after 1937. Unlike the early plans for continuous 
north-south plantings, the reorientation was never rigid and Olson gave the rather vague 
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advice that "this office believes that exceptions to the rule should all be given their due 
consideration, and wishes to leave with you [the state directors] the responsibility of meeting 
or rejecting those exceptions."51 
Much as many foresters suspected, land ownership became another factor 
determining belt direction and continuity. One hundred continuous belts running from 
Canada to Texas, spaced one mile apart within a 100-mile zone, would have given the Forest 
Service 1,820,000 acres of forestland to administer. Some foresters hoped that farmers could 
be convinced to donate all or most of this land, but this faded rapidly when most farmers 
balked at participating under such conditions. Foresters' preferred solutions were either direct 
government ownership or a protective lease. The first choice would have guaranteed long-
term protection for the belts, vastly expanded the bureaucratic reach of the Forest Service, 
and put the entire project in terms very similar to the National Forests. If direct ownership 
could not be achieved, however, the Service might at least gain partial control over planted 
belts through a protective lease or other legal agreement that prevented farmers from 
removing trees and allowed the Service to maintain the belts. 
Predictably, Zon was the most vocal advocate for direct ownership. Zon was closely 
connected to a cadre of radical fosters that were pushing for greater government ownership in 
the early 1930s, including George Ahem, Earle Clapp, Robert Marshall, Edward Munns, and 
Gifford Pinchot. Marshall's book, The People's Forests, was one of the most influential 
statements of their goals. In 1932, Pinchot presented Roosevelt a white paper created by 
Marshall and Zon that summarized many of the points from The People's Forest. As Zon 
began work on the Shelterbelt the following year, he brought the group's ideas to the plan. 
To those who argued for cooperative agreements or land donation, he replied that the 
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government policy as seen by the Clarke-McNary Act "has been that private altruism, plus 
government subsidy" would protect forestland. Time and again this assumption had fallen 
short because "voluntary private forestry has failed the world over. There is absolutely no 
reason to assume that it will succeed in the U. S." The condition of private forests appalled 
Zon. Private land owners consistently over-cut without replanting. Government purchase and 
planting of forestlands was the only way to assure success and protection. Zon even, wanted 
to "reverse gears" on public land policy and have the government buy land to increase public 
ownership. Placing shelterbelts under direct federal control would thus ensure that 
investments in planting and maintenance would not be wasted through ignorance or exploited 
for greed.52 
There were other reasons for foresters to support public ownership. Assistant Forester 
L. F. Kneipp wanted some "definite certainty of tenure" because it "seems to be somewhat of 
futility in starting a 100-year program" with a protective lease that only ran for 10 years. A 
donation policy was clearly out of the question on such lands, and even a short-term lease 
agreement faced serious bureaucratic and legal hurdles since it would have to go through a 
variety of insurance and loan companies, banks, federal and state agencies, the Federal Farm 
Loan Bank, Rural Credit Agencies, State Land Agencies, and individual owners. Thus 
Kneipp favored "establishing fee-simple ownership" to guarantee the shelterbelt's long-term 
survival. Chief of Lands, Alva Simpson, also argued for direct purchase, noting that "a large 
percentage of the farms within the shelterbelt zone are mortgaged." Buying of foreclosed 
farmland would give the Forest Service direct control of the land and it would simplify 
immensely the legal landscape of the Plains. It would also have guaranteed the public welfare 
over individual greed.53 
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The bureaucratic advantages to the Forest Service were also substantial. As planning 
for the project began in the summer of 1934, the Service contemplated that "the organization 
created for the handling of this project may eventually grow into a new regional office." 
Taking into account the unique character of Plains forestry and the need to integrate various 
Forest Service activities, Roberts hoped to create a "new Forest Service region" which would 
have "all Forest Service functions having to do with afforestation, and articulation and 
integration of forestry and agriculture transferred to it." For the foresters planning the project, 
land ownership was both a means of protecting shelterbelts and a way to make tree planting 
"someone's business." Giving the Forest Service almost two million acres to manage as a 
massive, interconnected forest would certainly have made the Plains its business.54 
But one after another, plans for landownership fell through. Forced to rely on WPA 
funds for its budget, the project barely met administrative expenses. With each failure to 
obtain a permanent budget from Congress, and with no change in House opinion in sight, 
foresters drastically trimmed their hopes for transforming the Plains, forced instead to rely on 
whatever resources were available to get trees in the ground. The Forest Service initially 
signed lease contracts that used a land valuation system borrowed from the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration (AAA) to determine rental payments. These ten-year leases 
guaranteed the Forest Service a measure of control over the early life of trees, and they 
contained a clause allowing the Forest Service to purchase the land outright. This was, 
however, an expensive policy with considerable red tape. Surveying the belts and 
establishing the exact outlines of leased land was a burden. In 1936, the PSFP secured a deal 
to use AAA funds to pay for shelterbelt land as part of its crop reduction program, but the 
deal fell through when the Supreme Court ruled the AAA's processor tax unconstitutional. 
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The PSFP next negotiated an arrangement with farmers to donate a perpetual easement, and 
after 1936 the PSFP conducted plantings under cooperative agreements that carried no 
government interest in the land or trees planted. The final agreements eliminated the need for 
three complete divisions in the regional office (Land, Engineering, and Law), reduced costs, 
and streamlined the application process, but it also left in question the long-term future of 
plantings. Just as Zon had feared, many farmers later removed their shelterbelts to increase 
acreage or make room for center-pivot irrigation systems.55 
When foresters began planning for the Shelterbelt, they undertook a sweeping 
reorganization of the natural, political, and social spaces of the Great Plains. They did so 
primarily under the assumption that they could use science to find a more efficient and 
rational arrangement. But the plans they created always contained a mixture of contradictory 
goals that science was ill-equipped to reconcile. In his study of the Wilderness Society in the 
1930s, historian Paul Sutter unearthed similar complications with planning. Wilderness 
Society members such as Aldo Leopold, Robert Sterling Yard, Benton MacKaye and Robert 
Marshall became increasingly skeptical that federal planning efforts could make nature 
accessible to the majority of Americans and still protect it. All four developed an ambivalent 
relation to high-modernist planning. On the one hand they worried that the state would 
destroy the very resource it was trying to save; on the other, they advocated a new round of 
state intervention and management through a system of planned wilderness. Complex 
political and environmental landscapes subverted many of the New Deal's high-modernist 
interventions. 
229 
Difficult compromises also faced the Shelterbelt when it entered the political arena. 
Certainly Raphael Zon and Carlos Bates were aware that the science of Plains forestry could 
not at that time determine the absolute boundaries for tree growth, but when confronted with 
resistance to their plan on one side and calls for massive expansion on the other, they 
understandably turned to the one source that seemed above such considerations: science. It 
would have taken considerable courage to tell President Roosevelt that the nature of the 
Great Plains was incredibly complex and that the science was uncertain. Speaking truth to 
power threatened to disrupt plans for the Shelterbelt, and other programs that foresters hoped 
Roosevelt would support. Bates acknowledged the pitfalls of simplistic thinking in a letter to 
Roberts: 
The writer [Bates] is perfectly willing to admit that he has made a mistake; 
that his sympathy for the drought-sufferers of the Plains region, and the 
striking "simplicity" of the original scheme "carried him away", as it did a 
great many other persons, by its magnificent sweep. It is well, indeed that we 
have all had opportunity to realize that a project so magnificent in its 
conception cannot possibly be "simple" in execution, and that wish alone does 
not make fulfillment possible. This should not make us any less ardent for that 
which is good in the proposal, or for anything else which may be better than 
the original proposal.56 
Foresters' high-modernist impulses had come into conflict with the complex natural 
and cultural environment of the Great Plains. In the struggle to reconcile statist, professional, 
and local visions, foresters found the discourse of high-modernism had far less appeal than 
American populism. Historian Alan Brinkley described the populist discourse as "one of the 
most powerful impulses of the Great Depression, and of many decades of American life 
before it: the urge to defend the autonomy of the individual and the independence of the 
community against encroachments from the modern industrial state." Farmers, local 
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politicians, and townsfolk on the Great Plains welcomed government money, but they 
fiercely resisted letting that assistance undermine their independence. From the perspective 
of planners this resistance threatened both efficiency and effectiveness, and it was only 
through a long process of discovery that they learned to modify their plans enough to make 
them palatable to local opinion. By the time they had succeeded in this goal, their plans had 
lost most of their high-modernist ideals.57 
The difficulty that early plans had of integrating political, social, and natural factors 
made latter changes difficult to recognize. President Roosevelt continued to believe that the 
Forest Service was creating a giant tree-wall across the Plains, and he was poorly prepared to 
understand why his hopes had gone unrealized. This was partly the Forest Service's fault for 
being less than candid at critical moments, but it also had a simpler explanation: Roosevelt 
had neither the time nor the inclination to follow the nuanced history of his own plan. 
Explaining why the Shelterbelt Project had become the PSFP, why it could not plant a solid 
wall, and why it planted in different directions was a complicated story. To this technical 
discussion foresters would also have had to add an explanation of why Plains residents and 
politicians had reacted in shock to what they perceived as "blueprints, formulas and 
theories." The compromise program that foresters carried out was not only difficult to 
explain but could never capture the President's or the public's imagination with the same 
power as had the early, dramatic plans and maps. Nuance did not sell in public forums. 
Although it was easy to criticize foresters' plans, they nevertheless contained a 
number of valuable ideas. Roberts, Olson, and Zon had been correct in arguing that 
systematic planting in concentrated areas was the most efficient way to utilize labor and to 
minimize the amount of land that any one farmer needed to devote to trees. Likewise, 
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foresters' preference for landownership policies would have given much better long-term 
protection to the land and public investments in shelterbelts, and community planning 
represented a more efficient approach to regional problems than individual initiative. Each of 
these agendas required compromises, however, that most Americans were unwilling to 
accept. Foresters' large-scale plans never resolved these tensions, but that did not discourage 
them from focusing their planning on ever-smaller landscapes. 
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Chapter Six—Forests in Miniature: PSFP technical standards 
As foresters began the work of translating plans into trees they confronted a host of 
technical troubles. Removed from the politics of zone boundaries, belt orientation, and 
landownership, foresters hoped to apply their scientific expertise on a smaller scale. Just as 
with large-scale plans, they constructed these as technical problems to be solved through 
expertise and experiment, but the many difficulties their plans encountered revealed that, 
even on a miniature scale, science operated within a milieu of competing political, social, and 
natural forces. Even the most tightly focused silvicultural decisions harbored multiple 
influences and goals. 
Foresters made a series of design compromises to account for this changing milieu. 
They planned their original belts as wide, "forest-like" structures that mimicked natural 
conditions. They theorized this would increase the chances of long-term survival and serve a 
broad range of forestry goals, but replacing farmland with forests was less popular with 
farmers than foresters. Thus foresters gradually narrowed tree belts. Within the belts foresters 
had to make further decisions about tree spacing. Foresters viewed this as another 
compromise between technical ideals and farmer needs, and again they ultimately 
accommodated farmers. But there also existed considerable scientific and natural uncertainty 
within these decisions. Foresters could not agree on an ideal spacing, and what seemed ideal 
in dry years was different from wet years. Foresters also hoped to choose tree species for 
belts based on technical suitability. For longevity and superior wind deflection, they 
preferred conifers, but politics and economics forced them instead to rely on cottonwoods. In 
the long term, the over-reliance on cottonwoods and underutilization of conifers meant less 
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effective shelterbelts, but in the short term their choices helped get more trees in the ground 
and increase popular support. 
More than farmer resistance changed PSFP technical standards. State extension 
agents formed a vocal and experienced pool of scientific knowledge on Plains forestry. PSFP 
personnel repeatedly found extension challenging their judgments on issues such as belt 
width, row spacing, and species selection. The conflict had both bureaucratic and technical 
roots. Most extension agents wanted the PSFP to work through their offices, or at least to 
present them with detailed plans. This would prevent interference between extension and 
PSFP projects, but it would also give extension greater control over PSFP actions. PSFP 
work potentially challenged extension's position as the principal supplier of scientific 
farming knowledge, at least on the subject of tree cultivation, and some extension agents 
thought that their longer experience with Plains forestry and residents gave them a certain 
scientific authority. They were therefore frustrated when PSFP planners ignored their advice 
and research. This was not only a case of hurt feelings. Extension foresters fretted that, by 
not following their standards, PSFP planners would repeat old mistakes and reduce the 
effectiveness of plantings. The conflict between extension and PSFP in this case prefigured a 
much larger struggle between the PSFP and SCS. 
When foresters began planning for the Shelterbelt, they had to make choices about 
belt width and form. Setting aside President Roosevelt's idea of a multi-mile wide belt, the 
initial plans called for shelterbelts of about 100 feet in width. In the face of extreme 
skepticism about foresters' ability to grow trees on the Plains, and foresters' own growing 
realization that this might be no simple task, belts paradoxically grew wider. The theory 
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behind wide belts was that they would create "forest-like" conditions, or microclimates that 
facilitated tree growth. This silvicultural ideal neatly merged with other agricultural 
programs, such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, that limited farm production. 
Thus foresters replaced 100-foot belts with 165-foot belts (Figure 6.1), but creating miniature 
forests and limiting production was never a popular goal with farmers. 
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Figure 6.1—A 165-foot wide belt from 1936 creating forest-like conditions.1 
Creating forest-like conditions within individual belts promised to bring eastern 
forestry conditions several hundred miles farther west. The underlying theory was that in the 
first years of a belt's life, it depended like any other row crop on available water. A large 
amount of this came in the form of showers that were too light to be effective, but these 
problems might not be permanent. As trees grew, a litter of fallen leaves and twigs formed a 
spongy duff that absorbed moisture and retarded run-off. When this mulch covered the 
ground, a canopy of foliage closed protectively overhead, and the sides of the belt grew to 
shut out wind and light. Forest conditions resulted. In areas only marginally supportive of 
tree growth, these conditions created an interior climate that was significantly moister. The 
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closure of the canopy also shaded out weed growth, leaving more of the moisture that entered 
the belt for trees. D. S. Olson argued that in areas with an annual precipitation of twenty-four 
inches, 82 percent of the total was lost under open field conditions. Forest-like conditions 
reduced this loss significantly, and in his estimation made another twelve inches available for 
tree growth.2 
For 1935 the Forest Service planted these wide, forest-like belts, but this proved 
atypical. Initially, foresters were able to choose the most enthusiastic tree farmers to 
participate. Every county in the Great Plains seemed to have at least one farmer, or more 
often several, who were supportive of tree planting. They had often worked for years, with 
relatively little recognition, to grow trees on their property, sometimes making use of Clarke-
McNary trees and other times buying them from local nurseries. Letters from such farmers 
trickled into program headquarters in 1934 and 1935, and while many were from outside the 
zone, enough were from nearby farmers to give the foresters a pool of zealous candidates for 
the first year's very wide belts. Unfortunately, these farmers were always a small minority, 
and given their limited geographical reach, foresters quickly exhausted such farms.3 
The first year foresters also had the luxury of offering payments for the land. The 
severe economic and natural conditions of the Dust Bowl and Great Depression made giving 
up a small portion of one's land in return for even a small, but steady, payment appealing. 
The Department of Agriculture justified this policy on the grounds that it would help protect 
the belts and act as a form of assistance. However, such a plan had serious drawbacks. First, 
the funds were coming from the President's emergency relief money, and the Budget Office 
raised serious objections about using relief funds to make lease payments. As it became clear 
that the project would continue to operate on relief funds for the foreseeable future, further 
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lease payments were impossible. In their search for funding foresters also began to realize 
that Congress wanted farmers contributing to the program in some substantial manner. One 
of the most obvious ways farmers could was to provide the land for shelterbelts. After all, the 
belts were nominally designed to assist the farmer and improve conditions. Therefore, as the 
Shelterbelt became the PSFP and began promoting its cooperative nature, it was difficult for 
foresters to maintain even a minimal leasing policy. 
By 1936 the wide belt policy was running into significant opposition because many 
farmers objected to sacrificing large portions of their land to tree production. Farmer pressure 
was sufficient in states such as Kansas that field workers began to "favor hedge rows and 
narrow shelterbelts as a substitute for the wide belts as originally conceived and planted up to 
the present time." Workers made these compromises in a deliberate effort to encourage 
greater participation. Farther north in Nebraska, field workers tried to maintain the wide belt 
policy, but under the new working conditions of 1936 they had abandoned the Broken Bow 
headquarters because of a lack of farmer demand. Clayton Watkins, the state director, 
explained that the lack of interest was "due to the fact that last year we leased land and 
fenced it at Government expense, and this year we were able to do neither." To keep the 
project going, Clayton had moved work to the Stapleton area where several landowners had 
petitioned for belts. Field administrators were still finding land to plant in 1936, but not 
without difficulty and one of the simplest inexpensive steps to increase farmer participation 
was narrower belts.4 
Foresters initially advocated wide belts as a technical adaptation to Plains conditions, 
but upon closer examination some began to question the wisdom of wide belts. The ever-
opinionated Carlos Bates outlined the many technical failings in September 1936. Bates 
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explained that "elaborate plans which have been made for wide, self-protecting shelterbelts 
... have had in view the most difficult conditions for tree growth." Wide belts increased the 
cost of planting "without furnishing protection to any large proportion of the land, it being 
admitted that at least four belts per mile would be necessary to give even the minimum of 
protection to all the land." Bates suggested planting much narrower areas on favorable 
locations. From the standpoint of protecting adjacent fields, belts that were two- to five-rows 
deep were every bit as effective as a much wider belt. If narrower belts jeopardized the 
chances of successful growth, then plantings should be concentrated on more favorable soils 
and in the eastern portion of the zone. Although Bates, was still struggling with the dilemma 
of whether such narrow plantings represented true "forestry," or simply soil conservation, he 
could no longer justify wide belts as technically necessary.5 
The breakdown in technical agreement allowed Roberts to urge a new policy of 
narrower plantings. The primary advantage of wide belts had been their ability to create 
forest-like conditions, but this seemed unnecessary on higher value, higher rainfall lands on 
the eastern edge of the zone. As the architect of the forest-like conditions theory and the 
project's chief field technical advisor, Olson was the most significant target for Robert's 
campaign to change the standards. Roberts began by explaining to Olson that "at least 
consideration should be given to the question of whether it is desirable on the more valuable 
lands to take as much as a 10-rod strip per section out of commodity crop production, and 
devote it to tree growth unless we are in a position to show definitely that the benefits gained 
thereby are economically justifiable." Roberts was well aware that Olson could not provide 
any such direct economic justification. Lest Olson misunderstand what was at stake, Roberts 
reminded him that "as a matter of fact the 10-rod standard width of shelterbelts is one of the 
242 
primary things which is in the way of getting good concentration of planting in many areas at 
the present time, because many farmers object to the wide belts." Roberts offered Olson the 
carrot of "concentrated plantings" with the stick of farmer objections.6 
Roberts also had to convince Zon to accept a narrower belt policy, or at least persuade 
him not to object strenuously if field personnel displayed flexibility. Roberts began by 
pointing out the many difficulties that field personnel were having obtaining farmer 
cooperation under the new donation policy. He then explained that from a field protective 
standpoint one-to-three row belts worked fine. Accurately judging Zon's attitude, however, 
Roberts then explained that the PSFP would be "justified in planting belts at least five rods 
wide through their combined value as field protective belts, wood supply, bird sanctuaries, 
and recreational areas." Thus, despite being the one arguing for narrower belts, Roberts had 
put himself in favor of a "compromise" solution that would "in part [meet] the wishes of the 
farmers and yet maintain sufficient width to bear some resemblance to a forest—and 
forestry." Roberts' arguments proved persuasive to Zon, who by that time had already moved 
to other projects. Zon even sent his own letter to Olson urging a reduction in widths and a 
more flexible approach to "the encouragement of more numerous narrow belts."7 
A strange thing happened when Olson defended his wide belt policy: instead of 
justifying wide belts as necessary technical adaptations, he explained them as bureaucratic 
and social decisions. Zon had suggested that Olson show more flexibility in planning options, 
including using narrow 3-row belts. Olson countered that "if the program is to be handled by 
the Forest Service, the work should have some semblance of forestry. ... I doubt if planting 
hedge rows can be accepted by the public or profession as forestry." In Olson's estimation, 
three-row belts were really "hedge rows" and should be planted by farmers. Foresters planted 
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forests, not hedges. Instead, Olson "suggested five to seven-rod belts because I felt that it was 
administratively necessary to plant as near like a forest on each farm as was economically 
justified." He admitted that wide planting could not be "justified on the major point of 
protection against wind erosion, but it is possibly justified because of its additional benefits 
in supplying wood products and increased social values." Following the thinking of foresters 
for generations, Olson also alluded to the long-debated climatic effects of trees, suggesting 
that "the wider belts are also justified for the benefits that wide belts may give which cannot 
now be recognized because of lack of factual data, but which we hope will come later into 
the picture." He admitted that it was "inadvisable to give these possibilities any place in our 
publicized objectives," but social and climatic impacts were intrinsic to his justifications.8 
According to Olson, one of the most important functions of the belts was to 
"demonstrate the value of trees to the farm economy and the social security of the region." 
Olson hoped that wide belts would appeal to farmers as woodlots, even if they were skeptical 
about reducing wind erosion. The forest-like conditions within the wide belts would also 
create new wildlife sanctuaries. Habitat once limited to riparian corridors would spread over 
the uplands, offering shelter to songbirds, deer, pheasants, and other animals. Most 
importantly of all, project officials wanted to demonstrate that trees would grow. Wide belts 
abetted this goal by hiding, or making irrelevant, planting failures. It was not uncommon to 
have one or two rows within a belt partially or completely fail. According to Olson, "had the 
farmers planted hedge rows or two-to three-row belts at this stage of the Project and 
encountered these row losses, there would have been much disappointment, and skepticism 
toward our ability to establish successful shelterbelts." Wide belts, except under extreme 
conditions, presented a full and successful appearance even while containing failures.9 
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Despite all of Olson's arguments, the pressure to narrow belt width was irresistible. 
Most of the 1935 and 1936 plantings were 165 feet wide with many narrowly spaced rows. 
By 1937 the standard width was 7-rods, or closer to 110 feet, and about 10-rows wide. 
However, the retreat from the original standard opened the door to further revisions, and state 
directors and field personnel often followed a flexible approach. They would start 
negotiations by encouraging farmers to plant at least a full 7-rod belt, but would then 
consider reducing the width if conditions warranted. Under this approach plantings often had 
seven, or even five, rows. In some cases the 10-row standard belt was only a 9-row belt "so 
that one could start cultivating on one buffer strip and go around each row and the last buffer 
strip and wind up at the same end of the belt where he started." Although Roberts had been a 
forceful advocate of narrowing belt width, he was also a staunch supporter of centralized 
control and maintaining standards, and he found field personnel's display of flexibility 
disturbing.10 
To restore order, Roberts and Olson ordered field workers to follow the 7-rod 
standard. In a shrill memorandum to state directors in 1938, Roberts scolded them for their 
"violation and disregard of standards." What field personnel viewed as a flexible approach, 
Roberts saw as "a more or less passive attitude on the part of the State Offices in following 
up the standards in the field." In Roberts' opinion this indicated "taking the course of least 
resistance and [an] inability of administrative personnel to handle their assignment." If "these 
standards do not agree with the wishes of the cooperators," he admonished "it is your job to 
sell him on our standards, rather than the other way around." Olson also worried about the 
gradual drift from standards, and warned the state directors "it is human nature to meet any 
rule or standard with a claim for exception. If we can hold our ground at the start, as I believe 
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we can, only the first few days will be difficult." Foresters were not planting belts to make 
farmers happy, but rather "for the very definite purpose of protecting fields from wind 
erosion." Olson saw no contradiction between enticing farmers with wide belts' multiple 
benefits and then insisting that shelterbelts were solely for wind erosion.11 
Olson understood that farmer resistance was driving the project towards accepting 
narrower belts, and he continued to resist such a move. When Roberts returned from an 
inspection tour of Kansas in the summer of 1938, he warned Olson that the Kansas foresters 
and farmers were still unhappy with the width standards. In response Olson prepared a new 
policy statement on belt width that allowed for significant width reductions on intermediate 
and "small farm" belts. He held firm at 7-rods for most belts however. Olson defended the 
wide standard on the grounds that "Timber Management's [Olson's office] main concern has 
been in developing simple standards that would be more or less fool-proof to the relief roller 
type of men and inexperienced foresters." He also suggested that "the claim of Kansas that 
the land is too valuable for crop production to release four to five percent for trees" was 
unreasonable. Olson noted that a "great percent of Kansas wheat land is speculatively grown 
in wheat by business men of the towns," and he agued that wide shelterbelts were really a 
form of "crop acreage retirement." None of these insights were entirely new, nor for that 
matter were they particularly persuasive to Kansas farmers. They did illustrate how far Olson 
had come from supporting wide belts as a technical necessity. Wide belts increasingly 
reflected Olson's social goals, not a technical adaptation to harsh conditions.12 
All of Olson's arguments could not make wide belts popular with farmers. To limit 
some criticism Roberts adopted a policy of speaking of belts in row numbers, not rods. 
Accordingly, the "standard basic belt will be comprised of 10 rows in all States." but field 
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personnel would be allowed to adopt either 10 or 8 foot spacing between rows. In theory this 
would reduce the focus on belt width, and allow field personnel to slim belts using narrower 
spacing. In announcing the policy, Roberts reminded field workers that, "from an 
administrative point of view, we are still in the demonstrational stage and must play safe. It is 
far better to find years hence that we planted more trees than were necessary than too few to 
make work effective." While logical from Roberts' perspective, the counter argument—that 
planting too many trees would make the work less effective—was also a distinct possibility.13 
The logic of reducing belt width to meet farmer demands eventually proved stronger 
than administrative standards or silvicultural ideals. John Emerson, the Nebraska State 
Director, later explained that the width of early belts was "extreme" and "took too much land 
out of production." During his time as state director he faced "considerable resistance to our 
seven rod wide belts because farmers are reluctant to divert so much land to trees." In many 
planting districts Emerson saw little "social" justification for shelterbelt plantings since "a 
great many farms have some waste land along a creek or other drainage in natural timber. 
Wild plums and some other fruits are abundant and the fire wood supply will normally be 
available from a sources aside from the field shelterbelt." If wide shelterbelts offered few 
social advantages, and neither grew better nor protected more soil than narrow ones, then 
Emerson saw little reason to plant them. He was "beginning to wonder if we are justified in 
demanding strict adherence to our seven rod wide standard." Finally, he warned Roberts that 
"I am confident the Pierce District has potentialities for planting 300 to 400 miles of five rod 
wide shelterbelts in 1939, but I am not prepared to estimate what may be the result if we 
adhere to our present requirements for seven rod wide belts."14 
247 
Emerson was not alone in his desire to see belt widths narrow. In 1940, the Kansas 
State office of the PSFP conducted a survey that asked field crews to outline the reasons for 
local resistance to shelterbelts. Donald Duncan from the Meade area explained that farmers 
there "cannot give up that much land for trees." Robert Dellberg of Kingman clarified that 
farmers objected to wide belts and that "this is particularly true on the eastern half of the 
district, although all the owners of the better farm land object to the wide belt." Carl Hawkes 
of Pratt, added that farmers in his section believed that "fourteen acres of land still seems like 
a lot of land to be out of production." When the state office tabulated the results, they found 
that the loss of land topped the list of farmer concerns, beating out absentee ownership, 
unwillingness to fence, and lack of moisture—the other top complaints—by a considerable 
margin. With such overpowering evidence in hand, the Kansas State Director argued for a 
further narrowing, to perhaps as low as one or three rows at more frequent intervals.15 
Although it was not a common occurrence during the 1930s—at least according to the 
existing records—there was the potential that farmers might carry out the desired narrowing 
themselves. Once the PSFP adopted a cooperative model it lost control over the trees, and 
there was nothing to stop farmers from plowing under "extra" rows. In Kearney County, 
Nebraska the PSFP planted a 14-row belt with 10 foot spacing on the land of Julius Hansen. 
He kept the rows cultivated through the first summer, and "it was considered as one of the 
best plantings in Kearney County, in growth and survival." When the local PSFP 
representative next visited Hansen's farm, however, he found that the 14-row belt had 
become a 6-row belt. Hanson had plowed up eight rows of trees, and made it clear to the 
forester that he wanted the belt left that way. Hansen's experience was likely not unique, and 
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many belts that were recorded as "failures" or "partial failures" in the PSFP files were 
probably the victims of farmer modification.16 
The logic of planting wide forest-like shelterbelts was always open to more 
interpretations than foresters had initially imagined. Olson planned for wide forest-like belts 
to help increase interior moisture conditions, but in defending the decision he relied on social 
goals, even if he cautioned against too heavy a reliance on them. Roberts always saw belt 
width as primarily a political consideration. If belts were too wide, then farmers would never 
voluntarily cooperate; if belts were too narrow, then the PSFP would lose its connection to 
forestry. The more their plans for shelterbelt width incorporated social, political, and 
technical considerations, the less attention foresters paid to nature. Foresters were involved in 
fundamental manipulations of nature on the Plains, yet their plans assumed a static nature 
which even the most cursory examination belied. When foresters planned their wide, 
moisture saving belts, they assumed the belts would shelter farms facing the same natural 
conditions. However, as rainfall began to increase in the 1940s, soil erosion declined, land 
values swelled, and many farmers found themselves the owners of what, by almost any 
standard, appeared excessively wide belts. Foresters, of course, defended wide belts as 
necessary for the eventual return of drier conditions, but such a claim continued to be 
problematic on several levels. On areas of favorable soil and ground water, the trees, once 
established, could fend for themselves even during dry years. On less favorable soils, the 
trees would gradually use the subsurface moisture and begin to die from competition and a 
lack of soil moisture, irrespective of forest-like conditions. Besides, farming was a business 
that rewarded those who took advantage of the good times, not those who waited for the bad. 
A slight increase in production when prices were low was worth far less than a substantial 
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increase in production when prices were high. For all of these reasons, wide belts proved one 
of the PSFP's most problematic legacies. 
Row spacing, another significant element of belt design, also harbored both long and 
short-term problems. Row spacing was the distance between rows of trees within a belt. Like 
belt width, it began as a silvicultural ideal but soon became a hybrid of technical and social 
needs. Leaning on research done at the Mandan, North Dakota experiment station by Ernest 
George, Edward Munns and Olson promoted a "hip-roofed" belt design that featured low 
shrubs on the outsides and progressively taller trees towards the middle. Ideally this created 
an arboreal A-frame. Foresters theorized that belts with this shape would act as a sort of 
wind-wedge, gradually pushing low-lying winds upwards. 
Although the aerodynamic advantages of the "hip-roofed" design were doubtful, the 
design was attractive from a silvicultural perspective. The dense belts would capture blowing 
snow and thereby increase springtime moisture. Belts composed of diverse species would 
also provide home and food for wildlife. The low growing, dense shrubs on the outside 
prevented light from reaching the interior and encouraging weed growth. Most important, the 
trees growing in the center would receive the greatest protection and achieve the greatest 
possible height. However, the taller, larger trees towards the center needed to be spaced 
farther apart to allow more growing room, while the shrubs and smaller trees were spaced 
closer to encourage a closure of the canopy and forest-like conditions. From a silvicultural 
perspective the ideal belt had many rows with variable spacing.17 
Unfortunately, these laboratory ideals ran into immediate problems in the field. 
Farmers liked the idea of a closed canopy, thereby ending their cultivation duties, but they 
opposed close or variable spacing. As a part of their cooperation with the project, farmers 
harrowed or plowed between the rows several times each year to eliminate weed growth, but 
farmers could not cultivate narrow rows with their regular equipment, and they did not want 
to make special alterations to accommodate foresters. Recognizing the gravity of the 
situation, Roberts began lobbying Zon to change standards. Roberts warned Zon that 
"spacing between the rows has caused more controversy from the field than any other point." 
Roberts agreed that the six to eight foot spacing used in 1935 and 1936 was close to ideal, 
but "as long as we cannot definitely plan that the Forest Service will do the cultivation, but 
on the contrary must depend upon the farmer's help, we will have to meet his demands to 
some extent." Further confusing the matter, different states had different types of equipment. 
Thus "Kansas wants to go to twelve-foot spacing because it is claimed 'practically all' tillage 
machinery on the farms we are planting is ten-foot width." Zon, Olson, and Bates resisted 
widening row spacing on the grounds that this would make creating "forest-like" conditions 
difficult. Instead they hoped for a compromise whereby farmers would modify or buy the 
right equipment and foresters would avoid narrow spacing.18 
Asking farmers to buy new equipment in the midst of the Great Depression to 
cultivate trees was doomed from the start. The only real alternative for Roberts was to create 
a compromise standard. A. L. Ford, the South Dakota State Director, warned Roberts that 
"under the present depressed financial conditions, it would be decidedly unwise, we think, to 
require the cooperators to purchase special tools to fit Lake States spacing." As a practical 
matter Ford wanted "to space the trees to fit the tools," even if it meant facing down "rather 
stubborn opposition on the part of the research people." Other state directors and county 
extension agents also put Roberts "under terrific pressure ... to increase the spacing." In 
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consultation with Olson, Roberts agreed to adopt ten foot spacing between all rows as the 
new standard. John Emerson in later years lamented that this was "a little wider than we 
probably would recommend if only technical considerations were involved, but cultivation of 
the trees devolves upon the farmer and spacing must accommodate common farm cultivation 
machinery." Although social considerations were the immediate issue, in later years 
environmental contingencies also exposed problems with spacing. In some cases ten foot 
spacing was too narrow because of increased competition between trees as they matured. The 
tall, water-loving cottonwoods, most commonly planted in the center rows, would in drier 
soils die out as a result of competition from nearby rows. Ten-foot spacing was thus a 
"compromise" between what some foresters thought were the "safe limits of good forestry 
practice" and "the wishes of the farmers," but this was in fact only one of several critical 
factors.19 
Row spacing was not the only compromise foresters would have to make. Like other 
facets of the project, technical guidelines developed for the selection of tree types contained 
multiple goals. Foresters chose between types based on silvicultural principles such as 
hardiness, habitat, and longevity, but they also made compromises based on availability and 
"flashiness." Foresters used this term to describe fast growing trees, such as cottonwoods, 
which impressed farmers and generated early community interest in tree planting by rapidly 
creating an image of success. Foresters also preferred cottonwoods because they were one of 
tallest species available and could be collected free from riverbeds. Conifers were another 
popular choice because of their long-lived nature and year-around protection. Unlike 
cottonwoods, however, conifers were slow growing, difficult to cultivate, and not available in 
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large numbers. For all these reasons foresters tended to over-use cottonwoods and under-use 
conifers despite the admitted silvicultural advantages of the latter. Foresters also 
experimented with exotic species, some of which seemed to promise a proverbial "silver 
bullet" solution for Plains tree planting. Foresters reasoned that if the available choices, such 
as cottonwood and conifers, offered unpleasant compromises, then perhaps an exotic would 
offer the traits they sought. With tight planting deadlines, however, foresters did their 
experimentation with exotics in the field and often produced unexpected results. 
Of the native species, cottonwood was the most popular because it was available as 
a seedling from North Dakota to Texas. Pulled cottonwood species had been the basis of 
Plains forestry efforts since the period when farmers had tried to fulfill the requirements of 
the Timber Culture Act. This long history reassured foresters that they could grow 
cottonwoods in a variety of locations and soils. Cottonwood seedlings grew wild on the 
sandbanks of most Midwestern rivers, and foresters hired crews of relief workers to pull 
these "wildings." In late winter or early spring, foresters searched local rivers for natural 
cottonwood nurseries. These were usually large, newly formed sandbars covered with 
thousands of similar age trees. Relief workers used steel hoops from old wagon wheels to 
pull the "wildlings" by holding the top of the seedling firmly clamped to the wheel and 
gently rolling it until the seedling was pulled from its roots. With little effort foresters could 
transform first nature into bundles of seedlings ready to create second nature. For the 1935 
plantings this was a critical advantage because there were not enough seedlings available 
through other sources for extensive plantings.20 
Cottonwoods also had the distinct advantage of being flashy, and this trait was 
particularly important to early planting efforts. A common criticism of the Shelterbelt Project 
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was that trees would not grow in the proposed zone (Chapter Four), and the leafy shade of a 
fast growing cottonwood was one of the quickest ways to dispel such criticism. By 1937 
cottonwoods planted in 1935 were already taller than a man. Newspapers emphasized this 
point by showing pictures of smiling farmers amidst their cottonwood-dominated 
shelterbelts. An article from the Christian Science Monitor in November 1937, had three 
photographs running down the center. The top showed three men standing silhouetted against 
a dust filled sky, surrounded by blow-sand and weeds. The next photo was from the same 
site, seventeen months later showing a farmer standing between leafy rows of cottonwood 
trees that reached well above his head. The final picture featured a crew of relief workers 
planting another shelterbelt. Variations on this theme appeared in other papers. The flashy 
cottonwood had done its work with spectacular results, proving that trees would grow on the 
Great Plains.21 
The next question that foresters faced was how long those trees would grow. 
Foresters had overused cottonwood. In 1936, Harold Engstrom had begun warning his fellow 
foresters about over-reliance on cottonwood. He admitted that "during the early life of a 
shelterbelt it [cottonwood] stimulates interest in the plantation because of its habit of rapid 
and vigorous growth." But he cautioned that "the slower growing and less showy species 
may ultimately be of greater value." The cottonwood was fast-growing, but it was also short­
lived. On deep sandy soil, or in areas with a shallow water table, the Cottonwood's longevity 
was comparable to other broadleaf species, but on less favorable sites it was often the first to 
die. According to Engstrom, "therein lies the danger in its indiscriminate planting," for 
"nothing lowers a farmer's interest in a plantation more than having even part of the trees of 
which it is composed die at an early age." Choices about trees had to consider both short- and 
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long-term goals. The heavy use of cottonwoods had resulted in a media victory for the PSFP, 
but what foresters began to call the "cottonwood problem" also threatened eventually to 
reinforce the very claim it was intended to refute.22 
As with so many other compromises, deciding on whether to continue planting 
cottonwoods presented unpalatable choices. Not only were cottonwoods flashy, but they 
were also cheap to harvest as seedlings and tall, when they survived. Foresters had no ideal 
replacement for the troublesome cottonwood, so they continued to use it but compensate by 
developing new planting guidelines. The problem with developing new guidelines, however, 
was that there was no real agreement about what represented safe conditions. Olson 
suggested limiting cottonwoods to bottomlands or sites where the water table or runoff 
increased the moisture supply. John Emerson continued to recommend cottonwoods for 
Nebraska but left open the option of using Chinese elms instead. Farther south, Engstrom 
wanted to use cottonwood only on sandy soils, reserving American elms for heavy 
bottomland soils. In the Dakotas, foresters also tried to limit cottonwood planting to 
bottomland or sandy soils, but they continued to rely on it widely because of the ease of 
gathering seedlings.23 
By developing cottonwood guidelines while still planting, foresters had in effect 
created the largest cottonwood experiment in history. Although they would spend years 
arguing over the final results, it was clear by 1940 that cottonwood guidelines had mixed 
success. In Oklahoma, Texas, and, to a lesser extent, Kansas, foresters concluded that the 
1936,1937 and 1938 plantings had "erred in early judgment of what constituted a 
cottonwood site." But hope sprang eternal, and for "1939 this situation was largely corrected, 
and this year [1940] cottonwood planting will be even more rigidly limited." This proved a 
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bit premature since cottonwoods often looked splendid after the first couple years. It was 
actually during the next few years that problems appeared.24 
At its root, the cottonwood problem required a technical solution. Foresters had 
recommended, and continued to use, cottonwoods primarily for political and economic 
reasons, but they still needed to develop technical guidelines to support their choices. 
Foresters argued about what exactly constituted a "cottonwood site," one group "contending 
that a high water table is essential, the other maintaining that a deep, sandy soil without a 
high water table will support cottonwood." The high-water-table supporters pointed out that 
cottonwoods were typically planted in the center of a shelterbelt and thus were "locked in" 
on both sides and faced competition from more drought-hardy species. They contended that 
using cottonwoods required a change in site selection guidelines and probably a modification 
in belt design. The sandy-soil supporters based their arguments on the historic success of 
cottonwoods in sandy soils since at least the Timber Culture Act. There was no absolute 
answer available to either group, however. The experiments continued, and in the meantime 
failed seedlings "created an enormous repair job in those plantings, one which will require 
our best efforts to solve." Deciding upon cottonwood guidelines for the Great Plains was like 
trying to hit a moving target: the zone of sufficient moisture kept shifting, and foresters 
would only learn years later whether they had hit or missed.25 
The results of cottonwood die-off could be dramatic, and correcting the problem 
time-consuming. Cottonwood had formed the center of the wide belt policy because of its 
availability and growth characteristics. Foresters had often planted several rows of the 
species, but when most cottonwoods in one of these belts died they left "a 58-foot space 
through the middle of the strip." The plantings might otherwise be in "excellent care, all rows 
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except the cottonwood having been clean cultivated this last season," but down the center ran 
rows of broken skeletons. Such a failure created particular concerns when they were close to 
local highways. Foresters were left wondering whether to "clean out all the cottonwood 
including the few trees that are alive and plow up and replant the gap or should we merely go 
in and underplant, leaving the dead trees stand?" If foresters decided to replant, they still had 
to decide whether to cover the gap quickly with rapid growing species, such as Chinese elm 
and black locust, or to try slower growing but more "ideal" species such as cedar. Or, if one 
of the remaining sides was in acceptable condition, foresters might remove the other half and 
leave a much narrower shelterbelt. The cottonwood problem was revealing that there was 
much more to planting shelterbelts than getting a high initial survival rate. Shelterbelts could 
involve considerable maintenance.26 
The purported political and social advantages of cottonwood had turned from a 
blessing to a curse, and Roberts—ever conscious of political repercussions—recognized the 
change. Although earlier a supporter of cottonwoods, by 1940 he warned Olson that he was 
"opposed to the use of cottonwood on anything except sites where we can reasonably expect 
cottonwood to reach a satisfactory state of development and have a life of probably a 
minimum of 30 years." This seemed a reasonable conclusion, one which Olson would fully 
approve, but Roberts added that he did "not believe we should compromise sound, technical 
practices to administrative exigencies where we can avoid doing so, and on this basis I am 
opposed to the use of cottonwood as a so-called 'propaganda' tree to encourage interest and 
care by farmers." Coming from Roberts, this was quite a leap. In 1936 he had argued that 
"the Cottonwood's rapid growth generates just the sort of interest we need if we are ever to 
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refute the doubters." He, like the rest of the PSFP, had benefited enormously from the 
positive publicity that cottonwood created.27 
As the project's chief silviculturalist, Olson made the final decisions about how to 
deal with the cottonwood problem. He chose to defend the species, and continue 
recommending its use "because the species is so highly desirable for our program where it 
can be successfully grown." Instead of blaming the cottonwood, Olson argued that the 
failures were an "early indicator of the difficult conditions under which all tress are 
attempting to maintain themselves." He believed that the "unusually dry spell" explained 
"why we have been unable to establish cottonwood where evidence on the ground shows this 
species thrived before." The question for Olson then became whether he "should accept the 
present situation as the new normal or recognize it as an extreme condition not likely to 
reappear in the comparatively short rotation of shelterbelt plantations." Answering this 
question had implications for more than just cottonwood planting. If the weather was taken 
as the "new normal," then Olson foresaw "the reclassification of the old zone into 
submarginal farm land and the question of feasibility of shelterbelt protection for such 
submarginal crop land." However, Olson's explanation failed to account for the thousands of 
other trees that had thrived under "new normal" conditions. The simplest answer was still the 
best: "due to the popularity of the cottonwood for its quick showing, to some extent because 
of shortages in other species, and for other reasons, its use has in a good many cases been 
extended far beyond the feasible classification for this species."28 
Foresters also had to struggle with complex choices over whether to use conifers in 
their plantings. Unlike cottonwood, conifers were long-lived and maintained foliage 
throughout the year, an important consideration for a windbreak. Foresters commonly used 
blue spruce, red cedar, ponderosa pine, and Austrian pine in their shelterbelts. Even after 
belts narrowed to 10-rows, they still called for one or two rows of conifers on the windward 
side. Despite their substantial advantages, conifers were difficult to use. In the 1935 
plantings, a large number of the red cedar was "wilding" stock. This had such a poor survival 
rate that foresters abandoned the practice almost immediately, relying instead on nursery-
raised seedlings. These proved more reliable but required more labor and more time in the 
nursery than deciduous trees. The greatest barrier to increased conifers use, however, was 
that they did not provide the rapid visible growth of deciduous trees such as cottonwood. Red 
cedar seedlings looked like little more than a weed after a year—not a bold statement of trees 
conquering the Plains. Thus, even though in the long term conifers were a better choice for 
most shelterbelts, politics and economics dictated a reliance on faster growing shorter living 
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species. 
The political and economic liabilities of conifers also made it difficult to experiment 
with very narrow belts. Ultimately, they resulted in helping sustain the wide-belt, many-row 
theory of planting. The dense structure and year-around foliage of conifers made them ideal 
for one- or two-row shelterbelts. Most foresters doubted that narrow deciduous belts would 
be as effective since wind poured through gaps making the belt almost useless once trees lost 
their leaves. But instead of favoring narrow conifer plantings, foresters reasoned that "two 
rows of conifers are needed to get a dense year-long wind protective barrier, and these 
become the permanent part of the planting for wind erosion protection." These two rows 
needed a row of shrubs to protect them until established. "But because these necessary rows 
of conifers are so slow growing that it would be years before they became effective and made 
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an encouraging showing to the farmer, the faster growing hardwoods must be planted." 
Foresters also wanted "at least two rows of high trees" and "sufficient rows of intermediates 
to give wind resistance during all seasons of the year until the conifers have become 
established." They hesitated to rely solely on conifers, so they added yet another row or two 
to resolve the permanence and permeability issues of pure deciduous windbreaks. Foresters' 
institutional and political goals had once again shaped their shelterbelt plans.30 
Olson was the only forester to raise a sustained and significant objection to what he 
called "over-reliance" on deciduous trees. Beginning in 1936 he berated Zon for "moving 
away from their [conifer] heavy use." Olson wanted standards that required several rows of 
conifers in all belts. He argued that only conifers would achieve the goal of "permanency in 
farm plantings," and only conifers would provide much needed winter protection. This was 
not an idle concern in the winter of 1936 because "right now the soil is blowing at a terrific 
pace from Nebraska north, and the leafless hardwood belts do not seem adequate protection." 
He also worried that it would be difficult to justify the large expense of planting and 
maintaining a shelterbelt if it only offered protection for a few decades. In theory, conifers 
would last several times as long as a deciduous belt, and the initial cost could be spread over 
more years.31 
In what was a common pattern for the PSFP, events in the field made Olson's theories 
moot, and conifers always formed only a small portion of plantings. Work at the Bessey 
Nursery on the Nebraska National Forest had increased foresters' ability to raise conifer 
seedlings—especially the difficult red cedar—but the process remained slow and difficult to 
replicate at other nurseries with untrained relief labor (Chapter Two). D. S. Gross, on an 
inspection of plantings in 1936, explained that in many early plantings "practically all the 
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conifer rows were left blank for future planting" because of insufficient seedlings. The 
premium on conifer seedlings meant that the hoped-for replacement plantings rarely took 
place. Gross warned that in "many cases these blank rows are now being filled with 
hardwoods since the conifers of planting size are still not available." In the Northern Plains 
states the problem was slightly different. Foresters had to experiment with a variety of 
species and methods just to establish conifers as a part of their belts. Pine, the fastest growing 
conifer, did poorly during the cold winters, so foresters tried protective cover such as 
sorghum or other crops which they grew around the conifers late in the season. Eventually, 
both F. E. Cobb and Olson came to favor spruce in North Dakota to the exclusion of most 
other conifer species. This was one of the slowest growing varieties, however, and foresters 
relied heavily on deciduous trees to make up for spruce's failings.32 
It was doubtful that foresters could have initiated the Shelterbelt on such a grand scale 
if they had insisted on using conifers, but from a purely technical standpoint, such a decision 
would have resulted in narrower and more permanent belts. Given that these two issues— 
longevity and width—would be the program's most frequent post-mortem criticisms, 
depending on deciduous trees became a liability. This was not simply a failing of foresters; it 
also represented a failure in the way Americans approached conservation decisions. 
Everyone from farmers to news editors, foresters, and President Roosevelt desired 
immediate, visible results, and they were impatient with solutions that required careful 
explanation and years of preparation. Foresters made choices in favor of flashy trees because 
they were under pressure from Congress, the President, and the public to show immediate 
results. The pressure to show immediate results was a powerful goad when combined with 
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foresters' own enthusiasm and sense of technical mastery. It caused continual difficulties 
with species selection. 
The Shelterbelt's early plans called for the use of hardy native species such as 
cottonwood and red cedar, but foresters attempted to improve upon nature and experimented 
with exotic, non-native species as well. Foresters used fast-growing caragana, Russian olive, 
and Chinese elm extensively, but the caragana and Russian olive, while "flashy in early life," 
did not endure the vicissitudes of the Plains as well as native species. The caragana, also 
called the Siberian pea-tree, produced a multitude of pea-shaped pods filled with edible pea­
like seeds. Unfortunately, few animals or humans on the Plains had adapted to take 
advantage of this yearly windfall, and the tree's weeping form made it vulnerable to heavy 
snow and ice. The tree eventually found favor in urban gardens, where its form, nitrogen 
fixing qualities, and small size were more appreciated. Americans had experimented with 
Russian olive since at least the 1830s, but even a century later there had been little systematic 
study of the tree. Foresters with the PSFP chose to experiment with Russian olive because of 
its reputation for drought hardiness, ability to grow on poor soils (like caragana it was also a 
nitrogen fixer), and promise as a compact, fruit-producing shrub. To their surprise they found 
that Russian olive was really more of a tree and would quickly overshadow and suppress 
nearby rows. Its large and sharp thorns made trimming painful work. If it did not succeed in 
suppressing its neighbors, the Russian olive frequently died. Despite these setbacks, the 
Russian olive survived well enough to spread from many PSFP shelterbelts and across the 
Plains, where it is now considered an invasive weed.33 
Of all the exotics foresters experimented with, the Chinese elm seemed closest to 
providing a "silver-bullet." The tree was easy to cultivate and grew quickly and vigorously, 
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giving the cottonwood competition. It was also drought resistant, dense, and relatively tall. 
According to Engstrom, "the success of this species has done much to spread the shelterbelt 
gospel among the great plains farmers." Foresters widely recommend the tree and it became 
a favorite of both farmers and foresters in the Central and Southern Plains states. Not until 
1940 did Chinese elm's fatal flaw reveal itself. A cold front hit the Southern Plains on 
November 13-14, with temperatures hovering at 0° F. This was the first cold snap of the 
winter, and the trees had yet to harden. The extreme cold killed most of the Chinese elm in 
Kansas in what Olson described as the "Chinese elm freeze." The damage was less severe to 
the south, but as with the cottonwood problem, fixing the damage presented an enormous 
task.34 
Although the Chinese elm freeze surprised foresters, there was ample evidence 
available in Kansas that the tree was near its climatic limit. The Fort Hays branch of the state 
experiment station had planted the first Chinese elm in the state in 1913. The tree was one of 
two obtained from China, and its rapid growth made it popular with the experiment station, 
which propagated thousands of seedlings from this one parent and planted them throughout 
the state. On March 26,1931, however, a severe blizzard struck Kansas, killing thousands of 
Chinese elms and leaving the rest severely damaged. The November 1940 freeze finished off 
"practically all Station Chinese elm over 16 inches in diameter," damaged most other young 
trees, and killed the old 1913 tree "except for one branch on the north side." The Fort Hays 
experiment station had a wealth of information on Plains tree culture, not only about Chinese 
elm, but the Forest Service rarely made full use of extension. The freeze of 1931 and 
forester's surprise at the results of the 1940 freeze served as an example of this 
compartmentalization.35 
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The 1940 freeze served as a synecdoche of broader bureaucratic divisions. Foresters 
believed they did a relatively good job of working with other agencies concerned with 
forestry on the Plains, but the relationship was never trouble free. Forest Service personnel 
tended to view their expertise as superior, and they rarely paid more than lip service to 
outsiders. One of the largest sources of forestry knowledge outside the Forest Service, 
extension foresters, had been prominent among the Shelterbelt's early critics. They generally 
supported a federal tree-planting program on the Plains, but they regarded early proposals as 
unrealistic, even dangerous, to the status of forestry as a profession. As the Shelterbelt lost its 
wilder elements and evolved into the PSFP, extension foresters gradually changed their 
views and became supporters. But even then they continued to harbor serious differences 
over such matters as belt width, row spacing, and species selection. At one level these were 
simply scientific disagreements about technical aspects of tree growth, but they also reflected 
different approaches to farmer assistance, and different opinions about what organization was 
better positioned to provide that assistance. 
The Forest Service's initial act of coordination was to send a representative through 
the Plains states late in 1934 to discuss the program with various agencies. H. D. Cochran, 
the forester charged with the task, was surprised at the skepticism he found. Most officials he 
met were "skeptical of the possibility of accomplishing much ... except in the way of social 
benefits." Foresters of the Bureau of Plant Industry experiment station at Woodward were 
particularly critical. Director E. F. Chilcott warned Cochran that the effect of shelterbelts "on 
crops will be negligible," and that because of root sapping the net effect would be negative. 
Instead of focusing on field protection, Chilcott suggested that the Forest Service concentrate 
on "protection for livestock and farm buildings." If the Service really wanted to expand its 
264 
program on the Southern Plains, then it should "do some planting around lakes that are being 
developed especially in Kansas by the C. C. C." Cochran did find individuals who were more 
supportive, but even the most enthusiastic proponents urged the program to "adapt the 
planting to local conditions."36 
Chilcott might have had a more positive view of the Shelterbelt had its planters made 
more effort to study the station's work, and if his own circumstances had not been so 
precarious. Chilcott had directed the station since its founding in 1913, and while he focused 
on crop and livestock studies, he also experimented with trees and shrubs. This had given 
him fairly fixed opinions about what would grow in the region, what purposes trees might 
serve, and how they should be planted. Until Cochran's visit, Chilcott had received little 
attention from the Service, and despite an occasional visitor thereafter, the PSFP never 
expressed a sustained interest in his findings. Adding to Chilcott's annoyance were New Deal 
bureaucratic reorganizations. For a time in 1934 it appeared that the Woodward Station, and 
several other Great Plains stations, would not be funded for 1935. Popular support eventually 
forced Congress to restore Woodward's budget, but the scare had done nothing to endear the 
Shelterbelt and other New Deal recovery schemes to Chilcott.37 
The Forest Service also faced serious difficulties with extension in Nebraska. At first 
it counted itself lucky for having convinced Clayton Watkins, a state forester, to assume the 
role of PSFP state director, but Watkins became an opinionated and troublesome director. 
Although not part of the Forest Service's research branch and without an advanced degree in 
forestry, he believed that his "eight years of farm tree planting work in Nebraska" gave him 
the right "to make some comments as a result of observation and study." The most damning 
of these observations was that shelterbelt planting could not be justified from an economic 
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perspective. He could not rationalize a program which spent "$99.50 per acre or nearly twice 
the actual value of the land involved." To those who thought the initial high cost might be 
justified partially as a research measure, he replied that "a lot of our experimental work 
parallels or overlaps similar research activities being conducted by Experiment Stations." He 
also did not see how the program could be defended as a labor measure since "it is costing 
$950.00 per year to pay each laborer $550.00 an overhead which is grossly out of 
proportion." He thought there might be some justification for making plantings around 
homes and livestock pens, but the economics of planting did not seem to warrant using 
shelterbelts to protect fields. Watkins never made his complaints public, but he was never 
comfortable working for the Forest Service and left in 1937 when replaced by John Emerson 
as state director.38 
Having worked with farmers and local farm organizations for years, state agents such 
as Watkins had considerable sway with farmers, so their views mattered for more than 
bureaucratic reasons. When John Emerson assumed control in Nebraska, he became 
"concerned relative to the attitudes of farm organizations in Nebraska towards our Project." 
The Farm Bureau, Grange, State College, and extension service all doubted the project's 
practicality and questioned the value of shelterbelts for field protection. Watkins attributed 
the resistance to negative publicity, but the existing records also suggest that he did little 
while state director to change opinions. Blaming poor newspaper coverage was also 
unconvincing, because by 1937 and 1938 newspapers were almost unrelenting in their praise. 
Emerson hoped to correct the situation in Nebraska through "more aggressive action toward 
bringing to their attention the value of shelterbelts in general land use plans," but by the time 
he made this proposal in 1938 the window for this opportunity had already passed. The PSFP 
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had needed vocal support from the Farm Bureau and extension in 1935 and 1936, when its 
legislative status had been under consideration by Congress.39 
Roberts was also concerned with the relationship between the PSFP and extension in 
Nebraska and other states. By the summer of 1937, he was under "considerable criticism" 
from other agencies for not being in "full cooperation with the states." Roberts admitted that 
some of this was "well founded" and called upon his state directors to increase their 
cooperation. He instructed the state directors to draw up memorandums outlining their 
current activities and to send these to the heads of various agencies before following up with 
personal meetings. The policy seemed limited in its effect. By late in 1937, he was warning 
his state directors that "there is still a question in my mind whether we are yet working in as 
close cooperation [as we should] with the Extension Service, State Foresters, and 
Agricultural Colleges in the various States." W. H. Brokaw, the director of extension for 
Nebraska, had been placing particular pressure on Roberts to provide more information about 
ongoing work in the state. Roberts was also under instructions from the Department of 
Agriculture to coordinate his agency's work.40 
Despite Roberts' attempt, the PSFP continued to enjoy poor relations with extension 
in Nebraska. An inspection report in 1941 once again put Roberts on the defensive. He 
explained to the Chief Forester that the PSFP had "experienced considerable difficulty with 
the Nebraska Extension Forester's office from the very beginning of this Project." In 
Roberts' opinion extension had "often capitalized on opportunities given them by Region 2 
to carry on this criticism more or less publicly." Extension was using the inspection report to 
unfairly criticize PSFP work. Roberts' primary complaint was that Nebraska extension was 
bypassing his office and going directly to the Region 2 office in Denver, but there was more 
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at stake than disagreements over bureaucratic lines of command. Extension foresters 
disagreed with many of the PSFP's technical decisions.41 
A simple three-row shelterbelt planted at a state hospital in Hastings, Nebraska came 
to represent these divergent views. The PSFP had planted the short belt in Chinese elm, green 
ash, and American elm with 6 by 12 foot spacing in 1936. When the belt was reexamined in 
1940, PSFP foresters thought the belt was in "very vigorous condition" and should be left 
alone. However, Higgins in the Denver Regional Office "made the recommendation that the 
two outside rows be cut out completely to give the center row 'adequate' space to grow in," 
and the Cheyenne experiment station suggested "taking out every other tree in each row." 
The PSFP foresters were surprised at these criticisms since they went against everything that 
had been desired: dense wind blocking stands and forest-like conditions.42 
PSFP research assistant Joseph Stoeckeler had documented the disagreement "to 
show the apparent confusion and division of opinion that still exists in various agencies 
engaged in demonstration tree planting in the Great Plains." He explained that on the one 
hand there was the "orchardist" approach that recommended very wide spacing "on the 
theory that since good orchard practice in subhumid regions consists of giving each tree a 
maximum of rooting space and area for crown and fruit development, such practices can be 
given blanket endorsement for shelterbelts." On the other hand the "silvicultural" approach 
"favors relatively close spacing, formation of a closed canopy and a forest floor early in the 
life of the belt." As Stoeckeler explained, the silvicultural approach was "the foundation of 
the Prairie States Forestry Project's concept of prairie tree planting." He favored the 
silvicultural approach and recommended that the Forest Service impose some discipline on 
the issue since the PSFP and its silviculturalists were the "dominant" federal agency.43 
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Stoeckeler's opinions aside, the evidence was not as clearly in his favor as his report 
suggested. Crowding was a real concern in tightly packed shelterbelts, and although the 
cottonwood problem had many causes, the situation was made worse by narrow spacing that 
forced trees to compete for moisture. The silvicultural approach held that close spacing was 
needed to quickly shade out weeds and create forest like conditions. The orchardist solved 
this problem by requiring more frequent and longer-term cultivation. The orchardist approach 
was a higher energy solution, but it increased the amount of moisture available to individual 
trees and held the promise of supporting greater ultimate growth. Contrary to Stoeckeler's 
claim that orchardist techniques were devised for subhumid regions, they were actually a 
careful adaptation to Plains aridity. It was the silviculturalist's affection for forest-like 
conditions that was a holdover from humid conditions. 
Although not described using the same terms, the orchardist v. silviculturalist 
dilemma was also a feature of relations between PSFP and extension on the southern Great 
Plains. The Woodward Station favored a much wider spacing than the PSFP for western 
Oklahoma and Texas panhandle. PSFP foresters tried to reassure themselves with the 
knowledge that the Woodward Station was generally planting farther west than the PSFP, 
and that therefore its standards might differ, but given that the "drought has resulted in 
bringing the dryer western climate farther east," some foresters began to worry if they were 
too hastily dismissing Woodward's findings. One PSFP visitor commented that he "could not 
help but feel that they [Woodward] confidently expect us to sooner or later recognize their 
spacing recommendations." Disagreement over row spacing was not unique to Woodward. 
The Kansas extension service also wanted wide spacing, although for somewhat different 
reasons. Kansas opposed the PSFP standard ten-foot spacing between rows because "the 
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wide tillage equipment used in that state for wheat farming" and, like Woodward, because it 
followed an orchardist approach to spacing.44 
The Woodward Station also had different standards for belt width. The Station 
followed the policy that if "the farmer can only take care of one row, that is all they plant 
since one row is better than none at all." If the Station thought the farmer was able and 
motivated to cultivate more rows it would supply the trees—sometimes enough for even five 
rows. The director told Engstrom in 1940 that "in a few cases, if the farmer is so 'gullible' as 
to want more than five rows for his windbreak, they will even supply those." Engstrom 
surmised from the director's choice of the word "gullible" to describe farmers who accepted 
10-row belts that "the Station has a definite opinion that our 10-row belts contained more 
rows than necessary when considered from a purely windbreak standpoint." The orchardist 
approach to shelterbelt planting not only allowed, but encouraged, narrower belts because of 
the greater cultivation required.45 
Woodward had also developed its own methods for handling tree types. The station 
had largely abandoned cottonwoods except for locations "under irrigation or depressions 
where run-off accumulated or where high water table afforded an opportunity for 
supplemental moisture." The Station thought it lunacy to plant cottonwoods at sites that 
depended solely on rainfall. The Station had also developed a unique method of growing 
conifers that produced better initial survival—a problem that constantly plagued PSFP 
conifer plantings. The Woodward Station removed the conifer seedlings from the nursery 
using a special puller, similar to a post-hole digger, that removed the root ball with the 
seedling. The root ball was then wrapped in burlap and sent to the planting site. The method 
showed exceptional results compared to the bare-rooted method used by the PSFP. The 
270 
problem was that it used up the nursery's topsoil and made for a very heavy seedling. The 
PSFP would have had to move thousands of the eight pound balled stock from nursery to 
planting location, a logistical task they were unwilling or unable to undertake.46 
The conflict between PSFP and other agencies was never particularly open or 
fierce, but it displayed the potential for disagreement when multiple organizations assumed 
overlapping control for a conservation measure. Each group contained foresters with peculiar 
views and experiences, and each was reluctant to adopt other perspectives. Roberts had 
admitted that "in the early days of the Shelterbelt it practically ignored the pioneer work of 
the early Land Stations at Mandan, Cheyenne, and Woodward." This statement was 
formulaic, though. It was a staple of PSFP inspection reports for the life of the project to 
recommend more visits to stations, yet each time a PSFP forester visited a station they 
thought they were the first, and never failed to recommend the experience to peers. Such 
visits and recommendations did little to transfer knowledge, however. The cottonwood 
problem, the Chinese elm freeze, and disagreements over spacing would all have been 
assisted by greater cooperation that never really emerged.47 
Even the minutia of technical planning involved sweeping social, political, and 
natural implications. In moving from grand to tightly focused plans, foresters had not 
escaped this dilemma. Belt and row widths combined technical adaptations, land use policy, 
and more than a small part of nineteenth-century "social forestry." Species selection became 
a race for short-term acceptance, even with many of the participants knowing they were 
racing towards a double-edged end. In the case of belt and row width, foresters seemed intent 
on deceiving themselves about their methods to continue advocating wide forest-like belts. 
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The theory and techniques that went into creating these belts gave foresters more 
professional and personnel satisfaction. They thought of themselves as foresters and not 
agronomist and were reluctant to make the switch. However, as long as landownership 
remained with farmers, forestry goals would always be second to farm ones, and foresters 
would have to learn to be agronomists if they wanted to continue planting trees. 
This realization had long since dawned on most state foresters on the Great Plains. 
For years they had learned to work with farmers, and their limited budgets and cooperative 
tree planting programs had made promoting forestry goals off of the experiment station 
difficult. Extension foresters experienced more than a little frustration when the Forest 
Service repeated many of their experiments and ignored their advice. They already intimately 
understood that when farmers lost interest in trees, or decided that the land was more 
valuable used for other purposes, the trees' days were numbered. In contrast, Forest Service 
personnel were annoyed that extension did not embrace forestry's potential to transform 
Plains society and environment. The two groups often argued about technical decisions, but 
the arguments reflected underlying institutional cultures and goals. The disagreement 
between the two would seem minor when compared to the graver struggle between Soil 
Conservation Service and PSFP. 
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Chapter Seven—Constructing a Bureaucratic Landscape: the SCS and 
PSFP 
Foresters hoped that the Shelterbelt would make forestry relevant to the nation's 
natural and economic crises, and, equally important, assure the Forest Service as a national 
leader in agricultural conservation. The Service would apply the same scientific measures 
and concern for public welfare to the nation's farmlands that it had lavished on forests. This 
was always a two-sided goal. On the one hand, this giant expansion in activities would 
greatly increase the bureaucratic stature and financial clout of the Service. Even partially 
increasing its involvement in agricultural conservation would increase the Service's stature 
within the Department of Agriculture and help insure that it remained part of that 
Department. On the other hand, most foresters genuinely believed that the Service could 
improve the condition of farmland and farmers. Bureaucratic calculations aside, we should 
not completely dismiss the altruistic dimensions of the Shelterbelt Project. 
Early optimism about an increased Forest Service role in conservation faded after 
1934 as the Shelterbelt became a controversial and difficult project, and as a new 
conservation agency, the Soil Conservation Service (originally the Soil Erosion Service), 
took the lead. However, many Shelterbelt personnel such as Paul Roberts and Raphael Zon 
continued to argue that the program could wedge the Forest Service into farm conservation. 
They reasoned that the problems of drought and wind erosion on the Plains required a long-
term solution. The best, if not the only, of these was tree planting. Since the Forest Service 
had the greatest technical proficiency in growing trees on the Plains, and since Soil 
Conservation Service (SCS) tree planting efforts appeared relatively unsuccessful, the Forest 
Service might still emerge as overseer of long-term conservation efforts on the Plains. Thus 
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while Forest Service attitudes were generally friendly toward the SCS, their desire to 
promote Forest Service successes by emphasizing SCS failures grated at bureaucratic 
relationships within the Department of Agriculture. 
The growing antagonism of the Forest Service in large part reflected the growing 
status of the SCS. The SCS understood that some of its activities overlapped with the Forest 
Service, but it had framed the problem of soil erosion in a way that favored SCS plans. The 
agency was greatly assisted in this by the relative newness of soil conservation science and 
by the stature of Hugh Bennett as the nation's premier soil conservationist. As SCS director, 
Bennett envisioned a national farm conservation agency that attacked soil erosion on all 
fronts with all methods. Although he had initially focused on the water-based erosion that 
afflicted his native South, by 1935 Bennett also addressed wind erosion. His multi-front 
attack on soil erosion was not only effective but offered solutions to erosion on most 
landscapes, something that the exclusively tree-planting approach of the Forest Service could 
not offer. As a result, the SCS gained permanent funding and legislative status as the nation's 
soil conservation agency and then used this status to assume control of most Prairie States 
Forestry Project (PSFP) activities. 
A more stable funding base gave the SCS significant advantages over the PSFP. 
Foresters' preference that shelterbelts be a long-term erosion control measure, and their 
reliance of Works Progress Administration (WPA) funding, encouraged them to establish 
their own nurseries and to constrain their plantings. The PSFP needed its own nurseries to 
"soak up" excess WPA labor and to maintain the exacting standards foresters believed 
necessary. Foresters also argued that the PSFP should only plant field shelterbelts, preferably 
in close proximity and systematic form, to end wind erosion. Planting around recreation 
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areas, farm homes, or feedlots was not really an erosion measure, so it was not part of the 
Shelterbelt's mandate. Unfortunately for the Forest Service, such projects were the most 
popular with Plains' residents. A long shelterbelt beside a field might or might not improve a 
farmer's crop or reduce erosion, but every farmer understood that well designed windbreaks 
would make the home more comfortable and that animals protected by windbreaks put on 
more weight than those left in the open. Likewise, a well-placed grove around a recreation 
area could dramatically improve local perceptions of Plains forestry, although it might do 
little to stop erosion. The SCS quickly stepped into these lacunae to offer communities and 
farmers desired trees. 
By the end of the 1930s, the relative success of the SCS and the budgetary difficulties 
of the PSFP made a merger increasingly irresistible. This was a contest that the Forest 
Service could not win. President Roosevelt, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, and 
Budget Director Harold Smith pushed the Forest Service to turn over the project to the SCS. 
Forest Service personnel resisted the transfer until 1942, but the demands of World War II, 
returning rainfall, and a changing bureaucratic calculus made tree planting seem at least 
temporarily irrelevant to the Forest Service's central mission. 
The exact role and extent of the Shelterbelt Project had remained unclear during its 
early planning stages. Forest Service planners led by Raphael Zon developed several 
proposals that would fit with President Roosevelt's idea of a wall of trees, but they were 
uncertain how far such a program could extend and which agency should take charge of 
conservation work beyond the project's boundaries. As early as 1934, Zon questioned Chief 
Silcox whether the plan was designed primarily as land retirement or revegetation and water 
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conservation. In Zon's view the Shelterbelt could only be a small portion of any land 
retirement scheme on the Plains, and the President would have to give another agency 
overarching control. If the primary goal was revegetation and water conservation, however, 
then the Forest Service should be given control. He proposed dividing the Plains into two 
regions, "in the eastern half tree planting will be the dominant feature while in the western 
half revegetation with grass will be the prevalent method of controlling wind erosion." The 
methods varied, but the objective stayed the same.1 
Although the conservation zone that Zon proposed would be at least half composed of 
grassland, he hoped to give the Forest Service overall control. Up to that time, the Forest 
Service had been the primary agency charged with national conservation measures, and Zon 
believed that the Service could easily acquire the expertise to expand its mandate on the 
Plains. The only other agency with a large interest in grassland conservation, the new Soil 
Erosion Service, was still a part of the Department of Interior. Only a small amount of public 
land on the Plains remained under Interior control, however, and the vast majority was 
privately held and therefore more appropriately managed by the Department of Agriculture 
and the Forest Service. Zon argued that at the very least, the Soil Erosion Service's 
involvement should be under the "guidance and direction of the Forest Service."2 
Zon's conservation plan envisioned the Forest Service as the lead agency, but the 
actual outline closely resembled the future mission of the Soil Conservation Service. He 
wanted to treat the protective zone as an "integrated unit" in which shelterbelts, grass cover, 
water impounding, and other conservation measures would be applied in unison. All of these 
activities would be organized in "close cooperation with local government and land planning 
agencies" to secure support and integrate federal plans with state and regional views. 
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Ironically, integrated conservation management and local conservation districts became 
hallmarks of Bennett's SCS, in almost direct opposition to Zon's early plans for sweeping 
walls of trees. Zon did not dwell on the contradictions between the two visions, but he 
probably wanted the Shelterbelt to remain as the flagship of Forest Service conservation 
work on the Plains, while other activities extended conservation work west of the zone in 
which trees could be safely grown.3 
Paul Roberts, the Shelterbelt's Director, most fully thought through the implications 
of expanding the Shelterbelt into a wider farm conservation program. In the spring of 1935, 
as dry conditions and high winds once again stirred dust storms on the Plains, Roberts argued 
that "listing and plowing" were merely temporary measures and "totally ineffective on 
certain types of soils." He envisioned a "system in which, probably, shelterbelts might form 
the primary bulwark against the wind, supplemented by strip farming or other tillage 
methods." Like Zon, Roberts advocated returning some land to grasses, but he was more 
optimistic about pushing shelterbelt planting "considerably west of the Shelterbelt zone." 
There was little scientific data to support such a program, but Roberts argued that "since 
there is practically no agency which has devoted a great deal of effort to this subject," the 
Forest Service was as logical a leader as any government organization.4 
Underneath Zon's and Roberts' proposals was a belief that systematic, large-scale 
tree planting would also have regional effects. Under such a strategy it was logical to 
establish and then expand areas of concentrated tree planting. As these areas grew they 
would gradually improve the conditions of surrounding lands and make further expansion 
easier. In its most extreme expression, systematic shelterbelt planting would gradually 
stabilize most of the Plains and render other conservation techniques irrelevant. Under such a 
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system Forest Service expertise would reign supreme and other conservation agencies would 
be marginalized. In 1934 and 1935 foresters were already learning to edit climatic claims 
from their public announcements, but internal discussions about the role and extent of the 
Shelterbelt still frequently expressed climatic beliefs. 
The connection between climatic change and soil conservation goals meant that 
Forest Service plans were necessarily long term. Writing to Roberts in the winter of 1935, 
assistant forester L. F. Kneipp explained that the project might be viewed mostly as a relief 
measure during the next few years, but if the Shelterbelt were "viewed as a measure to 
permanently modify the ecology of the middle western States, as foresters naturally would 
view such a project, then we are working ... for the next century, or possibly several 
centuries." Chief of Lands, Alva Simpson reinforced Kniepp's view when he pointed out that 
not only would plantings be for the long haul but, because only systematic plantings were 
likely to have significant climatic effects, planting would "have to be continued until 
completed." Simpson argued that "each individual shelterbelt will have its own immediate 
local effect, but it is also expected that there may be some cumulative mass effect which 
would necessitate a systematic arrangement of large numbers of individual shelterbelts."5 
Although the discrediting of climatic claims and lack of congressional support 
quickly eclipsed grand plans, Roberts continued to seek a central role for the Forest Service 
in Plains conservation. In 1937, Zon advised Roberts to concentrate on shelterbelt planting 
within the zone because any major expansion of Forest Service activities on the Plains 
seemed unlikely. Roberts responded that shelterbelt planting would always be a major part of 
their work, but "the success of this work will draw us into new phases of forestry activity in 
the Plains States." Roberts hoped that new conservation activities would serve as "the basis 
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for additional future financial support." He then chastised Zon for giving up too soon on a 
more expansive agenda. As he described some of the "new phases" of forestry activity, the 
pair reversed their roles from only two years earlier, when Zon had refused to believe that the 
program was "all washed up." Now Zon had gone conservative and Roberts was the 
ceaseless promoter.6 
Roberts' list of expanded objectives read like a wish list for Plains forestry. There 
was something for everyone but little to unify the disparate elements other than an emphasis 
on tree planting. On the sandhills of Nebraska, Roberts wanted to plant windbreaks for 
livestock protection. To please various state governments, he advocated roadside and 
"beautification" plantings. In the more northern states, roadside plantings could serve as 
living snow fences and potentially save the states thousands of dollars in snow removal costs. 
Rounding out the list, he encouraged "community recreational planting." Roberts hoped that 
such an expanded system would not only increase the profile of the Forest Service as a Plains 
conservation agency, but it would also result in an outpouring of state assistance.7 
Despite the budgetary uncertainties surrounding the project, Roberts never lost 
interest and continued to clarify his reasoning for an expanded mandate. By 1940, when the 
Forest Service had clearly been overshadowed by the SCS, he was still advocating expanded 
Forest Service responsibilities along lines similar to his 1937 proposals. He argued that 
"rehabilitation and stabilization" would require the "consideration of a wide range of 
problems dealing not only with the techniques of using the land, but the spiritual wellbeing 
and morale of the people." Roberts then described eight different ideas for improving social 
and ecological relations on the Plains. The first three involved soil and water conservation 
goals traditionally attributed to shelterbelt planting. Points four-through-eight outlined an 
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expanded program of planting for community and individual interests. Although Roberts did 
not list "spiritual wellbeing and moral health" as one of his eight goals, the memo dwelt at 
length on the subject. Roberts apparently realized that the only way to shift from strict 
erosion control goals to communal and individual goals would require a new, non-economic 
calculus. For example, Point Five contemplated increased farmstead plantings to "contribute 
tremendously to the comfort and contentment of the farm family." Although such a 
conclusion seemed valid, Roberts could not explain why the government should subsidize the 
personal comfort of farm families. Selling erosion control to a skeptical Congress had been 
difficult enough; expanding that mandate required more than arguments to include the farm 
home or livestock pens. By 1940, Roberts needed not only to make a concrete case for the 
advantages of tree planting but to explain why tree planting was superior to other techniques 
of erosion control and farm improvement.8 
Lacking any concrete economic calculus, Roberts fell back on the social forestry 
ideas of George Perkins Marsh. According to Roberts, humans has a "sentimental attachment 
to trees." They were not merely a sign of good land use but "part of a way of life, a part of 
the culture of the people, and as such their full function in the Plains encompasses but also 
transcends their function as an implement of land use." Tree planting was thus a conservation 
goal and a moral crusade in which, for obvious reasons, Roberts and the PSFP could play a 
pivotal role. This was Roberts' justification for going "a long way beyond the job of 
shelterbelt planting" and launching a renewed "attack on the whole field of forestry effort in 
the Plains." Under the weight of moral and social arguments, the economic and political 
calculus of tree planting would gradually be directed towards wider goals. While this was an 
appealing formulation to Roberts, and perhaps other forestry advocates, Marsh-like ideas of 
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social benefits through tree planting carried little weight politically and were unconvincing in 
scientific debate. By 1940, it was also probably too late for the Forest Service to assume 
control of Plains conservation. The SCS had already largely assumed that role, and Roberts 
and his fellow PSFP staffers were about the only Forest Service employees still seriously 
considering the possibility.9 
Early in the 1930s when the contest between the two agencies was still unsettled, the 
Forest Service has been under considerable pressure to show concrete evidence about the 
usefulness of trees as an erosion control measure. The SCS promoted a much broader agenda 
of soil conservation in which tree planting was only a small part. By relegating trees to a 
secondary status, the agronomic approach of the SCS undermined Forest Service claims of 
dominance in Plains conservation. Returning tree planting to a dominant position in the 
Plains conservation hierarchy required reasserting Marsh's moral and social claims and then 
providing concrete evidence. The first of these requirements was largely checkmated by the 
SCS's appropriation of moralistic and crusading rhetoric. The second was also problematic. 
Not only was evidence hard to come by, but more often than not it ended up supporting the 
SCS position at least as much as the Forest Service.10 
The SCS's founder and chief, Hugh Bennett, had been making a name for himself as 
the "father" of soil conservation since the 1920s. Bennett built on the work of Marsh and 
Nathaniel Shaler to argue that soil erosion was a fundamental threat to the future welfare of 
the country. Like Marsh and Shaler, he attributed the decline of ancient civilizations in the 
Mediterranean and China to soil erosion. If the United States did not halt erosion, it would 
follow a similar path. Also like Marsh, Bennett attributed the lack of soil conservation in the 
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United States to a frontier mentality that used and then abandoned land. For Bennett, 
America had been a "virgin land" before "eager colonists" began their "march of 
occupation." The major differences between Bennett's description of the problem and his 
predecessor's was his greater use of figures to define the extent and cost of soil erosion, and 
his focus on sheet and gully erosion of cultivated fields.11 
Bennett had begun his campaign against erosion in 1928 with a lecture at the 
Department of Agriculture that contrasted geological and accelerated erosion. According to 
Bennett, natural erosion occurred at a slower rate than soil formation. He admitted that under 
some circumstances, such as spring floods, soil might erode even in a state of nature, but 
under normal conditions nature achieved equilibrium. European settlers' arrival in the 
Americas had upset this delicate equilibrium and begun a process of accelerated erosion. 
Under accelerated erosion, soil was removed from the land faster than it could be replaced, 
and the removed soil was lost to future cultivation. Later ecologists would question the idea 
that nature left undisturbed assumed equilibrium, but Bennett's explanation was attractive at 
the time because it explained the decadent condition of much of the nation's farmland and 
offered an immediate solution. Humans had made the problem, and therefore humans could 
fix it.12 
To address the "national menace" of soil erosion, Bennett urged Congress to pass 
legislation funding a series of erosion stations in 1929. At the urging of James P. Buchanan 
of Texas, the ranking Democrat on the House Subcommittee on Agricultural Appropriations, 
Bennett addressed the committee and outlined the major points of his "national menace" 
speech. Like foresters in the late 1920s, Bennett pitched his discussion towards flood control. 
He argued that, with proper soil conservation measures on the upper Mississippi Basin, 
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floods like those of 1928 might be significantly reduced. He also commented that farmers 
would never address soil conservation on their own and that it was therefore in the public 
interest to teach them how to farm properly. Although Bennett was skeptical of framer's 
conservation credentials, he was careful to present his program as assistance and education, 
thus avoiding criticism that he was simply doing things farmers should do for themselves.13 
Congress was impressed enough to grant Bennett most of his wishes, but it did so in a 
way that made eventual leadership in the field unclear. The Department of Agriculture 
received an additional $160,000 to establish four or five experiment stations to study erosion 
control. The money was spread between Bennett's Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, the 
Bureau of Agricultural Engineering, and the Forest Service. Of the other two agencies, the 
Bureau of Agricultural Engineering seemed the most threatening at the time because there 
was no common agreement about what separated agronomy (Bennett's purview) from 
agricultural engineering. Thus in any competition for leadership, it was unclear which 
organization would triumph. Not only was this bureaucratically threatening, but Bennett was 
skeptical of what he viewed as the Bureau of Agricultural Engineering's over-reliance on 
terracing. Bennett found the Forest Service less threatening in 1929 because its mandate 
seemed only to apply to forestlands, and he saw little immediate risk that it would move into 
farm conservation.14 
Like forestry several decades earlier, in 1930 soil conservation was not clearly 
understood as a separate field of study and the voices that dominated it were few. This 
allowed Bennett and fellow scientists within the Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, and later the 
Soil Erosion Service and Soil Conservation Service, enormous control over the discourse. In 
the introduction to a soil conservation bibliography compiled in 1935 and 1936, Bennett 
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lamented that "inasmuch as the subject of erosion was not studied systematically until recent 
years, much of the material is of an empiric nature. It is unfortunate that more of the 
literature on erosion is not founded on actual experimental data or accurate surveys." The 
greatest potential source of opposition resided in the state extension services, where some 
erosion studies had begun in the 1920s. But no one from the extension service had anything 
like the extensive publication record or national reputation of Bennett. The extension service 
did not begin to challenge Bennett's ideas until after Congress granted the Soil Conservation 
Service a permanent mandate in April 1935. The other possible source of scientific opinion 
was from professional foresters, who had always thought of themselves as soil 
conservationists, but Bennett was careful to construct erosion as a farm problem. The 
creation of the Shelterbelt Project suggested that foresters had their own ideas about how to 
control soil erosion, but they where not ready to challenge Bennett publicly in 1935, and at 
first they saw little reason to do so.15 
During 1933 two possible solutions to dust storms on the Great Plains emerged in 
Washington. The first of these was the Soil Erosion Service under Bennett. The creation of 
the Service had caught Bennett napping, and much of the justification for its creation appears 
to have been as a make-work project rather than erosion control. Interior Secretary Ickes 
clearly wanted to increase his Department's role in conservation. His decision proved 
opportune because later that year dust storms began on the Plains, and with them the prospect 
of making the Soil Erosion Service a permanent agency. The second solution was, of course, 
the Shelterbelt Project (Chapter 4).16 
The huge increase in government spending during the early 1930s left room for both 
projects, but their pasts decisively influenced how each would progress. The SCS saw fewer 
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challenges raised to its methods and reasoning when it sought permanent funding from 
Congress. This was not so much because its methods were superior or because it was a 
national program as because Bennett and his agency were better able to control the scientific 
discourse on soil conservation. First, the field of soil conservation was relatively new, and 
there were few recognized authorities within it and none who could challenge Bennett's 
stature. Second, by its nature the SCS's approach was more insulated to criticism. By 
advocating multiple methods towards erosion control, it was much easier to emphasize or 
deemphasize specific practices as needs dictated. If farmers in Kansas wanted trees, then the 
SCS could offer them trees. If farmers in Georgia wanted terracing and gully damming, then 
the SCS would offer that too.17 
Probably the greatest contrast between the SCS and the Forest Service was that the 
creation of the SCS was untroubled by scientific debate. Members of Congress accepted at 
face value the SCS's claims and voted millions of dollars to the new agency. The only 
serious debate arose over bureaucratic questions about whether to place the new agency in 
the Department of Interior or Department of Agriculture. The desirability and practicality of 
the SCS's program was not an issue. Unlike the reception that the Forest Service faced in 
Congress, when Bennett testified before the House and Senate he was free to define both the 
problem of soil erosion and its solutions. In retrospect his scientific, economic, and historical 
statements were open to criticism, but no one in Congress had the background to contest 
him.18 
Besides being able to control the scientific discourse on erosion, Bennett also 
benefited from natural events. The story that has been handed down within the soil 
conservation community is that Bennett stalled his presentation before the Senate Committee 
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on Agriculture and Forestry in early April 1935 so that a dust storm darkened the windows of 
the chamber as he introduced his plan. In the actual Senate hearings, there was no indication 
of such an event, but Washington DC had been subject to a series of dust storms that March 
and the Committee was primed for a solution to the problem.19 
Bennett's presentation emphasized the long-term damage that accelerated erosion 
cost the nation, but he also offered a solution to the current troubles. He told Congress that 
his studies "have reached the definite conclusion that it [erosion] is the most serious problem 
relating to the permanency of our agricultural lands." According to a recently completed 
survey of the United States, "we have destroyed, practically destroyed, approximately a 
hundred million acres of formerly cultivated land." In addition to the millions of acres lost to 
cultivation, another 125,000,000 acres had "lost all or the greater part of the topsoil" and 
impoverished the thousands of farmers working the land. The perception that soil erosion 
was destroying the Plains was not unique to Bennett. By the mid-1930s, the idea received 
wide circulation in books such as Paul Sears, Deserts on the March. Sears, an ecologist, and 
other populizers of the theory that agricultural misuse was turning the Great Plains into a 
desert simply reinforced Bennett's claims.20 
Trying to put a cost on such destruction was a standard part of Bennett's presentation. 
His usual figure was "at least $400,000,000 annually, to say nothing of the enormous damage 
to highways and railways and the costly silting of reservoirs, streams, and ditches." Despite 
the enormity of these figures, neither Congress nor the public challenged Bennett until well 
after his program was underway. Instead, congressmen such as Samuel Massingale told his 
colleagues that "in the discussion of this bill on the floor of the House some startling figures 
have been submitted which show conclusively the importance of immediate enactment of 
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legislation to put an end to the ravages of water and wind erosion." On occasion Bennett 
bandied even more outlandish numbers, as in December 1934 when he issued a press release 
that claimed the $5 million spent that year by the Soil Erosion Service had saved the nation 
$5 billion. There was no indication in Bennett's records how he arrived at this figure. In his 
testimony before Congress, he attributed it to studies done by the Soil Erosion Service, but 
similar numbers had appeared in his "National Menace" bulletin of 1928, created well before 
the Soil Erosion Service. It was not surprising that Bennett would make such claims to 
support his new organization and to promote a cause in which he believed deeply. What 
seems significant is that the numbers went undisputed.21 
By the end of April 1935, the bill had made it through Congress and received 
President Roosevelt's signature to become Public Law 46. The law transferred the Soil 
Erosion Service from the Department of Interior to the Department of Agriculture, renamed it 
the Soil Conservation Service, and gave it permanent status as a regular bureau. The program 
was also greatly expanded by the transfer of 150 Civilian Conservation Corps camps from 
the Forest Service to the SCS that spring, with a further 300 camps shifted during the ensuing 
summer. Also that year the SCS began 147 demonstration projects and started 48 nurseries.22 
As the above developments suggest, the SCS's gains were Shelterbelt Project's 
losses. By the early 1930s, forestry science had many organizations, many experts, and many 
voices. Not only was it difficult to achieve agreement between them, but they could and did 
frequently work against each other's purposes. The scientific uncertainty and professional 
bickering that surrounded the Shelterbelt Project gave critics of all types ample opportunity 
to contest it. Likewise, the Shelterbelt's reliance on one remedy weakened its overall appeal 
and made it downright unworkable in some areas. Partially as a result of this, the Shelterbelt 
291 
only survived on the sufferance of Roosevelt and as work relief. Both the Forest Service and 
SCS argued that they had sound science on their side, but the debate was never just about the 
best science. It also reflected the ability to control scientific debate. 
Bennett and the SCS did not go unchallenged for long. As political scientists Robert 
Morgan and historian Donald Worster both describe, the SCS soon found itself in conflict 
with county agricultural extension agents. Extension hoped that new federal conservation 
efforts would go through their offices, while the SCS wanted the freedom to deal directly 
with farmers and dictate its conservation methods. Worster describes a further conflict 
between the two over whether their assistance would be aimed at increasing crop production 
or conserving soil. Many SCS personnel, including Bennett, advocated returning large areas 
of the Plains to grasslands as a permanent conservation measure, something that was 
anathema to state college agronomists. The SCS also continued to struggle with the Bureau 
of Agricultural Engineering, particularly in the South, over the use of terracing. When 
criticism coming from several sides, the SCS began to modify its plans to increase support. 
Public Law 46 had contemplated using coercion if necessary to achieve compliance. In the 
heady atmosphere of 1935, with Washington DC being blanketed by dust, this had seemed a 
reasonable, if last resort, provision, but Bennett quickly and completely renounced any such 
intention to gain farmer support in his struggle with local extension agents.23 
The SCS's relation to the Forest Service was also problematic. For the most part 
Bennett seemed more concerned with extension and the Bureau of Agricultural Engineering 
than with the Forest Service, but he wanted Congress to define more clearly the relationship. 
In 1935 the Soil Erosion Service was engaged in a large number of forestry projects around 
the nation as a part of their larger soil conservation goals. They had signed agreements to 
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convert over twenty-two thousand acres of farmland to forest. They had also planted over 
eight thousand acres of forest and set up 129 demonstration plots for forest management. 
When Bennett testified before the House Committee on Public Lands, he noted that "the 
energies of all services, Federal, State and private, may be made to work in harmony and for 
the accomplishment of the desired end." If the committee did not use the opportunity created 
by the current crisis to rationalize conservation programs, "there may follow a haphazard 
effort of erosion control, with conflicting ambitions and purposes and with the bidding of 
Government agencies for the support of various interests." In the name of "efficiency and 
economy," Bennett wanted a method of coordinating the various agencies. This did not mean 
giving one complete control. Bennett argued for a policy of "assigning of responsibility of 
major problems of distinct differences, such as erosion control on farm lands, and on forest 
lands, to different agencies."24 
Maintaining distinct differences between agencies by charging them with control of 
specific landscapes was an appealing idea because it granted the SCS dominance on 
farmland, while the Forest Service retained control of the National Forests. This arrangement 
was less clear on the Great Plains, however, where the nature of the soil conservation 
problem, and thus the responsibilities, were most confused. If strictly followed, such a plan 
would force the Forest Service to terminate the PSFP or transfer control to the SCS. Even if 
such an arrangement had bureaucratic appeal, there remained problems of scientific 
expertise. Up to 1935, Bennett had focused on hydraulic erosion, but the primary problem on 
the Great Plains was wind erosion. The Forest Service, through its longer involvement in 
Plains afforestation and through the Shelterbelt, was better positioned to manage wind 
erosion. Thus for the SCS to challenge the Forest Service's control, they either had to build 
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up their own expertise in forestry or to develop alternative strategies. Bennett pursued both 
tactics.25 
The SCS began by advocating a host of wind erosion control strategies, including 
shelterbelts. Bennett spelled out his pragmatic program in a series of speeches during the 
summer of 1935. As with his earlier emphasis on erosion by water, he claimed that "several 
million acres of formerly good land already have been seriously impaired or ruined," and that 
the SCS had a duty to prevent this destruction. For wind erosion he recommended 
"preservation of crop residues or stubble to anchor the soil; (2) Strip plantings of adaptable 
grasses and other plants; (3) Permanent windbreaks of trees and shrubs, and other measures 
for establishment and maintenance of protective plantings." Building on this combined 
approach, Bennett began to describe the SCS's work as "parts of a broader plan that differs 
from any heretofore undertaken in this country in that it does not contemplate the 
employment of any single, unsupported method of control." Although Bennett did not 
criticize the Shelterbelt by name, his emphasis on a "closely coordinated, properly balanced, 
adaptable and integrated system" contrasted sharply with reliance on the singular, tree-bound 
methods of the Forest Service.26 
The SCS program on the Great Plains followed Bennett's "integrated system" 
approach, and tree and windbreak planting always remained a small part. On the most 
erodible soils, the SCS promoted land retirement and grassland restoration. On the vast 
rangelands of the Western Plains, the SCS became primarily a range management specialist, 
demonstrating conservation techniques to ranchers and encouraging wheat farmers to 
diversify. In regions suited to permanent tillage, the SCS advocated a variety of agronomic 
methods to reduce erosion, including trees. Although windbreaks, shelterbelts, and erosion 
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control plantings were a small part of their program, the SCS's farm forestry program 
represented a significant presence on the Plains. Nowhere was this more evident than their 
tree and shrub nurseries. Nationally in 1935, the SCS controlled 20 Bureau of Plant Industry 
nurseries, 18 emergency conservation work nurseries, 17 SCS nurseries, and they had 
cooperative agreements at 5 PSFP and 19 state nurseries. They also put out contracts with 
private nursery operators. The vast majority of the trees and shrubs from these nurseries were 
destined for mass planting on heavily eroded lands, but the SCS also planted several 
thousands acres of windbreaks and shelterbelts, a number that would continue to grow during 
the decade.27 
With the initiation of Bennett's integrated approach, the SCS largely "captured" the 
soil conservation business on the Plains and ended foresters' hope of expanding the 
Shelterbelt—with the noted exception of Roberts. The congressional recognition and funds 
that the SCS now controlled made it almost impossible for the Shelterbelt to pursue a more 
diverse approach. Deviations from shelterbelt planting would be viewed, both by Congress 
and the SCS, as clear cases of overlap. Even if the Service had tried to expand their program, 
they would have had to do so with emergency funds since Congress would clearly not 
contemplate funding two overlapping agencies on the Plains. The presence of two federal 
agencies offering farmers trees on the Plains already created sufficient groundwork for future 
competition, without the Service compounding the problem by trying to expand into the 
SCS's "work." 
At first, the two agencies tried to work together. The Great Plains was a vast region in 
dire need of assistance, and both the SCS and PSFP faced daunting tasks. The rapid 
acceleration of forestry activities in 1934 and 1935 quickly exhausted the available supply of 
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seed stock. The SCS in particular was left with only a limited supply with which to start its 
nursery program. The Forest Service agreed to share some of their recently accumulated 
stock, and for its part the SCS agreed to purchase five million seedlings grown at PSFP 
nurseries. The Forest Service charged the SCS an average of three dollars and fifty cents per 
thousand seedlings. This figure included a discount for a portion of the cost if the SCS had 
contributed seed stock to the nursery. The cost was far less than what private nurseries 
charged, and it was just enough to meet costs.28 
The two agencies also worked together to protect the image of tree planting programs 
on the Plains. When in 1937 an SCS employee circulated a letter criticizing over-reliance on 
windbreaks as an erosion control measure, the SCS rapidly clamped down on the debate and 
demanded that its branch offices recall the letter. The reaction was spurred by fears that the 
letter "might be interpreted as a criticism not only of the SCS but of the much more extensive 
tree planting program of the Forest Service." Scientists from the two agencies also tried to 
cooperate in their research. Carlos Bates suggested bringing aboard SCS scientists for his 
crop influence studies. He believed that having SCS agronomists assist in the experiments 
would "supplement the natural enthusiasm of the foresters." He hoped "that this intimate 
working together may be continued, at least long enough to satisfy your bureau thoroughly 
that the results obtained and the methods employed are thoroughly reliable and free from 
taint of prejudice." Bates' response was probably partly a defensive strategy to allay fears 
rather than foster camaraderie, but at least the agencies were making some effort to 
coordinate their research.29 
In 1938 the Washington office of the SCS circulated a letter to its regional offices on 
the Plains asking whether they saw any reason why the SCS should not cooperate with the 
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Forest Service in obtaining congressional funding for the PSFP. The SCS employees "agreed 
that the shelterbelt program of the Forest Service could not be harmful to a general soil 
conservation program." The only significant objection was a concern that a farmer might be 
satisfied with only a windbreak, and "therefore the SCS could not inaugurate other measures 
it felt were equally essential." Although the last criticism was put in carefully qualified and 
polite terms, it betrayed the growing institutional rift. They could cooperate, but ultimately 
they were two different agencies with two different programs competing for the same 
space.30 
As soon as the dust had begun to fly on the Plains, foresters started to worry about the 
Soil Erosion Service and its plans. Writing from Lincoln, Nebraska, in March 1935, and 
enveloped by a "thick pall of dust," Paul Roberts warned his superiors in Washington that the 
"Soil Erosion Service is unable to cope with the situation." Roberts noted that the SCS's 
efforts "have been directed towards preventing water erosion" and that the only way to 
prevent continued blowing was revegetation. The problem with revegetation was that "it 
would unquestionably not be possible to re-establish grass" without first establishing "some 
form of tree and shrub growth as a start, and later establish grass growth." Roberts' letter 
never elaborated on what exactly he had in mind, but it was a good example of the natural 
tendency to put trees before everything else. In this case, Roberts was reasoning that even 
grass needed trees to grow. At almost the same moment Roberts was warning his peers in 
Washington, Raphael Zon also telegrammed to warn the Forest Service it needed to act 
quickly to tackle the soil blowing problem and that only the Service had the necessary 
expertise with "revegetation with grass and trees." Although, not quite as biased towards 
trees as Roberts, Zon too saw a central role for forestry in solving the dust storms. Had they 
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known that Bennett was using the very same storms to lobby for the SCS program of erosion 
control, both Roberts and Zon would have been doubly distressed.31 
As March rolled into April, Roberts became increasingly concerned that the SCS 
would take over the field. He advised Zon that the States disliked the Soil Erosion Service 
because it "worked too independently of the States." He told Zon that "it is incumbent upon 
both of us to watch the going pretty closely for a while, to see that we are not swallowed up 
in some general scheme; that we retain our identity; and, if possible, that we have a leading 
part in the coordination of the entire program." In Roberts' opinion this was not an unrealistic 
goal, since public sentiment on the Plains favored the Forest Service over the SCS. Most 
alarmingly, Roberts had heard from a local SCS employee that the SCS would soon be taking 
over the Shelterbelt Project. With the legislation still moving through Congress, all this was 
still speculation, but not paranoid speculation.32 
Later in 1935 the Forest Service began to come to terms with Public Law 46 and the 
SCS's emergence as the new giant of soil conservation. The Forest Service hoped to establish 
a new Great Plains Forest Experiment Station, however the Budget Bureau began resisting 
the Forest Service request on the grounds that it would overlap "the work already planned by 
the Soil Conservation Service in the Plains region." Congress had granted the SCS both 
regular and emergency funds and authority for conservation work on the Plains. In the 
Budget Bureau's opinion, "a lot of work, research and otherwise, is programmed by the SCS 
directly tied in with the Shelterbelt, including establishment of nurseries, [and] tree shrubbery 
plantings." The Forest Service tried to counter that the SCS's claim that it already had a 
mandate for soil erosion control by appeals that the Shelterbelt was "the President's project" 
and it needed a large amount of research to insure success. The Forest Service might be able 
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to resist absorption by the SCS, but it could not avoid the increasingly obvious redundancies 
and conflicting agendas.33 
The conflicting agendas became particularly apparent when both agencies went to 
work on the same ground. By early 1937 the SCS began to pressure the Forest Service to pay 
more attention to their terracing and contour practices when planting. The SCS complained 
that the PSFP had "cut through their contour areas with straight-line shelterbelts." From its 
inception the Shelterbelt had advocated rigid plantings running across the Plains irrespective 
of local human and natural geography. Although it had abandoned this goal as impractical 
even before the Shelterbelt morphed into the PSFP, the PSFP continued to plant shelterbelts 
on the grid pattern of property boundaries. There were very few examples in the PSFP files 
of shelterbelts planted along a contour. Roberts defended PSFP efforts at some length by 
arguing that they followed sound conservation practices. Others pointed out that SCS 
methods were not immune to the same criticism. In response to a circular that questioned 
SCS practices by asking state directors to comment on the differences between the two 
programs, John Emerson responded that "in many [farmers] the urge to plant, work with and 
live among trees is bred right in their bones." The SCS "practices, on the other hand, of 
contour farming, constructing terraces, farming around the hills with crooked rows and odd-
shaped fields is directly opposed to every habit a good farmer has been taught from father to 
son down through the ages." Emerson argued that the PSFP was "encouraging something 
which nearly everyone wants or likes to do."34 
In reality, the issue was not whether either agency followed established practices, or 
even what farmers preferred (a question that was open to more debate than Emerson's letter 
suggested), but whether different methods and different programs could co-exist in space and 
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time. In 1935 and 1936 there was no unified cooperative structure between the two agencies. 
Sometimes one agency only belatedly discovered that the other agency was working in the 
same area. The Forest Service tried to hold informational sessions across the Plains, but 
Roberts admitted that he was unsure if SCS personnel had attended more than a couple 
meetings.35 
In the Woolsey-Shue Creek Demonstration area of South Dakota, the two agencies 
found themselves in direct competition. The SCS had set up a demonstration area in several 
townships located within a PSFP concentration area. The local PSFP supervisor understood 
that a field agreement had been arranged in which the SCS would avoid planting in areas the 
PSFP had already entered, but the SCS carried out plantings anyway. Not only did both 
agencies work the same townships, but in one high profile incident they even established 
shelterbelts "on opposite sides and adjacent to the same highway." In response the PSFP 
project manager tried to interest the SCS in allowing the PSFP to establish all shelterbelts 
within the demonstration area, but found the SCS unwilling even to consider the idea. The 
SCS argued that it had primacy through Public Law 46, which had given the agency a 
mandate to conserve the nation's soil. The PSFP foresters replied that their seniority in the 
area and their superior expertise in tree culture justified their primacy. Both agencies 
reluctantly agreed on the need for some coordinating policy.36 
Initially, coordination meant meetings between the field personnel of both agencies to 
create "memorandum of understanding." Typically at these meetings both agencies tried to 
stake a claim to preeminence. SCS agronomists pointed out that they had been given a 
mandate to manage soil conservation on the Plains, and that windbreak and shelterbelt 
planting was but one type of soil conservation. Therefore the SCS should exercise overriding 
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control. PSFP foresters took the view that there were more benefits to tree planting than soil 
conservation. If the SCS was worried about overlap, then "that could be solved by having the 
Forest Service direct all tree planting work, including that on soil erosion projects." In part, 
this was bureaucratic bargaining with each agency attempting to maintain its own budget and 
mandate, but for the PSFP there was the added threat that haphazard SCS plantings might 
undermine public perceptions of Plains forestry.37 
The early public controversy and stiff congressional opposition that the Shelterbelt 
faced made it imperative that plantings have a high success rate. Forest Service personnel 
were trying to convince a skeptical Congress that trees could be grown on the Great Plains. 
The last thing they needed was dead, dying, and mishandled SCS plantings providing 
ammunition for critics. Roberts made this very argument in his early reports on cooperative 
agreements between the SCS and Shelterbelt. In his opinion the SCS was unequipped and 
lacked the "technique necessary in this region of adverse climatic conditions." The Forest 
Service could, and would, go to great lengths to ensure that its plantings achieved a high 
success rate. For Roberts the solution was, predictably, to give the Forest Service control of 
tree planting on the Plains or, at the very least, to establish cooperative agreements that 
required the SCS to use Forest Service technical advice.38 
The overlapping jurisdiction that the two agencies faced in the early 1930s was 
common among the tangle of agencies created by Roosevelt's New Deal. Similar conflicts 
emerged among the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Works Progress 
Administration, extension, and other agencies. In an attempt to impose some order on the 
growing chaos, the Department of Agriculture created regional advisory committees 
composed of members from the various agencies. The regional committees in turn referred 
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decisions and derived guidance from a Departmental Committee located in Washington. In 
the case of the Great Plains, the new regional coordinating committee created a formal chain 
of command within which to address complaints. The Board also offered personnel in both 
agencies a clearer idea of who to contact about concerns. As a result there were fewer 
obvious (or at least reported) incidents of overlap. The notable exception was in the area of 
nurseries, where accusations of overlap persisted because no coordinating committee could 
ever remove the fundamental redundancy of two agencies offering similar services across the 
same landscape.39 
In the early 1930s both agencies had scrambled to establish nurseries, and gradually 
this became a public relations problem. The two agencies also began to compete for planting 
sites and public acceptance. In this struggle the Forest Service was handicapped by its limited 
budget and restrictive rules. The SCS capitalized on the Forest Service's difficulties by 
conducting a variety of popular planting activities. By the early 1940s the two agencies were 
also mired in the previously unimaginable: a struggle for labor and farmland. Finally, and 
most problematically, bureaucratic reorganization eventually transferred the PSFP to the 
SCS. 
The problem of overlapping nurseries seemed minor in the early 1930s when seedling 
demand far outstripped supply, but by the late 1930s both agencies were producing excess 
stock. In an embarrassing case, the agencies had even located nurseries across the street from 
one another. The two agencies worked to remedy these situations by closing, moving, or 
sharing nursery space. They also tried to defend the overlap that did exist as necessary, but 
these arrangements never completely removed criticism. In the summer of 1939 both 
agencies once again found themselves in hot water over nursery duplication. This time 
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"outside sources" informed President Roosevelt that "considerable duplication still exists," 
so he ordered the Secretary of Agriculture to examine the matter.40 
The resulting investigation uncovered significant redundancies in South Carolina, 
Indiana, and the Great Plains. Both the SCS and PSFP had nurseries at Mandan, North 
Dakota and in Manhattan, Kansas. The PSFP vacated their Manhattan lease and moved to 
Abilene to distance themselves from the SCS nursery, but the two nurseries were still 
uncomfortably close from an organizational standpoint. In South Dakota several PSFP 
nurseries were included within the zone of distribution of the SCS's Vermillion nursery. The 
Biological Survey had a nursery at Valentine, Nebraska near the PSFP's Halsey nursery and 
there were also several state-run nurseries in the region. The Secretary of Agriculture 
instructed the two agencies to consolidate their production. If a case arose in which there 
were good reasons for overlap, then "the nurseries should be considered as one cooperative 
nursery and appropriately posted on the ground and maps," but the actual process was left to 
regional directors.41 
Consolidation was not as easy on the Great Plains as the administration wished. The 
existence of nearby nurseries did not necessarily equate with excess capacity. To reduce 
overlap, the PSFP canvassed the SCS nurseries with requests to use any idle acreage, but the 
SCS had very little to offer. The forester assigned to handle the PSFP's nursery 
consolidation, D. S. Olson, argued that despite their efforts, cooperative agreements had 
possibly "resulted in the saving of [only] one small lease in South Dakota." Olson blamed the 
SCS, which in his opinion "should release more of their acreage." Although Olson sincerely 
desired greater SCS cooperation, his primary goal was to get the SCS out of the nursery 
business so the PSFP could become the primary provider in the territory. He argued that "the 
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crux of this whole situation lies in whether or not the SCS is willing as yet to declare 
themselves going out of the tree production business in our territory." It seemed to him that 
the "logical adjustment would be that we grow the comparatively small amount of stock the 
SCS needs in this region in our nurseries, and that the present SCS tree nurseries be either 
abandoned or turned over to us." Olsen then offered a number of reasons why existing PSFP 
nurseries were necessary, including their superior locations, their more developed facilities, 
and their connection to local work areas.42 
In the late summer of 1939 the Department of Agriculture called in representatives 
from the PSFP and SCS, including Olsen, to Washington D. C. The meetings consisted of 
both agencies justifying their activities while requesting that the other agency transfer its 
nursery operations. They also discussed the political logic of moving nurseries such as the 
recent PSFP migration from Manhattan to Abilene, Kansas. Although all sides agreed that 
nursery duplication was undesirable, they were also uncomfortable with the idea of shuffling 
nursery leases for such callous political reasons. As a result they agreed that "the Department 
[of Agriculture] would fully support us on matters of this kind as long as conditions justified 
the selections we had made." In other words, nurseries would no longer be shuffled to avoid 
the appearance of overlap, but any new plans to acquire, expand, or abandon nurseries would 
be cleared through the Department's Coordinator Office.43 
Although un-discussed in the records of the meeting, PSFP resistance to nursery 
consolidation was rooted in bureaucratic and funding imperatives. As J. A. Fitz water told 
Paul Roberts in July 1939, the "fact that the Prairie States Forestry Project is operating 
strictly on emergency funds may to a considerable degree preclude adjustments which might 
otherwise be very desirable." With only ten percent of WPA funds slated for management 
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and materials, the PSFP used its nursery programs to absorb some of the labor paid for by the 
other ninety percent of WPA funds. Even more problematic, the PSFP lacked the fiscal 
flexibility to contract with other agencies to grow its seedlings. Given the restrictions on 
WPA funding, the PSFP found it more efficient to grow as much of its own seedling stock as 
possible using WPA labor. Thus an infrastructure of nurseries had to be the foundation for 
any expanded conservation mandate, a goal that Roberts and many on his staff still sought. It 
also almost certainly mattered that many PSFP personnel saw nursery duty as one of their 
primary responsibilities. Foresters such as Olson and Bates spent a great deal of time and 
invested a significant portion of their careers tackling nursery-related problems. Giving this 
responsibility to the SCS and becoming "simple" tree planters was neither politically nor 
personally appealing to most professionally trained PSFP employees.44 
The PSFP was also dedicated to the idea of planting only conservation shelterbelts 
and avoiding windbreak plantings around public facilities, farm homes, and livestock pens. 
From its initiation the Shelterbelt had been designed to halt wind erosion. As the project 
morphed into the PSFP, it never lost its focus on this primary goal. Zon explained that "only 
planting around fields in the form of shelterbelts is the thing worth while doing." Other 
activities "fall short of accomplishing the real objective of plains planting." When the project 
faced intense criticism over such issues as providing "free" trees to farmers, its directors had 
countered by suggesting that field shelterbelts provided local, regional, and national benefits. 
Their precarious financial standing also encouraged foresters to stay within well-defined 
policies. During the early 1930s this narrow focus on field shelterbelts had been politically 
savvy, but by the end of the decade the PSFP came under criticism for being unwilling to 
expand its program.45 
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The criticism came out most forcefully in a study conducted in late 1939 at the 
request of Milton Eisenhower, the Land Use Coordinator for the Department of Agriculture. 
Eisenhower directed the various regional land use coordinators to solicit opinions on the 
value of the PSFP "from the standpoint of its worthwileness [sic] to farmers and agriculture 
generally." The regional directors mailed surveys to farmers, extension workers, 
agronomists, businessmen, newspaper publishers, and others. They then assembled reports 
and summarized findings for Eisenhower. For the most part the reports revealed unrelenting 
praise of the PSFP. The exceptions were recurring requests that shelterbelt plantings be 
expanded geographically and extended to community and farm plantings. W. E. Grimes, the 
head of the Kansas State College Economics and Sociology Department, responded that "in 
many cases a good farmstead planting is more important than a shelterbelt planted along a 
field." L. E. Call the Director of the Agricultural Experiment Station at Manhattan, Kansas 
offered the similar opinion that "shelterbelts are of the greatest value in protecting livestock 
and the farm home, in beautifying the farm home and the countryside, and in furnishing 
protection for plantings and wildlife." Call wanted a change in the regulations to allow these 
types of plantings.46 
If the PSFP did not make these plantings, then there was always the risk that the SCS 
might step in. This was the case in Emporia, Kansas, when in 1938 the city asked the PSFP 
to furnish nursery stock for a new reservoir. Harold Reitz, the PSFP state director, visited the 
reservoir and discussed the city's plan, but he left without making promises. There was no 
farmland near the lake, and plantings could not be considered soil conservation plantings 
under the Farm Forestry Act. Furthermore, the PSFP recommended cultivating land at least 
one year before planting to reduce weeds and build soil moisture, so even if the PSFP could 
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bend its rules, any planting would have to be done the following year. Reitz was careful to 
inform the mayor and local representatives of these restrictions before returning to the work 
of planting shelterbelts on farmland.47 
It came as a shock six weeks later when Reitz read in his morning paper that the SCS 
had announced it was planting 79,900 trees on the site in the next few days. With its wider 
mandate and less restricted funding, the SCS had rapidly put together a large planting 
program. Perhaps even more disturbing, there were many other newly built or planned 
reservoirs around the state. The PSFP had missed a major opportunity to make itself relevant 
in the state of Kansas. Reitz fumed that the PSFP's narrow mandate had "elevated the S.C.S. 
to leadership in forestry matters." In the future, the new status of the SCS threatened to 
crowd the PSFP out of the tree planting field altogether. As Reitz surmised, why should 
Kansans work through the rule-bound and geographically limited PSFP when they could go 
to the SCS and get substantial and immediate assistance? Reitz concluded that the PSFP 
needed to pursue such plantings more aggressively and to lobby in Washington for overall 
control for Plains forestry, but this contained a circular problem. Without regular funding and 
a wider mandate, the PSFP could not expand its program; yet without an expanded program 
and the popular support such a program might generate, the PSFP lacked the political support 
to secure more funding and a broader mandate.48 
Despite some efforts at coordination, the two agencies continued to compete for 
planting locations and, by the early 1940s, labor. Because of conflicts over land and 
technique, the SCS petitioned the Forest Service to end its planting programs in Bridgeport 
and Broken Bow, Nebraska. Roberts argued that if carried out, this halt in PSFP operations 
would devastate the future of Nebraska planting. Bridgeport was at the western edge of PSFP 
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operations in Nebraska but contained a large area of plantings. Roberts wanted to maintain a 
program there so the PSFP could follow up on the success of older plantings, but to do so he 
needed "a new program of reasonable size each year to provide an economical operation and 
maintain the organization." The case was even worse in Broken Bow, which had been the 
center of operations for a large area and the greatest supply of WPA labor. Shutting the PSFP 
out of Broken Bow would "require long hauls of labor and result in reduced output" in 
neighboring areas. To make matters worse, the SCS move to assume control in these areas 
was part of a "progressive elimination of areas of this kind within the operating territory of 
the PSFP" that "would soon break up the area to the point where it would seriously interfere 
with the whole Project."49 
Adding to Robert's worries, it also appeared that the SCS and PSFP were in 
competition for WPA labor. The start of World War II in Europe had raised farm prices and 
reduced the attractiveness of WPA work on the Plains. Rearmament was also beginning to 
lower urban unemployment rates and even draw unemployed workers from smaller towns to 
larger cities, where the new jobs were emerging. By 1941, Roberts feared that there was 
insufficient labor in many districts to accommodate both SCS and PSFP programs. Since the 
agreements had already been signed, this could leave the PSFP in the unenviable position of 
failing to live up to its commitments and having a large excess of implanted nursery stock on 
its hands. The situation for 1942 looked even worse.50 
The nature of WPA funding, and the PSFP's reliance on it, made the labor problem 
particularly thorny. The PSFP needed to hire enough WPA labor each year to insure that the 
10 percent allowance for administrative costs was sufficient to cover fulltime employees. 
Reducing the level of plantings to accommodate reduced labor availability thus left the PSFP 
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with insufficient funds to pay staff and nursery costs. Likewise, more labor-efficient planting 
methods, such as the mechanical planters that the PSFP was experimenting with, could not 
solve the problem since it could not replace the lost administrative funding. The SCS, with its 
permanent funding, was better positioned to deal with such changes. It could use whatever 
WPA labor was available without imperiling its permanent structure. The SCS also employed 
mechanical planters to help maintain its overall acreage goals in a tightening labor market.51 
Although the war forced a consolidation that both agencies had conceded, the 
groundwork had been laid over many years. A part of that reorganization effort was 
transferring control of the nation's farm agencies to the Department of Agriculture and 
control of the nation's public lands agencies to the Department of Interior. The first of these 
was successfully achieved in 1935 when the Soil Erosion Service became the Soil 
Conservation Service and moved to the Department of Agriculture, but transferring the far 
more powerful Forest Service to Interior proved impossible. Roosevelt had discussed 
transferring the Forest Service since his election, but Gifford Pinchot and other 
conservationists had dissuaded him by painting Interior as corrupt and poorly managed. With 
the passage of the Reorganization Act (1939), Roosevelt once again began to support the 
Brownlow Committee recommendations for reorganizing the executive branch, including 
proposals to relocate the Forest Service. He justified this move in part on grounds of 
efficiency, but it was also an attempt to trim the power of the hugely influential Department 
of Agriculture, which had grown by leaps and bounds during the New Deal.52 
Forest Service resistance in what became known as the "transfer fight" angered 
President Roosevelt and soured him on any efforts to expand the Forest Service. Opposition 
to the transfer was widespread both within the Department of Agriculture and the 
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conservation community, but it was particularly fierce in the Forest Service itself. Assistant 
Forester Earle Clapp led the resistance and, as a consequence, never became Chief Forester. 
In explaining the affair to Paul Roberts, Clapp warned that "the whole transfer business, I am 
sorry to say, left F. D. R. with a very bad opinion of the Forest Service." Clapp explained that 
Roosevelt had transferred most of the forestry activities enabled under the 1936 Cooperative 
Forestry Act to the SCS. This was a deep wound to Forest Service plans to become a major 
player in farm conservation. It left them controlling only the PSFP on the Plains, while the 
SCS assumed control not only of farm conservation but most tree planting activities. Roberts, 
for his part, felt that Roosevelt would have preferred Clapp's "head on a platter" after the 
transfer fight.53 
As part of a policy of resistance, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace tried to 
shuffle responsibilities between agencies within the department. There were many theories 
but little clear direction. The Forest Service was left guessing exactly what Wallace intended. 
In an attempt to reassure various departmental directors within the Service, including 
Roberts, who were anxiously awaiting the outcome of the struggle, the Washington office 
issued a memorandum outlining two theories. The first was that Wallace was "diffusing some 
of the work in forestry through other bureaus" in order to "so inextricably relate forestry to 
the Department as a whole that it would be impossible on a logical basis to transfer the Forest 
Service from the Department of Agriculture." The second theory was that Wallace was 
removing most of the farm forestry, erosion, and flood control programs of the Forest Service 
to push it "more to the edge or corner of the agriculture field where we could be picked off 
with very little if any dislocation."54 
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The first theory proved the most accurate. A memo on 15 October 1938, marked 
"read and destroy," indicated that Wallace's principle purpose was "to integrate the Forest 
Service so fully with the Department that it could not be transferred." Farm forestry functions 
moved to the SCS, but the Forest Service maintained control of the research for such 
programs and for the PSFP. Thus Wallace had tried to locate forestry functions within so 
many different bureaus of the Department of Agriculture that Roosevelt could transfer no 
single bureau. Although such tactics may have helped prevent the transfer of the Forest 
Service to Interior, they did not endear the Department or Service to Roosevelt.55 
Trying to prevent transfer, however, did not mean allowing obvious and politically 
sensitive examples of overlap to continue. In 1937, Secretary Wallace began warning PSFP 
officials that, if they did not correlate their program with that of the SCS, he would do it for 
them. Instead of resigning itself to some form of shared responsibility, though, the Forest 
Service became increasingly protective and even paranoid. During the summer of 1938, 
Roberts sent a series of letter to Silcox warning him to resist any transfer of farm forestry 
functions to the SCS. According to Roberts, the SCS "has awakened just during the past few 
months to the full possibilities of shelterbelt work as a conservation measure in the Plains 
States, and that they want the work and they want it badly." In his view, the two agencies 
were waging a "battle" for control of forestry in the Plains states, and he calculated that the 
Forest Service was popular enough in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska to get those states to 
support the Forest Service. Conversely, if they lost farm forestry on the Plains, he feared they 
would lose it elsewhere around the country.56 
Later that year, the Department of Agriculture seemed to confirm Roberts by 
fulfilling Wallace's threat to reorganize Forest Service and SCS activities on the Plains. In 
October, Wallace authorized the SCS to administer the Cooperative Farm Forestry Act 
programs undertaken by the Department. As part of this Wallace instructed the Forest 
Service to transfer employees engaged in this work to the SCS. In January 1939, Wallace 
qualified his earlier plan by specifically excluding the PSFP and its personnel from transfer. 
For Roberts this was the foot in the door that he dreaded. It seemed only a matter of time 
before the SCS consolidated its gains and took full control of the PSFP.57 
The one potential barrier to the absorption of the PSFP was President Roosevelt, who 
had all along been the project's most important supporter. Roosevelt had wanted the project 
to form a wall between the Dust Bowl and more productive farmland to the East. For a 
variety of technical and political reasons the project as it actually developed was a more 
diffuse undertaking than the "wall" President Roosevelt had imagined across the middle of 
the nation. After swinging through the area briefly in his reelection bid, Roosevelt had been 
disappointed to find little evidence of "his" program. He expressed his dissatisfaction to 
Secretary Wallace and to Wallace's replacement, Claude Wickard, and instructed them to 
make the plantings conform more to his original suggestion. Roosevelt wanted to create a 
"very vivid effect" that would immediately announce to travelers that they were passing the 
Shelterbelt. Rather than just a soil conservation measure, he wanted one giant "Shelterbelt" 
that would "create an extensive national monument of trees in a treeless country."58 
Secretary Wickard tried to explain to Roosevelt why the project was not 
"monumental." Since the plantings varied in intensity, they did not present a clear contrast 
between land inside and outside the zone of planting. Most of the belts ran parallel to the 
main roads rather than across them, which reduced the impact of driving past. The original 
plan of having belts running north-south proved impractical because of wind direction which 
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tended to come from the southwest or northwest. The Forest Service could not make the belts 
continuous because they needed to meet community needs, and because soil types made such 
plantings nearly impossible. Although Wickard's explanation was correct, the program he 
described was not what Roosevelt had wanted, and there was little to differentiate it from the 
broader SCS program.59 
Roosevelt's vision for the Shelterbelt was not simply a matter of personnel egotism or 
monument building. Just as had past generations, he saw the Great Plains as a landscape that 
could be remolded through human intervention. The Shelterbelt was Roosevelt's way of 
reducing the troubles of the region to a manageable level. The problem became one of 
systematically planting trees to halt wind erosion. Of course, this was a vast 
oversimplification of both the troubles of the region and forestry's role as a solution. 
Roosevelt was, in the words of political scientist James C. Scott, "seeing like a state." He had 
narrowed his vision to focus on one solution, a tree wall. This process of simplification made 
the region seem more legible and easier to manipulate. Roosevelt did not have the time, or 
the inclination, to learn the nuances of soil science, settlement and wind patterns, or dozens 
of other variables. Although Roosevelt's plan was perhaps the grandest simplification of all, 
he was not the only one with a vision for the Plains. Each federal agency involved in erosion 
control had their own plans, and each plan involved a process of simplification.60 
When Roosevelt realized that the Forest Service could not complete his vision, he 
began supporting a reorganization of Plains soil conservation agencies. Roosevelt started by 
urging the Department of Agriculture to transfer the PSFP to the SCS in 1940. Bureau of the 
Budget Director Harold Smith pressed Roosevelt to make the transfer because the SCS could 
legally spend regular appropriations on the PSFP. He also pointed out that, in the six states 
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where the program worked, the SCS had already established Soil Conservation Districts 
which could take over maintenance and operation of the project. With all of these arguments 
in hand, Roosevelt exacted his revenge on Clapp by informing Wallace that the SCS was 
now in a position to take over responsibility for PSFP operations.61 
However, Roberts had not yet relinquished his policy of resistance, and in December 
he asked his state directors to assemble a report on SCS plantings. The next month Roberts 
presented his report to Acting Chief Forester Clapp. It painted a largely negative view of SCS 
efforts. John Emerson, the Nebraska State Director, claimed that 99 percent of the SCS's 
demonstration plantings from 1935 to 1937 had died by 1940—some 2.5 million trees. He 
observed that "the farmers in the area were pretty disgusted with the SCS and after an 
indignant meeting the SCS asked us to take over the job of replanting and fixing up the 
plantings they had originally started." Earle Thomas of the North Dakota state office 
complained that the SCS plantings ignored the needs of farmers and planted too close to 
roads. Personnel from other states echoed these complaints. Although Roberts hoped the 
report would help the Forest Service resist Departmental reorganization, there was no 
evidence that Roosevelt, Smith, or even Wallace ever read his reports. Furthermore, Roberts' 
logic—that the SCS lacked proper techniques and knowledge—was undermined by 
bureaucratic reorganization efforts aimed at transferring the PSFP to the SCS, thereby 
providing the SCS with many former PSFP personnel.62 
Stalling and internal resistance continued for much of 1941, but by the end of the year 
Smith could report to Roosevelt that Wickard had finally agreed to the transfer. Smith had 
continued to promote the transfer, despite Forest Service resistance during 1941, on three 
grounds: that the SCS already had authorization for such a program, that the SCS received 
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funding for the Cooperative Farm Forestry Act for fiscal year 1942, and that the presence of 
two such organizations on the Plains led to "duplication and overlapping." Smith 
acknowledged that the PSFP had made the program a success when no one else wanted it and 
when most believed it would not work, but that was as far as Smith or the administration 
would go. Wickard's decision to finalize the transfer was based primarily on a financial 
checkmate. With relief funds drying up in the face of renewed prosperity and wartime 
mobilization, the PSFP needed regular funds. In 1941, Congress finally seemed to recognize 
this by including funds for the PSFP under the Cooperative Farm Forestry Act (also often 
called Norris-Doxey) for fiscal year 1942, but Smith and Roosevelt warned Wickard that 
they would reduce Forest Service funding under the Act unless Wickard made the transfer.63 
This left Wickard and the Forest Service with an operose choice. The SCS was still 
trying to establish conservation districts in many Plains states. Since the SCS would only 
carry out work within established conservation districts, this meant that transferring the PSFP 
to the SCS would result in abandonment of roughly 80 percent of the shelterbelt zone, at least 
until the SCS expanded. The other alternative was even less pleasant to contemplate. The 
Forest Service could retain the PSFP and lose all of its Cooperative Farm Forestry Act 
funding, some $700,000. Not only would the Forest Service then lose funding for a number 
of other programs, but it would have to locate funds to continue the PSFP. Given these 
unpleasant alternatives, Wickard and the Forest Service agreed to the transfer.64 
In functional terms, however, transferring the PSFP to the SCS effectively signaled 
the end of the Shelterbelt Project. Under the SCS, Cooperative Farm Forestry Act work on 
the Plains would be realigned from "shelterbelt farm forestry work" as "rapidly as possible" 
to a program of "forestry assistance to farmers through local soil conservation districts." 
Funds would increasingly be used for technical guidance at a national level rather than be 
channeled into the PSFP zone. Thus transferring the PSFP to the SCS did not constitute a 
true continuation. The SCS would reassign personnel and funds according to its needs, and it 
was under no obligation to sustain shelterbelt planting or research, although it did continue 
some of both.65 
For the foresters of the PSFP, this was a deathblow. E. L. Perry, a forester who wrote 
an unpublished official history of the PSFP in 1942, explained that the SCS was "largely 
dominated by agronomists who, by and large, have a tendency to believe that any 
conservation end that can be achieved with trees can be better and more cheaply done by 
agronomic methods." Roberts noted that the "project lost its identity and character when 
turned over the SCS in 1942 and became an incidental and very minor phase of the activities 
of the SCS." Clapp mourned the loss, and could never "understand why FDR, after 
sponsoring the project as he did, approved a recommendation which could have only one 
result." What their disappointed appraisals ignored was an ongoing legacy. The PSFP 
foresters who did go to work for the SCS found that, while their work had a broader focus 
than previously, they never stopped planting trees on the Plains. Most continued to advocate 
afforestation as a superior long-term erosion control measure.66 
The SCS and the PSFP were as much engaged in constructing bureaucratic 
strongholds as conservation landscapes. Foresters wanted to make shelterbelts the primary 
conservation device for the Great Plains, partly because they hoped shelterbelts would solve 
some of the region's troubles but also with an eye towards bureaucratic survival and 
expansion. The PSFP depended on a farm landscape divided by shelterbelts to justify its 
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existence and sustain the flow of federal dollars to the Great Plains. Foresters argued in favor 
of tree planting by claiming that it was the only true long-term solution. In their arguments 
for an expanded conservation program with multiple approaches, however, foresters 
undermined their rationales for bureaucratic dominance. If soil conservation really did 
involve more than just trees, then why should the Forest Service and tree planting be given 
primary billing? This was a question that foresters could not answer, but that the SCS was 
poised to explain. 
The SCS promoted a more agronomic approach that made tree planting a small part 
of a larger program of soil conservation, but, like the PSFP, its ideas about the conservation 
landscape also harbored bureaucratic favoritism. SCS agronomists argued that a number of 
agronomic approaches could largely eliminate the need for field shelterbelts. To some degree 
they were correct, but reducing the importance of tree planting and adopting a variety of 
conservation methods was also an effective way to check PSFP influence on the Plains and to 
increase the stature of the SCS. Replacing an idealized landscape of tree-shrouded squares 
with a landscape of contoured, stubble mulched, and terraced squares was thus also a process 
of exchanging one bureaucracy for another. 
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Chapter Eight—The Conservation Landscape 
In the past two centuries Americans have altered the Great Plains. Farmers, 
politicians, scientists, and the state constructed and reconstructed the Plains to support their 
peculiar visions of a sustainable society. In the process, they transformed the region from a 
natural ecosystem or bioregion into a social and ecological space inextricably linked to the 
beliefs, agendas, and polices that had reshaped it. Americans' efforts to tweak, improve, and 
conserve the Great Plains created a new landscape. They so thoroughly blurred the social and 
the natural that these categories can no longer be separated, and their greatest task now is to 
recognize this hybrid space for what it is: a socially-constructed landscape, a conservation 
landscape. 
Although Americans initially believed that nature was infinitely malleable, such 
illusions faded rapidly with resurgent drought conditions. In some sense their greatest 
miscalculation was not in misreading nature, but in their inability to view the Plains as a 
humanized place. Each new intervention assumed that previous efforts had failed because of 
miscalculation, and that better science, technology, and funding would inevitably lead to a 
clearer understanding of the true nature of the Plains. In James Scott's words, they were 
"seeing like a state," and in the process vastly oversimplifying both nature and society. Again 
and again Americans thought that measuring and categorizing would result in knowing, but 
the Plains was never so tractable. Its past did not simply repeat, and each intervention 
changed the Plains both materially and culturally in ways that essentially made it a 
perpetually novel place. The Great Plains had become an evolving landscape of human 
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artifice and natural fluctuations. Thus seeing like a state was not enough. One also had to see 
like a historian.1 
In this way the Great Plains, or any other conservation landscape, underscores the 
significance of the historical perspective. Dry and wet cycles molded opinions about the land, 
pushed and pulled settlement and politics, and influenced people's assumptions about future 
climatic events. Viewing nature as a steady state, or natural events as singular rather than 
ongoing processes, led Americans again and again to misread the Plains. The same can be 
said about the institutional history of conservation landscapes. Americans formed 
organizations to undertake particular projects, but once they set an agency in motion, it 
developed an internal logic, an institutional view and goals that shaped its policies and work 
in ways that founders rarely foresaw. Scientific careers became wedded to the bureaucratic 
framework in ways that made it increasingly difficult for scientists to detach questions about 
how to shape the land, or judgments about previous programs, from the views of the 
institutions they served. In the end, understanding the environment, economy, politics, and 
institutions of the Great Plains requires understanding how each evolved over time. 
What emerges most strikingly from this complicated narrative about Plains forestry is 
the tangled relationships among science, politics, and nature. Science was portrayed as an 
objective tool to modify Plains landscapes, but in ways that pleased other interest groups. 
Politicians played an obvious role in promoting afforestation during dry cycles and ignoring 
these programs when the rains returned, but they also shaped, managed, and judged 
scientists' solutions, just as science shaped, judged, and managed political policies. Neither 
scientists nor politicians attained their dreams, and both were frequently unhappy with the 
ensuing compromises because nature also played a critical role in this history. Politicians and 
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scientists could propose, but wishful thinking did not grow trees. Ultimately nature facilitated 
or frustrated their attempts according to forces that have bedeviled humans for millennia. 
Nature provided its own historical context, and its contingencies were often the only bottom 
line that mattered. As a result, this is necessarily an unfinished and unending tale. 
When Americans first settled the Great Plains in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, they began a process of discovery. Boosters and theorists cast aside descriptions of 
the region as a Great American Desert and searched for a new title. They tried calling it a 
Garden, and they hoped that tree planting and other actions would eventually secure this 
image. Building on the work of George Perkins Marsh, tree boosters such as Richard Elliott, 
Robert Furnas, and J. Sterling Morton told Americans that trees would increase rainfall, and 
they stressed the many social advantages of forestry. This strain of thought, called social 
forestry, became the raison détat of later claims about the transformative potential of 
forestry. In the process of promoting social forestry, though, Elliott, Furnas, and Morton also 
promoted their own careers, but as with later foresters, this was never a simple matter of self-
promotion. Neither "altruism" nor self-interest adequately captures their actions. The social 
and the personal instead blurred and reinforced one another.2 
During this first era of transforming the Great Plains, Americans depended primarily 
on private initiative and public subsidies, and they were surprised when these failed. They 
had viewed afforestation as a relatively simple task. Speculators, boosters, and many farmers 
saw tree planting as a straightforward way to improve the image of the region or an 
inexpensive way to acquire land, but it was far easier to talk about trees than to plant and 
grow them. Although rarely acknowledged, nature, not humans, ultimately determined 
325 
success and failure. Had trees grown easily on the Plains, even the half-hearted efforts of 
farmers and boosters would have succeeded. Success would not have changed the climate or 
social structure, but it might have discredited the more outlandish claims about the 
transformative potential of social forestry. 
In the late nineteenth century, the feedback loops between science and politics 
seemed perfectly symmetrical. It was only nature that fouled things. Early foresters invoked 
their scientific and bureaucratic authority when encouraging Americans to adopt 
afforestation. In return, Franklin Hough and Nathaniel Egleston believed that their solutions 
to national problems would secure for forestry a lasting place in the public's eye and purse. 
Scientific foresters urged Americans to set aside vast portions of the Great Plains for tree 
planting to ameliorate problems with the American Desert and the new federal forests. In the 
equation foresters served politicians, and politicians served foresters. Nature had its own say, 
however, when the rains returned. Americans rushed onto the Plains again and resisted all 
efforts to keep any land off limits because trees seemed irrelevant during the wet years. 
But because history does not repeat itself, the next cycle of dry years sent foresters 
and politicians in a new direction. When drought struck the Great Plains in the 1890s, it 
undermined the facile theories of climate change. Trees and plows had not ensured the rains, 
so foresters and their allies argued that what was needed was better science and greater 
federal support. They scrutinized earlier failures for signs that private initiative and 
unscientific techniques had led to failure rather than that the Plains were unsuited to 
afforestation. Once they had established the argument, Bemhard Fernow and Charles Bessey 
laid the scientific groundwork for an expanded effort at Plains forestry, and Gifford Pinchot 
and the Forest Service created a series of forest reserves on the Great Plains. The Forest 
Service in effect institutionalized Hough's and Egleston's dreams of transforming these 
treeless spaces into forests. Now the state would improve the condition of surrounding lands, 
and in return the Forest Service would secure its own future, and that of forestry as a 
profession. The future of the Plains and foresters were bound together by the success of the 
federal forests in Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. 
Yet tree planting on the reserves proved much more difficult than foresters had 
anticipated. Instead of marking the start of a new era of authority, Plains forestry became 
mired in a fairly typical story of the times as one of many sciences competing for public 
recognition. Like other sciences, forestry grew increasingly diverse, and practitioners spent 
more and more time and energy contesting a variety of approaches to tree planting. The 
Forest Service tried to expand its institutional vision by promoting Plains forestry as an 
extension of forestry as practiced in other areas. They designed windbreaks and shelterbelts 
as miniature forests that would replicate the climates of other places. During this era Raphael 
Zon picked up where Fernow had left off, adding further scientific weight to social forestry 
ideas and continuing to argue for public control of forest resources. As forestry science 
matured, though, Zon could no longer control the debate as had Fernow and Hough. A 
growing number of foresters from outside the Forest Service also worked on Plains forestry, 
and their ideas were often at odds with the Forest Service. Their science and their 
experiences made them skeptical about social forestry, and they feared that continued 
reliance on social forestry would discredit their status as professionals. 
Plains forestry seemed to recede during the 1920s into relatively uninteresting debates 
between experts, but then nature intervened again. The Great Plains descended into another 
drought. Suddenly old and new ideas about how to solve the problem of aridity were again 
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front-page news, and foresters once again argued that they had the best answers. For the 
Forest Service this was another opportunistic development, and with encouragement from 
President Franklin Roosevelt, Zon, Edward Munns, and Ferdinand Silcox developed a plan 
that mixed social forestry with ecology and land management to create a new vision of the 
conservation landscape. The more outlandish aspects of the plan did not stand up to scientific 
scrutiny, but they did inspire Americans to reexamine their understanding of the Great Plains. 
Foresters still believed that they could transform the region into a garden through scientific 
expertise and federal assistance, but many Americans were increasingly skeptical of 
foresters' claims and even the Great Plains. 
The resulting political contests revealed the centrality of institutions in forestry and 
conservation history. Several historians have come to similar conclusions about conservation, 
forestry, science, and fisheries. When foresters planned for the Shelterbelt Project, their 
proposals were about more than growing trees. They sought nothing less than a dramatic 
reorganization of natural, political, and social spaces. Systematic tree planting carried out on 
rigid lines by federal experts would underpin this project. Foresters earnestly wanted to break 
the boom and bust cycles of Plains settlement. From their perspective they identified some of 
the large scale problems that farming faced on the Plains, including the struggle to find the 
limits of lands suitable for intensive cultivation and beginning of lands suitable for grazing. 
They hoped that by reducing the complexity of the region to manageable calculations, they 
could reengineer the mistakes of history and culture into a brighter future. It did not harm 
their enthusiasm however that such a program would also vastly expand the bureaucratic and 
budgetary importance of the Forest Service. The machinations of Zon and Paul Roberts, and 
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the hesitancy of Congress, suggests that bureaucratic concerns were an intrinsic factor of all 
forestry policies.3 
These plans encountered a host of technical, social, and political problems as foresters 
began their work. The zone of planting, designed as a diagnostic of where tree planting was 
difficult but possible, became instead a political and ecological marker that was relocated 
repeatedly to accommodate conflicting values and interests that extended far beyond 
technical questions of how to grow trees. Foresters also explored land ownership and belt 
orientation as technical solutions, but these too contained a mixture of goals that included 
foresters' social views, President Roosevelt's statist ambitions, and bureaucratic imperatives. 
The resulting plans for the Shelterbelt Project represented the apogee of high-modernists 
plans in federal forestry, but that vision eroded rapidly under the pressure of competing 
public, scientific, and natural interests. Administrators grudgingly altered their approach to 
accommodate a more diffuse and populist approach in the PSFP. This was a defeat for 
planners such as Zon, Bates, and D. S. Olson, who fervently sought a particularly statist 
conservation landscape, but they continued to seek similar goals, if over a much more modest 
landscape. 
Even on a minute scale, however, science continued to operate within a competing 
milieu of political, social, and natural forces. Planning shelterbelts as miniature forests 
appealed both technically and professionally to foresters, but the proposed massive, 
complicated belts were less appealing to farmers. Foresters worried that decisions concerning 
spacing within belts had compromised technical standards for farmer convenience, but it was 
unclear whether foresters' spacing preferences were technically any sounder than farmers' 
preferences. The search for appropriate species only underscored the blending of science and 
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politics in conservation landscapes. Foresters tried to identify the most robust, most 
appropriate trees for planting on the Plains, only to reverse themselves by favoring the 
technically suspect but flashy cottonwood over slower growing conifers for the sake of 
political expediency. Caught between political and economic pressures, foresters ultimately 
compromised their technical standards. In previous decades foresters had been able to justify 
their changes as technical necessities, but by the 1930s their decisions, even about specific 
technical considerations such as row spacing, were questioned by experts in other agencies. 
Such moments open a window, not onto the decline of expertise, but its evolution from a 
position of singular authority to heterodox contestation.4 
The emerging culture of contest encompassed not only scientists but their constituent 
bureaucracies. One example was the Prairie States Forestry Project. The more the PSFP 
compromised on the high-modernists' ideals of social forestry, the more it was just another 
alphabet agency of the New Deal competing with other agencies such as the SCS 
agronomists for control of a conservation landscape. The leaders and personnel of both 
agencies believed that the United States needed a new approach to soil conservation, but they 
pursued substantially different institutional approaches. The tree-bound Forest Service put 
forests and shelterbelts at the center of their conservation landscape. They acknowledged a 
role for other techniques such as grassland restoration, but they always viewed trees as the 
first and most important step to recovery. Less ideologically wed to any single technique, the 
SCS proffered a broader array of conservation methods and employed them more explicitly 
according to political popularity and effectiveness. Although both agencies downplayed 
bureaucratic competition, it was increasingly obvious that two federal organizations, offering 
farmers two rival conservation measures, created untenable overlap and conflict. In 1942 the 
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Department of Agriculture and Congress ended this contest by transferring the PSFP to the 
SCS. 
By the post-war period, shelterbelts were but one of many conservation techniques, 
and trees never regained their once-favored status. This was partly because the SCS was 
institutionally disinclined to elevate tree planting above its other techniques. Even during the 
Filthy-Fifties and the environmental-seventies, tree planting remained a relatively minor part 
of SCS programs, but shelterbelts' new status was not solely a matter of institutional inertia. 
Nature continued to influence events. Tree planting had always been a difficult and slow job 
that often frustrated even the most accomplished foresters. In regions where tree planting 
showed better results and greater stability, such as North Dakota, shelterbelt planting 
continued as an important conservation practice. As with every period in this history, this 
was a complicated tale. 
Transfer of the Prairie States Forestry Project's (PSFP) to the SCS and the outbreak 
of World War II effectively ended the PSFP, if not shelterbelt planting. Instead, like other 
conservation programs tree planting entered a new era in which it became secondary to the 
immediate goals of winning the war. With few dollars and fewer personnel, the SCS was 
constrained in the assistance it could provide, so it tried to convince farmers to undertake 
conservation practices. Getting farmers to plant, let alone maintain, shelterbelts during a time 
of agricultural expansion meant emphasizing crop production benefits. A conservation 
measure that had once been part of a crop reduction scheme became, at least in theory, a 
yield booster, but this too was temporary. 
The return of dry, dusty conditions during the "Filthy-Fifties" reawakened national 
attention to Great Plains conservation. Energized by crisis and bolstered by Great Plains 
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Conservation Program (GPCP) funding, the SCS again encouraged farmers to adopt 
conservation measures on a cost-sharing basis. Although in some ways cost-sharing was 
similar to the PSFP cooperative approach, shelterbelt planting remained a small part of SCS 
activities. Despite attempts to promote the PSFP as having ameliorated the Dust Bowl, there 
was little effort to revive the program. Stripped of most of its social forestry ideology, 
missing executive interest, and lacking bureaucratic promotion, afforestation could not 
recapture the public's imagination.5 
Not until the 1970s did the environmental movement ignite new interest in 
shelterbelts as a conservation measure. Hoping to capitalize on public concerns over the 
environment, SCS foresters melded older social forestry ideas with newer environmental 
concerns. Trees once again became a way to influence climate, but this time by improving air 
quality and reducing global warming. While the goals were noble, the renewed interest 
underscored the paradox of shelterbelt planting in a bureaucratic landscape. Soil 
conservationists were exploiting pubic interest to promote a bureaucratic agenda. They were 
protecting soil the only way they could given the prevailing cost-sharing models of 
cooperation between private and public interests. 
After 1942 the SCS became the primary federal agency charged with promoting 
shelterbelt planting on the Great Plains. During the 1940s the two main justifications for the 
PSFP—that it would provide employment and halt blowing soil—declined in importance. An 
expanding war economy put Americans to work, and increased rainfall held the soil. Just as 
Edwin Henson, land use coordinator for the Southern Great Plains, had predicted in 1939, "a 
good many of the Department of Agriculture's plow shares are going to be beaten into 
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swords; and it is more than likely that the Prairie States Forestry Project will be one of the 
first to feel the blow." The transfer of the PSFP to the SCS in 1942 was that blow, and with it 
came a different approach to tree planting.6 
Under the SCS shelterbelt planting lost its distinctiveness, becoming but one of many 
farm conservation policies. Many PSFP foresters accompanied the transfer to SCS and 
carried on some of their work and traditions, but under wartime conditions there was neither 
funding nor labor to sustain former practices. At best the SCS offered technical assistance in 
species selection and arrangement, site preparation, planting methods, and a limited supply of 
nursery stock. Bureaucratic consolidation and war resolved nursery overlap. Most farmers 
now bought their seedlings instead from state nurseries, which still provided them at cost. 
Farmers carried out planting and maintenance themselves. The most direct help the SCS 
could offer was to loan tree-planting machines. Without more state support, farmers rarely 
planted field shelterbelts and most plantings done during and after the war were for farm and 
feedlot windbreaks. The heavy dependence on farmer labor forced the SCS to develop a new 
model to encourage field shelterbelt planting. During the 1930s the PSFP and SCS could rely 
on extreme unemployment and government subsidies, but during the 1940s conservationists 
had to reemphasize old claims about the benefits of shelterbelts on crop production.7 
The relationship between shelterbelts and crop yields had fascinated and frustrated 
foresters. Early Forest Service plans partially viewed shelterbelts as a crop retirement 
scheme, and wide belts reinforced that impression. However, there was also the possibility 
that shelterbelts' wind-reducing properties might increase crop yields. Carlos Bates had 
begun a series of experiments in 1936 to establish a scientific test of such claims. The start of 
the war and end of the PSFP intervened before he could finish his work, and he never 
333 
published a complete accounting. Bates' biographer, Richard Sartz, suggested that Bates 
continued some research on shelterbelts until his death in 1949. If true, then Bates kept his 
own council, but in 1949 Joseph Stoeckeler, Bates' assistant during his field experiments, 
indicated that "the variability of production within fields" had made calculations so difficult 
that "the entire mass of data" collected between 1935 and 1941 had to be "restudied."8 
Although the record is unclear, there were reasons to suspect that the study's results 
were negative or inconclusive. Bates had been extremely skeptical that shelterbelts produced 
a positive effect on crop yields, and nothing he said in the following years suggested a 
change of mind. In a confidential memorandum to Zon in 1936, he laid out a careful case 
against positive results. Bates argued that "wind protection as is reasonably attainable only 
slightly delays evaporation and loss of soil moisture and after any extended period without 
rain such temporary gains are entirely lost." He could not see how a slight reduction in the 
rate of evaporation would be effective in aiding growth or preventing drought damage except 
in very mild cases. "The percentage of cases in which this occurs does not seem to justify 
putting down moisture conservation as a 'certain benefit.'" Lest Zon miss his point, Bates 
reminded him that even "the most adequate shelterbelts scarcely delay the searing of crops 
and do not save them," because heat was the main cause of evaporation and shelterbelts did 
not reduce this. Bates then confidently predicted that reports of crop benefits from 
shelterbelts were the result of snow drifts, not wind reduction.9 
Justifying shelterbelts as a yield booster was even a more difficult task. Bates' 
experiments to determine if shelterbelts increased crop yield were only a start. Even if he had 
found a modest increase in yield under ideal conditions, it would not then follow that 
shelterbelts boosted total yield. The increased yield behind a shelterbelt would have to be 
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sufficient to make up for the amount of land lost to the belt, for the root sapping effect on 
nearby crops, for the years of relatively little effect while the belt grew, and for the cost of 
installation and maintenance (Figure 8.1). Foresters would eventually prove that shelterbelts 
had a positive effect on crops, but proving that the benefit paid for the full costs was more 
difficult during a period when foresters had little hard data. It was clear, however, that wide 
shelterbelts had trouble "paying for" the land they occupied because their effects were no 
greater than a narrow belt, and they took a significant amount of land out of production. 
PSFP foresters had viewed shelterbelts as part of a sweeping overall plan to modify the Great 
Plains, and they envisioned increased crop yield as one of many positive improvements. 
Foresters might still value shelterbelts as soil conservation measures, wildlife habitats, wood 
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producers, and aesthetic improvements, but the SCS thought few farmers would be willing to 
plant for these reasons alone. Thus in the postwar conservation calculus, SCS foresters 
pushed crop yield to the front of the list of potential benefits to encourage farmer 
participation.11 
To sell this idea, though, SCS foresters depended on farmer testimonials. These 
folksy tributes became a regular feature of SCS literature on shelterbelt planting. R. J. Tucker 
of Paducah, Texas, explained that he would "rather have 100 acres behind shelterbelts than 
150 acres outside of them." He was particularly pleased with the way the belts prevented 
spring winds from blowing out young cotton plants. Ernest Fuhrman of Norfolk, Nebraska, 
attributed his victory in a 1947 corn-yield contest to shelterbelts. "I had 90 acres of corn 
north of the shelterbelt, including the 10-acre contest plot, and it was evident that the 
protection the trees gave the field made a lot of difference. The best corn was near the 
shelterbelt. The yield tapered off as the distance from the trees increased." Such stories might 
have reassured farmers who already owned shelterbelts, but they offered little to tempt new 
participants.12 
Even Joseph Stoeckeler could do little better than this when he published a study of 
shelterbelts on the Southern Great Plains in 1945. After the transfer of the PSFP to the SCS, 
Stoeckeler continued to work for the Forest Service from the Lake States Experiment Station. 
From this position he emerged as the Forest Services' principal Plains forestry technician, 
and he worked with the SCS to promote shelterbelt planting and research. In a 1945 study 
Stoeckeler examined PSFP shelterbelts planted during the 1930s. The results, published in 
Soil Conservation, indicated that shelterbelts increased crop yield, but like previous articles, 
Stoeckeler relied primarily on farmer testimonials to make the point. Rube Bittner of Vernon, 
Texas, claimed that he had made as much money from nine acres of watermelon grown 
behind a shelterbelt as a neighbor on twenty unprotected acres. Ira Tucker of Cottle County, 
Texas, claimed she would "sooner have 100 acres of farm with shelterbelts than 150 acres 
without." Despite being partially responsible for one of the largest crop influences studies 
conducted, the only scientific evidence that Stoeckeler could offer was a rather cryptic 
statement that "unpublished data by the Lake States Forest Experiment Station, shows 
increased cotton yields" on fields protected by shelterbelts. In his defense, Stoeckeler was 
primarily interested in describing the soil conservation advantages of shelterbelts rather than 
yield improvements, but his terseness spoke volumes about the problems foresters faced 
trying to persuade farmers to plant their own shelterbelts.13 
Suasion was not the only challenge foresters faced during the 1940s. The SCS was 
institutionally disinclined to plant more shelterbelts. As head of the SCS, Hugh Bennett 
continued to favor soil conservation, but he was astute enough to adapt his agency's goals to 
wartime interests. He instructed his staff to emphasize conservation techniques that 
maintained or increased yields and that required little labor, equipment, or technical 
assistance. Shelterbelt planting required all of these, though, and even the most uncritical 
boosters had to admit that they reduced crop yields in the short-term. In Bennett's Elements 
of Soil Conservation, published after the war, he briefly endorsed shelterbelts for "making 
farm homes more livable and comfortable for both men and animals in times of climatic 
extremes." He also suggested that shelterbelts could "help check soil blowing that would 
otherwise sweep topsoil from parts of fields near windbreaks." But between the demands of 
war and Bennett's less than ringing endorsement, the SCS's lack of emphasis on shelterbelt 
planting was unsurprising.14 
As Bennett expected, high profits and wet years led farmers to expand their 
operations during the 1940s. The plow-up that accompanied the war was not as great as 
during and after World War I. Farmers did continue some conservation techniques, but 
agriculture nevertheless expanded into submarginal lands that had only recently been 
stabilized after the disaster of the 1930s. Moreover, demand remained high. Between 1941 
and 1950 farmers opened approximately 5 million new acres to cultivation. About three-
fifths of that total was on lands poorly suited for crop production, and a portion had never 
before been farmed. Under a "normal" rainfall regime, the plow-up represented little but 
profits for farmers, and despite occasional expressions of concern from soil conservationists, 
there was no strong effort to restrain the expansion.15 
Of course, normal conditions were rarely normal on the Great Plains, and in 1950 dry 
conditions returned. The drought began in the Southwest, and by 1953 it had spread to 
Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. The next year the drought continued to stretch over a ten-
state area from the Midwest to New Mexico. The most severe conditions struck the old Dust 
Bowl areas of the Texas panhandle, central and eastern Colorado, western Kansas and central 
Nebraska. As with the drought of the 1930s, the 1950s saw very high temperatures. In the 
summer of 1953 temperatures in Dallas exceeded 100 degrees F for fifty-two days. The 
drought peaked in 1956, and then relief came in 1957 when spring rains finally fell to hold 
the soil in place.16 
Although the drought was shorter and not accompanied by the economic dislocations 
of the 1930s, its effects were severe. High temperatures and low rainfall cut crop yields by as 
much as 50 percent and seared grasslands for grazing. With its protective cover removed or 
in poor condition, the soil blew once again. By the winter of 1954 some observers remarked 
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that the dust storms were worse than in the 1930s. H. H. Finnell, head of the SCS Dust Bowl 
experiment and later head of SCS Region VI, remarked that the "catastrophe to the land has 
already exceeded that of the 1930s, but due to the absence of financial straits and hysteria 
which existed in the 1930s, farm abandonment has been much slower." Newspapers and 
magazines soon informed the nation that a new Dust Bowl had formed on the Great Plains. 
According to popular accounts there was little to separate these storms from the 1930s, but 
historian Douglas Helms has pointed out some significant differences. The area affected was 
much larger, and while it included all of the areas of the old Dust Bowl, conservation 
measures seemed to help limit the severity of the crisis within the old Dust Bowl area.17 
Predictably, the drought and dust storms sparked a renewed federal commitment to 
Great Plains conservation. In 1956 Congress passed a new land protection scheme, the Great 
Plains Conservation Program (GPCP), that set out a system of farmer-government 
cooperation. GPCP authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into ten-year contracts 
with farmers and ranchers who dedicated land to soil conservation practices. Recognizing 
that farmers had little incentive to pursue measures on their own, GPCP provided incentives 
in form of federal payments. The SCS was charged with helping farmers convert land and 
determining what constituted a conservation measure. As usual, the SCS promoted what it 
considered permanent techniques, such as strip-cropping, terracing, windbreaks, diversions, 
irrigation systems, and other techniques, but its preferred solution was to convert cropland 
back to grassland. An emphasis on grassland restoration was bureaucratically popular during 
the 1950s: in 1954 the Forest Service assumed responsibilities for managing the National 
Grasslands, a system created by the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act and the Resettlement 
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Authority in 1937, and the Bureau of Land Management continued to administer the much 
larger system of federal grazing lands established by the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.18 
GPCP legislation made clear the diminished status of afforestation as a conservation 
measure. Most supporters of GPCP, along with the SCS, hoped the program would "provide 
a great deal of incentive to landowners and operators to restore to grass hundreds of 
thousands of acres which probably should never have been plowed up in the first place." The 
best that trees could do under the program would be to allow "farmers a new opportunity to 
plant" around homes and livestock. In the middle of droughts and dust storms the previously 
unthinkable had occurred: afforestation had disappeared as all but a very minor aspect of any 
recovery scheme.19 
While the GPCP abandoned trees as a tool of environmental modification, it did adopt 
organizational methods similar to the PSFP. Political and public pressures had forced 
foresters to modify extensively their early plans for the Shelterbelt Project. As it lost most of 
its high-modernist aspects, the reformulated PSFP pursued conservation as a cooperative 
program that mixed public and private funds to implement individual farm plans. Similarly, 
"the heart of the program [GPCP] is a long-time conservation plan for individual farms and 
ranches through which conservation and land-use adjustments can be worked out with 
producers in accordance with the capabilities of their land." The key to achieving cooperation 
would be government cost-sharing that, for example, paid roughly 50 percent of the cost of 
reestablishing grasslands in return for a contract that prevented farmers from plowing those 
lands for at least five years. As with the PSFP, farmers could plow under conservation 
measures after the agreement period. As a tool for temporary acreage reduction and 
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conservation, the GPCP was a significant step, but it was not the long-term solution that 
foresters had originally sought.20 
Despite the meager recognition GPCP gave shelterbelt planting, plantings did 
increase except in the Southern Plains. Shelterbelts increased most rapidly in North Dakota, 
where they jumped from 591 miles a year in 1956 to 2,000 to 3,000 miles a year during the 
1960s. Although less dramatic, South Dakota and Nebraska also experienced appreciable 
increases. Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas displayed the opposite trend. Kansas planted 118 
miles in 1956, and then declined to about a dozen miles a year in the 1960s. Oklahoma 
peaked with 29 miles in 1956 and Texas managed only 8 miles the same year.21 
The reasons for the variation were unclear, but foresters recognized the difference and 
suggested several theories. Harold Engstrom blamed the difference on SCS personnel. In the 
North they had maintained a greater interest in field shelterbelt planting than in the South. 
Others suggested that field shelterbelts were more useful in the North because they held 
blowing snow in winter, and crops received extra water when it melted in spring. Another 
possibility was that the SCS had rapidly developed methods for harvesting wild grass seed, 
and Southern farmers had accepted grass planting as a quick and efficient alternative to 
shelterbelts. If true, these theories seemed to bear out Carlos Bates old adage that tree 
planting would never prosper unless it became "somebody's business." In North Dakota the 
SCS made shelterbelt planting an important part of its farm conservation plan, but on the 
Southern Plains it remained indifferent at best towards trees.22 
Environmental and economic conditions on the Northern Plains were also more 
favorable to shelterbelt planting. The initial survival rate and longevity of trees were higher 
on the Northern Plains. The cooler summers were a great asset for newly planted seedlings 
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with underdeveloped root systems, and low temperatures kept evaporation rates modest and 
allowed trees to make the most of available moisture. The Northern Plains also received 
more snow, often piled in thick drifts around shelterbelts. Most years drifts would partially, 
or even completely, melt in spring only to be rebuilt by the next storm. The result was more 
water for tree belts than for the surrounding fields or for more southerly shelterbelts. Land 
values and farm size, both of which tended to be higher in the south, may also have 
discouraged farmers from planting shelterbelts. What clearly was not at stake was the role of 
shelterbelts in reducing soil erosion, since this problem was an order of magnitude larger in 
the Southern Plains. Farmers' preference for shelterbelts in the Northern Plains thus seemed 
both bureaucratically and environmentally influenced.23 
Shelterbelt planting continued during the 1960s as a small part of general soil 
conservation plans. The Forest Service, SCS, and extension service each provided some 
technical advice, funding, and research, but shelterbelt planting and research during the 
decade went largely unnoticed by the public and Congress. Without specific advocacy trees 
remained just another agronomic method. 
That changed in the late 1960s and 1970s as environmentalism became a popular 
movement worldwide and foresters realized that shelterbelts might once again garner public 
interest. Thus in 1969 the chief administrator of the SCS, Kenneth Grant, announced 
"'Windbreaks for People' [as] part of the enlarging 'Trees for People' movement that 
recognizes trees serve man in many ways before they mature for harvest as wood products." 
Capitalizing on the popularity of Earth Day and new environmental awareness, the SCS soon 
rediscovered older social forestry ideas, warning farmers that "trees are essential to life on 
our planet." In this new formulation trees did not modify climate directly; rather "they 
342 
moderate temperature and affect pollution, noise, wind, and water." Trees were also boosted 
as a partial solution to the "greenhouse" effect through their ability to absorb polluted air and 
emit oxygen. According to one SCS promoter, "the worth of the tree goes far beyond the 
concept of economics. Chlorophyll-bearing plants make life possible for other organism on 
earth."24 
The SCS increased its promotion of shelterbelts after 1970 because, on the surface at 
least, they seemed to satisfy so many environmental goals. As historian Samuel Hays argues, 
conservationists often found that their goals conflicted with those of environmentalists 
because the former sought to rationally manage resources for sustained use, while the latter 
often stressed preservation of resources in an unused state. Shelterbelts seemed an ideal 
mediation of this rift. They protected soil and increased production while fixing carbon, 
reducing noise, and beautifying landscapes. Trees blurred the line between conservation and 
environmentalism. They seemed to offer the best of both worlds. Other soil conservation 
activities such as channelization and reservoirs, by contrast, conflicted with environmental 
attitudes. In areas where urban and rural interests competed, shelterbelts offered common 
ground between environmentalists and conservationists 25 
Along with an increasing interest in shelterbelts came fears that trees might be 
disappearing faster than they were planted. The major concern was that farmers were 
removing shelterbelts to install center-pivot irrigation. Circular watering systems did not 
mesh well with existing, rectilinear belts, and at least some conservationists complained that 
farmers were choosing irrigation over shelterbelts. Some farmers were also removing 
windbreaks because of old age, disease, or production. The Comptroller General explained 
all of these fears to conservationists and to Congress in 1975. His report indicated significant 
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shelterbelt removal was occurring in Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma (Table 8.1). Although 
the statistics came from a small sampling of counties in each state, the report concluded that 
shelterbelts were being removed throughout the region at a much greater rate than they were 
being planted. In the near future they would virtually disappear from some counties.26 
Number Number Percent Miles Approximate 
County Standing Removed Removed Removed Time Frame 
Kansas 
Clay 00nssb 1957-71 
Pratt 687 1.6 2.3 1963-70 
Reno 743 mm# 1.6 1963-71 
Sedgwick 284 13 4.6 4.9 1963-70 
Stafford 996 22 2.2 1963-70 
Nebraska 
Holt 2117 16? 7.8 35.4 1967-74 
Madison 1240 41 3.3 19.7 1970-74 
Merrick 560 20 3.6 4.1 1969-73 
Seward 143 19 13.3 5.9 1965-70 
Oklahoma 
Alfalfa 104 2.9 0.6 1961-73 
Caddo 413 84 20.3 40.5 1935-72 
Garfield 104 8.7 1961-73 
Grant 107 1954-73 
Greer 663 140 21.2 73 1935-72 
Kingfisher 263 3.8 26 acres 1964-70 
Washita 866 301 34.8 139.8 1935-74 
Table 8.1—Windbreak Removal rates from the 1975 G AO report.27 
The report offered a number of theories to explain the removals. Soil conservationists 
in Nebraska explained that "other conservation practices to prevent wind erosion are being 
emphasized because farmers are reluctant to give up productive land for trees." In Oklahoma, 
which had the lowest rate of new plantings, conservation officials had "deleted" cost-sharing 
"for field windbreaks" in 1974 "because of a lack of interest in using this practice." Farmers 
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offered additional reasons. Some believed "the windbreaks planted under the Prairie States 
Forestry Project are a nuisance because they occupy too much land and because certain tree 
species sap so much moisture that crops will not grow next to the windbreak." They also 
doubted whether the belts could produce sufficient benefits to pay their way, and they argued 
that "the high land values and prices of commodities raised on the land offset any benefits 
received from the windbreaks." One farmer in Oklahoma explained that "a mile-long 
windbreak he removed had added about 16 acres to his production" when he included both 
the land freed from under the shelterbelt and the adjoining land "on which crops would not 
grow." Some farmers also cited age, disease, crop sprays, and poor maintenance.28 
The greatest reason for removal though, was to make room for center pivot irrigation 
systems. Frank Zybach, a Nebraska farmer, patented the first center-pivot device in 1952. 
Using a long rotating pipe equipped with sprinklers at regular intervals, and wheeled towers 
for support, these systems were expensive investments and farmers had to maximize their 
effectiveness by ensuring that booms traveled 360 degrees without hindrance from trees, 
fences, or other obstructions. Although the device occupied a full 160 acres, the circular 
sweep left four corners of each section unwatered. Thus the typical center-pivot irrigated 
closer to 133 acres. There were special attachments to allow farmers to irrigate these corner 
sections, but the corners were often covered with grass, shrubs, or, in a few cases, trees. 
Many farmers saw little reason to preserve shelterbelts once they had mechanical irrigation 
systems. Removed from dependence on rainfall, they no longer needed to worry about failed 
crops and vulnerable soil. If farmers wanted to take a field out of production, it was relatively 
easy to seed grass. Either way shelterbelts were unnecessary.29 
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The Comptroller General's report led to a Great Plain Windbreak Symposium in 
April 1976 that addressed the pressing question: "what can be done to halt the removal of 
tree windbreaks on the Great Plains and why are they being removed?" Larry Goldsmith of 
the General Accounting Office, who had helped write the original study warned the audience 
that "unless action is taken to encourage farmers to renovate and preserve the existing 
windbreaks rather than remove them, an important resource which has taken years to develop 
could be lost." Symposium attendees including representatives from the SCS, extension, 
Forest Service, and state agencies, agreed that they needed "an effective information and 
education program to urge landowners to reevaluate windbreaks." They also advocated 
increased research and "accelerated technical and financial assistance." SCS administrator R. 
M. Davis reasoned that farmers were removing shelterbelts for what they thought were right 
reasons, but the right reason was to replace ineffective ones. Simple removal to put more 
land in production was repeating bad decisions from the past.30 
Davis objected to removing shelterbelts to increase production, but many farmers in 
the early 1970s heard a different message from the Department of Agriculture. President 
Richard Nixon viewed agricultural exports as one of two potential areas (technology was the 
other) in which the United States still enjoyed a competitive advantage, and he encouraged 
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz to expand production. American farmers began planting 
"fence row to fence row." The agricultural expansion was abetted by the sale of grain to the 
Soviet Union and a growing global food crisis. Grain prices spiraled upward and American 
farmers maximized production and then collected their profits. At the same time Butz tried to 
reduce agricultural support programs and disband the Department of Agriculture. The 
Democratic Party resisted Nixon's reorganization efforts, and when the boom turned to bust 
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during the Ford Administration, Democrats positioned themselves as friends of the farmer 
and supported a variety of assistance measures.31 
Then drought descended again on the Great Plains, and brought home the risks of 
agricultural production on submarginal lands. The cyclical nature of drought was no longer a 
surprise, and farmers had been warned that the 1970s were likely to bring another dry period 
similar to the 1930s and 1950s. Most hoped that conservation and irrigation had freed them 
from natural cycles, but "in central Oklahoma on February 23,1977, the worst dust storm in 
more than 20 years" transported soil particles far to the east. Satellite data also revealed a 
disturbing pattern to the blowing. The photography showed that the most severe storms 
originated in the heavily cultivated regions of West Texas and Oklahoma and "a sharp 
western limit to the wind-raised dust—this limit in Colorado corresponds to the western 
boundary of extensive cultivated lands in the eastern part of the that state [Colorado]." The 
cultivated lands were blowing, while grazing lands were stable. While it was unclear how 
much worse the blowing might have been without conservation and irrigation, it was clear 
that neither intervention had precluded the problems of drought and dust storm.32 
The mid-1970s fear over shelterbelt removal was exacerbated by drought and politics. 
Democrats advocated stricter conservation legislation and greater government intervention, 
and a few even called for renewed shelterbelt plantings. The most substantial step in this 
direction was an order to the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) to 
offer 50 to 75 percent cost-sharing for new shelterbelts. The resonance with the 1930s did not 
end there because the ASCS, heir of the New Deal's Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration, oversaw the Department of Agriculture's commodity price, income support, 
and conservation cost-sharing programs. Representative Larry Pressler of South Dakota even 
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introduced legislation to create a new shelterbelt program. Pressler's bill did not leave 
committee, but he continued offering variations of this legislation. By 1977 he was gaining 
support among Congressmen from other states.33 
Pressler's call for a new shelterbelt program rested on two assumptions. The first was 
that the PSFP of the 1930s had helped fix the Dust Bowl. He explained that "the same 
inexpensive and effective conservation measures which helped to end the Dust Bowl years 
can be used today to prevent a recurrence of disastrous wind erosion." One of Pressler's more 
influential supporters, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota explained that those who lived 
through the dust storms remembered and that "the shelterbelt would make things better, and 
that they would help stop the wind and dust storms." Of course, the PSFP had never stopped 
the dust storms, let alone the Dust Bowl. The single most important factor in checking the 
dust storms had been increased rainfall and the natural re-growth of grass and weeds. 
Shelterbelts were a short-term solution only to political problems, and even under ideal 
conditions trees could take a decade to reach heights at which they could prevent soil 
blowing over any considerable distance. However, shelterbelts had been more effective in the 
northern tier states that Pressler and Humphrey represented. The Plains were not all alike, 
and environmental contingencies created variations in political support for tree planting. 
Pressler and Humphrey mixed myth and experience promoting shelterbelts, and they 
probably realized this. Future versions of the legislation dropped the Dust Bowl claims.34 
Both politicians probably did believe their second reason for renewed planting: the 
General Accounting Office's report that existing conservation programs were inadequate and 
farmers were removing more shelterbelts than they planted. Citing the GAO report and 
recommendations, Humphrey explained that "the deterioration of the shelterbelts cannot 
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continue without an adverse effect." In a letter to Butz, Humphrey warned that "in recent 
years trees planted as shelterbelts in the Great Plains during the 1930-1940's have been 
threatened with destruction. The shelterbelts stretching from the Dakotas to the Texas 
Panhandle, are being removed to increase the amount of available cropland." Pressler made 
similar claims, but in 1975 they could be excused for reaching such conclusions, the same 
concerns were motivating soil conservationists.35 
Upon closer examination, however, this conclusion fell apart. Farmers were not 
removing shelterbelts faster than they were planting them. One result of the GAO report had 
been to push the SCS in 1977 to initiate a more substantial survey of shelterbelt planting. In 
1980 the SCS published the study results. Using aerial photography to measure installation 
and removal in 126 randomly selected counties in five Plains states, it concluded that the 
number of field shelterbelts had increased between 1970 and 1975 at a rate of 2.5 percent per 
year overall. North Dakota led all other states in plantings (Table 8.2). The total area of field 
windbreaks had decreased by 5,500 square acres, but linear mileage had increased by almost 
700 miles. Only Oklahoma showed a net decline in both acreage and linear mileage. The 
results revealed that even at the height of Nixon's and Butz's plow-up, Plains farmers were 
still planting field shelterbelts.36 
Although the report undermined the narrative of decline that the GAO, Pressler, and 
Humphrey had presented, it did disclose a number of important trends in shelterbelt 
construction. The five state totals revealed that farmers abandoned wide belts (over 50 feet) 
at a net rate of 3.6 percent by number and 2.4 percent by length during the five-year period. 
In the same sample, medium shelterbelts (26-50 feet) showed only minor changes. However, 
the number of narrow field shelterbelts (less than 26 feet) had increased by 8.5 percent by 
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number and 8.8 percent by length in the same sample. Farmers were removing wide 
shelterbelts and replacing them with much narrower installations. In a crude sampling such a 
process could give the impression that shelterbelts were indeed endangered because the total 
area occupied was declining. But since the measure of a field shelterbelt was not how 
State Number Acres Miles 
1970 1975 1970 1975 1970 1975 
North Dakota 53437 55887 101635 101573 21569 22546 
% of total 45.6 46.5 35.8 36.6 56.8 58.3 
South Dakota 13546 13463 48513 47789 3808 3778 
% of total 11.6 11.2 17.1 17.2 10 9.8 
Nebraska 32630 32908 84159 79484 7661 7455 
% of total 27.8 27.4 29.7 28.6 20.2 19.3 
Kansas 12975 13397 34677 34948 3521 3521 
% of total 11.1 11.2 12.2 12.6 9.3 9.1 
Oklahoma 4594 4414 14722 14155 1443 1384 




Table 8.2—Summary of field windbreak statistics from 1980 SCS report.37 
how much land it occupied, but how much it protected, more and narrower shelterbelts meant 
more land protected.38 
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In one important respect the report supported earlier narratives. Farmers were indeed 
removing shelterbelts to make room for irrigation (Figure 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7). The 
report suggested that the leading cause was unknown, but it ranked irrigation second. The 
numbers also hinted at an explanation for the relatively greater acceptance of shelterbelts in 
the Northern than the Southern Plains. In North Dakota irrigation played no role in removals, 
Five-Stai te Summary 
Age Irrigation Farm 
reorganization 
Unknown Total 
Number 138 526 335 1961 2960 
% of total 4.7 17.8 11.3 66.3 
Acres 489 2938 636 9410 13473 
% of total 3.6 21.8 4.7 59.8 
Miles 49 194 82 828 1153 










Miles % of total 
Figure 8.2—Five-state summary of reasons for windbreak removal.39 
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while in Kansas it was the major reason. Because of the unevenness of the data, firm 
conclusions were not possible, but the numbers seemed to support the theory that farmers 
preferred center-pivot irrigation to shelterbelts. Where irrigation was possible, it provided far 
more security than shelterbelts, and while conservationists might want farmers to choose 
both measures, the two did not easily coexist.40 
North Da kota Summary 
Age Irrigation Farm 
reorganization 
Unknown Total 
Number 0 0 97 829 926 
% of total 0 0 10.5 89.5 
Acres 0 0 163 2859 3022 
% of total 0 0 5.4 94.6 
Miles 0 0 25 368 393 








Miles % of total 
Figure 8.3 I—North Dakota summary of reasons for windbreak removal.41 
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The expansion of irrigated agriculture since 1950 seemed to offer farmers the long 
sought panacea. They could increase production and prevent soil erosion, and they could also 
farm right through dry years, as a few did in the 1950s, many did in the 1970s, and many 
more did in the late 1980s. Where and while ground water was available, irrigation seemed to 
solve the problem of aridity and free humans from dependence on the Great Plains' natural 
South Da kota Summary 
Age Irrigation Farm 
reorganization 
Unknown Total 
Number 0 123 87 0 210 
% of total 0 58.6 41.4 0 
Acres 0 676 146 39 861 
% of total 0 78.5 17 4.5 
Miles 0 28 9 3 40 









Miles % of total 
Figure 8.4—South Dakota summary of reasons for windbreak removal.42 
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cycles. As historian John Opie has noted, however, in the longer term dependence on 
groundwater was unsustainable. Like waking from a dream too good to be true, farmers will 
eventually have to reexamine the entire basis of intensive cultivation on the Plains.43 
Nebraska Summary 
Age Irrigation Farm 
reorganization 
Unknown Total 
Number 87 284 0 1047 1418 
% of total 6.1 20 0 73.8 
Acres 219 1278 40 5291 6828 
% of total 3.2 18.7 0.6 77.5 
Miles 25 107 2 369 503 










Miles % of total 
Figure 8.5—Nebraska summary of reasons for windbreak removal.44 
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Kansas Summary 
Age Irrigation Farm 
reorganization 
Unknown Total 
Number 0 119 0 0 119 
% of total 0 100 0 0 
Acres 0 984 0 1145 2129 
% of total 0 46.2 0 53.8 
Miles 0 59 0 65 124 










Miles % of total 
Figure 8.6—Kansas summary of reasons for windbreak removal 45 
Although it is tempting to believe that farmers will inevitably rediscover shelterbelts, 
the history of afforestation on the Plains suggests that growing trees was always a difficult, 
and usually an unsatisfactory, affair. The slight decrease in evaporation rates downwind from 
shelterbelts might increase crop yields in some dry years, but these small changes have never 
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Oklahoma Summary 
Age Irrigation Farm 
reorganization 
Unknown Total 
Number 51 0 151 85 287 
% of total 17.8 0 52.6 29.6 
Acres 270 0 287 76 633 
% of total 42.7 0 45.3 12 
Miles 24 0 46 23 93 










Miles % of total 
Figure 8.7—Oklahoma summary of reasons for windbreak removal.46 
conserved enough water to free farmers from natural drought cycles. Plains farmers have 
learned to farm quite successfully during wet years, but shelterbelts have never compensated 
sufficiently for the dry years that spawned severe dust storm and economic disaster. 
Nature has always played a central role in creating the Great Plains landscape. 
Humans have tried to impose labels, values, and management techniques upon the region, but 
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their "success" or "failure" always depended as much on nature as human effort. Even when 
Americans thought they were adapting their methods and perceptions to the region, recurring 
wet and dry cycles shattered their expectations. The forest reserve movement failed in part 
because foresters found it exceedingly difficult and slow to grow trees on the Great Plains. 
The erasure of federal forests is not then just a story of waning congressional support, 
insufficient land bases, or losses of faith in the principles of social forestry. When economic 
and natural cycles inflicted a devastating one-two blow during the 1930s, some foresters 
renewed their efforts to stabilize the natural and social conditions of the region, but their 
project remained at the mercy of the natural conditions that shaped its form, methods, and 
outcome. When the 1930s were done it was Plains forestry that seemed to have stabilized as 
a minor part of SCS conservation programs, not nature. After the Second World War farmers 
embraced irrigated agriculture to control natural cycles, but this solution will last only as 
long as another form of nature facilitates it: the Ogallala aquifer. 
The Great Plains is also obviously a bureaucratic landscape, constructed by a variety 
of federal and state agencies. Shelterbelts, windbreaks, terraces, conservation reserves, and 
grasslands are second nature across the region, but each has its own history closely tied to the 
relative status of the scientists and bureaucracies that promoted these measure. This is not 
meant to condemn but to acknowledge the consequences of deeply entangled personal, 
public, and scientific ambitions across time and space. As Americans contemplate future 
changes to the conservation landscape, they will have to contend with the complex historical 
forces now embedded in the existing conservation landscape.47 
The conservation landscape is also revealing for what it does not contain. In 
particular, the current formulation of the Great Plains is almost entirely based on the 
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principle of cost-sharing. To protect the nation from soil erosion and depletion caused by 
farming practices, the government entered into a compromise with landowners and agreed to 
pay for conservation measures on private lands. During the 1980s and 1990s demands 
increased for some form of "sod-buster" legislation to prevent farmers from destroying 
public investments in conservation, but federal policy remains wedded to the cost-sharing 
principle. For Plains foresters this was never a satisfactory solution. Partially this had been a 
function of bureaucratic expansionism and mistrust of private motives, but it also expressed a 
fundamentally different way of viewing the conservation landscape. Fernow and Zon 
imagined conservation as sustaining social values. Public spaces open to the community for 
recreation and relaxation would be managed to protect nearby private land. Their vision was 
easy to dismiss when scientific debate contradicted Zon's claims about climate change, but 
the idea of mixing public and private landownership into a hybrid conservation landscape 
that supports social values, not just individual profits, has continued to be an attractive 
alternative.48 
The epilogue of Plains forestry is not a story of either gradual disappearance or 
faddish resurgence. Instead it is a narrative of a movement that is alive and well but different 
in many parts of the Great Plains where conditions—both environmental and institutional— 
continue to support it. Tree planting has gone through several phases of expansion and 
decline, much like the region itself. As in the past these vacillations are likely to continue to 
correspond with fears over drought or diminishing groundwater supplies, but new ideas, such 
as block planting cottonwood for pulp paper mills in the heart of Nebraska, will also shape 
this future in ways that make it something other than a simple repetition of the past.49 
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Beyond the stories of failure and success, beyond the tangled relationships of nature 
and the state and individuals and bureaucracies and science and politics, there is, finally and 
most importantly, a clear and hopeful insight. Foresters' concern for public and 
environmental welfare mixed as it was with bureaucratic and scientific calculations, suggests 
not simply that humans can improve the conditions of their existence but that social and 
environmental health are not inimical goals. Anne Whiston Spirn has urged Americans to 
embrace restoring the land within the city through the use of parks, green spaces, and 
waterways. An agrarian corollary to this might be to encourage American farmers to 
establish permanent conservation easements that serve human recreation and wild nature 
alike. Restoration ecologists, land use planners, and others stand ready to make such a 
transformation, but it will only happen if Americans gather the political will to challenge the 
centuries-old tradition of regarding private property owner's rights as sacrosanct, even when 
individual actions taken on those lands have negative externalities for society as a whole. 
Human and natural history are deeply entangled in the conservation landscape, but 
acknowledging this complexity is the first step to improvement.50 
359 
Chapter Eight—Notes 
1 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
2 Richard White, "Discovering Nature in North America," Journal of American History 3(79) 
(December 1992): 874-891. 
3 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation 
Movement, 1890-1920 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1999); Nancy Langston, Forest Dreams, Forest 
Nightmares: The Paradox of Old Growth in the Inland West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995); 
Charles Rosenberg, No Other Gods: On Science and American Social Thought (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1997); Joseph E. Taylor III, Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest 
Fisheries Crisis (Seattle: University of Washington, 1999). 
4 Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debates and Public Participation in Americans Commercial 
Nuclear Power, 1945-1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Anthony Barker and B. Guy 
Peters, eds., The Politics of Expert Advice: Creating, Using and Manipulating Scientific Knowledge for Public 
Policy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Hamilton Cravens, ed., The Social Sciences Go to 
Washington: The Politics of Knowledge in the Postmodern Age (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
2004). 
5 R. Douglas Hurt, "Return of the Dust Bowl: The Filthy Fifties," Journal of the West 28 (1979): 85-
93; Douglas Helms, "Great Plains Conservation Program: 25 Years of Accomplishment," Soil Conservation 
Service Bulletin No. 300-2-1 (24 November 1981). 
6 Edwin Henson to Milton Eisenhower, 15 December 1939, Regional National Archives (RG 95), 
Kansas City, Missouri (hereafter Regional National Archives). 
7 Richard Pfister, "A History and Evaluation of the Shelterbelt Project," (MA thesis, University of 
Kansas, 1948), 69. Pfister quotes SCS figures indicating that it assisted farmers in planting 26,000 acres of 
shelterbelts. This is misleading, however, because it is a national figure and includes all types of shelterbelt 
planting. 
8 Richard Sartz, "Carlos G. Bates: Maverick Forest Service Scientist," Journal of Forest History 21(1): 
31-39; Joseph Stoeckeler and Ross Williams, "Windbreaks and Shelterbelts," in Trees, The Yearbook of 
Agriculture 1949 (Washington: GPO, 1949), 194. 
9 Carlos Bates, "Memorandum for the Acting Chief, Division of Research," 25 September 1936, 
National Agroforestry Center, Lincoln, Nebraska (hereafter Agroforestry Center). 
10 Comptroller General of the United States, "Action Needed to Discourage Removal of Trees That 
Shelter Cropland in The Great Plains," 20 June 1975, 9. 
11 Scientific opinion seems to have reached some agreement that shelterbelts have a positive effect on 
crop yields, but the much more difficult question of whether they are justified solely on this basis remains 
contested. See, Joseph Stoeckeler, "The United States of America," in R. N. Kaul ed., Afforestation in Arid 
Zones (The Hague: W. Junk N.V. Publishers, 1970) for Stoeckeler's opinion in favor of very narrow belts. 
360 
12 
"Shelterbelts Increase Production," Soil Conservation 10(2) (August 1944): 25; "Shelterbelt Boosts 
Yield," Soil Conservation 13(12) (July 1948): 267; "Trees Took a Hand," Soil Conservation 14(2) (September 
1948): 44-5. Soil Conservation was the SCS's official publication that it sent to soil conservation district 
members and other participating farmers. The publication contains technical advice, conservation news, policy 
statements, and no private advertising. 
13 Joseph H. Stoeckeler, "Narrow Shelterbelts for the Southern Great Plains," Soil Conservation 11(1) 
(July 1945): 16-20. 
14 Helms, "Great Plains Conservation;" Hugh Bennett, The Elements of Soil Conservation (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1955 [1947]), 307. 
15 Hurt, "Return of the Dust Bowl," 85. 
16 United States Department of Commerce, Weather Bureau, Climatic Summery of the United States— 
Supplement for 1931 through 1952 (Washington: GPO, 1953); United States Department of Commerce, 
Weather Bureau, Climatic Summery of the United States. Supplement for 1951 through 1960 (Washington: 
GPO, 1961). 
17 Quoted in Helms, "Great Plains Conservation," 5. See also, Douglas Helms, "Conserving the Plains: 
The Soil Conservation Service in the Great Plains," Agricultural History 64(2) (1990): 58-73; Hurt takes a 
similar view. 
18 Helms, "Conserving the Plains." 65; Dan Flores, "A Long Love Affair with an Uncommon Country: 
Environmental History and the Great Plains," in Fred Samson and Fritz Knopf, eds., Prairie Conservation 
(Washington: Island Press, 1996): 14-15; R. Douglas Hurt, "Federal Land Reclamation in the Dust Bowl," 
Great Plains Quarterly 6 (1986): 94-106. 
19 Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session (1956), 14693, 14113. 
20 Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session (1956), 14112. The SCS had also pioneered these 
methods, and they too had struggled over whether their program was largely one of demonstration and 
assistance or direct management. The most frequent criticism of the GPCP was that large farmers used up most 
of the funds to subsidize the installation of center-pivot irrigation. 
21 James B. Lang, "The Shelterbelt Project in the Southern Great Plains—1934-1970—A Geographic 
Appraisal" (MA thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1970), 89. 
22 Ibid., 95-96; Bates, "Memorandum for Acting Chief," 5. 
23 Ralph Read, "The Great Plains Shelterbelt in 1954" Publication No. 16 (Lincoln, Nebraska: Great 
Plains Agricultural Council, 1958); Susan Pommering Reynolds, "Shelterbelts in the Red River Valley of the 
North: Patterns in the Landscape" (PhD diss., University of Oregon, 1983). 
24 Kenneth Grant, "Windbreaks and Conservation," Soil Conservation 35(3) (October 1969): 71; 
Jacques Pinkerd, "Trees Regulators of the Environment," Soil Conservation 36(3) (October 1970): 56. 
25 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States: 
1955-1985 (New York: Cambridge Press, 1987), 86. 
26 Comptroller General of the United States, "Action Needed to Discourage Removal of Trees That 
Shelter Cropland in The Great Plains," 20 June 1975. 
361 
27 Ibid., 12. Kingfisher, Oklahoma data on miles removed was available in acres only. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
29 Ibid., 13-14. Rudi Volti, "Center-Pivot Irrigation," Facts On File Encyclopedia of Science, 
Technology, and Society (New York: Facts on File, 1999). 
30 Lee Egerstrom and Gil Gailey, "Roots of a New Dust Bowl," The Des Moines Tribune, 15 March 
1977; John M. Cross, "Need for a New Approach Stressed at Great Plains Windbreak Symposium," Soil 
Conservation 41(11) (June 1976): 21-23; R. M. Davis, "Windbreaks: Fact or Fancy," Soil Conservation 41(11) 
(June 1976): 2. 
31 Allan Matusow, Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas, 1998); Joel Solkoff, The Politics of Food (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1985); Mohammad 
Mohabbat Khan, "The Politics of Administrative Reorganization: Presidents Nixon's Departmental 
Reorganization Program," Political Science Review 19(2) (1980): 170-180; Leslie Gelb and Anthony Lake, Less 
Food, More Politics (17) (1974-75): 176-189. 
32 John Borchert, "The Dust Bowl in the 1970s," Annals of the Association ofAmerican Geographers 
61 (March 1971): 1-22; Edwin Kessler, et al., "Duststorms from the U. S. High Plains in Late Winter 1977: 
Search for Causes and Implications," Proceeding of the Oklahoma Academy of Sciences 58 (1978): 1. 
33 The ASCS was folded into the Farm Service Agency in 1994; Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 
1st Session (1975), 2105; See also (H. Con. Res. 35), (H.R. 9183), (H.R. 6602), and (H. R. 8888) in the 95® 
Congress, 1st Session (1977); Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 1st Session (1977), 12134. 
34 Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 1st Session (1975), 41065, 33544. As a South Dakota native 
Humphrey probably did have first-hand experience with shelterbelts while growing up. 
35 Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 1st Session (1975), 33544. 
36 United States Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, "Field Windbreak Removals in 
Five Great Plains States 1970 to 1975," 29 July 1980. 
37 Ibid., 9. 
38 Ibid., 8. 
39 Ibid., 14. 
40 Ibid.,14, 15. The numbers for Oklahoma undermine this theory since no local farmers listed 
irrigation as a reason for removal, but the great number that listed reorganization suggests that farmers may 
have been removing shelterbelts to make more room for irrigation works. This is one of the liabilities of the 
report. Aerial photography could determine the total acreage lost or gained with some precision, but it could not 
determine the motivations for changes. This relied on the cooperation and candor of landowners. 
41 Ibid., 14. 
42 Ibid., 14. 
43 John Opie, Ogallala, Water for a Dry Land (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2000); John Opie, 
"The Drought of 1988, the Global Warming Experiment, and its Challenge to Irrigation in the Old Dust Bowl 
Region," Agricultural History 66(2) (Spring 1992): 279-306. 
362 
44 Soil Conservation Service, "Field Windbreak Removals," 14. 
45 Ibid, 14. 
46 Ibid, 14. 
47 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1995), 108-13. 
48 Joseph E. Taylor III, "'Well-Thinking Men and Women:' The Battle for the White Act and the 
Meaning of Conservation in the 1920s," Pacific Historical Review 71(3)(2002): 356-387; Paul S. Sutter, Driven 
Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement (Seattle: Weyerhauser 
Environmental Books, 2002), 239-48. 
49 Walter Bagley and R. Monahan, "Cottonwood a Potentially Profitable Crop for Nebraska," 
Nebraska University College of Agricultural and Home Economics Quarterly 16(3) (Fall 1969): 18-19. 
50 Anne Whiston Spirn, "Designing with the Land," Journal of Soil and Water Conservation (January-
February 1992): 35-38. The current Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), with its emphasis on cost-sharing for 
conservation measures on highly erodible soils, does not provide this model. It reinforces traditional private 
ownership patterns by allowing farmers to opt out and return land to cultivation at a future date. It is also scaled 
to farmer's goals, not community interests. Its emphasis on conservation ecology, however, has helped create 
the science and personnel to support a larger and more diverse program. See, Philip Gersmehl, "Bonanza for the 
Land Miners: A Contemporary Western Saga," European Contributions to American Studies 16 (1989): 81-98. 
363 
Bibliography 
"A Shelter From the Storm." Successful Farming 19(2) (1920): 52. 
Allan, John L. "New World Encounters: Exploring the Great Plains of North America." 
Great Plains Quarterly 13(2) (1993): 69-80. 
Ananthaswamy, Anil. "Rising clouds leave forests high and dry." New Scientist (March 22, 
2003): 18. 
Argersinger, Peter. Populism and Politics: William Alfred Peffer and the People's Party. 
Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1974. 
Aughey, Samuel. Physical Geography and Geology of Nebraska. Omaha: Daily Republican 
Book and Job Office, 1880. 
Bagley, Walter, and R. Monahan. "Cottonwood a Potentially Profitable Crop for Nebraska." 
Nebraska University College of Agricultural and Home Economics Quarterly 16(3) 
(Fall 1969): 18-19. 
Balogh, Brian. Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American 
Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945-1975. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991. 
Baltensperger, Bradley H. "Plains Boomers and the Creation of the Great American Desert 
Myth." Journal of Historical Geography 18(1) (1992): 59-73. 
. "Plains Promoters and Plain Folk: Premigration and Post-Settlement Images of 
the Central Great Plains." Ph.D. diss., Department of Geography, Clark University, 
1974. 
Barker, Anthony and B. Guy Peters eds. The Politics of Expert Advice: Creating, Using and 
Manipulating Scientific Knowledge for Public Policy. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1993. 
Bates, Carlos G. "Experiments In Sandhill Planting." Proceedings of the Society of American 
Foresters 5 (1910): 59-83. 
. "Technical Considerations Which Should Govern the Shelterbelt Project." Quoted 
in Paul H. Roberts. "The Prairie States Forestry Project." Paul H. Roberts Papers. 
Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln. 
. "The Great Plains Shelterbelt Project." Journal of Forestry 32 (November 1934): 
978-91. 
364 
. "The Windbreak as a Farm Asset." In Farmers ' Bulletin No. 1405, by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry Division. Washington: GPO, 1924. 
. "Windbreaks for the Great Plains." In Bulletin 86, by the U.S. Forest Service. 
Washington: GPO, 1911. 
Becquerel, M. "Forests and their Climatic Influence." In Annual Report of the Board of 
Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, 1871, 397-416. Washington: GPO, 1871. 
Bennett, Hugh H. and W. R. Chapline. In Soil Erosion: A National Menace, by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Washington: GPO, 1928. 
Bennett, Hugh. "A National Menace" TD. Special Collections, Parks Library, Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa. 
. Soil Conservation. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 
. The Elements of Soil Conservation. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955. 
Bessey, Charles Edwin. Bessey Papers. Parks Library microfilm repository. Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa. 
Bogue, Allen G. Money at Interest: The Farm Mortgage on the Middle Border. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1955. 
Borchert, John. "The Dust Bowl in the 1970s." Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 61 (March 1971): 1-22. 
Botkin, Daniel B. Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century. New 
York: Oxford Press, 1990. 
Bowden, Martyn J. "The Great American Desert in the American Mind, 1890-1972: The 
Historiography of a geographical notion." In Geographies of the mind: Essays in 
historical geosophy in honor of John K. Wright, ed. Martyn J. Bowden and David 
Lowenthal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
. "The Perception of the Western Interior of the United States, 1800-1900: A 
Problem in Historical Geography." Proceedings of the Association of American 
Geographers 1 (1961): 16-21. 
Brinkley, Alan. Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression. 
New York: Vintage, 1983. 
Brinkman, C. E. "The Midwest Tree Belt; Feasibility of Project Doubted by One who Knows 
Country." New York Times, 13 September 1934, 22. 
365 
Bruner Family Papers. Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska. 
Card, Fred W. "Windbreaks." In Bulletin 48, by the University of Nebraska. U. S. 
Agricultural Experiment Station. Lincoln, 1897. 
Chapman, H. H. "Digest of Opinions Received on the Shelterbelt Project." Journal of 
Forestry 32 (December 1934): 952-72. 
. "The Shelterbelt Tree Planting Project." Journal of Forestry, 32 (November 
1934): 801-03. 
. "Why the Cooperative Forest Restoration Bill Should Not Pass." Journal of 
Forestry 38 (March 1940): 231-34. 
Clements, F. E. Research Methods in Ecology. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1905. 
. The Development and Structure of Vegetation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 
1904. 
Cobb, Francis. Francis E. Cobb Papers. Historical Society of North Dakota, Bismarck. 
"Colorado Seeks Shelterbelt." American Forests 41 April 1935: 186. 
Compton, Wilson. "Government Versus Desert: The Fallacy of the Shelter Belt." Forum and 
Century 93(4) (April 1935): 237-39. 
Comptroller General of the United States. "Action Needed to Discourage Removal of Trees 
That Shelter Cropland in The Great Plains." 20 June 1975. 
Congressional Globe. 39th cong., 1st sess., 1866. 
Congressional Globe. 40th cong., 1st sess., 1867. 
Congressional Globe. 40th cong., 3rd sess., 1869. 
Congressional Globe. 41st cong., 1st sess., 1869. 
Congressional Globe. 41st cong., 2nd sess., 1870. 
Congressional Globe. 42nd cong., 2nd sess., 1872. 
Congressional Record. 61st cong., 2nd sess., 1910. 
Congressional Record. 61st cong., 3rd sess., 1911. 
366 
Congressional Record. 68th cong., 1st sess., 1924. 
Congressional Record. 74th cong., 1st sess., 1935. 
Congressional Record. 74th cong., 2nd sess., 1936. 
Congressional Record. 75th cong., 1st sess., 1937. 
Congressional Record. 84th cong., 2nd sess., 1956. 
Congressional Record. 94th cong., 1st sess., 1975. 
Congressional Record. 95th cong., 1st sess., 1977. 
Cotton, William R., and Roger A. Pielke. Human Impact on Weather and Climate. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Cravens, Hamilton ed. The Social Sciences Go to Washington: The Politics of Knowledge in 
the Postmodern Age. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004. 
Cross, John M. "Need for a New Approach Stressed at Great Plains Windbreak Symposium." 
Soil Conservation 41(11) (June 1976): 21-23. 
"Dalhart Home Before ... and ... After the Trees Grow." Ft. Worth Star Telegram 12 
December 1937. 
Danbom, David B. Our Purpose is to Serve: The First Century of the North Dakota 
Agricultural Experiment Station. Fargo: North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, 
1990. 
Davis, R. M. "Windbreaks: Fact or Fancy." Soil Conservation 41(11) (June 1976): 2. 
De Voto, Bernard, ed. Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition. Boston: 
Houghton and Mifflin, 1953. 
DeBres, Karen. "Plains Climate Conditions: An Early Interpretation by the Smithsonian 
Meteorological Project in Manhattan Kansas 1858-1873." Prairie Forum 25(1) 
(2000): 159-172. 
Dibben, John. "Who Were the Populist: A Study of Grass-Roots Alliance Men in South 
Dakota." Agricultural History 54 (October 1982): 677-91. 
Droze, Wilmon H. "Changing the Plains Environment: The Afforestation of the Trans-
Mississippi West "Agricultural History 51 (January 1977): 6-22. 
367 
. Trees, Prairies, and People: A History of Tree Planting in the Plains States. 
Denton: Texas Women's University, 1977. 
Dunlap, Thomas R. Saving America's Wildlife: Ecology and the American Mind, 1850-1990. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
Egerstrom, Lee, and Gil Gailey. "Roots of a New Dust Bowl." The Des Moines Tribune, 15 
March 1977. 
Egleston, N. H. Arbor Day—Its History and Observance. Washington: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 1896. 
Elliott, Richard Smith. Letter Press Book. Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis. 
Elliott, Richard Smith. Notes Taken in Sixty Years. St. Louis, MO: R. P. Studley and Co., 
1883. 
Emmons, David M. "Theories of Increased Rainfall and the Timber Culture Act of 1873." 
Forest History 15(3) (1971): 6-14. 
. Garden in the Grasslands: Boomer Literature of the Central Great Plains. 
Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1971. 
Engstrom, Harold E. "Shelterbelts of the Future." Plains Forester 5(12) (1940): 2-3. 
. "The Cottonwood." Plains Forester 3(3) (1936): 12. 
Evernden, Neil. The Social Creation of Nature. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1992. 
"Federal Shelterbelt Should Extend to the North Platte Valley Region." Business Farmer 6 
December 1934, 1. 
Fernow, Bemhard E. "Report Upon Forestry Investigations of the Department of Agriculture, 
1877-1878." 55th Cong., 3rd sess., 1899. House Document 181,1899). 
Fernow, F. E. "Forest Influences." In Bulletin No. 7, by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Forestry Division. Washington, DC: GPO, 1893. 
. "What is Forestry." In Bulletin No. 5, by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Forestry Division. Washington, DC: GPO, 1891. 
Finley, John P. Certain Climatic Features of the Two Dakotas. Washington, DC: GPO, 1893. 
Fite, Gilbert C. The Farmers ' Frontier 1865-1900. New York: Holt, 1966. 
368 
Fitzgerald, Deborah. Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
Fleming, James R. "Meteorology at the Smithsonian Institution, 1847-1874: The Natural 
History Connection." Archives of Natural History 16(3) (1989): 275-284. 
Flores, Dan. "A Long Love Affair with an Uncommon Country: Environmental History and 
the Great Plains." In Prairie Conservation, ed. Fred Samson and Fritz Knopf, 14-15. 
Washington: Island Press, 1996. 
"Forests in Relation to Climate and Floods." Scientific American 29 October 1910,334. 
Fort Hays Experiment Station. Kansas Bulletin 453. Fort Hays: Kansas State University, 
1947. 
Fosbery, L. A. "Climatic Influences of Forests: Results of the Destruction of Timber on 
Climate and Soil." Scientific American Supplement No. 2024 (17 October 1914): 246-
47. 
Free, E. E., and J. M. Westgate. "The Control of Blowing Soils." In Farmers ' Bulletin 421, 
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1910. 
Fremont, John Charles. Report of the Exploring Expedition to the Rocky Mountains. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Microfilms, 1966. 
Fritts, Harold C., Robert G. Lofgren, and Geoffrey A. Gordon. "Past Climate Reconstructed 
from Tree Rings." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 10(4) (1980): 773-793. 
Gardner, Bruce L. American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century: How it Flourished and 
What it Cost. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Gelb, Leslie, and Anthony Lake. Less Food, More Politics (17) (1974-75): 176-189. 
George Ward Holdrege Papers. Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska. 
Gersmehl, Philip. "Bonanza for the Land Miners: A Contemporary Western Saga." European 
Contributions to American Studies 16 (1989): 81-98. 
Glacken, Clarence J. Traces on the Rhodian Shore; Nature and Culture in Western Thought 
from Ancient Times to the end of the Eighteenth Century. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967. 
Grant, Kenneth. "Windbreaks and Conservation." Soil Conservation 35(3) (October 1969): 
71. 
369 
Hall, William L. "The Grand Shelterbelt Project." Journal of Forestry 32(9) (December 
1934): 973-74. 
Hansen, N. E. "The Shade, Windbreak, and Timber Trees of South Dakota." In Bulletin No. 
246, by South Dakota State College. South Dakota, 1930. 
Hayden, F. V. Preliminary Report of the U. S. Geological Survey of Wyoming and Portions 
of Contiguous Territories. Washington, DC: GPO, 1872. 
. Preliminary Report of the U. S. Geological Survey of Montana and Portions of 
Adjacent Territories; 5th Annual Report of Progress. Washington, DC: GPO, 1872. 
. Report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office for the Year 1867. 
Washington, DC: GPO, 1867. 
Hays, Samuel P. Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United 
States: 1955-1985. New York: Cambridge Press, 1987, 86. 
. Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation 
Movement, 1890-1920. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999 [1959]. 
Helms, Douglas. "Conserving the Plains: The Soil Conservation Service in the Great Plains." 
Agricultural History 64(2) (1990): 58-73. 
. "Great Plains Conservation Program: 25 Years of Accomplishment." Soil 
Conservation Service Bulletin No. 300-2-7 (24 November 1981). 
Henry, Joseph. Scientific Writings of Joseph Henry. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute, 
1886. 
Hibbard, Benjamin Horace. A History of the Public Land Policies. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1924 [1965]. 
Hicks, John D. The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's 
Party. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1961. 
Hough, Franklin B. The Elements of Forestry. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1882. 
House Committee on Appropriations. Agricultural Appropriation Bill, 75th Cong., 1st sess., 
1937. 
. Agricultural Department and Farm Credit Administration Appropriation Bill, 
Fiscal Year 1937, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., report 2061 to accompany H. R. 
370 
. Department of Agriculture and Farm Credit Administration Appropriation Bill, 
1939, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., 1938, report 2130 to accompany H. R. 
House Committee on Expenditures in the Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 
Department Appropriations Bill 1911, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., 1911. 
House Executive Document 267,48th Congress, 2nd Session, 1885. 
House Subcommittee on Agriculture of the Committee on Appropriations. Department of 
Agriculture Appropriation Bill for 1930, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 1929. 
. Agricultural Department Appropriations Bill 1937, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., 1936. 
. Agricultural Department Appropriation Bill 1939, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., 1938. 
House Subcommittee on Deficiencies. Committee on Appropriations. Third Deficiencies 
Appropriation Bill, 1937. 75th Cong., 1st sess., 1937. 
Huntington, Ellsworth. "Marginal Land and the Shelter Belt." Journal of Forestry, 32(8) 
(November 1934): 804-12. 
Hurt, R. Douglas. "Federal Land Reclamation in the Dust Bowl." Great Plains Quarterly 6 
(1986): 94-106. 
. "Return of the Dust Bowl: The Filthy Fifties." Journal of the West 28 (1979): 85-
93. 
. American Agriculture: A Brief History. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 
1994. 
. Problems of Plenty: The American Farmer in the Twentieth Century. Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2002. 
Ise, John. The United States Forest Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. 
James, Louise Boyd. "Jujubes, Grapes, & Grass: The USD A Research Station at Woodward, 
1913-1987." Chronicles of Oklahoma 65 (4) (Winter 1987): 354-379. 
Johnson, Floyd A. "Covering Nature's Nakedness—A Sacred Duty." Nature Magazine 26(5) 
(November 1935): 302-03. 
Johnson, Fred R., and F. E. Cobb. "Tree Planting in the Great Plains Region." In Farmers ' 
Bulletin No 1312, by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1923. 
371 
Johnson, Thomas H. Agricultural Depression in the 1920s: Economic Fact or Statistical 
Artifact? New York: Garland, 1985. 
Keffer, Charles E. "Experimental Tree Planting on the Plains." In Bulletin 18, by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry Division. Washington, DC: GPO, 1898,2. 
Kellogg, Royal S. "Proposed Tree Belt Regarded as Futile." New York Times 16 (September 
1934): 5. 
. "The Shelterbelt Scheme." Journal of Forestry 32 (December 1934): 977. 
. Forest Planting in Western Kansas. Washington, DC: GPO, 1909. 
Kennedy, David. Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-
1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Kepfield, Sam S. "The Nebraska Drought of 1890." Journal of the West 36(1): 47-53. 
Kessler, Edwin, et al., "Duststorms from the U. S. High Plains in Late Winter 1977: Search 
for Causes and Implications." Proceeding of the Oklahoma Academy of Sciences 58 
(1978): 1. 
Khan, Mohammad Mohabbat. "The Politics of Administrative Reorganization: Presidents 
Nixon's Departmental Reorganization Program." Political Science Review 19(2) 
(1980): 170-180. 
Kollmorgen, Johanna, and Walter Kollmorgen. "Landscape Meteorology in the Plains Area." 
Annual of the Association of American Geographers Vol 63, No. 4. (December 
1973): 424-41. 
Koppes, Clayton R. "Efficiency/Equity/Esthetics : Towards a Reinterpretation of American 
Conservation." Environmental History Review 11(2) (Summer 1997): 134. 
Kutzleb, Charles R. "American Myth: Can Forests Bring Rain to the Plains?" Forest History 
15(3) (October 1971): 14-21. 
Lang, James B. "The Shelterbelt Project in the Southern Great Plains—1934-1970—A 
Geographic Appraisal." MA thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1970. 
Langston, Nancy. Forest Dreams, Forest Nightmares: The Paradox of Old Growth in the 
Inland West. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995. 
Lawson, Merlin P. "A Behavioristic Interpretation of Pike's Geographical Knowledge of the 
Interior of Louisiana." Great Plains-Rocky Mountain Geographical Journal 1(58) 
(1972): 58-64. 
372 
. Nebraska Droughts—A Study of Their Past Chronological and Spatial Extent with 
Implications for the Future. Lincoln, University of Nebraska: Nebraska Water Center, 
1971. 
Lawson, Merlin P., and Charles W. Stockton. "Desert Myth and Climate Reality." Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 71(4) (1981): 527-535. 
Libecap, Gary, Hansen Libecap, and Zeynap Kocabiyik. "'Rain Follows the Plow' and 
Dryfarming Doctrine: The Climate Information Problem and Homesteading Failure in 
the Upper Great Plains, 1890-1925." Journal of Economic History 62(1) (2002): 86-
120. 
Lienhard, John. "Last Laugh Goes to Zon's Trees." St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press, 16 
October 1938, 1 and 2. 
Lindley, Earnest. "Roosevelt Puts Tree Belt Plan in Operation." New York Herald-Tribune, 
22 July 1934, 1. 
Lockmann, Ronald F. Guarding the Forests of Southern California: Evolving Attitudes 
towards Conservation of Watershed, Woodlands, and Wilderness. Glendale, CA: 
Clark, 1981. 
Lyman, Lauren D. "Great Tree Belt Aids Plains Area." New York Times, 1 August 1937, 7. 
Malin, James C. The Grasslands of North America: Prolegomena to its History with 
Addenda. Lawrence, KS, 1961. 
. Winter Wheat in the Golden Belt of Kansas: A Study in Adaptation to Subhumid 
Geographical Environment. New York: Octagon, 1973. 
Marcus, Alan I. Agricultural Science and the Quest for Legitimacy: Farmers, Agricultural 
Colleges, and Experiment Stations, 1870-1890. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 
1985. 
Marsh, George Perkins. Man and Nature: The Earth as Modified by Human Action. New 
York: Charles Scribner, 1907. 
Marshall, Robert. The People's Forests. Iowa City, I A: University of Iowa, 2003 [1933]. 
Marx, Leo. The Machine in the Garden. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 
Matusow, Allan. Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes. Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas, 1998. 
373 
Maxwell, E. G. "Twenty-five Years of Clarke-McNary Tree Distribution." Extension 
Circular No. 1728. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, Agricultural Extension Service, 
1951. 
"McCarl Halts Roosevelt Shelter Belt Money Grants Only One Million of the 15 Allotted." 
Forestry News Digest, November 1934, 1. 
Mcintosh, C. Barron. "Use and Abuse of the Timber Culture Act." Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers 65:3 (September 1975): 347-62. 
Miller, Char. Gifford Pinchot and the Making of Modern Environmentalism. Washington: 
Island Press, 2001. 
Miller, R. G. "Gosh! Those Trees are Growing." The Daily Oklahoman, 12 June 1938,11. 
Mock, Cary J. "Drought and Precipitation Fluctuations in the Great Plains During the Late 
Nineteenth Century." Great Plains Research 1(1), 1991. 
Morgan, Perl. W., ed. History of Wyandotte County Kansas and its People. Chicago: Lewis 
Publishing, 1911, Part two. Quoted in Frank W. Blackmar. Kansas: A Cyclopedia of 
State History. Chicago: Standard Publishing, 1912. 
Morgan, Robert. Governing Soil Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization. 
John Hopkins: Baltimore, 1965. 
"Morrell and Zon Head Shelterbelt Project." American Forests 40(9) (September 1934): 
415. 
Myers, Norman, ed. Tropical Forests and Climate. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1991. 
Nash, Roderick. Wilderness and the American Mind. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1967. 
National Agroforestry Center. Lincoln, Nebraska. 
National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II. College Park, Maryland (RG 
95). 
Nebraska State Board of Agriculture. Annual Report, 1890. Lincoln: State Journal Co., 1891. 
Nebraska State Horticultural Society. Annual Report 1893. Lincoln: State Publisher, 1893. 
. Transaction. Omaha, 1871. 
374 
Nelson, Paula M. The Prairie Winnows out its own: the West River Country of South Dakota 
in the Years of Depression and Dust. Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa, 1996. 
Nixon, Edgar B., ed. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation. New York: Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library, 1957. 
Ogden, Gerald R. "Forestry for a Nation: The Making of the National Forest Policy Under 
the Weeks and Clarke-McNary Acts, 1900-1924." Ph.D. diss., University of New 
Mexico, Albuquerque, 1980. 
Olson, D. S. "Forest Conditions in Shelterbelts." Plains Forester 5(4) (1940): 1-2. 
. "Why 7-Rod Shelterbelts?" Plains Forester, 2(12) (1937): 7-10. 
Olson, James C. "Arbor Day—A Pioneer Expression of Concern for Environment." 
Nebraska History 53 (Spring 1972): 1-13. 
. J. Sterling Morton. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1942. 
., and Ronald C. Naugle. History of Nebraska. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1997. 
Opie, John. "The Drought of 1988, the Global Warming Experiment, and its Challenge to 
Irrigation in the Old Dust Bowl Region." Agricultural History 66(2) (Spring 1992): 
279-306. 
. Ogallala, Water for a Dry Land. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2000. 
Overfield, Richard A. "Trees for the Great Plains: Charles E. Bessey and Forestry." Journal 
of Forest History 23(1) (1979). 
Owen, A. L. Riesch. Conservation Under F. D. R. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. 
Perry, E. L. "History of the Prairie States Forestry Project" TD. Nebraska State Historical 
Society, Lincoln. 
Personal Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York. 
Pfister, Richard. "A History and Evaluation of the Shelterbelt Project." MA thesis, University 
of Kansas, 1948. 
Pike, Zebulon Montgomery. Sources of the Mississippi and the Western Louisiana Territory. 
Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966. Appendix to part II. Quoted in Roger L. 
375 
Nichols and Patrick L. Halley. Stephen Long and American Frontier Exploration. 
Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1980. 
Pinkerd, Jacques. "Trees Regulators of the Environment." Soil Conservation 36(3) (October 
1970): 56. 
Pool, Raymond J. "Fifty Years on the Nebraska National Forest." Nebraska History 34 
(September 1953): 139 -179. 
Popper, Deborah E., and Frank J. Popper. The Buffalo Commons thesis of land use in the 
Great Plains region. Cassette SOUN 003 956. Ames: Iowa State University Lecture 
Series, 1993. 
Powell, John Wesley. Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States, with a 
more detailed account of the lands of Utah. Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1879. 
Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. 23rd Meeting. 
Salem, August 1875. 
"Pros and Cons of the Shelterbelt." American Forests 40(11) (November 1934): 528-46. 
Pyne, Stephen J. Year of the Fires: The Story of the Great Fires of 1910. New York: Viking, 
2001. 
Raney, William F. "The Timber Culture Acts." The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 
10:2. November 1920. 
Read, Ralph. "The Great Plains Shelterbelt in 1954." In Great Plains Agricultural Council 
Publication No. 16, by the University of Nebraska Experiment Station. Lincoln, NE, 
1958. 
Rechel, Z. C. "Streamlining America's Plains." Christian Science Monitor Magazine 3. 
(November 1937): 14. 
Regional National Archives. Denver, Colorado (RG 95). 
Regional National Archives. Kansas City, Missouri (RG 95). 
"Rented Acres for Shelterbelt." American Forests 41(8) (August 1935): 388. 
Reports of the Committees of the House of Representatives. 43 rd Cong., 1st sess., 1874. 
Reynolds, Susan Pommering. "Shelterbelts in the Red River Valley of the North: Patterns in 
the Landscape." Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1983. 
376 
Richardson, James D., ed. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 
Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1910. 
Robbins, William G. American Forestry: A History of National, State, and Private 
Cooperation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1985. 
. "Federal Forestry Cooperation: The Fernow-Pinchot Years ."Journal of Forest 
History 28 (October 1984): 164-73. 
Roberts, David. A Newer World: Kit Carson, John C. Fremont, and the claiming of the 
American West. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. 
Roberts, Paul H. Paul H. Roberts Papers. Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln. 
. "The Prairie States Forestry Project" TD. Nebraska State Historical Society, 
Lincoln. 
Rodgers, Andrew Denny. Bernhard Eduard Fernow: A Story of North American Forestry. 
Princeton: University Press, 1951. 
Rodgers, Daniel T. "In Search of Progressivism." Reviews in American History 10(4) 
(Baltimore, 1982): 113-32. 
"Roosevelt Forest Belt Plan Halted as McCarl Bars Drought Fund Use." New York Times, 22 
September 1934, sec. 4, p. 6. 
Rosenberg, Charles. No Other Gods: On Science and American Social Thought. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
Sartz, Richard. "Carlos G. Bates: Maverick Forest Service Scientist." Journal of Forest 
History 21(1): 31-39. 
Schiff, Ashley L. Fire and Water: Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962. 
Schinto, Jeanne. "Rainmakers." American West 14(4) (1977): 28-33. 
Schmaltz, Norman J. "Forest Researcher Raphael Zon." Journal of Forest History 24:1 
(1980): 25-97. 
Schulman, Edmund. Dendroclimatic Changes in semiarid America. Tucson: University of 
Arizona, 1956. 
377 
Scott, Charles A. "My Story of the Development of the Tree Planting Project in the Nebraska 
Sand Hills" TD. Parks Library, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
. "The Development of the Bessey Nursery" TD. Chap. In The Early Days: The 
Dismal River and Niobrara Forest Reserves. Parks Library, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa. 
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
Sears, Paul B. "The Great American Shelter-Belt." Ecology 17(4) (October 1936): 682-89. 
. Deserts on the March. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1935. 
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Protection of Land Resources Against Soil 
Erosion. 74th Cong., 1st sess., 1935. 
Shaler, N. S. "The Economic Aspects of Soil Erosion." National Geographic Magazine 7 
(1896): 328-338, 368-377. 
. Nature and Man in America. New York: 1891. 
Shannon, Fred A. The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897. New York: Rinehart, 
1945. 
Sheldon, Addison E. The Lincoln Sunday Star. 19 June 1927, Section D, pg. 1. 
"Shelterbelt Boosts Yield." Soil Conservation 13(12) (July 1948): 267. 
"Shelterbelts Increase Production." Soil Conservation 10(2) (August 1944): 25. 
Silcox, F. A. "To Insure Against Drought, A Vast Plan Takes Shape." New York Times 29 
July 1934, 3. 
Skowronek, Stephen. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National 
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982. 
Smith, Henry Nash. Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1962. 
Smith, Wyman. "Trees Stop Drifting Dollars." Successful Farming 35(4) (April 1937): 26, 
98-99. 
378 
Snyder, Robert L. Pare Lorentz and the Documentary Film. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1968. 
Solkoff, Joel. The Politics of Food. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1985. 
Spirn, Anne Whiston. "Designing with the Land." Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 
(January-February 1992): 35-38. 
Steen, Harold K. "For Wider Public Forest Ownership." New York Times, 20 April 1924,18. 
. The U. S. Forest Service: A History. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1976. 
Steinel, Alvin T. History of Agriculture in Colorado. Ft. Collins, Colorado: State 
Agricultural College, 1926. 
Stephens, H. A. Woody Plants of the North Central Plains. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 
1973. 
Stockton, Charles W., and David M. Meko. "A long-term History of Drought Occurrence in 
Western United States as Inferred from Tree Rings." Weatherwise XXVIII (1975): 
244-249. 
Stoeckeler, Joseph H. "Narrow Shelterbelts for the Southern Great Plains." Soil Conservation 
11(1) (July 1945): 16-20. 
. "Shelterbelts and Their Effects on Crop Yields in the Great Plains." Journal of 
Soil and Water Conservation 18 (1963): 139-44. 
. "The United States of America." In Afforestation in Arid Zones, ed. R. N. Kaul. 
The Hague: W. JunkN.V. Publishers, 1970. 
Stoeckeler, Joseph, and Ross Williams. "Windbreaks and Shelterbelts." In Trees, The 
Yearbook of Agriculture 1949, 194. Washington, DC: GPO, 1949. 
Strom, Claire. "Texas Fever and the Dispossession of the Southern Yeoman Farmer." 
Journal of Southern History 66(1): 49-74. 
Sutter, Paul. Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern 
Wilderness Movement. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002. 
Taylor III, Joseph E. "'Well-Thinking Men and Women:' The Battle for the White Act and 
the Meaning of Conservation in the 1920s." Pacific Historical Review 71(3)(2002): 
356-387. 
379 
. Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis. 
Seattle: University of Washington, 1999. 
Tobey, Ronald C. Saving the Prairies: The Life Cycle of the Founding School of American 
Plant Ecology, 1895-1955. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. 
Trask, David S. "Nebraska Populism as a Response to Environmental and Political 
Problems." In The Great Plains: Environment and Culture, ed. Brian W. Blouet and 
Frederick C. Luebke, 61-81. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1979. 
Travis, Paul D. "Changing Climate in Kansas: A Late 19th-Century Myth." Kansas History 
1(1): 48-58. 
"Tree Belt in West to Fight Droughts." New York Times, 22 July 1934, p. 1. 
"Trees Took a Hand." Soil Conservation 14(2) (September 1948): 44-5. 
Tyrrell, Ian. True Garden of the Gods: Californian-Australian Environmental Reform, 1860-
1930. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
U.S. Census Bureau. Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900. Population. Washington: 
GPO, 1902. Vol.  1,  Parti .  
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Circular 33. Washington, DC: GPO, 1928. 
. Circular No. 421. Washington, DC: GPO, 1932. 
. Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture. Washington, DC: GPO, 1869. 
. Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture. Washington, DC: GPO, 1883. 
. Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture. Washington, DC: GPO, 1884. 
. Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture. Washington, DC: GPO, 1885. 
. Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1891. Washington, DC: GPO, 1891. 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Weather Bureau. Climatic Summery of the United States— 
Supplement for 1931 through 1952. Washington, DC: GPO, 1953. 
. Weather Bureau. Climatic Summery of the United States. Supplement for 1951 
through 1960 Washington, DC: GPO, 1961. 
. Weather Bureau. Maps of Seasonal Precipitation Percentage of Normal by State, 
1886-1938. Washington, DC: GPO, 1942. 
380 
. Weather Bureau. US Meteorological Yearbook. Washington, DC: GPO, 1949. 
U.S. Division of Forestry. Bulletin 18. Washington, DC: GPO, 1898. 
. Report of the Chief of the Division of Forestry, Annual Report 1886. Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1886. 
. Report of the Chief of the Division of Forestry, Annual Report 1892. Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1892. 
. Report of the Chief of the Division of Forestry, Annual Report 1897. Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1897. 
. Report of the Division of Forestry for 1886. Washington, DC: GPO, 1887. 
U.S. Forest Service. "Report on Forestry on Plains." National Archives and Records 
Administration, Archives II. College Park, Maryland (RG 95). 
. Bulletin 121. Washington, DC: GPO, 1913. 
. Bulletin No. 66. Washington, DC: GPO, 1905. 
. Forestry for the Great Plains. Lincoln, Nebraska: Prairie States Forestry Project, 
30 June 1937. 
. History of the Nebraska National Forest. Washington, DC: GPO, 1927. 
. Lake States Experiment Station. Possibilities of Shelterbelt Planting in the Plains 
Region. Washington, DC: GPO, 1935. 
. Nebraska National Forest, Washington, DC: GPO, 1952. 
. The Bulletin, Rocky Mountain District, Nebraska Forest Silver Anniversary Issue 
11:1 (July 1927). 
. Use Book: Grazing. Washington, DC: GPO, 1910. 
U.S. Soil Conservation Service. Field Windbreak Removals in Five Great Plains States 1970 
to 1975. 29 July 1980. 
. Report of the Chief of the Soil Conservation Service, 1935. Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1935. 
U.S. Weather Bureau. Climatology of the United States. Washington, DC: GPO, 1906. 
381 
. Report of the Chief of the Weather Bureau, 1934-35. Washington, DC: GPO, 
1936. 
. U. S. Meteorological Yearbook 1936. Washington, DC: GPO, 1938. 
United States Statutes at Large. Washington, DC: GPO, 1899. 
US Congress. Senate. Committee Hearings Vol 481. 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935. 
Volti, Rudi. "Center-Pivot Irrigation." Facts On File Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, 
and Society. New York: Facts on File, 1999. 
von Humboldt, Alexander. Cosmos: A Sketch of a Physical description of the Universe. 
London: G. Bell, 1891-1893. 
Waldron, C. B. "Windbreaks and Hedges." In Bulletin 88, by the Government Agricultural 
Experiment Station, North Dakota Agricultural College. Fargo, North Dakota, 1910, 
3. 
Weakly, Harry. "A Tree-Ring Record of Precipitation in Western Nebraska." Journal of 
Forestry, 41 (November 1943): 816-19. 
Webb, Walter Prescott. The Great Plains. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1931. 
White, Richard, '/if's Your Misfortune and None of My Own ': A History of the American 
West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
. "Discovering Nature in North America." Journal of American History 3(79) 
(December 1992): 874-891. 
. " 'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and 
Nature." In Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William 
Cronon. New York: Norton, 1995. 
. The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1995. 
Whitnah, Donald R. A History of the United States Weather Bureau. University of Illinois: 
Urbana, 1961. 
Wieland, Lillian H. Bibliography on Soil Conservation. U.S. Department of Agriculture. Soil 
Conservation Service. Washington, DC: GPO 1936. 
Wilber, Charles D. Great Valleys and Prairies of Nebraska and the Northwest. Omaha: Daily 
Republican Printer, 1881. 
382 
Williams, Burton J. "Trees But No Timber: The Nebraska Prelude to the Timber Culture 
Act." Nebraska History 53 (Spring 1972): 77-87. 
Williams, Michael. "Afforestation: the United States." In Afforestation: Policies, Planning 
and Progress, ed. Alexander Mather. London: Belhaven Press, 1993. 
Wilson R. and F. E. Cobb. "Development of Cooperative Shelter-belt Demonstrations on the 
Northern Great Plains." In Bulletin 1113. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1923. 
Wilson, Edward O. Biophilia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 
Wilson, Jon S. Windbreak Design. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1996. 
Wilson, Joseph S. Report of the Commissioner of General Land Office for the Year 1868. 
Washington, DC: GPO, 1868. 
"Winning against the Wind." Denver Post, 19 September 1937. 
Worster, Donald. Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s. New York: Oxford Press, 
1979. 
Yeager, A. F. "Shelterbelts for North Dakota." In Circular 43,2-3. North Dakota 
Agricultural College, 1921. 
Zon, Raphael. "A Plan for immediate Drought Relief and for the Permanent Benefit and 
Protection of the Great Plains Belt through Extensive Windbreak Planting," 6 June 
1934, TD. Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul. 
. "How the Forests Feed the Clouds." In Science Remaking the World, ed. Otis W. 
Caldwell and Edwin E. Slosson. New York: Doubleday, 1923. 
. "Notes on Forest Conditions and the Conservation Movement in Kansas and 
Nebraska" 17 June 1913, TD. National Archives II, Maryland (RG 95). 
. "Shelterbelts—Futile Dream or Workable Plan." Science 81 (April 1935): 391-93. 
. "Some Instances of Censorship and Bias on the Part of the Editors of the Journal," 
26 January 1935, TD. Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul. 
. Forests and Water in the Light of Scientific Investigation. Washington, DC: GPO, 
1927. 
. Raphael Zon Papers. Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul. 
383 
. "The Relation of Forests in the Atlantic Plain to the Humidity of the Central 
States and Prairie Region." Proceedings of the Society ofAmerican Foresters 8, July 
1913. 
